In re the Probate of Two Papers Propounded as the Last Will & Testament of Forman

54 Barb. 274, 1869 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 41
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedJune 7, 1869
StatusPublished
Cited by22 cases

This text of 54 Barb. 274 (In re the Probate of Two Papers Propounded as the Last Will & Testament of Forman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re the Probate of Two Papers Propounded as the Last Will & Testament of Forman, 54 Barb. 274, 1869 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 41 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1869).

Opinion

[284]*284By the Court,

Sutherland, J.

The contestants do not contend that" the two written instruments, dated the 27th day of February, 1862, were executed under restraint or undue influence. There is no pretense that they were.

The questions, then, presented by the appeal, are four:

1st. Could these two instruments, notwithstanding their repugnancy in certain particulars, or in certain respects, constitute a will, or the will of the deceased, and legally and properly be admitted to probate as such?
2d. If they could, were the two instruments executed and attested in the manner required by the statute ?
3d. If they could constitute, and be admitted.to probate as a will, or as one will or instrument, and were executed and attested in due form, had the deceased testamentary capacity when they were executed^ and attested ?
4th. If the preceding questions are decided in the affirmative, the remaining question presented by the appeal is: Should the tearing up of the two instruments by-the deceased, on or about the 31st day of August, 1864, under the circumstances, and considering what was said and done at the time, be regarded as a revocation of them, viewing them as constituting one will or instrument ?

As to the first question, I am the more willing to say that I think the general term erred in deciding it, when the case was here before, because that impromptu decision was made upon, and probably in consequence of, my suggestion. Further consideration of the question does-not permit me to doubt that the point or question of repugnancy or inconsistency in the provisions of the two instruments did not arise, and could not properly be considered, in the probate proceeding; that the two instruments, if executed and attested at the same time, could constitute a will, and might properly be admitted to probate as such, notwithstanding their repugnancy in certain [285]*285particulars; that the question or point of repugnancy might or would be a subject for consideration, after the probate of the will, when the two instruments came to be carried into effect, or claimed or acted under, as a will.

The general rule is, that two or more written instruments, executed at the same time, relating to the same subject matter, by the same party, or between the same parties, should be construed together, and viewed as one instrument,

I see no reason for making these two instruments an exception to this rule. The repugnancy could not prevent or affect its application to them. The proofs, when the case was here before, were clear and conclusive that the two instruments were executed and attested at the same time; and, if possible, this point is made clearer by the additional evidence before us now.

I do not .think that the former impromptu decision of this question, when the case was here before, should, under the circumstances, be regarded as res adjudícala.

As to the second question, whether the two instruments were executed and attested in the manner required by the statute, I am clearly of the opinion that the proofs show that they were; and that the surrogate was right in holding and decreeing that they were.

Mrs. Westervelt, one of the two witnesses to the will, swears clearly and positively on this point. She swears that Mrs. Forman told her, in the room, when and where the two papers were executed, before they were signed by Mrs. Forman or the witnesses, when she, Mrs.. Forman and Maria Smith were together, that the paper or papers was or were her will. Maria Smith, the other witness* swears that Mrs. Forman did not say, while she was in the room with Mrs. Westervelt and Mrs. Forman, when and where the papers were executed, that the paper or papers was or were her will; but she admits when Mrs. Forman came to the kitchen to call her as a witness, that she then [286]*286and there told her that she wanted her to witness her will. The inference, if Maria Smith was an honest and willing witness, is, that she had forgotten that Mrs. For-man called the paper or papers her will, in the room when and where they were executed and attested. .

It is not disputed that the proofs show that the two papers were signed by Mrs. Forman in the presence of the -two witnesses, and that they sighed their names as witnesses in her presence and in the presence of each other.

3d. Had Mrs. Forman testamentary capacity when the two papers were executed and attested ?

This is the great and interesting question in this very extraordinary case, and the question, to which nearly all 'of the evidence in the bulky volumes of printed evidence relates. The words “persons of non-sane memory,” in the statute of Wills of Henry YIH, meant persons of non-sane or unsound mind. It was held in the Marquis of Winchester’s case, (5th Coke,) that a person, to make a testamentary disposition of his lands, must have a memory sufficiently sane and perfect to do the act or thing authorized by the statute; that is, to make a testamentary disposition of his lands, with reason and understanding.

The words of our statute of wills as to real property are: “ All persons except' idiots, persons of unsound mind, &e., may devise,” &c. (2 R. S. 56.) The words of our statute as to wills of personal property are: “ Every male person, &c., of sound mind and memory, and no others, may give, bequeath,” &c.

The words mind and memory, as used in this last statute, and as used at common law, are and were convertible terms. The use of the words mind and memory as convertible terms is not so unphilosophical as it might at first seem to be, for without memory there could be no mind, properly speaking. Without any memory, a person would be the mere recipient of a succession of present sensations, like the lowest type of animal life.

[287]*287As the result of the reported cases relating to testamentary capacity, under our statutes, it may be said that the question of capacity, in the abstract, is, had the testator, at the time, &c., a mind, or mind and memory, sufficiently sound to make a will; that is, to do the thing or act authorized by the statutes; but that practically, in most cases, the question is, had the testator, at the time, &c., a mind, or mind and memory, sufficiently sound to make the will in' question. (See the Parish Will Case, 25 N. Y. Rep. 9, &c.; The Hopper Will Case, 33 id. 619; The Lispenard Will Case, 26 Wend. 255; Clark v. Fisher, 1 Paige, 171; Stanton v. Wetherwax, 16 Barb. 259; Thompson v. Thompson, 21 id. 107.)

There is no pretense that Mrs. Forman, when the two papers were executed and attested, was an idiot, or in a state of fatuity. There is no pretense that she was then a raving maniac.

I think the proofs in this case furnish no reasonable ground for thinking or saying that she was then in a state of dementia—that she was then generally or absolutely insane on all subjects, or in relation to all persons.

The undisputed circumstances attending the execution of the two papers-—her conversation at the time, as testified to by both the witnesses to the papers—her conversation with Mrs.

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54 Barb. 274, 1869 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 41, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-the-probate-of-two-papers-propounded-as-the-last-will-testament-of-nysupct-1869.