Opinion issued August 20, 2024
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-23-00616-CV ——————————— IN RE THOMAS S. PRENTIS AND LAKE MANAGEMENT SERVICES, LP, Relators
Original Proceeding on Petition for Writ of Mandamus
OPINION
Relators Thomas S. Prentis and Lake Management Services, LP filed a
Petition for Writ of Mandamus asking this Court to vacate the trial court’s order
denying their Plea to the Jurisdiction. Relators argue that because the trial court
lacks jurisdiction over Real Party in Interest Desi Sykes’ claims against Relators, the trial court should have granted their Plea and entered a final judgment dismissing
Sykes’ claims without prejudice.1
We conditionally grant the Writ.
Background
The underlying case arises out of an automobile accident on August 2, 2019.
Thomas Prentis and Sykes were traveling in a Ford F250 truck owned by Lake
Management Services, LP. Prentis was driving the truck and Sykes was sleeping in
the rear passenger-side seat when the collision occurred. At the time of the accident,
Sykes and Prentis were employees of Lake Management and both were compensated
on an hourly basis.
Sykes filed suit against Lake Management and Prentis advancing a negligence
claim for alleged physical injuries sustained in the accident. In their first
supplemental and amended answer, Relators asserted “the exclusive remedy
provision of the Worker’s Compensation Act as a bar to [the] suit for negligence
against [them].” Relators later filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking
dismissal of Sykes’ lawsuit arguing that his claims were “barred by the exclusive
1 The underlying case is Desi Sykes v. Thomas S. Prentis and Lake Mgmt. Serv., LP, cause number 21-DCV-283331, pending in the 268th District Court of Fort Bend County, Texas, the Honorable Steve Rogers presiding.
2 remedies provision in the Texas Worker’s Compensation Act.”2 The district court
judge denied the summary judgment motion in August 2022.3
Relators filed a Motion to Reconsider the trial court’s denial of their summary
judgment motion and they also filed a Plea to the Jurisdiction arguing the court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Sykes’ negligence lawsuit. Relators argued
that because Sykes was injured “in the course and scope of his employment with
Lake Management” who “is a subscriber of worker’s compensation insurance,”
Sykes’ claims are “governed by the Texas Worker’s Compensation Act.” Because
Sykes had not exhausted his administrative remedies under the Act, Relators argued
the trial court lacked jurisdiction.4
Sykes filed a response to Relators’ Plea arguing that because there is a fact
issue as to whether he was in the course and scope of his employment when the
accident occurred, it is “highly disputed” that workers’ compensation applies and as
2 Sykes separately filed a partial Motion for Summary Judgment on the question of duty and breach, which the trial court granted. The trial court’s ruling on that motion is not at issue here. 3 Former District Court Judge O’Neil Williams, who then presided over the 268th Fort Bend District Court, signed the order in August 2022. The judge who signed the order Relators now challenge in their Petition for Writ of Mandamus is District Court Judge Steve Rogers, who assumed office in January 2023. 4 In support of their Plea, Relators attached excerpts from the deposition of Sykes and Prentis, sworn affidavits from the Controller and Human Resources Manager at Lake Management and the Senior Manager of Corporate Underwriting at Texas Mutual Insurance Company, and a copy of Lake Management’s worker’s compensation insurance policy.
3 such, Relators’ Plea “should be denied.” Sykes argued that the trial court had already
determined, in denying Relators’ Motion for Summary Judgment, that a fact issue
existed on this issue and that Relators were “simply rehashing the same factual
disputes disguised in different motions.”
On March 6, 2023, the Associate Judge held a hearing on Relators’ Motion to
Reconsider and their Plea to the Jurisdiction. A few days later, on March 13, 2023,
the Associate Judge signed three orders, but only two are relevant to the issue before
us: one order granting Relators’ Plea to the Jurisdiction and dismissing Sykes’ claims
against Relators without prejudice, and another denying Relators’ Motion to
Reconsider the prior denial of their Motion for Summary Judgment.5
Perceiving a conflict in the two signed orders, Sykes filed a Motion for
Reconsideration/Clarification of the trial court’s March 13 orders, arguing the two
were inconsistent and entered in error. Sykes argued that because Relators’ Plea to
the Jurisdiction and Motion for Summary Judgment were premised on the same
arguments and were “inextricably intertwined in both law and fact,” one order could
not be denied while the other granted. Relators responded that the orders were not
in error and the trial correctly had concluded it lacked jurisdiction over the suit
5 The Associate Judge also signed a third order denying Relators’ Motion to Reconsider the trial court’s prior order granting Sykes’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the question of duty and breach. That third order is not relevant to the issues raised in Relators’ Petition for Writ of Mandamus. 4 because “the exclusive remedies defense applied” and Sykes had not exhausted his
administrative remedies under the Act. Relators thus concluded that the trial court’s
order granting their Plea was correct and Sykes’ Motion for Reconsideration should
be denied.
On May 5, 2023, the District Court Judge granted Sykes’ Motion for
Reconsideration. In his order, the trial court judge stated that after considering
Sykes’ “Motion for Reconsider[ation]/Clarification Regarding [Relators’] Plea to
the Jurisdiction,” the “Court clarifies that [Sykes’] Motion should be GRANTED
because [Relators’] Plea to the Jurisdiction was DENIED.” In the same order, the
trial court ordered that Relators’ “Plea to the Jurisdiction is (and was) DENIED” and
it set the case for trial.
Relators filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus challenging the trial court’s
order denying their Plea to the Jurisdiction. Relators argue that the trial court lacks
jurisdiction over Sykes’ negligence claims and thus erred in denying their Plea
because (1) the “[t]he Division of Worker’s Compensation . . . has exclusive
jurisdiction to determine whether an employee was in the course and scope of his
employment when his alleged injuries occurred;” and (2) Sykes “failed to first
exhaust his administrative remedies” before filing suit. Relators request that we
enter an order vacating the trial court’s order, granting their Plea, and dismissing
Sykes’ claims without prejudice.
5 Standard of Review
Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is available only in limited
circumstances. See Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992) (orig.
proceeding). To secure mandamus relief, a relator must establish that (1) the trial
court committed a clear abuse of discretion or violated a duty imposed by law, and
(2) there is no adequate remedy by appeal. In re Prudential Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d
124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). “A trial court abuses its discretion if it
reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and
prejudicial error of law or if it clearly fails to correctly analyze or apply the law.” In
re Cerberus Cap. Mgmt. L.P., 164 S.W.3d 379, 382 (Tex.2005) (orig. proceeding)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Mandamus will not issue when there is a clear and adequate remedy at law.
Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840. We review the adequacy of an appellate remedy by
balancing the benefits of mandamus review against its detriments. In re Team
Rocket, L.P., 256 S.W.3d 257, 262 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding). We consider
whether mandamus will “preserve important substantive and procedural rights from
impairment or loss, allow . . . appellate courts to give needed and helpful direction
to the law that would otherwise prove elusive in appeals from final judgments, and
spare [the litigants] and the public the time and money utterly wasted enduring
eventual reversal of improperly conducted proceedings.” In re Prudential Ins. Co.
6 of Am., 148 S.W.3d at 136. An appellate remedy is not inadequate merely because
it may result in more expense or delay than in obtaining a writ. Walker, 827 S.W.2d
at 842.
Did the Trial Court Abuse its Discretion?
Relators argue that the trial court erred in denying their Plea to the Jurisdiction
because the Division of Workers’ Compensation (“Division”) has exclusive
jurisdiction to determine whether Sykes was in the course and scope of his
employment when his alleged injuries occurred. Because Sykes did not exhaust his
administrative remedies before filing suit, Relators contend the court lacks
jurisdiction. In his response, Sykes argues there is a fact question over whether he
was in the course and scope of his employment when the accident occurred. He
argues that the “hotly contested” issue of course and scope is an issue the trial court
must consider.
A. Applicable Law
The Texas Legislature first enacted the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act
over a century ago to “balance[] two competing interests: providing compensation
for injured employees and protecting employers from the cost of litigation.” Tex.
Mut. Ins. Co. v. PHI Air Med., LLC, 610 S.W.3d 839, 843 (Tex. 2020). The Act
provides a “comprehensive system with specific benefits and procedures.” Woodard
v. Tex. Dep’t of Ins., Div. of Workers Comp., No. 01-22-00761-CV, 2023 WL
7 5535679 at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 29, 2023, pet. denied) (mem.
op.) (citation omitted).
The “cornerstone provision” of the Act allows injured employees to receive
workers’ compensation benefits “in exchange for [giving up] the common law right
to sue [their] employer[s] for negligence in the event of an on-the-job injury . . . .”
Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ruttiger, 381 S.W.3d 430, 450 (Tex. 2012). “The Act
ultimately struck a bargain that allows employees to receive a lower, but more
certain, recovery than would have been possible under the common law.” See
SeaBright Ins. Co. v. Lopez, 465 S.W.3d 637, 642 (Tex. 2015). Employees can
“recover workers’ compensation benefits for injuries in the course and scope of
employment without proving fault by the employer and without regard to their
negligence or that of their coworkers.” Port Elevator-Brownsville v. Casados, 358
S.W.3d 238, 241 (Tex. 2012) (citing TEX. LAB. CODE § 406.031). In exchange, an
employer’s liability for work-related injuries is limited to the payment of benefits
under the Act. See id.
An employee of a subscribing employer who desires to retain his “common-
law right of action to recover damages for personal injuries” may opt out and waive
coverage under the Act thereby retaining his common-law right in the event he is
injured on the job. See TEX. LAB. CODE § 406.034(b). But for employees who do
8 not opt out, the exclusive remedy for a work-related injury is “[r]ecovery of workers’
compensation benefits” under the Act. See id. § 408.001(a).
The Act contemplates potential disputes between injured workers and
insurance carriers. See Ruttiger, 381 S.W.3d at 437, 450–51; see also Woodard,
2023 WL 5535679, at *6. To that end, the Act provides a dispute resolution process
consisting of three administrative steps: (1) a review conference conducted by a
benefit review officer, (2) a contested case hearing before an administrative law
judge, and (3) review by an administrative appeals panel. See Ruttiger, 381 S.W.3d
at 437 (citing TEX. LAB. CODE §§ 410.021, 410.025, 410.151, 410.202). “[A]fter
exhausting [these] administrative remedies, a party aggrieved by a final decision of
the . . . appeals panel may seek judicial review of the panel’s final decision.” Am.
Zurich Ins. Co. v. Miller, No. 01-22-00666-CV, 2023 WL 5535678 at *3 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 29, 2023, pet. denied) (citing TEX. LAB. CODE
§ 410.251) (internal quotation marks omitted). A party may not seek judicial review
under the Act without first exhausting his administrative remedies. In re Metro.
Transit Auth., 334 S.W.3d 806, 810–11 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, orig.
proceeding). Failure to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit renders a
trial court without subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 810.
The Division is the agency that oversees the workers’ compensation system
and adjudicates workers’ compensation benefit disputes. See TEX. LAB. CODE §§
9 402.001, 410.002–.302. The Act “vests the power to award compensation benefits
solely in the [Division] . . . subject to judicial review.” In re Tex. Mut. Ins. Co., 157
S.W.3d 75, 78 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, orig. proceeding). Relevant here, the Act
vests the Division with the sole authority to determine whether an employee suffered
a “compensable injury” entitling him to workers’ compensation benefits. See Henry
v. Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc., 70 S.W.3d 808, 809 (Tex. 2002); see also In re Metro.
Transit Auth., 334 S.W.3d at 810–11. A “compensable injury” is one that “arises
out of and in the course and scope of employment for which compensation is
payable” under the Act. TEX. LAB. CODE § 401.011(10); Morales v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 241 S.W.3d 514, 518 (Tex. 2007). Because course and scope of
employment is an element of compensability, the Division’s “exclusive jurisdiction
to determine compensability [thus] necessarily encompasses [the] exclusive
jurisdiction to determine whether an injury . . . occurred in the course and scope of
employment.” In re Tyler Asphalt & Gravel Co., Inc., 107 S.W.3d 832, 839 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding).
B. Analysis
Relators argue that the trial court erred in denying their Plea to the Jurisdiction
because the Division has exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether Sykes was in
the course and scope of his employment when his alleged injuries occurred. Because
Sykes did not exhaust his administrative remedies before filing suit, Relators
10 contend the court lacks jurisdiction. In support of their argument that “an employee
must exhaust his remedies with the D[ivision], including a determination on course
and scope, before pursuing personal injury claims against his employer, and that a
failure to do so deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction[,]” Relators rely
on three opinions from our sister courts: In re Hellas Constr., Inc., Nos. 03-21-
00182-CV, 03-21-00233-CV, 2022 WL 2975702 (Tex. App.—Austin July 28, 2022
(orig. proceeding) (mem. op.), Berrelez v. Mesquite Logistics USA, Inc., 562 S.W.3d
69 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2018, no pet.), and In re Tyler Asphalt & Gravel Co.,
Inc., 107 S.W.3d 832. We agree with Relators that all three support their position
that the trial court erred in denying their Plea.
The proceedings in In re Hellas Construction ensued after a worker died from
injuries caused by “heat stroke sustained while working on a construction site
overseen by subcontractor Hellas Construction, Inc.” 2022 WL 2975702, at *1.
Because the worker’s family did not believe he was an employee at the time of
injury, they did not file a claim for workers’ compensation benefits and instead filed
a tort suit against Hellas. Hellas asserted the exclusive remedy defense in its answer,
and it requested a “benefit review conference” with the Division. Id. Arguing the
Division had exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether the worker was an
employee at the time of his fatal injury, Hellas “filed a combined plea to the
jurisdiction and motion for abatement” in the trial court. Id. at *2. The trial court
11 issued an order abating the tort case to allow the parties to invoke the Division’s
jurisdiction. Id. Several months later, the worker’s family moved to lift the
abatement arguing that the worker’s beneficiaries had “never filed a claim for
benefits, the statute of limitations to file such a claim had passed,” and thus “there
[wa]s no pending or disputed claim for worker’s compensation benefits for [the
Division] to resolve[,]” meaning “its exclusive jurisdiction [was] no longer
triggered.” Id. The trial court lifted the abatement and Hellas filed an original
proceeding arguing the trial court had abused its discretion in doing so. Id.
Separately, Texas Mutual—the workers’ compensation carrier for Hellas—
had filed a request for a benefit review conference with the Division to determine
whether the worker was an employee of Hellas at the time of his injury and death.
Id. Following a contested case hearing, the administrative law judge determined that
the worker had sustained a compensable injury, and that Hellas was his employer.
Id. The worker’s family appealed arguing that the jurisdiction of the Division had
“never been invoked because [they] had chosen not to file a claim with the agency.”
Id. The appeals panel adopted the decision of the administrative law judge. The
family sought judicial review of the appeals panel’s decision in district court, but it
later filed a plea to the jurisdiction seeking dismissal of its own suit for judicial
review, arguing there was no dispute to resolve because no actual claim for benefits
had been filed and the time to file one had expired. Id. at *3. After the trial court
12 denied the family’s plea, the family filed an original proceeding arguing the district
court had abused its discretion in denying their plea. Id.
In considering the parties’ writs, the Austin Court of Appeals explained that
the parties’ disagreement concerned “whether [the] D[ivision] had exclusive
jurisdiction to determine whether [the worker] was an employee acting in the course
and scope of employment at the time of injury.” Id. Hellas and Texas Mutual argued
that exclusive jurisdiction was vested in the Division and that as such, the trial court
in the judicial review suit correctly had denied the family’s plea to the jurisdiction.
Id. The worker’s family on the other hand argued that the Division had “no
jurisdiction over the dispute in the absence of a pending claim filed by [the worker’s]
beneficiaries,” and therefore the trial court in the tort action had not erred in lifting
the abatement. Id. Agreeing with Hellas and Texas Mutual, the court held that the
Division “had exclusive jurisdiction over the question of eligibility regardless of
whether there was, in fact, a pending claim or merely a potential claim” for benefits.6
Id. at *5 (explaining that applicable regulations suggest that “a pending claim might
not be a necessary predicate to invoke the agency’s jurisdiction over the dispute.”).
The court further held that when the trial court in the tort action lifted the abatement,
the “suit for judicial review [filed by Texas Mutual] was still pending, and there was
6 The court also rejected the argument that because the statute of limitations had expired to file a benefits’ claim, the trial court presiding over the tort claim had properly lifted its abatement of the tort suit. Id. at *6. 13 therefore no final administrative determination that might allow the court to lift the
abatement.” Id. at *6. The trial court denied the family’s petition for writ of
mandamus, granted Hellas’ petition, and issued a conditional writ ordering the
district court presiding over the tort suit to abate the litigation until a final decision
in the suit for judicial review issued. Id. at *6–7.
In Berrelez v. Mesquite Logistics USA, Inc., a housekeeper employed by
Mesquite Logistics was sexually assaulted while on duty by a Mesquite Lodge guest.
562 S.W.3d at 71. After the sexual assault, Mesquite submitted a workers’
compensation claim to its insurance carrier. Id. The carrier determined that the
housekeeper, Berrelez, had suffered a compensable injury, but Berrelez never
contacted the carrier. Id. She resigned and filed suit against Mesquite instead
asserting claims for premises liability and gross negligence. Id. Berrelez alleged
that she was not in the course and scope of her employment when she was assaulted.
Id. Mesquite filed a motion to dismiss Berrelez’s suit based on the exclusive
remedies provision of the Act and her failure to exhaust her administrative remedies.
Id. at 71–72. Berrelez responded arguing her claims were exempted from the Act
under the “personal animosity” exception because her injuries had resulted from the
intentional act of a third person who intended to injure her for personal reasons
unrelated to her employment. Id. at 72. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss
14 holding that Berrelez had not exhausted her administrative remedies under the Act
and thus her claims were barred under the Act’s exclusive remedies provision. Id.
The San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed holding that while the parties
disputed whether Berrelez was in the course and scope of her employment at the
time of the assault, the determination of that issue “is a matter within the initial,
exclusive jurisdiction of the D[ivision].” Id. at 74. And merely pleading an
exception, such as the “personal animosity” exception, “does not remove a claim
from the jurisdiction of the [Division] and its exclusive right, in the first instance, to
determine whether an employee was in the course and scope of employment at the
time of the alleged injury.” Id. at 75. The Court concluded that because Berrelez
had not exhausted her administrative remedies before the Division, the trial court
lacked jurisdiction over her claim, and therefore dismissal was proper. Id.
In In re Tyler Asphalt & Gravel Co., Inc., an employee was electrocuted and
died while using a power sprayer to wash his car on his employer’s premises. 107
S.W.3d at 836. The employee’s representatives filed a negligence suit in Harris
County, Texas against Tyler Asphalt & Gravel Co, Inc., the employer, and the
manufacturer of the power sprayer. Id. Tyler argued that the suit was barred by the
exclusive remedy provision of the Act because the employee’s death had occurred
in the course and scope of employment. Id. Tyler paid for the employee’s funeral
expenses and sought reimbursement from its insurance carrier. Id. The carrier
15 contested compensability because it disputed course and scope. Id. Following a
contested case hearing, the benefit review officer held that the employee had
sustained a compensable injury, and it awarded death benefits to the family and
burial benefits to Tyler. Id. The carrier appealed the decision to the appeals panel,
and in an “unusual turn of events,” so did the employee’s family. Id. The appeals
panel affirmed the hearing officer’s decision and the carrier filed suit in Smith
County, Texas seeking judicial review. Id. at 836–37. At the family’s request, the
trial court abated the carrier’s lawsuit in Smith County. Id. at 837.
Meanwhile, after several continuances, the Harris County trial court set the
tort suit for trial. Id. Tyler moved to abate the suit until the Smith County suit was
decided. Id. The trial court denied Tyler’s motion to abate. Id. Tyler responded by
filing an application for writ of mandamus. Id. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals
conditionally granted the writ holding that “the Smith County court ha[d] exclusive
jurisdiction because the determination of the course and scope issue is committed to
the statutory workers’ compensation process, judicial review is a part of that process,
and judicial review [had to] occur in Smith County” where the appeal concerning
“compensability” remained pending. Id. at 838, 846 (holding that because “the
viability of the negligence claims in the [Harris County] suit depend[ed] on the . . .
determination o[f] the course and scope issue due to Tyler’s exclusive remedy
16 defense[,] [the] exclusive statutory process must yield certain findings before a trial
court may adjudicate a claim.”).
We agree with Relators that Hellas, Berrelez, and Tyler all support the
conclusion that the Division has exclusive jurisdiction to determine in the first
instance whether Sykes was in the course and scope of his employment when the
collision occurred, and therefore, that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
Relators’ Plea to the Jurisdiction.7 It is undisputed that Lake Management is a
subscriber of workers’ compensation insurance, that Sykes is an employee of Lake
Management, and that following the accident, Sykes did not pursue treatment under
Lake Management’s workers’ compensation policy. Sykes instead filed the
underlying suit against Relators for negligence, negligence per se and/or gross
negligence, and vicarious liability. Sykes does not argue that he opted out of the
system and retained his common-law right to sue in the event he was injured on the
job. See TEX. LAB. CODE § 406.034(b). Sykes instead contends that his suit for
7 Sykes did not address Berrelez or Hellas in his response to Relators’ Petition for Writ of Mandamus. He only addressed Tyler. He contends that Tyler is inapposite because the case “involved a collateral proceeding for judicial review of the Division’s decisions regarding compensability, in addition to the personal injury suits.” While that is true, a clear reading of Tyler, Berrelez, and Hellas clarifies that their import is not that limited. All three cases focus on the Division’s exclusive jurisdiction, and they make clear that the Division has exclusive jurisdiction in the first instance to determine the course and scope issue Sykes seeks to adjudicate in the trial court. By seeking to adjudicate course and scope in the trial court first, Sykes essentially seeks to bypass the Division’s exclusive jurisdiction thus circumventing the very purpose of the Act. We reject Sykes’ arguments. 17 negligence is proper because whether he was injured in the course and scope of
employment is a “hotly contested” issue that the trial court must first consider.
To the contrary, if a party is dissatisfied with the outcome of the Act’s
administrative process, that aggrieved party may seek judicial review of the agency’s
decision. See Am. Zurich Ins. Co., 2023 WL 5535678, at *3 (citing TEX. LAB. CODE
§ 410.251). Nowhere in the Act is there an exception allowing Sykes to circumvent
this administrative process, nor can the trial court exercise jurisdiction to consider a
matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Division. A party may not seek
judicial review under the Act without first exhausting his administrative remedies.
In re Metro. Transit Auth., 334 S.W.3d at 810–11. Requiring a party to exhaust his
administrative remedies prior to filing suit does not deprive him of any legal rights;
“[r]ather, it honors the Legislature’s intent that the appropriate body adjudicate[] the
dispute[] first . . . []thereby ensur[ing] an orderly procedure to enforce those rights.”
Berrelez, 562 S.W.3d at 73 (internal quotation marks omitted) (“The exhaustion of
administrative remedies requirement permits the agency in question to apply its
expertise and develop a factual record if a suit is later filed.”).
Sykes’ argument that he vehemently disputes whether the accident occurred
while he was in the course and scope of his employment has no impact on the
Division’s exclusive jurisdiction. Indeed, it is the Division’s task to discern whether
a plaintiff’s injuries were sustained in the course and scope of employment. See
18 Harris Cnty. v. Dogan, No. 01-22-00079-CV, 2023WL 3311167, at *5 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] May 9, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Under the [Act], an injured
employee may receive compensation only for a “compensable injury,” . . . defined
as “an injury that arises out of and in the course and scope of employment.”) (citing
TEX. LAB. CODE § 401.011(10)).
We acknowledge our sister court’s conflicting opinion in Univ. of Tex. Rio
Grande Valley v. Oteka, on which Sykes relies, but we disagree with the proposition
that a plaintiff may bypass the Division’s adjudication process, and instead, have the
trial court consider the merits of the defendant’s exclusive remedy defense. No. 13-
22-00063-CV, 2023 WL 413587, at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg Jan.
26, 2023, pet. filed) (mem. op.). In Oteka, a nursing professor was struck by a car
driven by a University of Texas Rio Grande Valley police officer as she was walking
to her car following a graduation ceremony. Id. at *1. The University’s claim
administrator contacted Oteka to discuss workers’ compensation coverage. Oteka
told the administrator she “was using her private insurance” and the University
“thereafter denied coverage.” Id. Oteka later sued the University for negligence.
Id. The University asserted the exclusive remedy defense and later filed a plea to
the jurisdiction arguing Oteka had not “exhaust[ed] her administrative remedies with
19 the Division regarding the compensability of her injuries.”8 Id. Oteka argued she
was not required to exhaust her administrative remedies because “the jurisdictional
record established she was not in the course and scope of employment at the time of
her injury, or there was at least a fact issue in this regard.” Id. The trial court denied
the University’s plea to the jurisdiction and on appeal, the Corpus Christi Court of
Appeals affirmed holding that “Oteka’s suit [was] not based on the ultimate question
of whether she is eligible for workers’ compensation benefits,” but “the opposite[:]
if Oteka’s injury is compensable, this would likely bar her suit pursuant to the
exclusive-remedy defense.” Id. at 3.9
We decline to extend the court’s holding in Oteka to the matter before us.10
Based on the exclusive jurisdiction the Legislature expressly conferred on the
Division to consider in the first instance the question of compensability, including
the question of course and scope, and Sykes’ failure to exhaust his administrative
8 In the interim, but over two-and-a-half years after the accident, the University’s claim administrator accepted coverage. Id. at *1. 9 The University filed a petition for review and the Texas Supreme Court requested the parties to file briefs on the merits, stating “[t]he petition for review remains under consideration by this Court.” See Univ. of Tex. Rio Grande Valley v. Oteka, No. 23-0167 (Tex. Nov. 10, 2023), available at SearchMedia.aspx (txcourts.gov); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 55.1. 10 See In re Langford, No. 04-20-00263-CV, 2020 WL 4607017, at *5 (Tex. App.— San Antonio Aug. 12, 2020, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (citing In re Reardon, 514 S.W.3d 919, 923 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, orig. proceeding) (explaining that “courts of appeals are not bound by precedent of sister courts but may be guided by their reasoning and analysis.”)).
20 remedies before the Division, we hold the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
to consider Sykes’ claims, and it thus abused its discretion in denying Relators’ Plea.
See In re Metro. Transit Auth., 334 S.W.3d at 810–11 (explaining that failure to
exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit renders a trial court without
subject matter jurisdiction).
Is there an Adequate Appellate Remedy?
While the erroneous denial of a plea to the jurisdiction does not by itself render
an appeal inadequate, “the erroneous denial of a plea to the jurisdiction based on
exclusive agency jurisdiction can justify mandamus relief where [the denial]
interferes with the legislatively mandated function and purpose of the agency and is
a clear disruption of the orderly processes of government.” In re Tex. Mut. Ins. Co.,
329 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009, orig. proceeding) (quoting In re
Entergy Corp., 142 S.W.3d 316, 321 (Tex. 2004)); see In re Congregation B’Nai
Zion of El Paso, 657 S.W.3d 578, 582–83 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, orig.
proceeding) (citing In re Tex. Mut. Ins. Co., 510 S.W.3d 552, 556 (Tex. App.—El
Paso 2016, orig. proceeding)).
“[U]nder the exclusive jurisdiction doctrine, the Legislature grants an
administrative agency the sole authority to make [the] initial determination in a
dispute.” Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212, 221
(Tex.2002) (emphasis in original). Thus, where an agency has exclusive
21 jurisdiction, courts have no subject matter jurisdiction, and a party can turn to the
courts only after first exhausting all administrative remedies in the agency. In re
Entergy Corp., 142 S.W.3d at 321–22; Subaru, 84 S.W.3d at 221. Whether an
administrative agency has exclusive jurisdiction is a question of law we review de
novo. In re Entergy Corp., 142 S.W.3d at 322.
Because we have concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
Relators’ Plea to the Jurisdiction based on exclusive agency jurisdiction, and Sykes
has not exhausted his administrative remedies, we hold that Relators lack an
adequate remedy by appeal and mandamus is thus proper.11 In re Tyler Asphalt &
Gravel Co., 107 S.W.3d at 844 (granting mandamus relief and holding that by
“paying workers’ compensation premiums, [a subscribing employer] bargain[s] for
the right to have the course and scope issue resolved through the process prescribed
by the [Division] thereby saving it the time, expense, and uncertainty of litigation.”).
This does not end our inquiry, however. We must also determine whether, as
Relators advocate, dismissal without prejudice is proper or whether abatement is the
proper course. Typically, if an agency has exclusive jurisdiction, a party must
exhaust all administrative remedies before seeking judicial review of the agency’s
action[s].” Subaru, 84 S.W.3d at 221. Until then, a trial court lacks jurisdiction and
11 We express no opinion on the merits of the parties’ course and scope arguments. As we have concluded, that is an issue for the Division to determine. 22 must dismiss claims within the agency’s exclusive jurisdiction without prejudice.
“In some instances, however, the statutory scheme may necessitate that an
administrative agency with exclusive jurisdiction make certain findings before a trial
court may finally adjudicate a claim.” Id. “Under those circumstances, if a party
files its claim in the trial court before the agency resolves the issue within its
exclusive jurisdiction, but the jurisdictional impediment can be removed, ‘then the
trial court may abate proceedings to allow a reasonable opportunity for the
jurisdictional problem to be cured.’” Id. at 321–22 (quoting Am. Motorists Ins. Co.
v. Fodge, 63 S.W.3d 801, 805 (Tex. 2001)).
The viability of Sykes’ negligence claims in the underlying suit depends on
the Division’s determination on the course and scope issue through final
adjudication. This is thus an instance where “an exclusive statutory process must
yield certain findings before a trial court may adjudicate a claim.” In re Tyler
Asphalt & Gravel Co., Inc., 107 S.W.3d at 843. Under such circumstances,
abatement, rather than dismissal, is “appropriate to allow a reasonable opportunity
for a trial court’s jurisdictional impediment to be removed.” Id.; see Subaru, 84
S.W.3d at 221–22.
Conclusion
We conditionally grant Relators’ Petition for Writ of Mandamus. We are
confident the trial court will vacate its order of May 5, 2023 denying Relators’ Plea
23 to the Jurisdiction and issue an order abating the case to afford the parties a
reasonable opportunity to proceed before the Division. If the trial court fails to do
so, the writ will issue.
Veronica Rivas-Molloy Justice
Panel consists of Justices Kelly, Landau, and Rivas-Molloy.