In Re Thomas Holman v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: April 30, 2025
• Docket: 03-25-00256-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-25-00256-CV

In re Thomas Holman

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING FROM WILLIAMSON COUNTY

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Relator Thomas Holman, an inmate in the Williamson County Jail, has filed an

ambiguously captioned pro se appellate submission with this Court entitled “Habeas Corpus[;]

Writ of Mandamus.” Although the precise nature of the relief sought could be clearer, his

principal complaint appears to be the trial court’s alleged failure or refusal to rule on a

long-pending motion for speedy trial. For the reasons discussed herein, we treat the submission

as a petition for writ of mandamus and deny the petition. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(a).

To the extent Holman’s submission may be construed as an original application

for habeas corpus, we lack jurisdiction to grant relief. As an intermediate appellate court, this

Court does not have original habeas-corpus jurisdiction in criminal cases. See Tex. Const. art. V,

§ 6 (providing that courts of appeals “shall have original or appellate jurisdiction, under such

restrictions and regulations as may be prescribed by law”); Tex. Gov’t Code § 22.221(d)

(limiting original habeas-corpus jurisdiction of courts of appeals to situations where relator’s

liberty is restrained by virtue of order, process, or commitment issued by court or judge in civil case); see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.05 (vesting “power to issue the writ of habeas

corpus” in “[t]he Court of Criminal Appeals, the District Courts, the County Courts, or any Judge

of said Courts”). Rather, our habeas-corpus jurisdiction in criminal matters is appellate only.

See Tex. Gov’t Code § 22.221(d); see also In re Wilkins, No. 03-20-00381-CV, 2020 WL

5608486, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Sept. 17, 2020, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).

Insofar as relator seeks mandamus relief from the trial court’s alleged failure to

act on relator’s motion for a speedy trial, it is his burden properly to request and establish

entitlement to such relief, including by providing us with a sufficient record from which to

evaluate his claims. See Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 837 (Tex. 1992); London v. State,

490 S.W.3d 503, 508 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (holding that failure to provide sufficient appellate

record precludes appellate review); see also Tex. R. App. P. 52.7(a) (requiring relator to file

record containing sworn copies “of every document that is material to [his] claim for relief and

that was filed in any underlying proceeding”). To establish an abuse of discretion for failure to

rule, relator must show that: (1) the trial court had a legal duty to rule on his motion for speedy

trial, (2) he made a demand for the trial court to rule, and (3) the trial court failed or refused to

rule within a reasonable time. See In re Chavez, 62 S.W.3d 225, 228 (Tex. App.—Amarillo

2001, orig. proceeding).

Relator has not provided us with a file-stamped copy of his motion. Thus, he has

failed to show that a proper filing is pending before the trial court or that the court is aware of the

filing and has been asked to rule. See In re Sarkissian, 243 S.W.3d 860, 861 (Tex. App.—Waco

2008, orig. proceeding) (observing that mandamus record failed to establish that relator

requested ruling or called motion to trial court’s attention and that “mere filing of a motion with

a trial court clerk does not equate to a request that the trial court rule on the motion”).

2 On this record, we conclude that relator has failed to show entitlement to

mandamus relief. Accordingly, his petition for writ of mandamus is denied. See Tex. R. App. P.

52.8(a).

__________________________________________ Darlene Byrne, Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Kelly and Ellis

Filed: April 30, 2025