In Re the Probate of the Will of Field

97 N.E. 881, 204 N.Y. 448, 1912 N.Y. LEXIS 787
CourtNew York Court of Appeals
DecidedFebruary 20, 1912
StatusPublished
Cited by45 cases

This text of 97 N.E. 881 (In Re the Probate of the Will of Field) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re the Probate of the Will of Field, 97 N.E. 881, 204 N.Y. 448, 1912 N.Y. LEXIS 787 (N.Y. 1912).

Opinion

Vann, J.

The surrogate refused probate because the paper purporting to be a will was not subscribed by the testator at the end ” thereof as required by statute, and the decree was affirmed by the Appellate Division for the same reason. As the essential facts were stipulated and the original paper itself is produced as one of the facts agreed upon, the question whether it was signed at the end is a question of law. The entire printed form was treated below as the first page, the sheets numbered from one to six as succeeding pages, and thus the conclusion was reached that the decedent did not sign at the end of the paper. When read in this way the instrument does not read naturally or consecutively and does not make sense. The physical position of the six sheets, the place and method of attaching them and the closing paragraphs at the bottom of the printed form are substantially ignored. The natural order of reading the paper is subverted and an artificial order substituted, not to aid but to overturn the obvious intention. The natural order *453 of reading it is to begin with the opening words on the printed blank and continuing with form and sense reasonably connected, to read the first of the numbered sheets and turning it over in the usual way with legal papers, to read the other sheets in their actual order and after the last has been read to turn that over also, when the closing paragraphs of the printed form follow, the end of the instrument is reached and no part thereof follows the signature. Who would read it in any other way unless he wished to destroy it as a will ? Who would turn over the six sheets without reading them, read the testimonium clause and then turn back to read the rest ? In reading an ordinary card calendar with the record of the month of December printed on the card itself and descriptive matter printed above, with the records of the other months on slips attached in the usual way, that of January being on top, who would not regard December as the end both of the calendar and the card ? The slips become by the place and method of attachment virtually embodied in the card; So the six sheets of the paper in question are part of the body of the will, being physically incorporated therein and not, as in some of the cases, wholly without the body and merely referred to therein. The essence of the paper subscribed is not the printed form alone, but the printed form with the six sheets so inserted therein as to become blended therewith at the point of insertion. Thus the physical and the literary beginning, body and end of the instrument are the same, and the signature of the testator is found at the end.

The position of the courts below, however, finds some support in the adjudged cases, for we have gone far to protect testators from the danger of imposition and fraud through unauthorized additions and changes in their wills. That danger does not exist when, as in this case, the will is holographic, and while we do not regard that fact as controlling, it is worthy of remark that none of *454 the six numbered sheets could have been changed without the co-operation of the testator himself. While the pins could be removed and other sheets substituted, this is true of many wills written on different sheets and fastened together by rivets or tape. There is no statute forbidding the use of separate sheets or directing how they shall be joined together. Oases where wills have been altered after execution are very rare, as the records of the courts show, while cases where the intention of the testator has been wholly defeated by a rigid construction of the statute requiring subscription at the end of the will are alarmingly frequent. Thus Judge Cullen, writing for the Appellate Division in Matter of Andrews (43 App. Div. 394, 401), said: “With every disposition to uphold this will, we do not see how it can be done by this court. If limitations or qualifications are to be made on the cases on which this opinion is based, those limitations must proceed from the Court of Appeals. If the decision now made by us should be upheld by that court, it will follow that at least six wills (including one in the fourth department, 42 App. Div. 593), undoubtedly containing the true testamentary dispositions of testators and executed by those testators with the intent to conform with the statutes of this State, will have been held void because of the interpretation placed on the statutory requirements for safeguards against fraud. The rule which our decision enforces in this case operates only to prevent fraudulent additions to testamentary instruments, and not as a security against wills forged in their entirety. We think the decisions of the courts of this State will be examined in vain in the attempt to find six cases of alleged fraudulent additions to wills, or even half that number; and it must be conceded that as to this supposed danger the remedy has proved in practice far worse than the disease. In England a statute similar to our own, and construed as strictly by the courts of that country as our statute has been construed by our courts, was passed in 1837 (1 Vic. *455 ch. 26). The evils resulting from it proved so great that in 1853 (15 & 16 Vic. ch. 24) it was modified. (1 Jarm. Wills [5th Am. ed.], 106.) ”

The evil of fraudulent changes in wills is rare, while the evil of defeating wills altogether in the manner suggested is common. Hence, we think we have gone far enough in the direction of rigid construction and that the doctrine of certain authorities should not be extended, lest in the effort to prevent wrong we do more harm than good.

The Appellate Division, not without some reason, relied upon Matter of Whitney (153 N. Y. 259) and Matter of Andrews (162 N. Y. 1). In the earlier case the facts as stated by Judge Edward T. Bartlett in his opinion were as follows: “The will is drawn upon a printed blank, covering only one page, and the testator and subscribing witnesses signed at the foot thereof. The subdivisions of the will, marked respectively ‘First’ and ‘Second,’ fill the entire blank space in the printed form, and at the end of the second subdivision are the words, ‘ See annexed sheet.’ On a separate slip of paper are written two additional subdivisions, marked respectively ‘ Third ’ and ‘ Fourth,’ and this is attached to the face of the will, immediately over the first and second subdivisions, by metal staples, so that the slip annexed has to be raised up oi.1 turned back, in order to read the first two clauses.” We held that probate of the instrument was properly denied,. citing Matter of O’Neil (91 N. Y. 516) and Matter of Conway (124 N. Y. 455).

In the. O’Neil case the instrument was drawn on a printed blank, the formal commencement being on the first page and the formal termination at the foot of the third page. The blank space was filled on the first, second and third pages and the last or thirteenth clause of the will was partly written on the third and the balance carried over to the blank fourth page. The names of the testator and the witnesses were subscribed near the bottom of the third page, below the formal printed termi *456 nation of the will, and there only. The last clause was below and beyond the signature.

In the Conway

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Bluebook (online)
97 N.E. 881, 204 N.Y. 448, 1912 N.Y. LEXIS 787, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-the-probate-of-the-will-of-field-ny-1912.