In Re the Voting Laws

12 R.I. 586, 1878 R.I. LEXIS 75
CourtSupreme Court of Rhode Island
DecidedMarch 30, 1878
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 12 R.I. 586 (In Re the Voting Laws) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Rhode Island primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re the Voting Laws, 12 R.I. 586, 1878 R.I. LEXIS 75 (R.I. 1878).

Opinion

OPINION OE THE COURT.

To Sis Excellency Charles C. Van Zandt, Covernor of the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations :

We have received from your Excellency a communication requesting our opinion upon the following question, to wit:

“ Can a husband, under the State Constitution, article 2, section 1, be entitled to vote by virtue of any right or interest which he may have as husband in the real estate of his wife, and if so, in what circumstances ? ”

We think it proper, in giving our answer to this question, to give the reasons also on which our answer rests. This will oblige us to go back to the doctrines of the common law, which previous to 1844 was the law that determined the right of the husband in the property of his wife in this State.

At common law the husband, simply by force of his marriage, without the birth of issue, acquired an estate in all the wife’s real property in possession, whether of inheritance, or for the life of the wife, and whether vesting in her before or after marriage, during their joint lives. The estate thus acquired is commonly denominated an estate by marital right. It entitles the husband to the entire usufruct of the property during its continuance. It *589 is a freehold, or an estate for life, though whether for the life of the husband or of the wife is uncertain. It may be leased or sold by the husband, or taken on execution for his debts, unless the law forbids. It is not, however, an independent estate, for under the old law it was forfeitable for the felony of the wife, and the husband is seised of the entire property jointly with his wife in her right, and not, separately, of his marital estate in his own right. But this is before -issue born. ' If the property of the wife is an estate of inheritance, then, after the birth of issue capable of inheriting it, the estate by marital right expands into an estate for the life of the husband, and becomes more independent and indefeasible. Indeed it has been held that, after the birth of issue, the husband becomes solely seised of a freehold estate in his own right, and that the interest of the wife is a mere reversionary interest, consequent upon his life estate. But the decisions on this point are not uniform. The estate after issue born, though not forfeitable by the attainder of the wife, may be forfeited by a divorce a vinculo for the fault of the husband. The estate is not consummate in the husband until the death of the wife. Before her death and after issue born, the husband is denominated tenant by the curtesy initiate.

The question submitted is therefore in effect whether a married man, who is qualified by age, residence, and citizenship, can vote as tenant by marital right or by curtesy initiate, on the real estate of his wife, under the Constitution, art. 2, sec. 1. Under that section no one has a right to vote unless, to quote the words of the section, he is “ really and truly possessed in his own right of real estate .... of the value of one hundred and thirty-four dollars over and above all incumbrances, or which shall rent for seven dollars per annum over and above any rent reserved or the interest of any incumbrances thereon, being an estate in fee simple, fee tail, for the life of any person, or an estate in reversion or remainder, which qualifies no other person to vote.” This section is very similar to a provision of the election law which was in force when the Constitution was adopted. That law, however, required that the qualifying estate should be “ at least an estate for a person’s own life.” We understand that it was the uniform practice under that law to permit a man a vote on his wife’s estate of inheritance, if of sufficient value, *590 after tbe birth of issue capable of inheriting it. It must therefore have been understood that an estate by the curtesy initiate was an estate for the husband’s own life. The Constitution was doubtless adopted under that understanding, which we think was entirely correct. The Constitution, as will be seen, is not less liberal in this respect than the election law. We think, therefore, there can be no doubt that an estate by the curtesy initiate, as it existed at common law, may be a sufficient real estate qualification under our Constitution, art. 2, sec. 1.

In regard to the estate by marital right there is more doubt. The estate by marital right was clearly not sufficient to qualify under the election law, for under that law the estate was required to be “at least an estate for a person’s own life.” In the Constitution, instead of this, the requirement is simply an estate “ for the life of any person.” The change is significant. It was evidently intended to extend the electoral right. It evidently extends it to the owner of an estate pur autre vie. But if that is all that was intended, the change was of trifling importance, for the estate pur autre vie is of rare occurrence. The estate by marital right is an estate for the life of one of two persons, that is to say, of the one of them who dies first, and it is therefore within the description of an estate “for the life of any person.” We think it is fair to presume that the question of extending the electoral right to tenants by marital right was considered, when those words were adopted by the framers of the Constitution ; and, if it was then considered, we can hardly conceive that the words would have been adopted, if they were not designed to embrace the estate by marital right as well as other estates for life. We think, therefore, that the estate by marital right, as it existed at common law, may also be a sufficient property qualification under art. 2, sec. 1.

Perhaps it may be suggested that a mere tenant by marital right cannot vote under art. 2, sec. 1, because that section requires that the person claiming to vote shall be “ possessed in his own right,” whereas a tenant by marital right is held to be seised jointly with his wife in her right. The difficulty is, however, merely verbal. The words, “ in her right,” are used not so much to describe the character of the estate as of the seisin or tenure thereof. The words, “ in his own right,” mean that the *591 person claiming to vote shall be entitled or hold beneficially for himself, and not simply as trustee or custodian. The words are in the old election law, where they could not have been intended to exclude an estate by marital right, but could only have been used in the sense above indicated.

Almost immediately after the adoption of the Constitution, the common law was changed. Dig. of 1844, p. 270.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
12 R.I. 586, 1878 R.I. LEXIS 75, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-the-voting-laws-ri-1878.