In RE: THE MEEKER REVOCABLE TRUST U/A/D July 15, 2014, THE HELEN S. MEEKER SURVIVORS' TRUST, Established by July 28, 2018 and FIRST AMENDMENT Thereto Dated September 3, 2018

Opinion

2026 WL 2207388

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NOTICE: THIS DECISION DOES NOT SERVE AS PRECEDENT. THE CASE WAS ENTERED IN THE WESTLAW DATABASE BEFORE THE TIME FOR REHEARING HAD EXPIRED. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT REHEARING HAS BEEN SOUGHT, GRANTED OR DENIED.

Supreme Court of Alaska.

IN RE: THE MEEKER REVOCABLE TRUST U/A/D July 15, 2014, THE HELEN S. MEEKER SURVIVORS’ TRUST, established by July 28, 2018 and FIRST AMENDMENT thereto dated September 3, 2018.

Supreme Court No. S-19054

July 31, 2026

Superior Court No. 3AN-21-00873 PR

Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Herman G. Walker, Jr., Judge.

Attorneys and Law Firms

Appearances: Jeffrey W. Robinson, Lane Powell LLC, Anchorage, for Larry Meeker. Tonja Woelber, Woelber & Associates, P.C., Anchorage, for Douglas A. Meeker, Trustee.

Before: Borghesan, Henderson, Pate, and Oravec, Justices. [Carney, Chief Justice, not participating.]

OPINION

BORGHESAN, Justice.

I. INTRODUCTION

Star page 1*1 This appeal involves a dispute over inheritance. A wealthy couple had created a revocable trust providing that, after their deaths, their assets would be distributed relatively equally between their two sons. After the husband died, his wife amended the trust, writing one son out of the inheritance and giving all assets to the other son. When the wife died, the disinherited son challenged the validity of the trust, arguing that his mother lacked testamentary capacity to make the trust amendments and had been unduly influenced by his brother. After a lengthy trial featuring the testimony of both brothers, medical doctors, caregivers, and the attorney who prepared the trust amendments, the superior court rejected the challenge. The court found that the mother had capacity to amend the trust and was not unduly influenced. The court also rejected claims of fraudulent conveyance and breach of fiduciary duty.

The disinherited son appeals. The existence of testamentary capacity and undue influence are largely factual questions. And in reviewing the superior court's factual findings, we are deferential to its credibility determinations and the inferences it drew from conflicting evidence. Because our review of the record does not leave us with a firm conviction that the superior court's factual findings are wrong, and because these findings moot the disinherited brother's other claims, we affirm the court's judgment.

II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

A. Background

George and Helen Meeker raised their two sons, Larry and Douglas, in Kansas. George and Helen held stock in the Meeker family business (Meeker, Inc.), a closely-held corporation that owned farmland in Kansas; the couple also owned land in Kansas outright.

In 1978 Douglas moved to Homer for work. In 1980 George bought land nearby and, with Douglas's help, constructed a home (the Cedar House) on the land. Three years later George and Helen placed some of their property into a revocable trust. Soon after, George and Helen retired from the Kansas farm and leased it to a relative. Larry remained in Kansas.

Over the next decade, George and Helen spent summers in the Cedar House until their permanent residence on the adjacent lot was completed in 1995. Douglas then moved into the Cedar House and received title to the lot in 1997 for one dollar “and other valuable consideration.” Douglas's wife Melanie moved in with him in 2004. Douglas and Melanie lived next door to George and Helen until the latter two moved into a senior center in 2016. Larry visited periodically over the years.

In 2005 George and Helen sent their sons a letter about the couple's estate planning with a Kansas lawyer. George and Helen expressed their belief that their estate planning was “in pretty good legal condition” and suggested that the grandchildren¹ set up retirement plans. They also indicated their intent to give their permanent residence to Douglas as part of his inheritance.

Star page 2*2 In July 2014 George and Helen, then in their nineties, hired Alaska attorney Stephen Greer to create a new trust, the 2014 Meeker Revocable Trust (the “2014 Trust”), and placed assets worth approximately $4.2 million into it.

The 2014 Trust was intended as a reservoir of funds for George and Helen's care for the remainder of their lives. The trust also operated as a will substitute, directing the creation of a trust for the surviving spouse upon either George's or Helen's death (“the Survivor's Trust”). The Survivor's Trust would also be revocable, allowing the surviving spouse to modify the trust in whole or in part at any point. Helen and George were designated co-trustees. Douglas was later appointed successor trustee in May 2015 due to his parents’ declining physical health.

According to the terms of the trust, upon the surviving spouse's death, the trust bequeathed to Douglas the permanent residence on lot 161 (next to the Cedar House), automobiles, and tangible personal property that would have been contained in the Survivor's Trust. The residuary estate of both real and personal property was to be split equally between Douglas and Larry. If either son predeceased the surviving parent, that son's share was to be distributed to his children.

In February 2016 Larry wrote a letter to his parents alluding to a disagreement over inheritance during a visit to Alaska in 2014. After reflections on “fairness and transparency,” Larry apologized for having accused Helen of lying about Douglas's entitlement to the permanent residence and “assum[ing] [that] a mistaken memory was a lie.” He acknowledged disharmony in the family over the years due to perceptions that the parents’ gifts to the children had not been equal. He then suggested that his parents share a copy of their wills with him and Douglas to avoid future misunderstandings.

George Meeker died in July 2018. By the terms of the 2014 Trust, the Survivor's Trust was created. Like the 2014 Trust, the Survivor's Trust was a revocable trust to support Helen for her life and a will substitute governing distribution of her estate upon her death.

Roughly two weeks after George's death, Douglas called attorney Greer and informed him that Helen wanted to change the Survivor's Trust to eliminate Larry as a beneficiary. Greer wrote to Douglas and Melanie regarding Alaska law on testamentary capacity and sent other instructions to facilitate the amendment. Specifically, Greer explained to Douglas and Melanie that a doctor needed to find that Helen had “sufficient mental capacity to understand the nature and extent of her property, the natural or proper objects of her bounty, and the nature of her testamentary act.”

Douglas and Melanie took Helen to see Dr. Cherie Inglis for a competency examination. Dr. Inglis, who had never treated Helen before, conducted a Mini-Mental State Evaluation (MMSE)² and gave her a score of 24 out of 30. Dr. Inglis concluded that Helen's long-term memory “seem[ed] to be intact” but that she likely had “some mild memory loss.” Douglas and Melanie also took Helen to see Dr. Giulia Tortora, who shared a practice with Helen's longtime physician, Dr. William Bell, and had treated Helen alongside Dr. Bell for ten years. Dr. Tortora sent Greer an email stating her conclusion that Helen was competent and appeared to understand the nature and extent of her property, to recall the names of her sons, and to be aware that she was changing the “recipients of her legacy.”

Star page 3*3 After reviewing the physicians’ assessments, Greer asked Helen his own questions to confirm that she understood the legal significance of any amendments to the Survivor's Trust. He determined Helen had testamentary capacity and moved forward with the amendment to the Survivor's Trust and his representation of Douglas as trustee.

The amendment to the trust provides: “This Agreement ... amends the HELEN S. MEEKER SURVIVOR'S TRUST, whose provisions were included in Article 2.4 of the MEEKER REVOCABLE TRUST DATED JULY 15, 2014.” The amendment indicates Helen's “specific intent to exclude LARRY G. MEEKER as a Residuary Beneficiary of this trust and direct[s] that should he survive [Helen] ... he shall receive only the pecuniary bequest” of $100,000. The residuary estate was left to Douglas and Melanie unless both predeceased Helen. In that event, their share would be distributed to all five living grandchildren, including Larry's children. The amended trust named Douglas as trustee and Melanie as successor trustee. The amendments also contained a no-contest clause.

Around this time, Larry emailed Douglas, requesting a copy of George's will and financial documents. Greer replied to Larry, representing himself as counsel to Douglas “in his capacity as Trustee” and as Helen's “attorney-in-fact.” Greer denied much of Larry's request, stating he would send whatever documents Larry was entitled to as George's beneficiary. Greer then recommended that Larry obtain counsel and advised Larry to direct communications about trust matters directly to him rather than to Douglas or Helen.

In September 2018 Helen received a letter from Larry who sought to “reestablish communications and a mother-son relationship.” He questioned “what could conjure up the intense anger [Helen] ha[d] toward” him but surmised it related to the longstanding conflict about whether Douglas had received the Cedar House as a gift. Larry alluded to another in-person conflict that occurred in May 2015, the same month George and Helen named Douglas as sole successor trustee. He again referenced Helen's “mistaken belief,” suggesting that Helen had been misled by Melanie (and perhaps Douglas) for financial gain.

Helen died two years later on September 2, 2020. Her causes of death were listed as multisystem failure, diabetes, and dementia. The day after Helen died, Larry emailed Douglas and Melanie requesting a copy of Helen's will.

Greer responded to Larry's email, attaching a copy of the Survivor's Trust. Greer indicated that he would instruct Douglas to distribute $100,000 to Larry pursuant to Article 5.1 of Helen's trust after the estate's bills had been paid.

B. Proceedings

1. Pretrial proceedings

In April 2021 Douglas filed a petition to validate the Survivor's Trust. Douglas attested that Helen had testamentary capacity to modify the trust in 2018, relying on the physicians’ competency reports. Acknowledging that he was the principal beneficiary of the Survivor's Trust, Douglas attested that he did not unduly influence Helen to amend her trust.³

Larry opposed the petition, arguing that Helen lacked testamentary capacity to amend the Survivor's Trust in 2018 and that Douglas had exercised undue influence over her. He sought the appointment of a new trustee and distribution of the trust assets according to the terms of the 2014 Trust. He also claimed that Douglas breached his fiduciary duty to Larry, a beneficiary, by failing to provide an accounting upon request shortly after George's death in 2018 and by failing to properly manage trust assets.

Star page 4*4 In February 2022 Douglas notified Larry that he had withdrawn funds from one of the Survivor's Trust's bank accounts several months earlier; that withdrawal reduced the value of the account from $1,439,525.66 to $743,852.00. Douglas used these funds to purchase a house in Anchorage.

In May 2022 Larry added a new claim for fraudulent conveyance. He alleged that Douglas intended to “hinder, delay, or defraud Larry” by “cash[ing] out all” assets from the Survivor's Trust and transferring them to his own personal trust. Larry also pointed to Douglas's transfer of $725,000 in trust assets to his personal bank account as indicative of a fraudulent conveyance because Douglas transferred the funds “[d]espite being aware of a potential lawsuit.”

2. Trial

A five-day trial took place in June 2022.

Attorney Greer testified. He recalled meeting George and Helen in 2014 to establish the 2014 Meeker Revocable Trust for their approximately $4.2 million estate. Douglas and Melanie drove George and Helen to the appointment, but were at some point asked to leave the room. Greer described George's detailed financial documents listing 38 financial accounts, farmland in Kansas held by Meeker, Inc., and approximately 640 acres of land in Kansas that Helen owned.

Greer testified that he received a phone call from Douglas a year later in May 2015. He testified that Douglas “indicat[ed] that he thought” that he should “step in as the successor trustee” due to George's “declining health.” Greer then testified that he relayed this conversation to George and Helen via email, along with paperwork to effectuate their resignations and Doug's appointment as trustee, and received the signed paperwork back. Greer attested that his next communication with the Meekers occurred in January 2016, when Melanie called him to report that “Larry had been abusive over the telephone towards Helen.” Greer testified that Douglas forwarded him a copy of the letter that Larry wrote to Helen and George in 2016. Greer recalled that two weeks later Helen called him “indicat[ing] that she was tired of the verbal abuse that she was getting from Larry.”

Greer testified to receiving a phone call from Douglas in August 2018 approximately two weeks after George died. Douglas informed Greer that Helen wanted to amend the Survivor's Trust and “essentially eliminate Larry as a beneficiary.” Greer recalled sending Douglas and Melanie an email reciting the legal elements of capacity that same day.

Greer testified that after he received confirmation that Helen had mental capacity, he had a phone conversation with Helen on August 28. Greer stated that he ensured Helen was alone during the discussion and then verified her wish to exclude Larry as beneficiary. He testified that Helen wanted Douglas “to get everything,” but ultimately accepted his suggestion to provide Larry a small pecuniary bequest to give weight to the trust's no-contest clause. Greer drafted documents reflecting Helen's wishes and emailed them to Douglas and Melanie the next day.⁴ Greer testified that he received an email from Douglas on August 30, 2018, suggesting they gather witnesses to the execution of the trust amendment as an extra precaution.

Star page 5*5 Greer recalled arriving in Homer on September 3, 2018, to execute the amendments to the Survivor's Trust. Greer testified that he instructed Douglas and Melanie to leave the room so he could again assess Helen's testamentary capacity. Greer testified that Helen knew the names of all her grandchildren and estimated that she owned stocks and approximately $3 million in financial assets. Helen also confirmed that she owned farmland in Kansas. Greer went through each page of the Survivor's Trust, speaking each provision out loud and having Helen initial each page. Greer also wrote an advice letter that reinforced Helen's intent to amend her trust. With the witnesses that Douglas had gathered, Helen executed the amended Survivor's Trust.

The court also heard from the physicians who had examined Helen in 2018. Dr. Inglis testified about Helen's appointment for the MMSE. She testified that Douglas and Melanie sat to the side in the examination room in a position where they could not influence Helen's answers. Dr. Inglis interpreted Helen's results to suggest that she had near-normal cognitive function with some mild cognitive impairment. She did not find it medically significant that Helen could not recall the names of her grandchildren or that she did not know what season it was.

Dr. Tortora also testified about the mental evaluation she performed. She asserted that Helen was “clearly competent” to understand her testamentary act and its ramifications. The physician corroborated Dr. Inglis's interpretation of Helen's score on the MMSE. When asked why she did not use the MMSE, Dr. Tortora explained that she asked the relevant questions including the composition of Helen's property, the nature of the paperwork she intended to sign, and what she understood of it. The physician indicated that Douglas and Melanie were in the room during the evaluation but could not influence Helen from where they sat. As for Douglas and Helen's relationship over the years, Dr. Tortora testified that Douglas “would not interrupt [Helen],” “[would not] put words in her mouth” or “fill in blanks for her,” and that he “always allow[ed] her to finish her thought [and] state her opinion.” Dr. Tortora was adamant that Helen communicated clearly and consistently throughout Dr. Tortora's roughly ten years of treating her, including her last examination in 2020.

Dr. Bell testified that he began treating Helen in 2002 and last examined her in 2019. When questioned about the appearance of the term “dementia” in Helen's medical records, Dr. Bell testified that he never officially diagnosed Helen with dementia but claimed that mild dementia would not necessarily “compromis[e] executive decision-making.” Dr. Bell also disputed the suggestion that Helen's CT scan showing atrophy indicated anything other than cognitive decline associated with aging. He recalled a follow-up visit with Helen after she went to an emergency room in 2018 for shoulder pain. He indicated that Helen's “altered mental state,” as described in an emergency room record, improved with treatment for pain and that there was no indication it was due to mental decline. Dr. Bell testified that Douglas and Melanie generally went to physician visits with Helen and that “[t]hey were all very attentive to her needs and very willing to accommodate her own personal wishes.”

Larry presented the testimony of a forensic psychologist he had retained to perform a posthumous forensic psychological evaluation of Helen's mental capacity. The psychologist concluded that Helen lacked capacity in September 2018 to amend her trust and that Helen's overall neurological condition and grief from George's passing likely made her susceptible to undue influence. To prepare the report, the psychologist reviewed Helen's medical records, the pleadings, and information from Larry. Douglas refused the psychologist's offer to interview him about Helen's mental capacity. The psychologist critiqued several aspects of the evaluations performed on Helen. She testified that the MMSE was a “screener” test requiring follow-up, that Dr. Inglis spent too little time with Helen and should have made Douglas and Melanie exit the room, and that Dr. Tortora's report merely parroted legal language. The psychologist also found it “concerning” that Helen could not recall the names of all of her grandchildren.

Star page 6*6 Larry also presented the testimony of a nurse from the senior center where Helen lived in her final years. The nurse testified about quarterly reports she prepared in January and April 2018 that indicated Helen was “extremely confused,” needed help with medications, and struggled with mobility. The nurse indicated that Helen's conditions worsened over time. She also testified that Douglas and Melanie instructed the senior center not to forward calls from Larry.

Larry and Douglas both testified extensively about their family's history and relationships, as well as events surrounding their parents’ estate planning.

3. Findings of fact and conclusions of law

Following trial, the superior court entered judgment in Douglas's favor. The superior court indicated that Larry had the burden of proving Helen lacked testamentary capacity as well as the burden of proving that Douglas unduly influenced her to modify the Survivor's Trust in 2018.⁵

The court found that Helen had testamentary capacity when she amended the Survivor's Trust in September 2018. The court acknowledged evidence that Helen had dementia but credited testimony from Greer and one of the witnesses to the trust amendment that Helen appeared lucid and aware of what she was doing when she modified the trust. The court also noted Greer's meticulous documentation of Helen's capacity in anticipation of a future legal challenge. And the court accepted the reports by the examining doctors indicating Helen had mental capacity. The court rejected Larry's challenge to the integrity of those exams, crediting the physicians’ testimony that Douglas and Melanie did not influence Helen during the exams. The court determined that the evidence supporting Helen's capacity outweighed the evidence calling it into question.

Next, the superior court found that although Douglas had “some influence over Helen,” he did not influence her to a degree that compromised her free will. The court determined that Douglas and Melanie's involvement in amending the Survivor's Trust was due in part to their role as George and Helen's primary caregivers. It credited testimony from Dr. Tortora that Douglas let Helen finish her thoughts and state her opinion without interruption and “never put words in her mouth.” The court rejected Larry's suggestion that Douglas isolated Helen from Larry and other family members, noting Douglas's testimony that he instructed the senior center to limit phone calls from Larry because Larry had made Helen cry in the past. The court also noted acts by Larry that had upset his parents, including calling Helen a liar, which tended to show that the motivation to change the trust was Helen's own. The court therefore concluded the 2018 amendments to the Survivor's Trust were valid.

Star page 7*7 The court rejected Larry's claim that Douglas fraudulently conveyed trust funds to purchase a home in Anchorage, finding “no evidence to support Larry's allegation.” It credited Douglas's testimony that he was advised by a certified public accountant to remove the funds from the trust as soon as possible for tax purposes. The court did not address Larry's claim for breach of fiduciary duty.

Douglas moved for summary judgment to confirm that Larry's pecuniary bequest of $100,000 had been forfeited because he challenged the validity of the trust, per the terms of the no-contest clause. The superior court granted the motion and entered final judgment awarding the trust's assets to Douglas.

Larry appeals.

III. DISCUSSION

A. The Superior Court Did Not Clearly Err In Finding That Helen Had Capacity To Amend The Survivor's Trust.

Larry challenges the superior court's finding that Helen had testamentary capacity to amend the Survivor's Trust in 2018. The existence of testamentary capacity is a factual finding that we review for clear error.⁶ A factual finding is clearly erroneous only if we are “left with ‘a definite and firm conviction on the entire record that a mistake has been made.’ ”⁷ Having reviewed the record, we are not firmly convinced that the superior court was wrong to find that Helen had capacity, so we affirm its finding.

The test for testamentary capacity “asks whether the testator understood the nature and extent of his or her property, the natural or proper objects of his or her bounty, and the nature of his or her testamentary act.”⁸ A deficiency in any one of the three elements invalidates the will or trust.⁹ Disease — including dementia — “do[es] not alone render a [settlor] incompetent to make” a trust.¹⁰ The question is “always whether, in spite of [disease],” the settlor “had sufficient mental capacity to understand” the three elements of testamentary capacity.¹¹ The challenger must show that the settlor's mental deficiency existed when the trust was modified.¹²

The superior court found that Helen had capacity to amend the Survivor's Trust despite evidence of her dementia. Larry argues that this finding is clearly erroneous, challenging both the adequacy of the court's findings and its overall weighing of the evidence.

Regarding the adequacy of the court's findings, Larry argues the superior court failed to “clarify, no less examine, the nature and extent of Helen's property or the [objects] of her bounty” to assess her capacity. However, Larry does not point to legal authority requiring trial courts to make express factual findings about the size and composition of the estate itself at the time the trust is created in order to find that the settlor understood the nature and extent of their property. Nor does Larry explain why we should adopt such a rule.¹³ To the extent that Larry means to argue that such predicate findings are legally required, the argument is waived for inadequate briefing.¹⁴ And although Larry challenges the findings on each of the three elements of capacity as clearly erroneous, we are not firmly convinced that the superior court made a mistake.

Star page 8*8 First, there is sufficient evidence to support the finding that Helen understood “the nature and extent of her property.” Evidence that a settlor was “capable of knowing and understanding” the extent of her property “in a general way” is typically sufficient to support a finding that the settlor had mental capacity.¹⁵ Larry notes that George had valued the estate at approximately $4.2 million in 2014, and describes Helen's estimate of the estate given to Dr. Inglis in 2018, $2–3 million, as “just plain wrong.” But there is enough evidence to support the superior court's finding that Helen understood the nature and extent of her property in a “general way.” Greer, who had extensive knowledge of Helen's estate, corroborated the physicians’ conclusions that Helen generally understood the extent and nature of her property and assets. Greer testified that Helen described the value of her assets to be $2–3 million in addition to the 246 shares of Meeker, Inc. stock. Drawing inferences in the light most favorable to the superior court's finding, as we must,¹⁶ Helen's estimate differed from Larry's accounting of the estate's value by about $900,000 — a little less than a quarter of the estate's value. This discrepancy is not so large as to convince us the superior court clearly erred in finding Helen understood the extent of her property.

Larry also notes that Helen told Dr. Inglis that she owned 2,800 acres of land in Kansas, but that George only identified the couple's ownership of around 600 acres. However, the Meekers also owned stock in Meeker, Inc., which owned farmlands in Kansas that were leased to relatives to farm. Therefore, Helen may have only been unsure as to whether she owned the land or held stock in the closely-held company which owned the lands.¹⁷ A mistake about the ownership structure and precise acreage of Kansas farmland does not mean that she lacked understanding of the nature and extent of her property in a “general way.”¹⁸ Because Helen's estimates of the value of her estate and the nature of her property were reasonable approximations, we cannot say the superior court clearly erred in finding that she understood the nature and extent of her property.

Second, there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that Helen understood the natural objects of her bounty. These are the settlor's “closest family members,” such as a spouse or children.¹⁹ Helen recalled George's death, the names of her regular caretakers at the Homer Senior Center, and the names of both her sons and Douglas's living children. The settlor does not need to “know the identity or location of remote relatives who are beyond [their] immediate family circle.”²⁰ Larry points to evidence that Helen could not remember the names of his children or Douglas's deceased child. But the record does not indicate that Helen was particularly close to Larry's children or saw them regularly. And Douglas's deceased child had died over a decade earlier. That Helen forgot the names of these grandchildren does not prove that she lacked testamentary capacity.

Third, there was sufficient evidence to support the finding that Helen understood the nature of her testamentary act. For example, Dr. Inglis testified that Helen explained the purpose and function of testamentary devices during the competency evaluation. Greer testified that, in drafting the amendments to the Survivor's Trust, he suggested that Helen add a $100,000 pecuniary bequest to Larry in order to protect against a will contest, and Helen considered and accepted his suggestion. The reported exchange can support an inference of comprehension on Helen's part. Greer also had Helen sign a disengagement letter summarizing the amendments to the Survivor's Trust and indicating that she understood the nature of her testamentary act. He testified that he read this letter to Helen and had her initial it in places to indicate that she understood the changes to the trust that she was making. This evidence is sufficient to establish that Helen understood the nature and consequences of her 2018 amendments to the Survivor's Trust.

Star page 9*9 Regarding the overall weight of the evidence, Larry argues that “[o]verwhelming evidence ... presented at trial” indicated “Helen's progressively worsening dementia clearly impacted her ability to understand” the three elements of testamentary capacity noted above. He suggests that the competency evaluations performed on Helen were defective, that Greer's testimony attesting to Helen's memory contradicted those evaluations, and that the superior court “ignored” the testimony of his expert witness and the testifying nurse. These arguments all go to the superior court's credibility determinations and the weight the court gave to conflicting evidence.

“It is the function of the trial court, not of this court, to judge witnesses’ credibility and to weigh conflicting evidence.”²¹ Therefore, when reviewing factual findings, we must “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.”²² We do not “overturn a ... finding based on conflicting evidence ... [or] reweigh evidence when the record provides clear support for the trial court's ruling.”²³

It was reasonable for the superior court to give more weight to the testimony of doctors who observed Helen's capacity personally at the time she made the trust amendments than to the posthumous analysis of Helen's capacity by Larry's expert.²⁴ Nor did the superior court clearly err by giving more weight to the testimony of Helen's doctors than to conflicting testimony offered by Helen's nurse at the Homer senior center. Larry argues that the superior court clearly erred by not crediting the “objective” testimony given by the nurse who cared for Helen. But it is the superior court's role to weigh conflicting testimony in order to resolve factual disputes.²⁵

Although Helen's nurse testified that Helen displayed extreme confusion that worsened over time, Dr. Tortora, Dr. Inglis, and Greer all testified that Helen provided responsive, accurate answers to questions asked of her and was not confused about the extent of her property. The superior court might reasonably have chosen to credit the nurse's testimony over the doctors’ and Greer's. But we cannot say it was clearly wrong to do otherwise. Helen was examined by Dr. Inglis, who had never treated her before, and Dr. Tortora, who had treated her for ten years; both concluded that she had mental capacity to make financial decisions. Her longtime primary physician Dr. Bell, who examined her in April 2018 and 2019, testified that Helen's mild memory loss was largely due to her age and did not impact her executive decision-making functions. And Greer, Helen's attorney at the time, witnessed Helen sign the amended Survivor's Trust and also attested to her capacity after asking Helen questions of his own.²⁶ This is sufficient evidence to support the superior court's factual finding. And the contrary evidence Larry points to is not enough to persuade us that the superior court made a mistake.

B. The Superior Court Did Not Clearly Err In Finding That The Will And Trust Were Not The Product Of Undue Influence.

Star page 10*10 Larry also challenges the superior court's finding that Helen was not unduly influenced by Douglas when amending the trust. “[A] trust may be set aside if ‘its creation was induced by ... undue influence.’ ”²⁷ We analyze claims of undue influence under a subjective test, asking whether “the testator was virtually compelled” to make a trust, which she “would not have made had [she] been left to the free exercise of [her] own judgment and wishes.”²⁸

Generally, “[t]he party challenging the validity of a gift under a theory of undue influence must produce proof of coercion or duress which would act as a dominating power over the donor.”²⁹ But when the proponent of the will or trust “is the principal or sole beneficiary, had a confidential relationship” with the settlor, and “participated in the drafting” of the trust, a presumption of undue influence arises.³⁰ To rebut this presumption, the proponent must produce “sufficient evidence to raise the possibility that there was no undue influence.”³¹ The beneficiary must “show that he did not take advantage of the confidential relationship in influencing the testator to execute the will in his favor.”³²

When the sufficiency of the evidence rebutting the presumption is challenged on appeal, we review de novo whether that evidence is “sufficient to permit reasonable minds to conclude that the presumed fact [of undue influence] does not exist.”³³ If we conclude the evidence produced was sufficient to rebut the presumption, the burden remains with the person challenging the will to prove “that it was more probable than not that there was undue influence.”³⁴ This ultimate question is a question of fact, and we review the superior court's finding for clear error.³⁵

Although the superior court did not expressly mention the presumption of undue influence, any error is harmless³⁶ because Douglas introduced evidence “sufficient ... to raise the possibility that there was no undue influence.”³⁷ Key pieces of evidence include Larry's letters to Helen, which acknowledged that he had accused her of lying and alluded to longstanding disputes with his parents about inheritance. These letters both support the inference that Helen had independent motivation to amend the Survivor's Trust and corroborate Douglas's testimony that he limited Larry's contact with Helen at the Homer Senior Center because Larry's attempts to contact Helen upset her — not so that he could control her decision-making. The evidence of Greer's careful efforts to ascertain Helen's capacity and independent wishes also supports the inference that Douglas did not take advantage of his relationship with Helen to coerce her into removing Larry as a trust beneficiary. Douglas and Melanie also provided Helen with care and personal support for a long period of time before her death, including around the time she amended the Survivor's Trust. Given the other ways they helped Helen as she aged, their involvement in the trust amendment process could plausibly be viewed as just another way in which they helped Helen accomplish her goals, rather than as efforts to manipulate her will. Together, these pieces of evidence were sufficient to rebut the presumption of undue influence. The burden properly remained with Larry to prove that undue influence existed.

Star page 11*11 We see no clear error in the superior court's determination that Larry did not carry his ultimate burden. Larry highlights evidence that echoes the legal test for undue influence: “whether a person used coercion and duress which would act as a dominating power over the mind and act of a testator.”³⁸ For example, he notes Helen did not obtain independent counsel, and Greer did not have her sign a conflict waiver. Larry also describes the amendment to the Survivor's Trust as having been done in a hasty, rushed, and secretive manner. He notes Douglas's procurement of witnesses to the amendment, testimony from a nurse that Helen was incapable of making key decisions, and his expert's opinion that Helen was susceptible to undue influence. Larry also charges that Helen's change of attitude toward him was a result of “Melanie and Doug[las]’s multi-year effort to cut Larry off from his parents.”

Yet when we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the superior court's finding, we are not firmly convinced that a mistake was made.³⁹ Larry's arguments invite us to reweigh conflicting evidence. That is not our role.⁴⁰ There was certainly enough evidence for the court to find that Douglas had unduly influenced Helen to change the terms of the Survivor's Trust. But the superior court chose to credit evidence suggesting Douglas and Melanie's involvement in the amendment process was limited to their being Helen's caregivers, and credited testimony that Douglas and Melanie were respectful of Helen and “never put words in her mouth.” The court also credited Douglas's testimony that he instructed the senior center to limit phone calls from Larry because Larry upset Helen. And it pointed to the letters Larry wrote as evidence suggesting that his estranged relationship with Helen prompted her to amend the trust. There was sufficient evidence to support the inferences the superior court drew, so we cannot say it was clearly wrong in finding that the 2018 amendments to the Survivor's Trust were not the product of undue influence.

C. The Fraudulent Conveyance And Breach Of Fiduciary Duty Claims Are Moot.

Because we uphold the superior court's rulings that Helen's amendments to the trust were valid, Larry's other claims are moot. “A case is moot if the party bringing the action would not be entitled to any relief even if they prevail[ed].”⁴¹ The remedy for Larry's fraudulent conveyance and breach of fiduciary duty claims would be to require Douglas to repay money to the Survivor's Trust. And because Larry is not entitled to any money from the trust, success on those claims would not bring him any relief.

Larry's fraudulent conveyance claim rests on the allegation that Douglas fraudulently conveyed trust assets to himself in order to purchase a house in Anchorage shortly after Helen's death.⁴² “It is well established that the usual remedy for fraudulent conveyance is voiding the transfers.”⁴³ Larry argues that the challenged transfer in this case should be voided and the funds “returned to the [Survivor's] Trust for distribution.” But since Larry is not entitled to any distribution from the trust, voiding the transfers and returning the funds to the trust gives him no remedy.

Star page 12*12 Larry's breach of fiduciary duty claim rests on the assertion that Douglas failed to keep him reasonably informed of the administration of the Survivor's Trust. Larry primarily points to the disappearance of several debts owed by Douglas and Melanie to George and Helen from spreadsheets listing the assets of the estate; he also points to evidence of Douglas and Melanie's poor accounting habits, lack of knowledge of the Survivor's Trust's value, and diversion of trust funds into the couple's personal accounts. But because Larry is not entitled to any funds from the trust, success on the breach of fiduciary duty would not benefit him personally.⁴⁴ Therefore, these claims are moot and we decline to address them.⁴⁵

IV. CONCLUSION

We AFFIRM the judgment of the superior court.

Footnotes

1

Larry and Douglas each have three children. One of Douglas's children died in 2006.

2

Dr. Inglis testified that the MMSE is a published test that physicians often use to determine whether a patient may suffer from cognitive impairment such as dementia, and if so, to what degree. The test ranks cognitive function as either normal function (27 to 30), mild impairment (21 to 26), moderate impairment (11 to 20), or severe impairment (0 to 10).

3

See Paskvan v. Mesich, 455 P.2d 229, 233 (Alaska 1969) (“[W]hen the principal or sole beneficiary under a will, who had a confidential relationship with the testator, participated in the drafting of the will, then a presumption of undue influence arises.”).

4

Greer explained that he corresponded with Helen via email through Douglas and Melanie because Helen did not have email access at the senior center.

5

The superior court mentioned AS 13.12.570, which is not applicable to this case, but the error was harmless. Douglas originally filed the petition to validate the Survivor's Trust under AS 13.12.535, which relates to the establishment of trust validity before a settlor's death. That petition was filed in April 2021 after Helen died. This seemingly led the superior court to turn to AS 13.12.570 for the correct burden of proof; AS 13.12.570 also relates to validating trusts before the settlor's death. But when revocable trusts function as will substitutes, the standards generally applicable to wills are applicable to such trusts. Restatement (Third) of Tr. § 11 cmt. b (A.L.I. 2003). The statute applicable to disputes over wills is AS 13.16.170, which provides that “[c]ontestants of a will have the burden of establishing lack of testamentary intent or capacity [or] undue influence.” Although the superior court cited an inapplicable statute, the error was harmless because, as our opinion later explains, the ultimate burden of proving both lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence rested on Larry.

6

Crittell v. Bingo, 36 P.3d 634, 638 (Alaska 2001).

7

Id. (quoting In re Est. of Kottke, 6 P.3d 243, 245 (Alaska 2000)).

8

In re Kottke, 6 P.3d at 246. “The capacity requirement applicable to wills ... applies to those will substitutes that are revocable.” Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Wills & Other Donative Transfers § 8.1 cmt. e (A.L.I. 2003).

9

In re Kottke, 6 P.3d at 246.

10

In re Est. of Kraft, 374 P.2d 413, 415 (Alaska 1962); 62 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts 197 § 13 (2001) (“[A] diagnosis of ... dementia, without further evidence of testamentary incapacity, is not sufficient to invalidate a will .... Proof that the testator's mental faculties were impaired is required.”).

11

In re Kraft, 374 P.2d at 415-16.

12

Paskvan v. Mesich, 455 P.2d 229, 239 (Alaska 1969) (adopting rule that challenger has burden of showing lack of testamentary capacity).

13

There was sufficient evidence presented to allow the court to compare Helen's estimates of the estate's value with other contemporaneous estimates of its value.

14

See Coppe v. Bleicher, 318 P.3d 369, 379 (Alaska 2014) (holding argument waived when appellant offered no citation to legal authority or legal theory to support it).

15

Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Wills & Other Donative Transfers § 8.1(b) (A.L.I. 2003); see In re Kraft, 372 P.2d at 415 (upholding validity of will following evidence that testator generally understood his property, bounty, and testamentary act).

16

In re Est. of Kottke, 6 P.3d 243, 245 (Alaska 2000).

17

Larry does not address the acreage owned by Meeker, Inc. in his arguments.

18

See Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Wills & Other Donative Transfers § 8.1(b) (testator or donor need only understand extent of property “in a general way”).

19

Id. § 8.1 cmt. c.

20

Id.

21

In re Est. of Rodman, 498 P.3d 1054, 1066 (Alaska 2021) (quoting Dara S. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Off. of Child.’s Servs., 426 P.3d 975, 989 (Alaska 2018)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

22

In re Est. of Kottke, 6 P.3d 243, 245 (Alaska 2000).

23

In re Rodman, 498 P.3d at 1066 (quoting State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Off. of Child.’s Servs. v. Dara S., 458 P.3d 90, 98 (Alaska 2020)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Downing v. Shoreside Petroleum, Inc., 563 P.3d 34, 39 (Alaska 2025) (“[W]e will not find clear error in the superior court's reliance on one expert's testimony over another's so long as the record contains sufficient support for the court's decision.”).

24

See Paskvan v. Mesich, 455 P.2d 229, 239-40 (Alaska 1969) (placing greater value on testimony of witnesses with more extensive connections and relationships with testator in determining whether testator had capacity).

25

In re Rodman, 498 P.3d at 1066.

26

Larry argues that Greer's testimony that Helen could name all of her surviving grandchildren roughly a week after Dr. Inglis reported Helen could not name those same grandchildren “defies belief.” It is reasonable to believe that Helen would, in the process of amending her will and trust, refresh her memory of important details.

27

Purcella v. Olive Kathryn Purcella Tr., 325 P.3d 987, 993 (Alaska 2014) (quoting Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 12 cmt. b (A.L.I. 2003)).

28

In re Est. of Kraft, 374 P.2d 413, 417 (Alaska 1962); see also Restatement (Third) of Tr. § 11 cmt. b.

29

In re Est. of Rousey, 568 P.3d 717, 728 (Alaska 2025) (quoting Ware v. Ware, 161 P.3d 1188, 1193 (Alaska 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

30

Helgason v. Merriman, 36 P.3d 703, 708 (Alaska 2001) (quoting Paskvan v. Mesich, 455 P.2d 229, 233 (Alaska 1969)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

31

In re Est. of McCoy, 844 P.2d 1131, 1135 (Alaska 1993) (emphasis omitted).

32

Id. (quoting Paskvan, 455 P.2d at 233).

33

See Alaska R. Evid. 301 (explaining operation of evidentiary presumptions); In re McCoy, 844 P.2d at 1135 (holding that will beneficiary presented sufficient evidence to rebut presumption of undue influence).

34

In re McCoy, 844 P.2d at 1135 (emphasis omitted).

35

Crittell v. Bingo, 36 P.3d 634, 638 (Alaska 2001).

36

Alaska R. Civ. P. 61 (instructing court to “disregard any error or defect ... which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties”).

37

Crittell, 36 P.3d at 638 (emphasis omitted).

38

Crittell, 36 P.3d at 639 (quoting Paskvan, 455 P.2d at 234) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Crittell, we adopted the Oregon Supreme Court's list of factors in considering whether undue influence was perpetrated by fraud:

whether the testator (1) received independent advice in the will-making process, (2) shrouded the will in secrecy and haste (suspicious circumstances), (3) exhibited an unexplained change in attitude toward others, (4) suddenly changed a prior plan of disposition, (5) made unnatural or unjust gifts, or (6) demonstrated a susceptibility to influence based on a weak physical or mental condition.

Id. at 642 (citing In re Est. of Reddaway, 329 P.2d 886, 891-93 (Oregon 1958)).

39

In re Est. of Kottke, 6 P.3d 243, 245 (Alaska 2000).

40

In re Est. of Rodman, 498 P.3d 1054, 1066 (Alaska 2021) (quoting Dara S. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Off. of Child.’s Servs., 426 P.3d 975, 989 (Alaska 2018)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

41

Maynard v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 902 P.2d 1328, 1329 n.2 (Alaska 1995).

42

Even under the terms of the 2014 trust that Larry advocates, Douglas was still entitled to half of the trust's roughly $4 million. So it is not obvious that Douglas, who was the trustee, committed fraud by distributing to himself $725,000. But we need not decide this point because the issue is moot.

43

Merdes & Merdes, P.C. v. Leisnoi, Inc., 410 P.3d 398, 410 (Alaska 2017) (citing 37 AM. JUR. 2D, Fraudulent Conveyances and Transfers § 116 (2013)).

44

At oral argument, Larry's counsel seemed to concede that there was no remedy for this claim beyond a “moral victory” if we ruled against Larry on his challenges to Helen's capacity and undue influence.

45

Ulmer v. Alaska Rest. & Beverage Ass'n, 33 P.3d 773, 776 (Alaska 2001) (quoting Gerstein v. Axtell, 960 P.2d 599, 601 (Alaska 1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

End of Document