I.
Facts and Procedural History
¶4
When Lawrence was a minor, he was arrested and charged by
direct filing in district court with (1) first degree murder,
(2) attempted first degree murder, (3) first degree assault,
(4) second degree motor vehicle theft, (5) reckless driving,
and (6) duty upon striking an unattended vehicle (i.e.,
leaving the scene of an
accident). At the time of his arrest, Lawrence was not
serving a sentence in any other juvenile case, and he had no
other juvenile cases pending.
¶5
Over one year later, and while his case was pending, Lawrence
turned eighteen years old. On the evening of his eighteenth
birthday, deputies from the La Plata County Sheriff's
Office transported him from the DYS facility in which he was
being held to the La Plata County Jail. The following day,
Lawrence filed an objection to that confinement, asserting
that his transfer was done without a motion having been filed
by the People or an order entered by the district court.
According to Lawrence, he had been thriving in the DYS
facility but was now facing an environment in the county jail
that was dramatically different and would cause him to suffer
potential harm that was real and significant.
¶6
Lawrence further argued that the district court had
discretion under section 19-2.5-305(4)(g) to keep him in DYS
custody despite the statutory language providing, in
pertinent part, that an adult who is being detained for a
crime over which the juvenile court has jurisdiction or for
whom charges are pending in district court pursuant to a
direct filing or transfer "must be detained in the
county jail." According to Lawrence, (1) section
19-2.5-1118(1), C.R.S. (2025), allows for commitment to DYS
until the age of twenty-one; (2) section 19-2.5-101, C.R.S.
(2025), emphasizes liberal construction of the Children's
Code to protect the best
interests of a child; and (3) section 19-2.5-801(4)(a),
C.R.S. (2025), allows a juvenile charged as an adult to seek
transfer of the case to the juvenile court.
¶7
Lastly, Lawrence contended that his placement in the county
jail violates his right to equal protection because he is now
subject to harsher conditions of confinement than a similarly
situated defendant who was serving a sentence for unrelated
acts in a juvenile case when he was charged by direct file in
district court with other crimes but who was not transferred
to the county jail when he turned eighteen. According to
Lawrence, because he, unlike the other defendant, did not
have a prior juvenile record unrelated to the current
charges, he should not have been treated more harshly than
the other defendant, who was permitted to remain in DYS
custody.
¶8
The following day, the People filed a motion to transfer
Lawrence to the La Plata County Jail, arguing that section
19-2.5-305(4)(g) mandates that he be so transferred and
affords a district court no discretion to order otherwise.
The People further contended that the transfer did not
violate equal protection principles.
¶9
The district court conducted a hearing on the People's
motion and then granted that motion. In the court's view,
section 19-2.5-305(4)(g) mandated Lawrence's transfer and
provided no grounds to allow the court to rule differently.
The court thus ordered that Lawrence be transferred to the
county jail as the
statute requires. The court, however, expressed discomfort
with this result, noting that it wished it could come to a
different conclusion and that it would welcome a different
opinion from a higher court on this issue.
¶10
Lawrence then sought relief in this court pursuant to C.A.R.
21, and we issued an order to show cause.
II.
Analysis
¶11
We begin by discussing our jurisdiction under C.A.R. 21 and
the applicable standard of review and principles of statutory
construction. Next, we address the pertinent statutes and
Lawrence's claims thereunder. Finally, we consider
Lawrence's equal protection argument.
A.
Original Jurisdiction
¶12
The exercise of our original jurisdiction under C.A.R. 21 is
a matter within our sole discretion. People v.
Tafoya, 2019 CO 13, ¶ 13, 434 P.3d 1193, 1195. An
original proceeding under C.A.R. 21 is an extraordinary
remedy that is limited in its purpose and availability.
Id. We have exercised our jurisdiction under C.A.R.
21 to address a district court's abuse of discretion or
ruling in excess of its jurisdiction when no other adequate
appellate remedy exists. People v. Jones, 2015 CO
20, ¶ 6, 346 P.3d 44, 46. We have also exercised our
discretion under C.A.R. 21 to hear matters that present
issues of significant public importance that we have not
previously considered. Tafoya, ¶ 13, 434 P.3d
at 1195.
¶13
Here, the district court's order raises a question as to
what, if any, discretion courts have in applying section
19-2.5-305(4)(g). This is a substantial question because, as
Lawrence has argued, other provisions of the Children's
Code reflect a legislative intent to give courts some leeway
in dealing with juvenile offenders, thus tending to undermine
a rigid reading of section 19-2.5-305(4)(g). In addition, the
question presented raises an issue that we have not
previously addressed and is of significant public importance
considering its constitutional implications and application
to juveniles turning eighteen years old across the state.
Indeed, as noted above, although the district court ruled
against Lawrence on the issue presented, the court expressed
discomfort with the result that it reached and invited a
higher court's opinion on this subject.
¶14
Accordingly, we deem it appropriate to exercise our
discretion under C.A.R. 21 to consider this matter.
B.
Standard of Review and Principles of Statutory
Construction
¶15
We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo.
People in Int. of B.C.B., 2025 CO 28, ¶ 24, 569
P.3d 74, 79. When interpreting a statute, we seek to discern
and effectuate the legislature's intent. Id. In
doing this, we apply words and phrases in accordance with
their plain and ordinary meanings, and we consider the entire
statutory scheme in order to give consistent, harmonious, and
sensible effect to all of its parts. Id. Moreover,
we must avoid interpretations that
would render any statutory words or phrases superfluous or
that would lead to illogical or absurd results. Id.
¶16
In interpreting a statute, we respect the legislature's
choice of language. Id. at ¶ 25, 569 P.3d at
79. Accordingly, we may not add words to a statute or
subtract words from it. Id.
¶17
If the statutory language is unambiguous, then we will apply
it as written and need not resort to other rules of statutory
construction. Id. at ¶ 26, 569 P.3d at 79.
C.
Section 19-2.5-305(4)(g)
¶18
Section 19-2.5-305(4)(g) provides:
A person who is eighteen years of age or older who is being
detained for a delinquent act or criminal charge over which
the juvenile court has jurisdiction, or for which charges are
pending in district court pursuant to a direct filing or
transfer if the person has not already been transferred to
the county jail pursuant to subsection (3)(c)(IV) of this
section, must be detained in the county jail in the same
manner as if such person is charged as an adult.
¶19
Here, when Lawrence turned eighteen, he indisputably was a
person who was eighteen years of age or older and was being
detained on charges pending in the district court pursuant to
a direct filing. Accordingly, under the statute's plain
language, he "must be detained in the county
jail" in the same manner as if he had been charged as an
adult. Id. (emphasis added). "Must" means,
in pertinent part, "is required by law, custom, or moral
conscience to." Must, Webster's Third New
International Dictionary (2002). Accordingly, as the district
court found, the statute afforded it no discretion, and
Lawrence was required to be detained in the county jail.
¶20
We are not persuaded otherwise by the contrary arguments that
Lawrence has presented in his petition to us.
¶21
First, Lawrence asserts that the legislature intended that
the Children's Code, of which section 19-2.5-305(4)(g) is
a part, be "liberally construed to serve the welfare of
children and the best interests of society." §
19-1-102(2), C.R.S. (2025). Although the legislative
declaration to the Children's Code does express such an
intent, that general expression of legislative purpose does
not allow us to disregard the mandatory language that the
legislature employed when it enacted section
19-2.5-305(4)(g).
¶22
Second, Lawrence contends that because the Children's
Code contains multiple provisions reflecting the
legislature's recognition that young adults do not
suddenly become fully assimilated into the adult criminal
justice system at eighteen years of age, he should be
returned to DYS custody. Again, however, we may not disregard
section 19-2.5-305(4)(g)'s plain and unambiguous language
in favor of general principles found elsewhere in the
Children's Code.
¶23
Third, Lawrence asserts that section 19-2.5-1117(1)(a),
C.R.S. (2025), and section 19-2.5-1118(1) authorize courts to
continue DYS custody of young adults
beyond age eighteen. Section 19-2.5-1117(1)(a) provides, in
pertinent part, that a court "may commit a juvenile to
the department of human services for a determinate period of
up to two years if the juvenile is adjudicated for an offense
that would constitute a felony or a misdemeanor if committed
by an adult." Section 19-2.5-1118(1), in turn, states,
in pertinent part, that a court "may commit a person
eighteen years of age or older but less than twenty-one years
of age to the department of human services if the person is
adjudicated a juvenile delinquent for an act committed prior
to the person's eighteenth birthday or upon revocation of
probation." In the instant case, however, Lawrence has
not been adjudicated a juvenile delinquent. Indeed, because
charges were direct filed against him in the district court,
he has never faced charges in the juvenile court.
Accordingly, by their very terms, neither section
19-2.5-1117(1)(a) nor section 19-2.5-1118(1) applies in this
case.
¶24
Fourth, Lawrence argues that section 19-2.5-103(6), C.R.S.
(2025), preserves jurisdiction in juvenile court over young
persons past eighteen years of age. That section provides:
The juvenile court may retain jurisdiction over a juvenile
until all orders have been fully complied with by such
person, or any pending cases have been completed, or the
statute of limitations applicable to any offense that may be
charged has run, regardless of whether such person has
attained the age of eighteen years, and regardless of the age
of such person.
Id.
¶25
Again, however, Lawrence was never subject to the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court in this case because the
charges were direct filed against him in district court.
Specifically, article VI, section 9 of the Colorado
Constitution declares district courts to be courts of general
jurisdiction. People v. Juv. Ct., 915 P.2d 1274,
1276 (Colo. 1996). As such, district courts generally have
authority over criminal and juvenile matters. Flakes v.
People, 153 P.3d 427, 436 (Colo. 2007). In contrast,
juvenile courts have only limited jurisdiction as established
by the legislature. Juv. Ct., 915 P.2d at 1277.
Accordingly, a juvenile court has no jurisdiction to order a
juvenile to be placed in the custody of the Department of
Human Services when a district court orders that the juvenile
be held in the county jail pending trial on charges filed
against the juvenile as an adult. Id. at 1275;
see also People v. Sandoval, 2016 COA 57, ¶ 53,
383 P.3d 92, 102 ("Because direct file cases charge
crimes, as opposed to delinquent acts, the enumerated crimes
constitute a class or type of criminal cases and thus fall
within the district courts' subject matter
jurisdiction."). As a result, the district court is the
only court that has had jurisdiction over the charges at
issue, and section 19-2.5-103(6), which addresses when a
juvenile court may retain jurisdiction over a
juvenile, does not apply.
¶26
Finally, Lawrence argues that section 19-2.5-801(4) allows a
juvenile charged as an adult to seek to transfer the case to
juvenile court. As Lawrence contends,
section 19-2.5-801(4)(a) provides, in pertinent part,
"After a juvenile case has been charged by direct filing
of information or by an indictment in district court, the
juvenile may file in district court a motion to transfer the
case to juvenile court." Upon the filing of such a
motion, the district court then determines whether to
transfer the case to juvenile court, based on the factors set
forth in section 19-2.5-801(4)(b). The question of this type
of reverse transfer, however, is not before us. Nor has
Lawrence explained why the potential availability of a
reverse transfer petition should inform our interpretation of
section 19-2.5-305(4)(g).
¶27
For these reasons, we conclude that, under section
19-2.5-305(4)(g)'s plain and unambiguous language,
Lawrence was properly transferred to the county jail when he
turned eighteen years old. Any arguments as to the perceived
harshness of the result of applying the statute's express
language are better made to our General Assembly.
D.
Equal Protection Challenge
¶28
Lawrence next contends that the district court violated his
right to equal protection by treating him differently from an
allegedly similarly situated criminal defendant named Hevon
Martinez. Assuming without deciding that Lawrence properly
preserved this issue, we are not persuaded.
¶29
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides that no state shall "deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Although
the Colorado Constitution does not contain an equal
protection clause, we have construed our constitution's
due process clause, Colo. Const. art. II, § 25, to imply
a similar guarantee. Dean v. People, 2016 CO 14,
¶ 11, 366 P.3d 593, 596. "Equal protection of the
laws assures the like treatment of all persons who are
similarly situated." Id.
¶30
When a party raises an equal protection challenge regarding a
statute, the level of judicial scrutiny varies according to
the type of classification used and the nature of the right
affected. People v. Diaz, 2015 CO 28, ¶ 25, 347
P.3d 621, 626-27. When, as here, the challenged law does not
impact a traditionally suspect class or implicate a
fundamental right, we apply rational basis review.
Dean, ¶ 12, 366 P.3d at 597. Under this
standard, the party challenging a statute's
constitutionality "must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the classification bears no rational relationship to a
legitimate legislative purpose or government objective, or
that the classification is unreasonable, arbitrary, or
capricious." Diaz, ¶ 25, 347 P.3d at 627.
Simply because a statutory classification creates a harsh
result in one instance, however, does not mean that the
statute fails to satisfy the rational basis standard.
Id.
¶31
In light of the foregoing principles, the threshold question
in the equal protection challenge before us is whether the
classes allegedly created by the statute at issue are
similarly situated. See People v. Young, 859 P.2d
814, 816 (Colo. 1993).
To establish an equal protection violation, "the
classification must 'arbitrarily single out a group of
persons for disparate treatment,' without singling out
others who are similarly situated." People v.
Hernandez, 2021 CO 45, ¶ 38, 488 P.3d 1055, 1064
(quoting Indus. Claim Appeals Off. v. Romero, 912
P.2d 62, 66 (Colo. 1996)). An equal protection challenge will
generally fail if persons alleging disparate treatment are
not similarly situated. People v. Black, 915 P.2d
1257, 1260 (Colo. 1996).
¶32
Here, notwithstanding Lawrence's assertion to the
contrary, he and Martinez were not similarly situated.
¶33
When Martinez was seventeen years old, he was adjudicated
delinquent in a juvenile proceeding in Montezuma County, No.
24JD54. Five days later, he was charged by direct file with
first degree murder in Archuleta County District Court, No.
24CR103. And a few weeks after that, he was committed to a
DYS facility for eighteen months in his juvenile case.
¶34
Approximately one month after his DYS commitment, Martinez
was charged in another direct file case in Archuleta County
District Court, No. 25CR16, with second degree assault
causing serious bodily injury. Martinez thereafter turned
eighteen, and the People filed a motion to transfer him to
county jail.
¶35
The district court, however, denied that motion. The court
began its analysis by noting that section 19-2.5-305(4)(g)
did not address a scenario like that before
it, where a defendant who had been sentenced on a juvenile
offense was simultaneously awaiting trial as an adult for a
charged felony. After noting what it perceived to be a dearth
of applicable case law in this area, the court relied on (1)
section 19-2.5-1118(1), which allows a person adjudicated a
juvenile delinquent to be committed to the DYS until the age
of twenty-one; (2) the General Assembly's intent, as
stated in section 19-2.5-101(1)(a), to protect, restore, and
improve public safety through a system of juvenile justice;
and (3) the purposes of the Children's Code to determine
that it had discretion to permit Martinez to remain in DYS
custody. Then exercising that discretion, the court concluded
that because (1) there was no indication that Martinez posed
a risk to the safety of others; (2) his DYS sentence was for
eighteen months; and (3) there was an unresolved reverse
transfer motion pending before it, it was not in
Martinez's best interest for him to be transferred to the
county jail merely because he had turned eighteen.
¶36
Without opining on whether the district court correctly
applied the law in Martinez's case, we note that that
case is distinguishable from the case before us. As noted
above, Martinez was serving a juvenile sentence in DYS
custody at the time he turned eighteen and the People moved
to transfer him to the county jail based on a separate
direct-filed case. In contrast, Lawrence was not serving a
separate juvenile sentence when he turned eighteen and was
transferred to the county jail. As a result, section
19-2.5-1118(1), which arguably applied in
Martinez's case, does not apply here, and the two men
were not similarly situated for purposes of establishing an
equal protection violation.
¶37
Accordingly, Lawrence's equal protection challenge fails
at its initial step.