In re the Marriage of Wells

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: April 23, 2025
• Docket: 24-1125
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-1125 Filed April 23, 2025

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF KAROL A. BANKS WELLS AND LYLE E. WELLS

Upon the Petition of KAROL A. BANKS WELLS, Petitioner-Appellee,

And Concerning LYLE E. WELLS, Respondent-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Appanoose County, Michael

Carpenter, Judge.

Lyle Wells appeals the decree dissolving his marriage to Karol Wells.

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.

Mark R. Hinshaw (argued) of The Law Offices of Mark R. Hinshaw, West

Des Moines, for appellant.

Heather M. Simplot (argued) of Harrison, Moreland, Webber & Simplot,

P.C., Ottumwa, for appellee.

Heard at oral argument by Tabor, C.J., Langholz, J., and Doyle, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2025). 2

DOYLE, Senior Judge.

Lyle (Sonny) Wells appeals the decree dissolving his marriage to Karol

Wells. The only question on appeal is whether Karol proved the existence of a

common law marriage. Because a preponderance of the evidence supports the

existence of a common law marriage, we affirm the decree dissolving the marriage

but remand to the district court to determine a reasonable award of appellate

attorney fees.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

In December 2012, Sonny and Karol married during a formal ceremony. At

the time, Lyle’s net worth was almost $1,000,000 while Karol had no property of

significant value and no debt. So at Sonny’s insistence, Karol signed a prenuptial

agreement before the ceremony. The decree dissolving the marriage was entered

in December 2013.

Although the parties divorced, Karol testified that she and Sonny “were

never apart,” so she viewed the dissolution decree as “just a piece of paper.” She

claims that in March 2014, Sonny proposed buying a home for them both. She

recalled looking at a house together in August and Sonny telling her, “If that’s the

one you want, that’s the one you’ll get.” Sonny made an offer on the house, and

the sale closed in October 2014. Only Sonny’s name is listed on the deed, and he

testified that Karol never contributed to the mortgage payments. 3

In Karol’s view, she and Sonny were married by the time Sonny bought the

new home. Although Karol never changed her legal name,1 she sometimes went

by Karol Banks-Wells or Karol Wells. When Sonny bought the new house, Karol

bought a large landscaping rock with “Sonny and Karol Wells” written on it and

placed it beside the sidewalk that led to the backdoor. The rock was clearly visible

to anyone approaching the home; according to Karol, “You couldn’t miss it.” She

claims that Sonny never objected to the rock and referred to her as his wife.

Sonny’s grandchildren called her both “Grandma” and “Grandma Karol.”

Sonny claims that he never intended to remarry Karol or told anyone they

were married after their 2013 divorce. Sonny also denies that he and Karol had a

relationship after their divorce. He testified that he only allowed Karol to live with

him because he “felt sorry for her.” Sonny also admits he added Karol to his

checking account but claimed he did so “just so she could pay the bills with my

money.”

For tax years 2014 through 2016, Sonny filed tax returns as “single.” But

starting in 2017, Sonny and Karol filed as “married filing jointly.” In May 2017,

Sonny signed a financial statement that listed his marital status as married. That

same month, Sonny bought a life insurance policy that designated Karol as his

beneficiary.

In May 2022, Karol petitioned to dissolve her marriage to Sonny, claiming

that a common law marriage began in 2014. Sonny denied the existence of a

1 Karol did not change her name when she and Lyle married in December 2012,

so there was no need for her to change her name when they divorced one year later. 4

common law marriage. In a thorough and well-reasoned ruling, the district court

determined that the evidence shows a common law marriage began in 2017. The

court dissolved the marriage and divided the parties’ assets and debts. It declined

to award Karol spousal support but ordered Sonny to pay $4000 of Karol’s trial

attorney fees. On appeal, Sonny challenges the existence of a common law

marriage.

II. Scope of Review.

A divorce action is an equitable proceeding. Iowa Code § 598.3 (2022).

Our review is de novo. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.907 (“In equity cases review is de

novo.”); In re Marriage of Martin, 681 N.W.2d 612, 616 (Iowa 2004) (“We review

claims of a common law marriage de novo.”). We give weight to the district court’s

fact findings, especially those involving determinations of witness credibility, but

are not bound by them. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(3)(g).

III. Discussion.

The only issue before this court is whether Karol proved the existence of a

common law marriage by a preponderance of the evidence. See Martin, 681

N.W.2d at 617 (stating that the party claiming the existence of a common law

marriage bears the burden of proof); In re Marriage of Winegard, 257 N.W.2d 609,

615 (Iowa 1977) (considering whether a preponderance of the evidence showed a

common law marriage). The existence of a common law marriage depends on

proof of three elements: “(1) present intent and agreement to be married by both

parties; (2) continuous cohabitation; and (3) public declaration that the parties are

husband and wife.” Martin, 681 N.W.2d at 617 (cleaned up). “Proof of

cohabitation, as well as evidence of conduct and general repute in the community 5

where the parties reside, tends to strengthen the showing of present agreement to

be husband and wife, as well as bearing upon the question of intent.” In re

Marriage of Gebhardt, 426 N.W.2d 651, 652 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988).

A. Present intent and agreement to be married.

We begin by considering whether Karol has proved the requisite intent and

agreement to be married. A present intent and agreement to be married “reflects

the contractual nature of marriage.” Martin, 681 N.W.2d 617. It does not require

an express agreement. Id. If “one party intends present marriage and the conduct

of the other party reflects the same intent,” an implicit agreement may exist to

support a common law marriage. Id. Evidence supporting a present intent and

agreement includes the parties’ conduct and general reputation in the community.

Id.

The parties gave conflicting testimony on intent. The district court found

clear evidence that Karol intended to be married beginning in 2014. But noting

that “it takes two to tango,” the court found Sonny’s purchase of a home in his

name alone and filing tax returns a single person from 2014 through 2016 belied

an intent to remarry. The court was also skeptical that Sonny would be willing to

remarry Karol without the protection of a prenuptial agreement just eight months

after they divorced.

Although the court found the parties’ intentions were mismatched initially, it

did not end its inquiry there. Instead, it found Sonny’s actions in May 2017 and

beyond show that he “capitulated to Karol’s longstanding assertion of marriage and

decided that he and Karol were married after all.” That month, Sonny signed a

financial statement that stated he was married. Shortly after, he bought a life 6

insurance policy and named Karol as his beneficiary. Sonny also filed his taxes

as “married filing jointly” beginning with his 2017 return and for each year after

through 2021. We agree that on this basis, a preponderance of evidence shows

Sonny considered he and Karol married starting in May 2017.

B. Cohabitation.

We turn then to the question of continuous cohabitation, which provides

circumstantial evidence of a common law marriage but cannot alone establish a

common law marriage. Id. There is no time requirement for cohabitation to show

common law marriage. Id. “Instead, it is important for the cohabitation to be tied

to the present intent and agreement to be married.” Id.

The evidence shows the parties cohabited beginning in 2014. Although

they disagreed as to their marital status until 2017, the evidence of their continuous

cohabitation supports finding a common law marriage.

C. Public declaration or holding out to the public.

Finally, we consider whether Karol showed that she and Sonny publicly

declared or held themselves out as married, which is considered the best evidence

of a common law marriage. See id. at 618. “In other words, there can be no secret

common-law marriage.” In re Est. of Dallman, 228 N.W.2d 187, 190 (Iowa 1975).

But there is no requirement that all public declarations are “entirely consistent with

marriage. A substantial holding out to the public in general is sufficient.” Martin,

681 N.W.2d at 618 (internal citations omitted).

Karol showed by a preponderance of the evidence that she and Sonny

publicly declared or held themselves out as married. The evidence shows that

Karol placed a large rock that read “Sonny and Karol Wells” by the sidewalk leading 7

to their backdoor. More importantly, the evidence shows that the couple was

viewed as married by family and friends. Despite Karol never legally changing her

name, mail sent by family and friends from 2017 forward was addressed to “Sonny

and Karol Wells” or “Mr. and Mrs. Lyle Wells.” The district court also noted the

obituary for Karol’s father referred to her as “Karol Banks (Sonny) Wells.” Sonny’s

grandchildren referred to Karol as “Grandma” or “Grandma Karol.” We agree that

this evidence shows that Sonny and Karol held themselves out as married.

D. Conclusion.

In support of his claim that no common law marriage existed, Sonny cites

three cases in which the appellate courts found that the parties claiming the

existence of a common law marriage failed to meet their burden of proof: Martin,

681 N.W.2d at 615, In re Marriage of Derryberry, No. 13-0408, 2014 WL 2884760,

at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. June 25, 2014), and In re Marriage of Nichols & Mauro, No. 23-

0767, 2024 WL 697752, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2024).

In Martin, as here, a couple divorced but continued living together in a home

purchased by one party while often presenting themselves to the community as

husband and wife. 681 N.W.2d at 615–16. Although they consistently filed

separate tax returns and maintained separate bank accounts, they each

contributed to household expenses. Id. at 615. In some documents, one party

declared himself married while indicating he was single in others. Id. at 615–16.

The court found, “The fluctuating status of their relationship was, from the

beginning, largely based on personal convenience or benefit, which is inconsistent

with the concept of marriage.” Id. at 618. Noting that one party refused the other’s

request to remarry four years into this arrangement, the supreme court ultimately 8

concluded that there was insufficient evidence establishing a common law

marriage. Id.

In Derryberry, this court considered whether a couple that was twice married

and divorced entered a common law marriage while cohabiting years later. 2014

WL 2884760, at *1–2. Although the parties cohabited, we found conflicting

evidence of the other elements because they listed their status as married or single

depending on the circumstance and benefit. Id. at *3–6. We disregarded evidence

of one party’s family calling the other party a stepparent, grandparent, or “in-law”

because those identifiers resulted from the two prior marriages, not the parties’

intent to remarry. Id. at *4.

Recently, this court rejected a claim of common law marriage in Nichols,

2024 WL 697752, at *1. Although the parties filed tax returns as “married filing

jointly” for twenty years, we found “the parties’ shifting assertions of married and

single status in various contexts reflect an intent to serve their personal

convenience or financial benefit—not a present intent and agreement to be

married.” Id.

The evidence before us is distinguishable from the cases cited by Sonny.

While those cases involved conflicting evidence about marital status, the evidence

here shows that conflict largely resolved in 2017, when the district court

determined that Sonny revised his assessment of their relationship. Sonny’s

testimony is largely silent about the nature of his relationship with Karol after their

2013 divorce apart from testimony that disparaged her character. But his claim

that he allowed Karol to live with him and did not kick her out only because he felt 9

sorry for her is not credible. The greater evidence supports finding a common law

marriage starting in 2017.

Because Karol proved each element of a common law marriage by a

preponderance of the evidence, we affirm.

IV. Appellate Attorney Fees.

Finally, Karol requests an award of her appellate attorney fees. An award

of appellate attorney fees is not a matter of right but rests within this court’s

discretion. See In re Marriage of McDermott, 827 N.W.2d 671, 687 (Iowa 2013).

In deciding whether to award appellate attorney fees, we consider the needs of the

party making the request, the ability of the other party to pay, and the merits of the

appeal. See id. Based on these factors, we grant Karol’s request for appellate

attorney fees incurred in successfully defending the dissolution decree. Because

Karol did not submit an attorney fee affidavit in support of her request, we remand

to the district court to decide a reasonable amount of appellate attorney fees to

award. See In re Marriage of Samuels, 15 N.W.3d 801, 809 (Iowa Ct. App. 2024).