In Re the Trust Estate of Wharton

28 Haw. 502, 1925 Haw. LEXIS 12
CourtHawaii Supreme Court
DecidedJune 29, 1925
DocketNo. 1605.
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 28 Haw. 502 (In Re the Trust Estate of Wharton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Hawaii Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re the Trust Estate of Wharton, 28 Haw. 502, 1925 Haw. LEXIS 12 (haw 1925).

Opinions

OPINION OP THE COURT BY

LINDSAY, J.

(Peters, C. J., dissenting.)

Henry Wharton, during his lifetime, leased certain lands to Waialua Agricultural Company, Limited, for a term of twenty-five years from September 1, 1909, the lessee covenanting, among other things, to pay an annual rental of $125, and also all taxes, assessments *503 and other charges lawfully assessed against the demised premises. By the will of said Wharton, the land demised, as well as other property, was devised to Henry Waterhouse Trust Company, Limited, upon certain trusts set forth in the will.

On May 23, 1924, the trustee filed its petition for the approval of its sixth annual account as trustee, praying that the same be examined, audited and approved. As shown in the account, the trustee had paid taxes for the year 1923, amounting to $312.98, on the leased land, which amount the trustee later recovered from the lessee. The trustee, regarding said amount of $312.98 as income, charged a commission thereon at the rate of seven per cent, amounting to $21.91. The master, appointed by the court to examine and audit the account, urged that the trustee was not entitled to the commission charged and recommended that it be surcharged therewith.

The circuit judge has reserved for our consideration the question as to whether such taxes, when paid, constitute moneys received in the nature of revenue or income, entitling the trustee to commissions thereon under the provisions of section 2544, R. L. 1925.

Although no express, provision has been made by statute for fees allowable to trustees, it has for many years been the rule in this jurisdiction to allow trustees the same compensation allowed to executors, administrators and guardians under section 2544, R. L. 1925, Avhich provides that “Executors, administrators and guardians shall be allowed the following commissions upon all moneys received and accounted for by them, that is to say: * * * Upon all moneys received in the nature of revenue or income of the estate, such as rents, interest and general profits, ten per centum for the first thousand dollars, seven per centum for the *504 next four thousand dollars, and five per centum for all amounts over and above the first five thousand dollars. Such commissions of ten, seven and five per centum, to be allowed upon- each accounting when made, but not oftener than once a year.”

In this Territory it is the duty of the owner of real property to return the same for taxation, and the assessment is made against the owner, who is liable for the payment of the taxes. Many leases, probably the majority of leases, contain, as in the instant case, covenants that the lessee, in addition to the stipulated rent, will pay all taxes assessed, but such agreement between the parties to the lease cannot affect the obligation of the lessor to the government to pay the taxes. In the instant case, the lessor, or rather his successor in interest, the trustee, having paid the taxes 'and recovered the same from the lessee, is the trustee entitled to charge the ordinary commission on the amount collected?

While the precise question has never been presented to this court, it is of interest to note, from many cases called to our 'attention by counsel, that the question has frequently been raised before circuit judges presiding in equity, who have generally held that trustees, in cases similar to this, are entitled to commissions on sums representing taxes paid by tenants under the covenants of their leases.

While, strictly speaking, the words “rent” and “taxes” have entirely different meanings, Avhere a party agrees to pay for the use of land a definitely stated annual amount and, in addition to such amount, agrees to pay' all taxes assessed against the land, there would seem no room for doubt that, as far as the lessee is concerned, the total sum that he is required to pay constitutes rental for the use of the land. It is imma *505 terial to the lessee that the additional amount to be paid is not, in the lease, called rental but is called taxes, the result of such an agreement being simply that the lessee is required to pay both of the stated amounts for the use of the land and such payment is undoubtedly in the nature of rental.

“Whatever a tenant is required to pay as a compensation for the right to occupy land may generally be termed rent.” W. S. Quinby Co. v. Sheffield, 79 Atl. (Conn.) 179, 183.

“A payment of taxes under a covenant in a lease is clearly in the nature of a payment of rent to the lessor and is not a payment of taxes so far as the lessee is concerned.” Tax Assessment Appeals, 11 Haw. 235, 240.

And this court in Richards v. Ontai, 20 Haw. 335, has clearly indicated that in its opinion, taxes payable by a lessee are in reality an additional part of the rent payable. In that case the plaintiff leased certain premises to defendant at an annual rental payable quarterly. The lease provided that the lessor should pay the taxes levied on the premises and that the lessees should pay all ' other charges of the leased premises and meet all requirements of the board of health at their own cost and expense. In a submission on an agreed statement of facts the first question submitted was whether the lessor or the lessees were liable under the terms of the lease to pay the sewer rates. The court held that sewer rates are not taxes within the ordinary meaning of the term and that the lessees were liable. On April 22, 1908, the lessor brought an action of assumpsit against the lessees for $685, being a balance of rent due under the lease, and recovered judgment. The second question was whether that judgment was a bar to the recovery by the plaintiff of that part of the sewer rates in controversy, which accrued prior *506 to the institution of that action of assumpsit. This court held the action barred, saying at page 338: “The payments agreed to be made for sewer rates and expenditures caused in compliance with board of health regulations, like similar payments for taxes, are in the nature of rent for the use of the demised premises;” and again, at page 340 : “The lessor, then, had, at the date of the commencement of the action for the other portion of the rent, a right of action against the lessees for the amount of the sewer rates then due. The claim for the rent reserved in specified instalments and that for the amount of the rates constituted one indivisible demand or cause of action. The parties were the same, both claims arose out of the same contract and both sums were parts of the same rental or consideration for the use of the land. A lessor is not in such a case at liberty to split his claim and to sue for one part of the rent in one action and another part in another action.”

“In its ordinary and natural usage, the word ‘rent’ does not include an amount paid by the lessee as taxes, but an agreement to pay taxes upon the demised premises and other premises of the lessor may constitute a rent, and taxes which áre assumed by the tenant as a part of the compensation for the use of the premises have been regarded as rent.” 36 C. J. 291.

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28 Haw. 502, 1925 Haw. LEXIS 12, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-the-trust-estate-of-wharton-haw-1925.