NUMBER 13-25-00095-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
IN RE THE MONSON LAW FIRM, LLC
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
OPINION
Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices West and Fonseca Opinion by Justice Fonseca1
By petition for writ of mandamus, relator The Monson Law Firm, LLC2 (Monson)
asserts that the trial court3 abused its discretion by issuing sanctions against it because,
1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d) (“When denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is not
required to do so. When granting relief, the court must hand down an opinion as in any other case.”); id. R. 47.4 (distinguishing opinions and memorandum opinions). 2 This original proceeding was originally brought in the name of SureChoice Underwriters
Reciprocal Exchange (SureChoice); however, as will be discussed further in this memorandum opinion, the party seeking relief is The Monson Law Firm, LLC. We have corrected the style of this case accordingly. See id. R. 52.1, 52.2. 3 This petition for writ of mandamus arises from trial court cause number CL-24-3777-I in the County
Court at Law No. 9 of Hidalgo County, Texas, and the respondent is the Honorable Patricia O’Caña- Olivarez. See id. R. 52.2. inter alia, the sanction order was issued without notice and hearing. We agree, and
accordingly, we conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus.
I. BACKGROUND
Real party in interest Ricardo Campos filed suit against SureChoice Reciprocal
Underwriters Exchange (SureChoice) alleging that it wrongfully denied or underpaid
Campos’s property damage claim resulting from a severe windstorm. Campos alleged
that SureChoice engaged in unlawful underwriting and policy cancellations; violated the
Texas Insurance Code by engaging in unfair settlement practices; failed to make prompt
payment of his claims; committed fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud; breached its
contract; breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing; and violated the Texas
Deceptive Trade Practices Act. See, e.g., TEX. INS. CODE ANN. §§ 541.060(a) (unfair
settlement practices), 542.055 (notice of claim), 542.058 (delay in payment of claim),
551.1055 (changes to policy on renewal); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46 (deceptive
trade practices). Campos asserted that SureChoice’s claim-handling policies were
designed to defraud its policyholders and that either SureChoice either failed to hire and
train competent, qualified, and ethical adjusters, or it purposefully instructed its adjusters
to ignore good faith claim handling practices and “to actively attempt to deny, underpay,
underscope [sic], and minimize damages claimed by policyholders such as [Campos].”
Campos alleged that SureChoice’s acts and omissions in this case, or similar acts and
omissions, occur with such frequency that they constitute “a general business practice,”
and that “[SureChoice’s] entire process is unfairly designed to reach favorable outcomes
for the company at the expense of the policyholders.” Campos sought declaratory relief,
actual and exemplary damages, and the award of attorney’s fees and costs. In a separate
2 pleading, Campos subsequently sought to compel statutory mediation of the case. See
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 541.161.
In response to Campos’s original petition and motion to compel mediation,
SureChoice, represented by Monson, filed a “Combined Original Answer, General and
Verified Denials, Affirmative Defenses, and Motions for Protection, Abatement, and
Motion to Preclude [Attorney’s F]ees.” In short, SureChoice alleged that Campos failed to
provide sufficient statutory notice of suit, and his claims should be submitted to appraisal
pursuant to the insurance policy at issue. SureChoice argued that it should not be required
to respond to discovery requests until these matters were resolved, and further asserted
that the case should be abated pending their resolution. SureChoice also alleged that
Campos was not entitled to recover attorney’s fees because he did not provide timely
written notice before filing suit.
Campos filed a response to SureChoice’s motions for protection, abatement, and
the preclusion of attorney’s fees, and that response included a motion for sanctions.
Campos alleged that his presuit notice complied with all statutory requirements, argued
that SureChoice’s motions were meritless and should be denied, and requested sanctions
of $3,000 for the time that Campos’s counsel spent responding to SureChoice’s
pleadings.
On December 4, 2024, the trial court held a hearing regarding Campos’s motion
to compel mediation and SureChoice’s motions for protection, abatement, and the
preclusion of attorney’s fees. On December 5, 2024, the trial court issued an order
granting Campos’s motion to compel statutory mediation. That same day, the trial court
also issued an order denying SureChoice’s motions for protection, abatement, and the
3 preclusion of attorney’s fees. This order also granted Campos’s motion for sanctions and
ordered SureChoice to pay Campos $3,000.00. The trial court’s order recites merely that
the $3,000 sanction “covers the time it took to research the applicable case law, review
the file, prepare the initial responses to [SureChoice’s] meritless motions, and attend a
hearing on these particular motions.”
On December 13, 2024, SureChoice filed a “Motion to Compel Appraisal, Policy
Compliance[,] and Appraiser Appointment.” SureChoice also filed a separate motion
seeking reconsideration of the trial court’s December 5, 2024 orders. On December 16,
2024, the trial court signed separate orders setting these two motions for hearing on
January 22, 2025.
On January 17, 2025, Campos filed a response to SureChoice’s motion to compel
appraisal and motion for reconsideration. This pleading included a second motion for
sanctions. This response and motion spans eighty-five pages, and, in it, Campos
requested sanctions against both SureChoice and Monson. Campos alleged that they
failed to comply with discovery obligations, failed to participate in mediation or pay the
previously assessed monetary sanction, made misrepresentations of law and fact, and
displayed bad faith litigation tactics. Campos requested the trial court to sanction
SureChoice and Monson each $12,500, payable to Campos and his counsel, and further
requested the trial court to strike SureChoice’s pleadings.
On January 21, 2025, SureChoice filed a motion seeking reconsideration of the
trial court’s rulings denying its motions for protection, abatement, and the preclusion of
attorney’s fees, requiring mediation, and imposing sanctions against SureChoice. That
same day, SureChoice also filed a reply in support of its motion to compel appraisal,
4 policy compliance, and appraiser appointment. And it further filed a reply in support of its
request for reconsideration of the $3,000 sanction imposed against it.
On January 22, 2022, the trial court held its hearing on SureChoice’s motions to
compel appraisal, policy compliance, and appraiser appointment and motion for
reconsideration. As will be discussed further, neither Monson nor any representative of
SureChoice appeared at the hearing. Nevertheless, the trial court proceeded with the
hearing, and it allowed Campos’s counsel to present evidence and argument regarding
his second motion for sanctions, even though it had not been set for hearing at that time.
On February 3, 2025, the trial court signed an order granting in part and denying
in part Campos’s second motion for sanctions. The trial court’s second sanction order
imposed an additional $5,000 sanction against SureChoice, in addition to the $3,000
sanction previously imposed, and further imposed a separate $5,000 sanction against
Monson. The trial court directed Monson and SureChoice to make these payments to
Campos within fourteen days. The trial court otherwise denied Campos’s second motion
for sanctions without prejudice.
The eleven-page sanction order is detailed and concludes that SureChoice “by and
through its counsel [Monson]” made misstatements of fact and frivolous legal arguments
for the purposes of causing unnecessary delay, harassing Campos, and needlessly
increasing the cost of litigation. This order references Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code § 10.001 and Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 10.001–.006 (governing sanctions for frivolous pleadings and motions); TEX. R.
CIV. P. 13 (providing sanctions for groundless pleadings and motions).
5 The trial court’s order states that SureChoice, acting by and through Monson, had
not participated in discovery, mediated, or paid the monetary sanctions as previously
ordered on December 5, 2024.4 The order also states that, since that time, SureChoice
“by and through its counsel” had made additional misstatements of fact and frivolous legal
arguments. For instance, the trial court concluded that Monson “expressly
misrepresented” the Texas Supreme Court’s holdings in seeking reconsideration of the
trial court’s rulings. The trial court’s order also notes that SureChoice failed to appear at
the January 22, 2025 hearing and failed to notify the court before or afterward of any
rationale for its nonappearance. The trial court concluded that SureChoice and Monson
had taken inconsistent positions regarding appraisal in different cases as a “disturbing
and systematic defensive strategy.” In making this determination, the trial court examined
a separate case and determined that an attorney from Monson had executed a false
affidavit therein. The court also reviewed “docket sheets from over one[ ]hundred litigated
cases throughout the State” and concluded that SureChoice and Monson had engaged
in sanctionable conduct that was “rampant and widespread.” Accordingly, it assessed
sanctions, in part, “to deter future similar conduct.”
This original proceeding ensued. By petition for writ of mandamus, Monson asserts
that the trial court abused its discretion by issuing the sanction order for failing to appear
at a hearing because it “advised [the court] of [its] inability to appear in-person,” “sought
remote appearance beforehand,” Campos’s counsel “was aware of [its] inability” to
4 We note that the trial court further, inter alia, determined that SureChoice had waived its objections
to all of Campos’s discovery requests by failing to participate in discovery as ordered. The trial court ordered SureChoice to “fully respond” to all such discovery requests within fourteen days.
6 appear in person, and “no notice of hearing on sanctions/order to show cause [was]
issued in violation of [the] right to due process.”
This Court requested and received a response to the petition for writ of mandamus
from Campos. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.2, 52.4, 52.8. Campos asserts that: (1) Monson’s
appendix should be struck because it contains evidence that was not presented to the
trial court; (2) the issue presented here is moot due to settlement; (3) the trial court did
not abuse its discretion; (4) the sanction is not reviewable by mandamus because Monson
has an adequate remedy by appeal; and (5) alternatively, this Court should order Monson
to file a proper appendix and record before further addressing its contentions. Monson
filed a reply to Campos’s response.
II. MANDAMUS
Mandamus relief is an extraordinary remedy available only on a showing that
(1) the trial court clearly abused its discretion and (2) the party seeking relief lacks an
adequate remedy on appeal. In re Ill. Nat’l Ins., 685 S.W.3d 826, 834 (Tex. 2024) (orig.
proceeding); In re Liberty Cnty. Mut. Ins., 679 S.W.3d 170, 174 (Tex. 2023) (orig.
proceeding) (per curiam). “A court abuses its discretion if no evidence supports the finding
on which its ruling rests and if the court could reasonably have reached only a contrary
conclusion.” In re AutoZoners, LLC, 694 S.W.3d 219, 223 (Tex. 2024) (orig. proceeding)
(per curiam). We conduct a “benefits-and-detriments analysis” to determine if the relator
possesses an adequate remedy at law. In re Auburn Creek Ltd. P’ship, 655 S.W.3d 837,
843 (Tex. 2022) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); see In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148
S.W.3d 124, 136–37 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding).
7 III. MOOTNESS
Campos asserts that this original proceeding has been rendered moot because
the parties reached a settlement agreement which encompasses the matters at issue in
Monson’s petition for writ of mandamus. Campos alleges that the parties filed a “Joint
Notice of Settlement” (Joint Notice) in the underlying lawsuit which encompasses the
sanctions against Monson. Campos thus contends that “this entire mandamus proceeding
is a complete waste of judicial resources.”
By reply, Monson asserts that its petition for writ of mandamus is not moot because
the Joint Notice did not encompass the sanction rendered against it. The Joint Notice
states that Campos and SureChoice “have resolved all their disputes and a settlement
has been reached in this matter” and provides that the settlement will be finalized within
a set period. The Joint Notice does not reference Monson, and it was filed on behalf of
SureChoice by different counsel, Thompson Coe Cousins & Irons, LLP (Thompson Coe).
On March 13, 2025, we issued an order requesting Thompson Coe to clarify this
matter. On March 20, 2025, Thompson Coe advised this Court that: (1) SureChoice did
not intend to be a party to this original proceeding; (2) the proposed settlement
encompasses the release of both SureChoice and Monson from liability for any damages
claimed by Campos in the underlying lawsuit; (3) the settlement encompasses the
sanctions ordered against SureChoice; and (4) the settlement does not encompass the
sanctions ordered against Monson.
Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that the mandamus is not moot as to
Monson, and we proceed accordingly.
8 IV. RECORD AND APPENDIX
Campos presents various complaints regarding the record for Monson’s petition
for writ of mandamus and has filed a motion to strike Monson’s appendix.
A. The Record
As a liminal matter, Campos asserts that if we “deem it necessary for this matter
to proceed any further,” we should order Monson to present an appellate record in
compliance with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 34. See generally TEX. R. APP. P.
34.1–.6. Campos’s assertion is premised on a fundamental misapprehension regarding
the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 34 governs the “appellate record” and is
applicable to appeals. See id. The record for a petition for writ of mandamus is not subject
to the rules pertaining to appeals but is instead governed by the appellate rule concerning
original proceedings. See generally TEX. R. APP. P. 52; see id. R. 52.7 (delineating the
contents of the record); id. R. 52.3(k) (describing the necessary contents for the
appendix). Rule 34 is inapplicable to Monson’s petition for writ of mandamus, and we
reject Campos’s assertion otherwise.5
Campos also contends that Monson’s record fails to include all required
documents—for example, it fails to include the exhibits that were admitted at the January
22, 2025 hearing. Campos asserts that this deficiency mandates the denial of Monson’s
request for relief. Campos is correct that the relator bears the burden to provide the Court
with a sufficient record to establish its right to relief. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833,
837 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding); In re J.A.L., 645 S.W.3d 922, 924 (Tex. App.—El Paso
5 We note that Monson filed a conjoined record and appendix whereas the rules contemplate
separate filings. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3(k), 52.7. Nevertheless, in our discretion, we consider Monson’s petition sufficient under the specific circumstances present here. See id. R. 2.
9 2022, orig. proceeding); In re Schreck, 642 S.W.3d 925, 927 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2022,
orig. proceeding). However, the items required for a record filed in an original proceeding
are limited to what is “material” to the “claim for relief” and what is “relevant” to the “matter
complained” about in the petition for writ of mandamus. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.7(a)(1),
(2). Thus, the required contents for a record vary from case-to-case. See id. R. 52.7(a);
see also In re S.M., No. 13-23-00371-CV, 2023 WL 6475319, at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi–Edinburg Oct. 4, 2023, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).
Here, Monson’s complaint is not that the trial court issued the wrong ruling based
on an assessment of the evidence presented. See, e.g., In re Athans, 458 S.W.3d 675,
678 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, orig. proceeding) (stating that “relators must
provide this court with a mandamus record of all of the trial evidence before this court
may determine whether the respondent abused his discretion in concluding that the trial
evidence is factually insufficient”). Rather, Monson’s contention, in relevant part, is that
the trial court held a hearing on Campos’s second motion to compel sanctions without
providing notice or an opportunity to be heard. Monson’s record and appendix contain the
documents material and relevant to this issue. Accordingly, we do not deny mandamus
relief based on any alleged insufficiency in the record.
B. Motion to Strike
Campos’s response to the petition for writ of mandamus includes a motion to strike
Monson’s appendix because it contains materials that were not presented to the trial
court. Campos has moved to strike Monson’s entire appendix, or in the alternative, “at an
absolute minimum,” certain specified portions of the appendix.
10 In original proceedings, we “must focus on the record that was before the court”
when it made its decision. In re Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 975 S.W.2d 601, 605 (Tex.
1998) (orig. proceeding); see Sabine OffShore Serv., Inc. v. City of Port Arthur, 595
S.W.2d 840, 841 (Tex. 1979) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re Liberty Cnty. Mut. Ins.,
606 S.W.3d 866, 874 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, orig. proceeding [mand.
denied]). With limited exceptions, we do not consider documents or exhibits that were not
part of the trial court record at the time the court heard and ruled on the matter that is the
subject of the mandamus proceeding. See In re Liberty Cnty. Mut. Ins., 606 S.W.3d at
874; In re State ex rel. Durden, 587 S.W.3d 78, 81 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2019, orig.
proceeding).
Monson’s appendix largely consists of file-stamped pleadings that were patently
considered by the trial court as directly relevant to the issues here: to wit, the motions and
responses concerning sanctions. Campos provides no reason to strike these documents.
Accordingly, we deny Campos’s motion to strike as it applies to Monson’s entire appendix.
We next consider Campos’s alternative request to strike three specific sections of
Monson’s appendix. First, Campos has moved to strike the exhibits attached to
SureChoice’s original answer and motions, including Campos’s insurance policy and
correspondence pertaining to his claim. Second, Campos has moved to strike email
correspondence regarding Monson’s inability to appear at the hearing on January 22,
2025, and his requests to reset the hearing. On January 20, 2025, at 10:30 a.m., Monson
sent an email to Campos’s counsel and the Hidalgo County District Clerk’s office with the
subject “URGENT: Inclement Weather—cannot attend in-person hearing CAUSE NO.
CL-24-3777-I Richard Campos v. SureChoice Underwriters,” advising that:
11 Due to the polar vortex bringing dangerous weather conditions to my area, and the state, my flight was cancelled.
I attempted to contact the Court, today, to see how it would be handling the inclement weather conditions, but the Court was closed due to the MLK holiday, and I was unable to contact.
Since I will not be able to attend the hearing in person due to circumstances beyond my control, I am requesting a courtesy link so that I can attend the hearing remotely. I am attorney for Defendant SureChoice Underwriters.
This is regarding the hearing at 10:30AM on January 22, 2025.
That afternoon, Campos’s counsel replied to Monson’s email, but the reply did not
include the Hidalgo County District Clerk’s office as an addressee. Campos’s counsel told
Monson that “[i]t’s not that long a drive and other options are still available” and suggested
that Monson travel by bus. The morning of January 22, 2025, at 8:51, Monson emailed
Campos’s counsel:
Could you extend a professional courtesy to me—similar to the professional courtesy I extended to you by signing your Rule 11 agreement to pass a hearing in Webb County when Raul was on vacation last.
This hearing is scheduled for 10:30AM today and I cannot get there due to circumstances beyond my control. The airports here will not be starting to depart flights until 11AM today and everything was shut down yesterday due to the weather. Even Greyhound wouldn’t have got me there before 2pm today—with 14 hours travel time billed at $200 [an] hour.
Third, Campos has moved to strike email correspondence regarding rescheduling the
hearing after it occurred. On Thursday, January 23, 2025, Monson advised the Hidalgo
County District Clerk’s office by email that: “Yesterday (January 22nd), we were unable
to appear at a hearing due to flight cancellations / delays and weather conditions. We
would like to ask to reschedule the hearing please. Can you assist us with that?” In
response, the district clerk’s office advised Monson to “contact the court directly regarding
your inquiry,” and provided a link to do so.
12 We need not consider these portions of Monson’s appendix to address the merits
of this petition for writ of mandamus.6 Therefore, we dismiss Campos’s motion to strike
these items as moot.
C. Summary
We reject Campos’s contentions regarding alleged insufficiencies in Monson’s
mandamus record. We likewise reject Campos’s arguments pertaining to Monson’s
appendix. Campos’s motion to strike the appendix is denied in part and dismissed as
moot in part.
V. SANCTIONS
By one issue, Monson asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by issuing
sanctions, inter alia, in the absence of notice and hearing in violation of its due process
rights. In response, Campos asserts that the sanctions were appropriate and supported
by the evidence, and further argues that Monson’s absence from the January 22, 2025
hearing was “unjustified” and “unexcused,” and the evidence submitted to the trial court
regarding the sanctions was uncontroverted.
A. Standard of Review
We review a sanction order under an abuse of discretion standard. Brewer v.
Lennox Hearth Prods., LLC, 601 S.W.3d 704, 717 (Tex. 2020); Nath v. Tex. Child.’s
6 We are not surprised that Campos’s counsel has moved to strike certain portions of Monson’s
appendix insofar as they appear, in part, to reflect conduct, comments, and behavior that are inconsistent with an attorney’s professional obligations. “[A]busive tactics—ranging from hostility to obstructionism—do not serve the justice we pursue.” PNS Stores, Inc. v. Rivera, 379 S.W.3d 267, 276 (Tex. 2012) (citing and discussing The Texas Lawyer’s Creed—A Mandate for Professionalism (1989), https://www.txcourts.gov/media/276685/texaslawyerscreed.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2025). “[T]he conduct of lawyers ‘should be characterized at all times by honesty, candor, and fairness,’” and “an attorney ‘will not take advantage, by causing any default or dismissal to be rendered, when [he] know[s] the identity of an opposing counsel, without first inquiring about that counsel’s intention to proceed.’” Id. (quoting The Texas Lawyers Creed). Although not at issue or relevant to the matter before us, we cannot ignore the fact that counsel’s actions and tactics are disconcerting.
13 Hosp., 446 S.W.3d 355, 361 (Tex. 2014). We limit our review of the sanctions order to
the specific rules cited in the order. Am. Flood Rsch., Inc. v. Jones, 192 S.W.3d 581, 583–
84 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam); Tarrant Restoration v. TX Arlington Oaks Apartments, Ltd.,
225 S.W.3d 721, 732 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. dism’d w.o.j.); Metzger v. Sebek, 892
S.W.2d 20, 51 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied). Here, the sanction
order references Chapter 10 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code and Texas
Rule of Civil Procedure 13. See generally TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 10.001–
.004; TEX. R. CIV. P. 13.
B. Presumptions and Burden of Proof
We presume pleadings and other papers are filed in good faith. Nath, 446 S.W.3d
at 361; GTE Commc’ns Sys. Corp. v. Tanner, 856 S.W.2d 725, 731 (Tex.1993) (orig.
proceeding); In re Guardianship of Browning, 642 S.W.3d 598, 607 (Tex. App.—Eastland
2022, pet. denied); KB Home Lone Star Inc. v. Gordon, 629 S.W.3d 649, 658 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 2021, no pet.). The party seeking sanctions bears the burden of overcoming
this presumption of good faith. Nath, 446 S.W.3d at 361; GTE Commc’ns Sys. Corp., 856
S.W.2d at 731; In re Guardianship of Browning, 642 S.W.3d at 607; KB Home Lone Star
Inc., 629 S.W.3d at 658. “Demonstrating a party filed a motion or pleading in bad faith is
a heavy burden.” Wenger v. Flinn, 648 S.W.3d 448, 456 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2021,
no pet.); see Mann v. Kendall Home Builders Constr. Partners I, Ltd., 464 S.W.3d 84, 92
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.). “Bad faith does not exist when a party
merely exercises bad judgment or is negligent; rather[,] bad faith is the conscious doing
of a wrong for dishonest, discriminatory, or malicious purposes.” Thielemann v. Kethan,
371 S.W.3d 286, 294 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. denied). In this regard,
14 bad faith cannot be established by surmise or speculation. Mann, 464 S.W.3d at 92. Thus,
to enable the trial court to make the necessary factual determinations about motives and
credibility, the trial court is required to hold an evidentiary hearing. Orbison v. Ma-Tex
Rope Co., 553 S.W.3d 17, 35 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2018, pet. denied);
WWW.URBAN.INC. v. Drummond, 508 S.W.3d 657, 677 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2016, no pet.).
C. Due Process
“[I]n order to safeguard constitutional due process rights, a sanction must be
neither unjust nor excessive.” Nath, 446 S.W.3d at 363.7 Further, “[t]he traditional due
process protections of notice and hearing are required before sanctions may be imposed.”
Mills v. Ghilain, 68 S.W.3d 141, 146 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2001, no pet.);
see In re Bennett, 960 S.W.2d 35, 40 (Tex. 1997) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); Clark
v. Bres, 217 S.W.3d 501, 513 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied); In re
Acceptance Ins., 33 S.W.3d 443, 451 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, no pet.); In re L.A.M.
& Assocs., 975 S.W.2d 80, 83 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, orig. proceeding). In this
regard, both Chapter 10 and Rule 13 expressly require notice and hearing prior to the
imposition of sanctions. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 10.003 (“The court shall
77 To determine if a sanction is just, we apply a two-part test. Schindler Elevator Corp. v. Ceasar,
670 S.W.3d 577, 589 (Tex. 2023); TransAm. Nat. Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913, 916 (Tex. 1991) (orig. proceeding). First, we must ensure that there is a direct relationship between the improper conduct and the sanction imposed. Schindler, 670 S.W.3d at 589; TransAm. Nat. Gas Corp., 811 S.W.2d at 917. Because the sanction should be directed toward the true offender, the trial court must attempt to determine whether sanctions should be imposed on the party, its attorney, or both. Schindler, 670 S.W.3d at 589; TransAm. Nat. Gas Corp., 811 S.W.2d at 917. Second, the sanction must not be excessive. Schindler, 670 S.W.3d at 589; TransAm. Nat. Gas Corp., 811 S.W.2d at 917. The sanction “should be no more severe than necessary to satisfy its legitimate purposes.” TransAm. Nat. Gas Corp., 811 S.W.2d at 917. These due process requirements apply to pleadings sanctions. Nath v. Tex. Child.’s Hosp., 446 S.W.3d 355, 364 (Tex. 2014).
15 provide a party who is the subject of a motion for sanctions under Section 10.002 notice
of the allegations and a reasonable opportunity to respond to the allegations.”); TEX. R.
CIV. P. 13 (“If a pleading, motion or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court,
upon motion or upon its own initiative, after notice and hearing, shall impose an
appropriate sanction . . . .”). Relatedly, “[w]hen sanctions are based on a party’s motion,
a trial court may not award sanctions on grounds not asserted in that motion.” Reynolds
Energy Transp., LLC v. Plains Mktg., L.P., 706 S.W.3d 845, 875 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2024, no pet.); see Polansky v. Berenji, 393 S.W.3d 362, 369 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012,
no pet.); Mann, 464 S.W.3d at 93.
D. Analysis
On December 16, 2024, the trial court signed an order setting “an oral hearing for
[SureChoice’s] Motions to Compel Appraisal, Policy Compliance and Appraiser
Appointment” to be held on January 22, 2025, at 10:30 a.m. That same day, the trial court
signed a second order setting “an oral hearing for [SureChoice’s] Motions to Reconsider”
to be held on that same date at that time.
On January 17, 2025, Campos filed a response to SureChoice’s motion to compel
appraisal and motion for reconsideration. This response included Campos’s second
motion for sanctions, which, for the first time, requested sanctions against Monson
specifically. However, nothing in the record before this Court indicates that Campos’s
second motion for sanctions was set to be heard on January 22, 2025. Nevertheless, the
trial court allowed Campos to present his second motion for sanctions for consideration
at that time, and the trial court then granted that motion in relevant part. The imposition
of sanctions based on Campos’s second motion for sanctions in the absence of notice
16 and an opportunity to be heard violated Monson’s right to due process and the express
terms of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code and the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure requiring notice and hearing before imposing sanctions. See In re Bennett,
960 S.W.2d at 40; Clark, 217 S.W.3d at 513; Mills, 68 S.W.3d at 146; In re Acceptance
Ins., 33 S.W.3d at 451; In re L.A.M. & Assocs., 975 S.W.2d at 83; see also TEX. CIV. PRAC.
& REM. CODE ANN. § 10.003; TEX. R. CIV. P. 13.
E. Conclusion
We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by sanctioning Monson
without notice and an opportunity to be heard in violation of the law and in violation of
Monson’s due process rights. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 10.003; TEX. R.
CIV. P. 13; In re Bennett, 960 S.W.2d at 40; Clark, 217 S.W.3d at 513; Mills, 68 S.W.3d
at 146; In re Acceptance Ins., 33 S.W.3d at 451; In re L.A.M. & Assocs., 975 S.W.2d at
83. Having reached this conclusion, we need not address any additional deficiencies in
the trial court’s order.
VI. REMEDY BY APPEAL
Monson asserts that it, as a non-party, has no adequate remedy on appeal to
address the sanction order, making mandamus the appropriate relief. Alternatively,
Monson asserts that the payment of monetary sanctions must be deferred until the
rendition of an appealable judgment. Campos asserts, in contrast, that mandamus relief
is inappropriate because Monson has an adequate remedy by appeal. In this regard,
Campos specifically contends that Monson has not shown that the monetary sanction at
issue precludes access to the court.
17 Orders imposing monetary sanctions can “typically” be addressed by appeal
following a final judgment. In re Casey, 589 S.W.3d 850, 855 (Tex. 2019) (orig.
proceeding) (per curiam). However, when a trial court imposes a monetary sanction
payable before the rendition of an appealable order, mandamus relief may be available if
the sanctioned litigant “contends that a monetary sanction award precludes access to the
court,” and the trial court fails to either (1) make the sanction payable on or after entry of
a final order, or (2) make express written findings, after a hearing, as to why the sanction
does not have such a preclusive effect. Id.; Braden v. Downey, 811 S.W.2d 922, 929
(Tex. 1991) (orig. proceeding). This procedure helps ensure an adequate remedy for an
improper sanctions order is available by appeal. In re Casey, 589 S.W.3d at 851; Braden,
811 S.W.2d at 930. In such cases, we may direct the trial court to modify the sanctions
order to defer payment until final judgment is rendered, allowing the opportunity to appeal
before such sanctions must be paid. See In re Casey, 589 S.W.3d at 851; Braden, 811
S.W.2d at 930.
In this case, the trial court’s order requires payment within fourteen days, and
Monson did not explicitly contend in the trial court that the order precluded its access to
the court. However, we remain mindful that the adequacy of a remedy by appeal “depends
heavily on the circumstances presented and is better guided by general principles than
by simple rules.” In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d at 137. We do not apply
“abstract,” “formulaic,” or “rigid” standards. Id. at 136. Thus, while we could order the trial
court to defer payment of the sanction until after the rendition of a final judgment, we find
under the circumstances of this case that it would not provide a complete remedy to
Monson.
18 With limited exceptions, only parties of record have standing to appeal a trial
court’s judgment. State v. Naylor, 466 S.W.3d 783, 787 (Tex. 2015); Medlin v. King, 705
S.W.3d 267, 283 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2024, pet. denied); Moody v. Herz, Tr. of Three R
Trusts, 672 S.W.3d 842, 846 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2023, no pet.). When a
non-party has no right to appeal, mandamus is appropriate. In re United Healthcare Ins.,
652 S.W.3d 458, 461 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2022, orig. proceeding); In re Berry, 578
S.W.3d 173, 182 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2019, orig. proceeding); In re
Bain, 144 S.W.3d 236, 239 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2004, orig. proceeding); City of Hous. v.
Chambers, 899 S.W.2d 306, 308 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, orig.
A party’s attorney, although a nonparty, may appeal sanctions imposed against
that attorney once a final judgment is rendered in the case. In re Onstad, 20 S.W.3d 731,
732 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]); see also In re Beard,
No. 12-15-00005-CV, 2015 WL 273187, at *1 (Tex. App.—Tyler Jan. 20, 2015, orig.
proceeding) (mem. op.); In re Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. 12-08-00497-CV, 2009 WL
4167809, at *2 (Tex. App.—Tyler Nov. 25, 2009, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]) (mem.
op.). But see In re Hill, No. 02–07–00295–CV, 2007 WL 2891059, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth Oct. 3, 2007, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (concluding that an attorney who
previously represented a party could not “bring an appeal to complain about the
imposition of sanctions” rendered against that attorney). However, Monson is no longer
representing SureChoice in this litigation. Campos and SureChoice have resolved their
claims by settlement. Our record fails to reflect if a final judgment has already been
rendered or when it might be rendered in the future. If a final judgment has already been
19 entered, Monson may have already lost the right to pursue a direct appeal. If it has not,
Monson may not receive notice of that judgment in time to pursue an appeal. Review by
mandamus in these circumstances preserves Monson’s substantive right to challenge an
order issued in violation of its due process rights. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.,
148 S.W.3d at 136. Moreover, if Monson is required to pay Campos the sanction now and
then wait until after a final judgment to appeal, it may not be able to recover the sanction
from Campos at that future juncture. See id. Further, Monson would incur additional
expense in pursuing an appeal and such an appeal would be a waste of judicial resources.
See id. 136–37 (granting mandamus review when trial court’s order would have wasted
public and judicial resources, lacked legal authority, and would have negatively impacted
the legal system). Finally, we consider the circumstances of this case to be extraordinary
for the reasons set forth above. See id.
Under these circumstances, we conclude that Monson lacks an adequate remedy
by appeal to assail the sanctions assessed against it.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Court, having examined and fully considered the petition for writ of mandamus,
Campos’s response, Monson’s reply, and record, is of the opinion that Monson has met
its burden to obtain mandamus relief. Accordingly, we lift the stay that we previously
imposed in this original proceeding. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.10 (“Unless vacated or
modified, an order granting temporary relief is effective until the case is finally decided.”).
We conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus, and we direct the trial court to
vacate its February 3, 2025 sanction order. We are confident the trial court will promptly
20 comply, and our writ will issue only if the trial court fails to act in accordance with this
opinion.
YSMAEL FONSECA Justice
Delivered and filed on the 30th day of April, 2025.