Original Proceeding Pursuant to C.A.R. 21 Douglas County
District Court Case No. 21CR60 Honorable Victoria
Klingensmith, Judge
ORDER MADE ABSOLUTE
Attorneys for Plaintiff: Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General
Kelley M. Dziedzic, Assistant Attorney General Denver,
Colorado
Attorneys for Defendant: Megan A. Ring, Public Defender
Michael C. Mattis, Deputy Public Defender Denver, Colorado
Ara
Ohanian, Deputy Public Defender Elizabeth Orton, Deputy
Public Defender Castle Rock Colorado
2
Attorneys for Respondent Douglas County District Court:
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General Lauren M. Dickey, First
Assistant Attorney General Brady J. Grassmeyer, Senior
Assistant Attorney General Conor A. Kruger, Assistant
Attorney General Denver, Colorado
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Office of the Alternate Defense
Counsel: Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP John Partridge Al
Kelly NoahLani Litwinsella Denver, Colorado
JUSTICE HART delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which
CHIEF JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ, JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE
HOOD, JUSTICE GABRIEL, JUSTICE SAMOUR, and JUSTICE
BERKENKOTTER joined.
3
OPINION
HART
JUSTICE
¶1
In this original proceeding, we consider whether a show-cause
hearing under section 24-72-305(7), C.R.S. (2024)
("subsection 305(7)"), of the Colorado Criminal
Justice Records Act ("CCJRA"), can be held in a
district court outside of the district where the requested
records are located. The question presents itself here
because the Colorado Bureau of Investigations
("CBI") is located in Jefferson County, where it
maintains its records, and some of those records are being
sought in a criminal case in Douglas County District Court.
¶2
Subsection 305(7) provides that a party who is denied access
to inspect a record covered by the CCJRA may submit an
application "to the district court of the district
wherein the record is found for an order directing the
custodian of such record to show cause why said custodian
should not permit the inspection of such record." The
parties' dispute here turns on two questions: (1) whether
the word "may," as used in the subsection, is
mandatory or permissive; and (2) whether the Douglas County
District Court has ancillary jurisdiction over a CCJRA
application, independent of the statutory provision.
¶3
We conclude that the plain language of the statute requires
that a CCJRA show-cause hearing take place in the district
court of the district where the records are found, and that
ancillary jurisdiction is unavailable because the statutory
4
provision squarely applies. Accordingly, we make the order to
show cause absolute.
I.
Facts and Procedural History
¶4
Adetayo Sotade is a defendant in an ongoing criminal case in
Douglas
County,
where he is represented by counsel from the Office of the
State Public Defender ("OSPD"). He is charged with
second degree kidnapping, sexual assault, and unlawful sexual
contact. As part of the underlying criminal investigation,
the CBI conducted forensic laboratory testing. During the
pendency of Sotade's criminal case, however, the CBI
learned that one of its DNA analysts, Yvonne
"Missy" Woods, had tampered with DNA testing in
numerous cases over the course of decades. Though another CBI
analyst conducted the testing in Sotade's case, Woods was
the technical reviewer.
¶5
Sotade endorsed Woods as a witness and, in April 2024, issued
two Subpoenas Duces Tecum ("SDTs") to the CBI for
its internal affairs investigation records related to Woods,
as well as other lab records relating to the primary analyst
in his case. The CBI produced responsive documents, which the
district court reviewed and provided to the parties subject
to a protective order.
¶6
In July and September 2024, the OSPD submitted two records
requests to the CBI, pursuant to the CCJRA, seeking records
related to (1) "any and all" cases in which Woods
was the analyst or technical reviewer and (2) "all"
of the cases in
5
which Woods had testified in a courtroom since 2007. The
CBI's custodian of records responded to both CCJRA
requests, (1) explaining that the custodian had made the
discretionary choice to withhold the records of cases in
which Woods was an analyst or technical reviewer; and (2)
providing a list of jurisdictions and dates where Woods had
given courtroom testimony during the requested timeframes,
but with the case names and numbers redacted.
¶7
Sotade subsequently filed an Application to Show Cause
("the Application") in his criminal case,
contesting the CBI's denial of the OSPD's records
request. Within days, the CBI responded by filing a Motion to
Quash or Dismiss Public Defender's Application to Show
Cause for Lack of Jurisdiction. It argued that the Douglas
County District Court lacked jurisdiction over the
Application because the records at issue were located at the
CBI's headquarters in Jefferson County.
¶8
The district court held a hearing on the Application to
determine whether it could exercise jurisdiction under
subsection 305(7) or ancillary jurisdiction under Woo v.
El Paso County Sheriff's Office, 2022 CO 56, 528
P.3d 899. The court concluded that it could exercise
ancillary jurisdiction over the Application and scheduled a
show-cause hearing.
¶9
The CBI thereafter filed a Petition for Rule to Show Cause in
this court, pursuant to C.A.R. 21, arguing that the district
court lacked jurisdiction over the
6
application because (1) the CCJRA requires anyone who is
denied access to inspect a criminal justice record to submit
an application in the district court of the district where
the records are located, and (2) ancillary jurisdiction is
unavailable under the circumstances presented here. We
granted the CBI's petition.[1]
II.
Analysis
¶10
We begin by explaining why exercising our original
jurisdiction under C.A.R. 21 is appropriate. Then, we address
the core tenets of statutory interpretation and conclude that
the plain language of subsection 305(7) requires a person
whose records request was denied to seek a CCJRA show-cause
hearing in the district court of the district where the
records are found. We then discuss the doctrine of ancillary
jurisdiction and hold that it is inapplicable here because
subsection 305(7) applies. We therefore make the order to
show cause absolute.
A. Our
C.A.R. 21 Jurisdiction
¶11
Whether we exercise original jurisdiction pursuant to C.A.R.
21 is a matter entirely within our discretion. People v.
Hernandez, 2021 CO 45, ¶ 13, 488 P.3d 1055, 1060.
"An original proceeding under C.A.R. 21 is an
extraordinary remedy that is
7
limited in both its purpose and availability."
Accetta v. Brooks Towers Residences Condo.
Ass'n, 2019 CO 11, ¶ 11, 434 P.3d 600, 602.
Exercise of our original jurisdiction, however, is
appropriate to review a trial court's pretrial orders
when an appellate remedy would be inadequate, see, e.g.,
Ortega v. Colo. Permanente Med. Grp., P.C., 265 P.3d
444, 447 (Colo. 2011); C.A.R. 21(a)(2) (providing that
"relief will be granted only when no other adequate
remedy is available, including relief available by
appeal"), or when a party may otherwise suffer
irreparable harm. See People v. Tafoya, 2019 CO 13,
¶ 13, 434 P.3d 1193, 1195. We have previously heard
cases involving the issue of venue under C.A.R. 21 because
they "directly affect the trial court's jurisdiction
and authority to proceed with a case" and "review
of a venue determination serves to avoid the delay and
expense involved in re-trial should this court deem venue
improper." Magill v. Ford Motor Co., 2016 CO
57, ¶ 10, 379 P.3d 1033, 1036 (quoting
Hagan v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2015 CO 6, ¶ 13,
342P.3d 427, 432).
¶12
An appellate remedy would not be adequate to address the
issue presented in this case. If the district court holds a
show-cause hearing, the CBI will have no choice but to attend
that hearing in Douglas County, regardless of whether venue
was proper there. Further, if the district court determines
that the CBI custodian's response to the records requests
constitutes an abuse of discretion, the CBI will have to
produce the records irrespective of whether the district
court was
8
permitted to hold a show-cause hearing in the first place;
and disclosure of records through the CCJRA forecloses the
opportunity to seek a protective order or to file a motion to
quash through the normal pretrial discovery procedures.
See People v. Spykstra, 234 P.3d 662,
666-67 (Colo. 2010) (holding that the People have standing to
seek protective orders or to move to quash SDTs served on
third parties). No appellate review could sufficiently
redress these harms.
¶13
Further, we generally opt to invoke our original jurisdiction
under C.A.R. 21 to address issues of first impression that
are of significant public importance. See
Accetta, ¶ 11, 434 P.3d at 602. No Colorado
appellate court has yet addressed whether section
24-72-305(7) permits a CCJRA show-cause hearing to take place
outside of the jurisdiction where the records are located.
And, if the district court's invocation of ancillary
jurisdiction is correct, all public agencies who maintain
criminal justice records subject to the CCJRA could be
subjected to show-cause hearings in jurisdictions across the
state.
¶14
For these reasons, we exercise our original jurisdiction
under C.A.R. 21.
B.
Section 24-72-305(7) Requires that an Application Be Filed in
the District Court of the District Where the Records Are
Located
¶15
We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo.
Thomas v. People, 2021 CO 84, ¶ 58, 500 P.3d
1095, 1108. When interpreting a statutory provision, we
"give 'its words and phrases their plain and
ordinary meaning'" and read them
9
"in context and in accordance with the rules of grammar
and common usage." Id. (quoting McCulley v.
People, 2020 CO 40, ¶ 10, 463 P.3d 254, 257). Our
aim in statutory interpretation is to effectuate the General
Assembly's intent. Arvada Vill. Gardens LP
v. Garate, 2023 CO 24, ¶ 9, 529 P.3d 105, 107. If a
statute is unambiguous, we apply it as written. Id.
¶16
Subsection 305(7) provides, in relevant part:
Any person denied access to inspect any criminal justice
record covered by this part [three] may apply to the
district court of the district wherein the record is
found for an order directing the custodian of such
record to show cause why said custodian should not permit the
inspection of such record.
(Emphasis added.)
¶17
The CBI argues that the statute unambiguously requires that
any person seeking an order directing a custodian of records
to show cause for their denial of a CCJRA request may do so
only in the district court of the district where the
records are located. It observes that the use of
"may," rather than "shall" or
"must," in the statutory provision is logical
because a person is not required to seek a
show-cause order, which the more mandatory language in the
same sentence would suggest-instead, whether to seek a
show-cause order is a choice. However, if a person does
choose to seek a show-cause order, the statute provides that
they "may" do so only in the designated location.
10
¶18
Sotade reads the statutory language differently, arguing the
word "may" makes the entire subsection permissive,
not mandatory. He asserts that this permissive language gives
a record seeker an option, but not the only option, to seek a
right to inspect records covered by the CCJRA. If this is not
a limiting provision, however, as the CBI notes, then a
person seeking review of records could file anywhere in the
state and the word "may" would become superfluous.
¶19
Both Sotade and the district court rely heavily on our
decision in People v. Sprinkle, 2021 CO 60, 489 P.3d
1242, to support their argument that "may" is
permissive rather than mandatory as used in subsection
305(7). Sprinkle examined a different provision of
the CCJRA-one focused on internal investigation files-that
uses language that is nearly identical to that at issue here.
See Sprinkle, ¶ 16, 489 P.3d at 1245-46
("Any person who has been denied access to any
information in a completed internal affairs investigation
file may file an application in the district court in the
county where the records are located . . . ."
(emphasis added) (quoting § 24-72-303(4)(f), C.R.S.
(2024))).
¶20
There, in preparation for trial, a defense investigator filed
a CCJRA records request with the El Paso County Sheriff's
Office ("EPCSO") seeking information about two
deputies who had been involved in Sprinkle's case.
Id. at ¶ 4, 489 P.3d at 1244. EPCSO denied the
request. Id. Sprinkle then filed an SDT for the same
11
deputies' internal records, and EPCSO moved to quash the
SDT. Id. at ¶ 5, 489 P.3d at 1244.
¶21
At the hearing, the court sua sponte noted that the request
seemed to fall under the CCJRA, so Sprinkle was entitled to a
show-cause hearing. Id. at ¶ 6, 489 P.3d at
1244. EPCSO agreed and requested a show-cause hearing.
Id. Sprinkle's attorney also agreed, and the
district court scheduled the hearing, despite the fact that
Sprinkle had not filed the application. Id. Days
before the hearing was set to occur, EPCSO filed a motion
claiming that the district court lacked jurisdiction.
Id. at ¶ 7, 489 P.3d at 1244.
¶22
On appeal to this court, EPCSO argued that the statutory
language, "may file an application," created a
jurisdictional prerequisite for a show-cause hearing under
section 24-72-303(4)(f), which Sprinkle had not met.
Id. at ¶¶ 13-19, 489 P.3d at 1245-46. We
disagreed. Id. at ¶¶ 18-19, 489 P.3d at
1246. We concluded that the application requirement was
non-jurisdictional and therefore could be-and was-waived when
EPCSO requested the show-cause hearing. Id.
Accordingly, we held that Sprinkle's failure to file an
application did not divest the district court of
jurisdiction. Id. at ¶ 20, 489 P.3d at 1246.
¶23
Contrary to Sotade's contention, Sprinkle does
not answer the question posed in this case. We stand by our
conclusion that the district court in El Paso County-where
the records were located-could hold a show-cause hearing
12
regarding access to those records even though it was the
county, and not Sprinkle, who brought the issue to the
court's attention. The El Paso County court was the
correct location to resolve the record inspection issue.
¶24
Here, we must resolve whether subsection 305(7) permits a
show-cause hearing for inspection of records in a district
other than where those records are located-that question was
not at issue in Sprinkle, and we had no occasion to
consider it there. The plain language of subsection 305(7)
gives authority "to the district court of the district
wherein the record is found." It does not add
contingencies or exceptions to allow for another district
court to exercise jurisdiction when the requested records
relate to a proceeding before it. And, again, though
Sotade's criminal case is before the Douglas County
District C ourt, the OSPD's requests sought CCJRA records
located at the CBI headquarters in Jefferson County.
Therefore, the plain language of subsection 305(7) required
that Sotade file the Application in the Jefferson County
district court.
¶25
The district court points out that subsection 305(7) does not
divest other district courts of subject matter jurisdiction
over the question as a general matter, and we agree. District
courts in Colorado are courts of general jurisdiction,
see, e.g., Marks v. Gessler, 2013 COA 115,
¶ 70, 2350 P.3d 883, 898, and any district court might
have authority to hear a CCJRA show-cause proceeding-if the
relevant
13
records are located in that court's district. Subsection
305(7) is more analogous to a venue provision than to a
jurisdictional one. But that does not make it less of a
legislative limitation on where claims may be brought.
¶26
Logistically, it would make little sense to conclude
otherwise. In this case, for example, given the statewide
impacts of Woods's misconduct on past and pending
criminal cases, the CBI could potentially be forced to attend
show-cause hearings in any number of Colorado jurisdictions
to defend the custodian's denial of the CCJRA request. It
is far more practical and consistent with the statute that a
show-cause hearing be held in Jefferson County, where the
records are located, especially given that the OSPD-not a
specific defendant or their counsel-made the broad CCJRA
requests underlying this dispute. Should an individual
defendant wish to access relevant criminal justice records
from a public entity, the normal discovery tools are
available to that defendant. Sotade, in fact, did as much
through his use of SDTs and by endorsing Woods as a witness.
The CCJRA, however, is not a discovery tool.
¶27
Accordingly, we hold that the plain language of subsection
305(7) means what it says: A person who is denied access to
inspect criminal justice records under the CCJRA must seek an
order directing the custodian of records to show cause in the
district court of the district where the records are located.
14
C.
Ancillary Jurisdiction Is Not Available Here
¶28
The district court, however, did not suggest that it had
jurisdiction under subsection 305(7). Instead, the court
concluded that it had ancillary jurisdiction under
Woo, ¶¶ 28-41, 528 P.3d at 906-09. The CBI
argues that this was error because (1) ancillary jurisdiction
is not available when there is a governing statute or rule
that controls; and (2) even if ancillary jurisdiction could
apply when there is a statute on point, the four criteria
required to invoke ancillary jurisdiction are not present
here.[2] Sotade and the district court counter that
ancillary jurisdiction is proper in this case for purposes of
judicial economy and that the criteria for exercising
ancillary jurisdiction are met. We agree with the CBI on its
first contention, so we do not address whether the elements
for ancillary jurisdiction are met here.
¶29
Ancillary jurisdiction is a judicially created doctrine, the
core purpose of which is judicial efficiency. Id. at
¶¶ 36-39, 528 P.3d at 908-09. We have noted,
though, that "[ancillary jurisdiction is not a
substitute for subject matter jurisdiction; it is a
supplement to subject matter jurisdiction." Id.
at ¶ 38, 528 P.3d
15
at 909. In cases where ancillary jurisdiction applies, it may
be invoked subject to a four-part test:
(1) the ancillary matter arises from the same transaction
which was the basis of the main proceeding, or arises during
the course of the main matter, or is an integral part of the
main matter; (2) the ancillary matter can be determined
without a substantial new factfinding proceeding; (3)
determination of the ancillary matter through an ancillary
order would not deprive a party of a substantial procedural
or substantive right; and (4) the ancillary matter must be
settled to protect the integrity of the main proceeding or to
insure that the disposition in the main proceeding will not
be frustrated.
Id. at ¶ 28, 528 P.3d at 907 (quoting
People v. Hargrave, 179 P.3d 226, 229-30 (Colo.App.
2007)). "[A]ll courts, absent some specific
statutory denial of power, possess ancillary powers to
effectuate their jurisdiction." Id. at ¶
39, 528 P.3d at 909 (alteration in original) (emphasis added)
(quoting Morrow v. D.C., 417 F.2d 728, 737 (D.C.
Cir. 1969)).
¶30
In Woo, after the defendant was sentenced for first
degree murder, he brought a civil action seeking the return
of his property that had been lawfully seized by the
government as part of his criminal case. ¶ 5, 528 P.3d
at 902-03. That action, however, was dismissed by the
district court as barred by the Colorado Governmental
Immunity Act ("CGIA"). Id., 528 P.3d at
903. Woo appealed, arguing that the CGIA rendered him without
any remedy and therefore violated his state and federal due
process rights. Id. We disagreed. Id. at
¶ 52, 528 P.3d at 912. In so doing, we expressly
acknowledged that there was no statute or rule
16
allowing a criminal defendant to seek the return of
government-seized property. Id. at ¶ 24, 528
P.3d at 906. We emphasized that "requiring defendants to
file a motion for return of property before sentencing would
likely be an illusory remedy" at best, and that
"challenging hurdles" existed for a criminal
defendant seeking the return of their property through a
civil action. Id. at ¶¶ 34-35, 528 P.3d at
908. Accordingly, we concluded that ancillary jurisdiction
could be applicable in that case and applied a four-part test
to determine if it was appropriate. Id. at
¶¶ 24-36, 528 P.3d at 906-08.
¶31
By setting venue in the district where the records reside,
subsection 305(7) squarely applies to divest courts outside
of that district of authority to consider a show-cause
application. Consequently, ancillary jurisdiction is not an
option. The concerns we enumerated in Woo are simply
not present. There are no "illusory remed[ies]" or
"challenging hurdles" here. Subsection 305(7)
provides a clear statutory scheme under which a person can
request a CCJRA show-cause hearing in a specific venue-where
the records are located. Further, an individual in
Sotade's position has other avenues available by way of
discovery tools. And notably in the context of this case,
unlike a criminal defendant seeking the return of his seized
property, Sotade does not seek to address a matter particular
to him. In fact, Sotade did not file the CCJRA request at
issue here-the OSPD did.
17
¶32
We therefore hold that, given the applicability of subsection
305(7), ancillary jurisdiction is not available under these
circumstances. Thus, because it is not necessary to do so, we
do not evaluate whether the four-part test for assessing the
appropriateness of exercising ancillary jurisdiction under
these specific circumstances is satisfied.
III.
Conclusion
¶33
The plain language of subsection 305(7) requires a litigant
to request a CCJRA show-cause hearing in the district court
of the district where the requested records are located.
Further, ancillary jurisdiction is unavailable where a rule
or statute specifically applies. Subsection 305(7)
establishes a clear venue for requesting CCJRA records, so
ancillary jurisdiction has no application here. Accordingly,
we make absolute the order to show cause and remand this case
for further proceedings in the district court.
---------
Notes:
[1] Specifically, we granted review of the
following issue:
1. Whether the district court exceeded its
jurisdiction and violated section 24-72-305, C.R.S. (2024),
when it ordered a show-cause hearing in [Sotade]'s
criminal case in Douglas County, rather than in a separate
civil proceeding where the requested records reside in
Jefferson County.
[2]Sotade argues that the CBI waived these
arguments because, after the district court concluded it
could invoke ancillary jurisdiction here, the CBI refused to
make a record. We disagree. The CBI expressly argued at the
motions hearing that the Jefferson County District Court had
exclusive jurisdiction over the CCJRA show-cause hearings,
and the district court should not turn to ancillary
jurisdiction in light of subsection 305(7)'s express
requirements.