In Re the United States for an Order Relating to Target Phone 2

733 F. Supp. 2d 939, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130713, 2009 WL 6767391
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Illinois
DecidedMay 21, 2009
Docket07 GJ 628-2
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 733 F. Supp. 2d 939 (In Re the United States for an Order Relating to Target Phone 2) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re the United States for an Order Relating to Target Phone 2, 733 F. Supp. 2d 939, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130713, 2009 WL 6767391 (N.D. Ill. 2009).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING GOVERNMENT’S APPLICATION FOR DISCLOSURE OF REAL-TIME CELL SITE INFORMATION ABSENT PROBABLE CAUSE TO SUPPORT THE APPLICATION

JAMES F. HOLDERMAN, Chief Judge.

The United States of America (the “government”) has applied ex parte to this court for an order requiring, among other things, the prospective disclosure of cell site information on a real-time basis. The government’s application is not supported by a statement of probable cause, but the government has articulated specific facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe the information requested is relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation. The court denies the government’s request because the court believes the law requires the government to support an application for real-time cell site information with probable cause.

Discussion

Cell phones, unbeknownst (this court suspects) to many of their users, send out signaling information that can be used to identify the phone’s physical location. Emission of the signaling information is not dependent on whether the cell phone is engaged in a call. Cell phones emit signaling information so long as they are on. The government would like real-time access to certain types of this signaling information to assist law enforcement personnel in locating and tracking criminal suspects. The court fully understands that the government believes it would be helpful if law enforcement had location information on potential criminals at all times. The problem with the government’s application is that the government has not told or, perhaps, cannot tell the court that probable cause exists to believe that the people the *940 government seeks to track may engage in criminal conduct. Letting the government electronically monitor, even in general parameters, the locations of people without probable cause of criminal conduct appears at first blush to be unsupported by statutory law and contrary to the requirements of the United States Constitution.

Upon examining the law regarding the question more closely, the court has found that the issue presented by the government’s application is far from novel. Numerous magistrate judges and district judges across our country have previously addressed the same arguments the government is making here, and the decisions are mixed. 1 As there is little this court can *941 add to the discussion, the court writes in hope that the government will seek guidance from the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit if the government disagrees with this court’s opinion.

In support of its application, the government relies on the combined authority of 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121 et seq. (the “Pen Register Statute”) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701 et seq. (“the Stored Communication Act”) and specifically seeks information concerning the cell site and antenna face at the beginning and termination of each call or attempted call in which the target cell phone is used. The government says it does not seek simultaneous signaling information from multiple towers, records of signaling activity when the phone is on but not engaged in a call, signaling information throughout the duration of a call, information regarding signal strength, or GPS information. According to the government, the information it requests will enable law enforcement officers to determine the general vicinity of a cell phone’s location based on the geographic coverage area of the cellular antenna site, but not the phone’s precise location. The government concedes that its application is not supported by probable cause but argues, instead, that the combined authority of the Pen Register Statute and the Stored Communications Act allows the government to obtain prospective cell site information on a showing consistent with the requirements of the Stored Communications Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (explaining that application for order under Stored Communications Act must be supported by “specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the ... records or other information sought are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”).

The majority of courts that have considered the question, however, have concluded that disclosure of prospective cell site information cannot be authorized without a showing of probable cause. 2 This court believes that those courts are correct. Briefly, the Pen Register Statute, which was enacted in 1984 and later amended by the USA Patriot Act in 2001, defines a “pen register” as:

a device or process which records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted, provided, however, that such information shall not include the contents of any communication, but such term does not include any device or process used by a provider or customer of a wire or *942 electronic communication service for billing, or recording as an incident to billing, for communications services provided by such provider or any device or process used by a provider or customer of a wire communication service for cost accounting or other like purposes in the ordinary course of its business.

18 U.S.C. § 3127(3). This court believes that the signal a cell phone transmits to an antenna tower or towers at the beginning and termination of a call falls within the definition of “signaling information” provided by the Pen Register Statute. See In re Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen Register Device, 497 F.Supp.2d 301, 306 (D.P.R.2007) (collecting cases); see also Deborah F. Buckman, Allowable Use of Federal Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device to Trace Cell Phones and Internet Use, 15 ALR Fed.2d 537 §§ 3, 4 (2006).

Additionally, the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (“CAE-LA”), 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq., which was enacted in 1994, ten years after the creation of the Pen Register Statute, prohibits the government from acquiring information otherwise available under the Pen Register Statute that may disclose the subscriber’s physical location:

with regard to information acquired solely pursuant to the authority for pen registers and trap and trace devices (as defined in section 3127

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
733 F. Supp. 2d 939, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130713, 2009 WL 6767391, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-the-united-states-for-an-order-relating-to-target-phone-2-ilnd-2009.