In re Tilyou

57 A.D. 101, 67 N.Y.S. 1097
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York·Decided January 15, 1901·Published·Cited by 5 cases

Opinion

Jenks, J.:

Pursuant to section 1348 of' the Code of Civil Procedure the respondents to the writ, who constitute the board of taxes and assessments of the city of. New York, ask us to modify an order of the Special Term, in Kings county, that a writ of certiorari issue to review an assessment of realty, situate in the borough of Queens, returnable to a Special Term in the county of Queens. It is asked that the writ be made returnable to a Special Term in the city of [102] Hew York, borough of Manhattan, that the dates be changed and that the proceeding hereafter be continued in that borough. The realty assessed is owned by an individual. In view of the decisions in People ex rel. Equitable Gas Co. v. Barker (81 Hun, 22, 24), which was reversed upon another point in 144 Hew York, 94, and in People ex rel. Bronx Gas Co. v. Barker (22 App. Div. 161), I propose-to consider this matter under both the General Tax Law and the provisions of the city charter. First, as to section 251 of chapter 908 of the Laws of 1896, known as the Tax Law. This law provides that the petition must be presented to a justice of the Supreme Court or to a Special Term thereof in the judicial district in which the assessment complained, of was made, and that the writ must be made returnable to a Special Term of said court “ of the judicial district in which the assessment complained of was made.” Undoubtedly, the provision is to confine the proceeding, as far as is possible in a general law, to the place where the assessment was made, having in mind that it was applicable to assessment rolls in the various and different divisions and subdivisions of ■ the State where- local taxes were imposed, and also that the Supreme Court was divided into districts, and that any attempt to limit further the jurisdiction might not provide a convenient and accessible forum for the early review of every assessment roll within the purview of the statute. In the .words of Andrews, J., in Birmingham Iron Foundry v. Hatfield (43 N. Y. 224), “the legislature, having in view some general policy for the distribution of the judicial business of the state, as well as the convenience of parties, has prescribed the place where the trial and other proceedings in actions in the Supreme Court shall be had.” I know of no place other than the city of Hew York where the question presented on this and on similar applications could arise. This is due to the fact that the city is partly in the first and partly in the second judicial district.

In construction' of a statute, I am permitted to ascertain its purpose from the cause or necessity of it. (Tonnele v. Hall, 4 N. Y. 140; Reno v. Pinder, 20 N. Y. 298, 301.) The reasons why the statute thus confines the return of the writ are not far to seek. The purpose of the statute -is to afford such writ -to ascertain whether an assessment be illegal- or erroneous by an overvaluation, Or by an- unequal and higher valuation than that of other property on the same roll. [103] The court may make its decision upon the return required by section 252 of the Tax Law, or it may, if it deem necessary, take evidence or appoint a referee to take such evidence as it may direct. If evidence be required, it is by testimony touching the procedure of those who actually made the assessment, or by testimony of facts that are peculiarly local, or by the testimony of witnesses who naturally are qualified by residence or by occupation in the immediate locality where the assessed property is situate. Not all, but many, reasons that dictate the place of trial of actions affecting realty apply. To make the writ returnable in another judicial district would be simply to defeat this purpose of the statute, possibly to retard a review wherein time is essential, and to transfer the hearing to a forum where all the elements of a local hearing would disappear. Ho reason is suggested, and I know of none, why we should thus modify the writ, save that it is claimed that the statute requires it. If the statute, then, can be fairly construed so as to carry out the policy that is plainly declared by its spirit, and which is only questioned here on account of its letter when applied to the peculiar local situation, then such construction should prevail. The question then is where was the assessment made within the meaning of the statute, in the borough of Queens or in the borough of Manhattan — in the second or in the first judicial district ?

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In re Tilyou, 57 A.D. 101, 67 N.Y.S. 1097 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1901).

57 A.D. 101 (In re Tilyou) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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