In re the Personal Restraint of Washington
This text of 106 P.3d 763 (In re the Personal Restraint of Washington) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
¶1 — Amandhla Washington seeks relief from the Department of Corrections’ decision that he was ineligible to accrue early release time up to 50 percent of his sentence under former RCW 9.94A.728(l)(b)(i) (2003).1 The Department determined that Washington was ineligible for the 50 percent maximum because he had a prior gross misdemeanor conviction for violating a domestic violence no-[508]*508contact order. Because the plain language of former RCW 9.94A.728(l)(b)(ii)(C)(III) provides that offenders with such convictions are not eligible for the 50 percent maximum, we deny the petition.
[508]*508Statutes
¶2 Former RCW 9.94A.728(l)(b)(i) provides that certain offenders can earn an aggregate earned release time not to exceed 50 percent of their sentences. But the 50 percent maximum is not available to offenders who have prior convictions for: (1) sex offenses; (2) violent offenses; (3) “crime[s] against persons as defined in RCW 9.94A.411”;2 (4) “felon [ies] that [are] domestic violence as defined in RCW 10.99.020”; (5) residential burglaries; or (6) certain drug offenses. Former RCW 9.94A.728(l)(b)(ii)(C)(I)-(VII). Four of the 45 offenses classified as “crimes against persons” may be either felony or gross misdemeanor offenses: (1) violations of domestic violence court orders,3 (2) communications with a minor,4 (3) riot,5 and (4) stalking.6
[509]*509Discussion
¶3 Washington has a prior gross misdemeanor conviction for violating a domestic violence no-contact order. He contends that because this was not a felony domestic violence offense, he is eligible for the 50 percent maximum. Although he acknowledges that his gross misdemeanor offense falls under the “crime [s] against persons” exclusion (former RCW 9.94A.728(l)(b)(ii)(C)(III)), he argues that if this exclusionary category applies, the felony restriction on the domestic violence exclusion is meaningless.7 We disagree.
¶4 In interpreting a statute, our primary objective is to ascertain and carry out the intent and purpose of the legislature. State v. Sullivan, 143 Wn.2d 162, 174-75, 19 P.3d 1012 (2001); State v. Chester, 133 Wn.2d 15, 21, 940 P.2d 1374 (1997). To determine legislative intent, we first look to the language of the statute. If the statute is unambiguous, we derive its meaning from the plain language of the statute alone. State v. Keller, 143 Wn.2d 267, 276, 19 P.3d 1030 (2001). “A statute is ambiguous if it can reasonably be interpreted in two or more ways, but it is not ambiguous simply because different interpretations are conceivable.” Keller, 143 Wn.2d at 276. We are not “ ‘obliged to discern any ambiguity by imagining a variety of alternative interpretations.’ ” Keller, 143 Wn.2d at 277 (quoting W. Telepage, Inc. v. City of Tacoma Dep’t of Fin., 140 Wn.2d 599, 608, 998 P.2d 884 (2000)).
¶5 Here, the “crimes against persons” exclusion is not ambiguous. By referring to RCW 9.94A.411 without restriction, this exclusion clearly and unambiguously applies to offenders with prior gross misdemeanor convictions of violations of domestic violence court orders. Although the [510]*510domestic violence exclusion (RCW 9.94A.728(l)(b)(ii)(C)(IV)) is limited to felony offenses and a violation of a domestic violence court order is considered a crime of domestic violence under RCW 10.99.020(5)(r),8 nothing in former RCW 9.94A.728(l)(b)(ii) requires that an exclusionary offense fit under a single category or that any one exclusionary category controls over another. Although violating a domestic violence order arguably fits two categories, one restricted to felonies and one that includes gross misdemeanors, that alone does not make the statute ambiguous.
¶6 As it did in the domestic violence exclusion, the legislature could have stated that the “crimes against persons” exclusion applied to only felony offenses. It chose not to do so, and we will not create an ambiguity by reading such a requirement into the statute.
¶7 Nor does this reading of the statute render meaningless the felony requirement in the domestic violence exclusion. RCW 10.99.020(5) defines “domestic violence” offenses very broadly; basically, as any offense that is committed by one family or household member against another.9 This includes offenses that are not necessarily crimes against [511]*511persons as defined by RCW 9.94A.411, for example malicious mischief and criminal trespass. Compare RCW 9.94A.411(2)(a) with RCW 10.99.020(5)(j)-(n). Thus, while all domestic violence crimes against persons exempt the defendant from earning 50 percent release time, only felony domestic violence crimes exempt the defendant from earning such time. In short, the two sections overlap but are not coextensive.
¶8 Accordingly, we hereby deny Washington’s petition.
Morgan, A.C.J., and Hunt, J., concur.
Review denied at 153 Wn.2d 1032 (2005).
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106 P.3d 763, 125 Wash. App. 506, 2004 Wash. App. LEXIS 3377, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-the-personal-restraint-of-washington-washctapp-2004.