2026 IL App (2d) 250161-U No. 2-25-0161 Order filed April 6, 2026
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
In re THE MARRIAGE OF RACHELLE M. WEISS, f/k/a Rachelle M. Holtman, Petitioner-Appellant,
and
ROGER A. HOLTMAN, Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of De Kalb County. Honorable Stephanie P. Klein, Judge, Presiding. No. 06-D-253
JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Jorgensen and Birkett concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court did not err in granting a directed finding for respondent on the petition for contribution to their daughters’ postsecondary educational expenses; Petitioner produced no evidence of the children’s financial resources or what portion of their larger educational expenses, such as tuition and housing, petitioner actually paid.
¶2 In this postdecree proceeding, petitioner, Rachelle A. Weiss, f/k/a Rachelle A. Holtman,
filed a petition for contribution against respondent, Roger A. Holtman, to order him to contribute
to the college expenses of the parties’ daughters, Cassandra and Jennifer Holtman, in accordance
with. The trial court found that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case for contribution under section 513 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act) (750 ILCS 5/513
(West 2022) and granted a directed finding (735 ILCS 5/2-1110 (West 2022)) in respondent’s favor.
Petitioner appeals, and for the reasons that follow, we affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 The parties were married in 2000. On November 17, 2006, the trial court entered a
judgment dissolving their marriage. The judgment incorporated a marital settlement agreement
(MSA). At the time, Cassandra was five years old and Jennifer was one. Section VI 1 of the MSA
addressed the payment of the children’s postsecondary education expenses, which included but
were not limited to “tuition, books, supplies, activity fees, registration fees, room and board.” In
pertinent part, section VI further stated:
“C. COURT DECIDES. The parties agree that the court shall decide the issue of
the parental contribution for post-high school education, if there is any, and if the parents
cannot agree, at the time each child pursues such education, using the appropriate statutory
standard as it exists at that time.
D. PARENTAL OBIGATION LIMITED ***. Notwithstanding anything contained
herein to the contrary, the parental obligation for educational expenses, if any[,] shall not
exceed what is then being charged for educational expenses at Northern Illinois University
[(NIU)] in DeKalb, Illinois. ***.
***
1 Due to a clerical error, the MSA has two section VI’s. We are concerned with the second section
VI listed in the MSA.
-2- F. CHILD’S OBLIGATION TO APPLY FOR LOANS, GRANTS, AND
SCHOLARSHIPS. A child of the parties shall be obligated to, and the parents will
cooperate in making application for, such governmental guaranteed loans, grants, or
scholarships as may be available to the child.”
¶5 On January 17, 2023, petitioner filed her petition, which alleged as follows. Cassandra and
Jennifer had both graduated from high school and were pursuing opportunities for postsecondary
education. Petitioner was already contributing to the children’s postsecondary educational
expenses, but respondent had contributed nothing. The parties had no agreement on paying for
educational expenses. Thus, per section VI(C) of the MSA, the trial court should determine, under
section 513 of the Act (750 ILCS 5/513), the parties’ respective contributions to these expenses.
In his response, dated February 24, 2023, respondent denied that he had “failed and refused” to
contribute to the children’s expenses. He alleged, rather, that his financial resources did not enable
him to contribute to those expenses and that petitioner’s financial resources far outweighed his.
¶6 On September 20, 2024, the trial court held a bench trial. Petitioner proceeded pro se. On
petitioner’s direct examination, the trial court admitted exhibits documenting both daughters’
academic records. Petitioner also introduced tuition and expense statements from the universities
the daughters attended. Relative to Cassandra, petitioner introduced a document from the
University of Memphis entitled “Detailed Account Activity,” showing tuition and various other
charges for the fall term 2022, spring term 2023, summer term 2023, fall term 2023, and spring
term 2024. The statement also showed credits, including loans, scholarships, and payments.
¶7 Relative to Jennifer, petitioner introduced, as Petitioner’s exhibits Nos. 14 through 16,
account statements from the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, for the fall term 2023, spring
term 2024, and summer term 2024. These statements reflected tuition and other charges and also
-3- showed credits, including scholarships, grants, and payments. Petitioner’s exhibit No. 14 showed
total charges of $14,414.12. Petitioner’s exhibit No. 15 showed total charges of $14,165.72.
Petitioner’s exhibit No. 16 showed total charges of $1,542.84. Each statement was generated on
September 6, 2024; as of that date, there was a balance of $1,027.
¶8 Also relative to Jennifer, petitioner introduced an “NIU Planning and Cost Estimator” dated
May 21, 2024. The document contained a chart indicating that, for each of the fall 2024 and spring
2025 terms, the total cost of Jennifer’s education as an engineering major would be $17,958.18,
consisting of (1) tuition, general fees, and expenses totaling $11,387.18; and (2) room and board
totaling $6,571. The combined cost for 2024-25 was $35,915.36. Beneath the chart was a section
titled “Estimated Cost of Attendance,” which indicated that the total expense for a 2024-25 full-
time undergraduate would be $31,030. 2
¶9 Petitioner then testified in narrative as follows. In January 2023, Cassandra began the
spring semester of her junior year at the University of Memphis. She completed three full terms
and a partial summer term before graduating in May 2024 with a business degree. Her expenses
included $856.04 for a computer and between $435.83 and $459.18 per month for automobile
insurance. In August 2023, Jennifer started attending the University of Tennessee, Knoxville’s
engineering school. She completed standard terms in fall 2023 and spring 2024 and a “mini term”
in summer 2024.
¶ 10 Petitioner testified that, in October 2023, she made a $210 “down payment” for Jennifer’s
apartment. Petitioner paid $1,462 for Jennifer’s “August 1st rent” and $1,515.08 for Jennifer’s
“September 1st rent.” Petitioner paid $1,973.18 for a “mouse and engineering laptop” for Jennifer
2 It is unclear what accounted for the disparity in the cost estimates.
-4- and $310 for her on-campus parking. From mid-August through December 2023, petitioner paid
various specified amounts for Jennifer’s (1) off-campus meals, groceries, and gas; (2) lab
equipment and other class necessities; and (3) miscellaneous educational charges. Petitioner
identified these expenditures on the invoices and credit card statements she introduced into
evidence. Petitioner also produced documentation that she paid $307.93 for four college
applications and the ACT. However, these latter obligations were incurred no later than November
1, 2022 (well before the filing of the petition).
¶ 11 Petitioner also introduced, as petitioner’s exhibit Nos. 87 through 97, statements from a
First Horizon account held jointly by petitioner and Jennifer. These statements showed several
deposits from “Cutco/Vector.” Petitioner did not identify “Cutco/Vector” until the trial court
granted the hearing on her motion to reconsider. Infra ¶ 34.
¶ 12 Petitioner testified next about her financial circumstances. She was the sole provider for
Cassandra, Jennifer, and a third daughter with special needs. The family home was titled solely in
petitioner’s name, and she was paying the entire mortgage. She introduced documentation that she
had a monthly mortgage payment of $1,829.63 and a monthly home equity line of credit payment
of $1,487.19. She had a Venmo account with a balance due of $2,092.82, an Amazon account with
a balance due of $6,053.58, a Target account with a balance due of $1,817.75, and a Citibank
account with a balance due of $23,0918.28. She had withdrawn $45,000 from her 401(k) account
to cover various expenses.
¶ 13 On cross-examination, petitioner’s financial affidavit, dated January 12, 2024, was
admitted into evidence. It stated the following. Petitioner’s monthly gross income from all sources
(she listed only her wages) was $15,007.76. Her total monthly payroll deductions were $3,116.98.
Her total monthly living expenses, including mortgage ($1,077) and car payment, were
-5- $15,680.87. Her health insurance expenses were $380 per month. Petitioner’s monthly debt
payments (exclusive of mortgage and car payment) totaled $1,736.69. Her assets included $6,336
in cash or cash equivalents; real estate with a fair market value of $429,900 and a balance due of
$180,000; motor vehicles with a total fair market value of $22,051 and a total balance due of
$4,062; a life insurance policy with a death benefit of $540,000 and zero cash value; four
retirement accounts with a total fair market value of $515,858; and a nonfunctional car with a fair
market value of $6,800. For tax year 2021, petitioner received a refund of $39,300; for tax year
2022, she owed $7,553.
¶ 14 Petitioner testified that her total retirement savings, as indicated in her financial affidavit,
did not reflect a $45,000 withdrawal from a 401(k) account in July 2023. Otherwise, the affidavit
was current.
¶ 15 Petitioner initially testified that Cassandra started school after January 17, 2023 (the
petition’s filing date), but petitioner later admitted that, on December 12, 2022, the University of
Memphis issued a charge for tuition and books, with a due date of January 9, 2023 (the invoice
was admitted into evidence). Asked how much she paid directly to the university for Cassandra’s
schooling for the spring 2023 term, petitioner testified, “I don’t know an exact number.” For the
fall 2023 term, petitioner paid all of Cassandra’s tuition, minus the approximately $2,000 she
received in scholarships. As of the date of trial, Cassandra’s school expenses were paid in full.
¶ 16 Respondent asked petitioner whether she was asking the trial court to order respondent to
reimburse her for any payments she made to the University of Memphis for Cassandra’s education.
Petitioner replied that she was “not asking for any money for [herself].” Respondent then asked
petitioner whether she was asking the trial court to reimburse her for any payments she made to
the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, for Jennifer’s education. She initially replied “Yes,” but
-6- after further interchange, she said, “No.” She agreed with respondent that Jennifer’s expenses at
the university “ha[d] been paid *** all the way through this fall 2024 semester.” Petitioner’s
testimony continued:
“Q. So are you just asking then that [respondent] contribute something toward
college in the future semesters for [Jennifer]?
A. I wasn’t, no.”
After further interchange, petitioner said that she was indeed “asking for future costs.”
¶ 17 At this point, the trial court interjected and asked petitioner to clarify what she was seeking.
She replied:
“I was hoping to get $4,000 a semester per girl for their expenses starting January 2022
including their tuition fees per semester and then starting in the future I’m asking for $1,200
a month payable by myself and [respondent] to [Jennifer] to cover all her expenses.”
¶ 18 Petitioner called respondent. He acknowledged that he had not yet contributed at all to the
children’s college expenses. Respondent’s current yearly salary was approximately $72,000. He
had no other income and was drawing no money from a pension he had with a former employer.
Respondent was 58 years old; if he started drawing pension benefits at age 60, he would receive
approximately $585 monthly. His 401(k) account with his current employer was worth
approximately $42,000. To respondent’s knowledge, he had no trust, rental, dividend, or interest
income. Respondent did not know his current wife’s income. They had separate bank accounts,
but they shared monthly bills of $100 for gas for the home, $130 to $140 for electricity, and $100
for telephone service, all of which they paid out of a joint account.
¶ 19 The trial court admitted respondent’s most recent financial affidavit, dated August 14,
2023. It stated as follows. Respondent’s monthly gross income from all sources (he listed only his
-7- wages) was $6,036.56. His total monthly payroll deductions were $1,220.50. He no longer paid
child support. His total monthly living expenses, including mortgage ($1,723.94) and car payment,
were $5,410.94. His monthly expenses also included $60 for his children’s health insurance (his
was employer-provided) and $1,287.67 for debt payment (exclusive of mortgage and car payment).
His assets included $1,109.06 in cash and cash equivalents; $406,085.50 in retirement accounts,
predominantly an Edward Jones account; real estate with a fair market value of $340,000 and a
balance due of $201,500; vehicles with a combined fair market value of $63,000 and a combined
balance due of $43,700; and two life insurance policies with combined death benefits of $125,000
and zero cash value. For tax year 2022, respondent received federal and state refunds totaling
$2,410.
¶ 20 Respondent testified that, as of the date of trial, he “probably” had $120,000 to $130,000
of equity in his home. His mortgage payments were $1785 monthly. His checking account had a
balance of about $900, and his savings account had a balance of about $600. His investment
account with Edward Jones was worth approximately $400,000.
¶ 21 On cross-examination, respondent testified that the bursar’s offices at his children’s
universities had denied his requests for information on their college expenses. Petitioner never told
respondent what she paid in any semester for either child or what scholarships either child had
received.
¶ 22 Petitioner called Cassandra. The trial court admitted copies of leases for apartments that
listed Cassandra and her roommate as tenants for November 15, 2022, through October 31, 2023,
and for December 1, 2023, through November 30, 2024. The leases were both unsigned. Cassandra
testified that, of the monthly rents of $855 and $955 shown in the leases, her roommate paid $500,
and she paid the balance plus utilities. She received a scholarship of between $2,000 and $3,000
-8- from the University of Memphis each semester from January 17, 2023 (her first day of class),
through May 2024, when she graduated. While enrolled, Cassandra incurred student loan debts.
She paid her college expenses by working part-time. She has since paid off her student loan debt.
¶ 23 Petitioner rested. Respondent moved for a directed finding to deny petitioner any relief. He
argued, “We have no idea what [petitioner] paid for either child’s college expenses all the way up
until today. We have no idea what the college expenses are going to be for January moving
forward.”
¶ 24 Petitioner responded that she had introduced ample evidence of her children’s college
expenses—for instance, petitioner’s exhibits Nos. 14 through 16, the account statements from the
University of Tennessee, Knoxville. When the trial court asked petitioner what relief she sought,
she replied that she wanted lump payments directly to Cassandra ($15,385) and Jennifer
($17,128.64) for expenses paid, plus biweekly payments directly to Jennifer for future expenses.
¶ 25 Respondent replied that Cassandra had testified that all her educational expenses had been
paid; he reiterated that there was “no evidence of what was actually paid.”
¶ 26 In ruling on respondent’s motion, the trial court began with the pertinent statute, section
513 of the Act. As pertinent here, it reads:
“(a) The court may award sums of money out of the property and income of either
or both parties *** as equity may require, for the educational expenses of any child of the
parties. ***.
(d) Educational expenses may include, but shall not be limited to, the following:
(1) except for good cause shown, the actual cost of the child’s post-
secondary expenses, including tuition and fees, provided that the cost for tuition
-9- and fees does not exceed the amount of in-state tuition and fees paid by a student
at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign for the same academic year;
(2) except for good cause shown, the actual costs of the child’s housing
expenses, whether on-campus or off-campus, provided that the housing expenses
do not exceed the cost for the same academic year of a double-occupancy student
room, with a standard meal plan, in a residence hall operated by the University of
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign;
(3) the actual cost of the child’s medical expenses, including medical
insurance, and dental expenses;
(4) the reasonable living expenses of the child during the academic year and
periods of recess;
(A) if the child is a resident student attending a post-secondary
educational program; or
(5) the cost of books and other supplies necessary to attend college.
(j) In making awards under this Section, or pursuant to a petition or motion to
decrease, modify, or terminate any such award, the court shall consider all relevant factors
that appear reasonable and necessary, including:
(1) The present and future financial resources of both parties to meet their
needs, including, but not limited to, savings for retirement.
(2) The standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the marriage
not been dissolved.
- 10 - (3) The financial resources of the child.
(4) The child’s academic performance.
(k) The establishment of an obligation to pay under this Section is retroactive only
to the date of filing a petition. The right to enforce a prior obligation to pay may be enforced
either before or after the obligation is incurred.” 750 ILCS 5/513 (West 2022).
¶ 27 The trial court noted that petitioner “[bore] the burden of proof of establishing at this point
in the proceedings at least sufficient evidence of all of the elements for the case to move forward.”
The court then addressed the expenses listed in subsection (d) and the factor identified in
subsection (j)(1): the parties’ financial resources:
“I will start first in looking at what the statute says, and it starts with talking about the cost
of tuition and that the tuition—there’s a cap in the statute as to the amount of tuition as well
as to the amount of housing expenses.
I haven’t received any evidence as to where these—even if I were to assume that
these reflected actual expenses[,] where they fall with regards to the statutory cap, but even
leaving that aside, again, I’ve heard evidence about [petitioner’s] financial resources. I have
heard some evidence about [respondent’s] financial resources. ***.”
¶ 28 As to the subsection (j)(2) factor (the standard of living that the children would have
enjoyed had the marriage not been dissolved), the trial court stated, “I have heard evidence about,
again, their financial situations that I think would probably play into that.” The court then
addressed the subsection (j)(3) factor (financial resources of the children):
“I have not heard any evidence about the financial resources of either child. Cassandra
testified. She testified first that she was a full-time student. Then it came out later, which I
- 11 - don’t doubt that she did take a full load of classes, but it came out later that she actually
was also working.
I don’t know what she earned. I don’t know how much she worked. I don’t know if
she had other financial resources. She had a scholarship of undetermined amount for an
undetermined length.
I don’t have any information about Jennifer’s employment, financial resources.
So I do not have sufficient evidence on factor 3. ***.”
¶ 29 Petitioner stated that she had documented Jennifer’s expenses and scholarships, but the
trial court responded that it had no information about Jennifer’s financial resources. The court
concluded:
“I do not find that [petitioner has] sustained [her] burden of proof to move past
directed [sic]. I am going to grant the motion for directed finding.
I will also say this. Even if I were to find that [petitioner] did, [her] income is almost
three times [respondent’s] income. [Petitioner has] over twice as much equity in [her] home
as he has.”
¶ 30 Petitioner, now represented by counsel, moved to reconsider the directed finding. She
argued that, “through testimony and numerous exhibits, [she] provided the [trial] court with
sufficient evidence of the adult children’s expenses to prove her [p]etition *** by a preponderance
of the evidence.” She also claimed that the court disregarded information (which she did not
specify) in respondent’s financial affidavit that related to his ability to contribute to the children’s
college expenses. Finally, she argued that the court failed to recognize that section IV(C) of the
MSA obligated both parents to contribute to the children’s college expenses.
- 12 - ¶ 31 The trial court held a hearing on petitioner’s motion to reconsider. Petitioner argued that
the court had overstated the discrepancy in the parties’ financial resources. She maintained that the
difference in the values of their retirement accounts was not very significant when the value of
petitioner’s 401(k) was adjusted by the $45,000 she had withdrawn. Also, respondent’s financial
affidavit did not include the $585 monthly pension payment to which he testified. Finally, the
disparity in the parties’ equity in their respective homes was not as great as the court had stated,
given that petitioner’s financial affidavit disclosed “that debt of the $112,680.” 3 Petitioner thus
suggested that “there was some additional debt that [petitioner] had that maybe wasn’t taken into
account.”
¶ 32 Respondent argued that the basis of the directed finding in his favor was that petitioner had
produced no evidence on the section 513(j)(3) factor, the financial resources of the children.
Further, petitioner “never told us what was actually paid for either of the children.” Finally,
petitioner had testified that she wanted reimbursement for college expenses incurred before
January 17, 2023, which the Act does not allow. See 750 ILCS 5/513(k) (West 2022) (“The
establishment of an obligation to pay under this Section is retroactive only to the date of filing a
petition.”).
¶ 33 Petitioner replied that the trial court had heard evidence of Jennifer’s income, i.e., the First
Horizon bank statements, which petitioner claimed showed deposits of Jennifer’s wages from her
job with “Cutco/Vector.” Petitioner conceded that there were no bank statements indicating
Cassandra’s income and that the testimony about Cassandra’s employment and her wages was “not
specific.” The court then asked petitioner whether there had been “any testimony about [Jennifer’s]
3 It is unclear which debt petitioner was referencing here.
- 13 - ability to earn income” or about “financial support she might have had that [was not] contained in
those seven months of bank statements.” Petitioner responded that, because Jennifer did not testify,
any such further information would have been from petitioner. Petitioner conceded that the only
evidence introduced as to Cassandra’s financial resources was that Cassandra worked part-time,
but that there “wasn’t anything specific.”
¶ 34 The trial court then asked petitioner what the evidence “establish[ed] Jennifer’s actual post-
secondary expenses to be.” Petitioner responded that “[Jennifer] had a one-time payment of
$17,128.64” in tuition and fees. When asked what testimony supported that assertion, petitioner
pointed not to testimony, but to her request (during argument on the motion for a directed finding)
that Jennifer be awarded a lump sum of $17,128.64. When the court asked “how *** that
establish[ed] *** Jennifer’s actual college expenses,” petitioner replied that “given time to go
through the exhibits, [she] could pull out the exhibits that coincide with the expenses.” As for
Cassandra, petitioner noted that she had previously requested $15,385 toward Cassandra’s
expenses, “based on exhibits that were introduced into evidence.” Petitioner stated, “[I]f it would
help the [c]ourt, we could file a supplemental memorandum going through the exhibits, itemizing
the amounts, [and] reconciling them with what [petitioner] asked for in the closing argument.” The
court did not comment on this offer, but said:
“I don’t know how you get past the fact that there was no evidence presented regarding the
financial resources of [Cassandra], and that that presented regarding Jennifer is certainly
not comprehensive. It does not give *** a full picture of her financial situation.”
¶ 35 The trial court also stated that, even assuming that the disparity in the parties’ financial
resources was only 2 to1 and not 3 to 1, it was still significant. However, the court continued, it
need not address that issue at all, because the grant of the directed finding for respondent was
- 14 - proper based on petitioner’s failure to establish all four of the criteria in section 513(j) of the Act.
Therefore, the court denied petitioner’s motion to reconsider the judgment.
¶ 36 This timely appeal followed.
¶ 37 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 38 On appeal, petitioner raises a variety of overlapping contentions that we have boiled down
to two substantive arguments: (1) the MSA required respondent to share in the payment of the
children’s postsecondary educational expenses; and (2) the trial court misapplied section 513(j) of
the Act by giving decisive weight to one factor, the financial resources of the children (see 750
ILCS 5/513(j) (West 2022)). We address these arguments in turn.
¶ 39 We set out our general principles of review. Section 2-1110 of the Code of Civil Procedure
(735 ILCS 5/2-1110 (West 2022)) states, in pertinent part:
“In ruling on the motion [for a directed finding in a non-jury case], the [trial] court shall
weigh the evidence, considering the credibility of the witnesses and the weight and quality
of the evidence. If the ruling on the motion is favorable to the defendant, a judgment
dismissing the action shall be entered.”
¶ 40 Case law establishes the following process for evaluating a motion for a directed finding:
“A court assesses a motion for directed finding in a two-step process. [Citation.] In the first
step, the court determines whether the plaintiff or nonmoving party has presented a
prima facie case as a matter of law. [Citation.] To demonstrate a prima facie case, the
nonmoving party must present at least some evidence of every element of the underlying
cause of action. [Citation.] If the nonmoving party has failed to meet its burden, the court
must grant the motion and enter judgment in favor of the defendant or moving party.
- 15 - [Citation.] Such a determination presents a question of law, and we review de novo the
court's ruling, performing the same analysis as the court below. [Citation.]
If, however, the nonmoving party has met its burden of presenting a prima facie
case, the trial court moves on to the second step. [Citation.] In this step, the court considers
all the evidence presented, weighing the evidence, determining the credibility of the
witnesses, and making all reasonable inferences arising from the evidence. [Citation.] By
weighing the evidence, some of the evidence presented by the nonmoving party may be
negated. [Citation.] After weighing all the evidence (with the possible negation of some of
it), the court must determine whether there remains sufficient evidence to establish the
nonmoving party’s prima facie case. [Citation.] If sufficient evidence establishing the
prima facie case remains, the court should deny the motion for directed finding and proceed
with the trial; if the prima facie case no longer can be established, the court should grant
the motion and enter judgment in favor of the moving party. [Citation.] The court’s ruling
on a motion for directed finding granted at the second step is reviewed to determine
whether it was against the manifest weight of the evidence.” Reynolds v. Reynolds, 2025
IL App (2d) 240028, ¶¶ 24-25. 4
¶ 41 The trial court’s comments on petitioner’s failure to produce evidence on every relevant
factor under section 513 suggest that the court did not advance to the second step of the analysis.
However, under either a de novo or manifest-weight standard of review, we would affirm.
4 In her opening brief, petitioner repeatedly misstates the standards for granting a motion for a
directed finding in a nonjury case and the standard of review on appeal; instead, she cites the standards that
apply to a grant of a directed verdict in a jury trial. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1110 (West 2022); Pedrick v. Peoria
& Eastern R.R. Co., 37 Ill. 2d 494, 510 (1967). In her reply brief, she corrects the error.
- 16 - ¶ 42 In a postdissolution proceeding under section 513 of the Act, petitioner must establish
(1) that the respondent should contribute to the educational expenses of the child and (2) how much
the respondent should contribute. People ex rel. Sussen v. Keller, 382 Ill. App. 3d 872, 879 (2008).
¶ 43 As the motion for a directed finding involved the construction of a contract, the MSA, the
trial court was charged with effectuating the intent of the parties. See In re Marriage of Kuyk, 2015
IL App (2d) 140733, ¶ 17. The interpretation of the MSA is a question of law and, thus, our review
is de novo. Id. To the extent that the issues involve the interpretation of section 513 of the Act, our
review is also de novo. See Blum v. Koster, 235 Ill. 2d 21, 44 (2009).
¶ 44 We turn to the first issue on appeal. Petitioner contends that section VI(C) of the MSA
required respondent to contribute to the children’s educational expenses and that, therefore, the
trial court erred in denying her any contribution from him. Petitioner asserts that, by reserving the
issue of educational expenses for later judicial determination, the MSA “created an enforceable
obligation for *** respondent to contribute to such expenses, with the only remaining question
being ‘how much?’ ” (Emphasis omitted.) She supports this interpretation of section VI(C) with a
single authority, In re Marriage of Dieter, 271 Ill. App. 3d 181, 190 (1995).
¶ 45 We again quote section VI(C) of the MSA:
“The parties agree that the court shall decide the issue of the parental contribution for post-
high school education, if there is any, and if the parents cannot agree, at the time each child
pursues such education, using the appropriate statutory standard as it exists at that time.”
¶ 46 We see nothing in this language that obligates respondent to contribute regardless of the
facts. The controlling language says only that, if the parties cannot agree on the allocation of the
children’s expenses, the trial court “shall decide the issue of the parental contribution for post-
high school education, *** using the appropriate statutory standard as it exists at that time.”
- 17 - (Emphasis added.) This language plainly leaves open the entire “issue” of parental obligation,
which includes whether the respondent spouse ought to pay anything at all. This reservation is
consistent with section 513(a) of the Act, under which the trial court “may award sums of money
out of the property and income of either or both parties.” (Emphasis added.) 750 ILCS 5/513(a)
(West 2022).
¶ 47 The open-ended language of the parties’ MSA contrasts sharply with the MSA language
that was applied in cases where the appellate court held that the MSA created a per se obligation
of the respondent parent to contribute. In In re Former Marriage of Donnelly, 2015 IL App (1st)
142619, ¶ 4, the MSA stated that “ ‘the parties *** shall pay for a trade school, vocational school,
[or] college or university education for the children.’ ” (Emphasis added.) The appellate court held
that this language expressly created an obligation on the part of both parties and did not reserve
the issue of who should pay. Id. ¶ 23.
¶ 48 In In re Marriage of Spircoff, 2011 IL App (1st) 103189, ¶ 6, the parties’ MSA stated that
“ ‘[e]ach of the parties shall contribute to the trade school or college and professional school
education expenses of their child in accordance with Section 513 [of the Act].’ ” (Emphasis added.)
The appellate court held that, under this language, “the obligation of the parties for educational
expenses was clearly and affirmatively stated and was not expressly reserved.” Id. ¶ 17. We
recognize that Spircoff is factually dissimilar from this case in that it involved an action brought
by the parties’ son as a third-party beneficiary of the MSA. Id. ¶ 1. Nonetheless, the case is relevant
for its distinction between MSA language that binds a parent in advance to contribute to the child’s
educational expenses and MSA language that does not do so but reserves the matter for future
determination.
- 18 - ¶ 49 This case is dissimilar to both Donnelly and Spircoff as to the relevant MSA language. Had
petitioner and respondent intended to obligate either or both of them in advance to contribute to
their children’s educational expenses, their MSA could have plainly said so, as did the MSAs in
Donnelly and Spircoff.
¶ 50 Dieter does not aid petitioner. There, in a postdissolution proceeding, the respondent father
was held in contempt of court for failing to adhere to the parties’ MSA and pay all the college
expenses of the parties’ son, who attended school in North Dakota. Dieter, 271 Ill. App. 3d at 182,
187. The trial court ordered the respondent to pay the son’s prospective expenses as well as past
expenses he failed to pay. Id. at 187-88. On appeal, the respondent argued that the trial court erred
in refusing to deduct from the award any amount that the son could have contributed or saved,
such as by applying for in-state tuition. Id. at 190-91. The appellate court affirmed. It noted that
the MSA stated, “ ‘[Respondent] shall pay for the college school education of [the son].’ ”
(Emphasis added.) Id. at 183. The court concluded that this language meant that the respondent
“was under a legal duty to provide for the maximum amount of his child’s future education
expenses.” Id. at 190.
¶ 51 Like the MSA language in Donnelly and Spircoff, the MSA language in Dieter stands in
sharp contrast to that here. Under the plain language of the MSA here, the parties left for judicial
determination whether either or both of them would be obligated to pay the children’s
postsecondary education costs. Thus, per the MSA, it was appropriate for the trial court to hear
and determine contribution, and likewise to determine that petitioner presented insufficient
evidence to establish a claim for contribution under the Act. Accordingly, we reject petitioner’s
contention that the trial court erred as a matter of law by declining to order contribution.
- 19 - ¶ 52 We turn to petitioner’s second issue. She argues that the trial court based its ruling solely
on the lack of evidence on the third section 513(j) factor, the financial resources of the children.
We note two crucial considerations. First, petitioner bore the burden not only to prove (1) whether
respondent should contribute anything at all but also (2) how much he should contribute. See
Keller, 382 Ill. App. 3d at 879. The MSA left both issues open.
¶ 53 Second, the trial court did not base its directed finding on the evidence (or lack thereof)
pertaining to just one factor under section 513(j). To be sure, there was a dearth of evidence as to
the children’s financial resources. Cassandra testified that she worked part-time, but she provided
no specifics. As for Jennifer (who did not testify), petitioner simply submitted statements from the
First Horizon account held jointly by petitioner and Jennifer. These statements showed that,
between August 16, 2023, and January 17, 2024, and between June 18, 2024, and August 16, 2024,
approximately $1,667 was deposited from Cutco/Vector. However, not until the hearing on the
motion to reconsider the directed finding did petitioner testify that Cutco/Vector was Jennifer’s
employer (although petitioner introduced no pay stubs to establish this). Therefore, in entering the
directed finding, the trial court was correct in determining that the record (including the First
Horizon statements) did not show any income earned by Jennifer. There were various other
deposits on the First Horizon statements—e.g., $1,200 on December 28, 2023, and $5,155 on
February 23, 2024—but the sources are not identified on the statements themselves or elsewhere
in the record. These deposits from unknown sources only added to the murkiness of the record
before the trial court.
¶ 54 Although the paucity of evidence as to the children’s financial resources might have been
enough to warrant the directed finding, the trial court stated additional valid grounds for its
judgment. We note that even if the trial court’s explanation of its ruling did not explicitly mention
- 20 - a particular factor, we would not presume that the court did not consider that factor. See In re
Custody of G.L., 2017 IL App (1st) 163171, ¶¶ 44-45; In re Marriage of Diehl, 221 Ill. App. 3d
410, 424 (1991). We consider all pertinent evidence in determining whether the trial court properly
concluded that petitioner did not establish a prima facie case for contribution.
¶ 55 As the trial court stated, it received relatively little evidence of how much petitioner
actually paid for the children’s education. Petitioner introduced extensive evidence of small
purchases that she made on behalf of the children. However, there was little or no evidence of how
much she paid for their tuition, housing, or other larger expenses. She testified to sums that she
claimed to have paid, but she admitted that she could not point to any documentation. She
introduced tuition statements reflecting fairly significant payments, but the sources of the
payments were not indicated. Neither petitioner’s credit card statements nor bank statements reveal
expenditures for tuition or other education expenses. Thus, we have virtually no evidence about
who paid the predominant expenses, such as tuition and housing, beyond both children receiving
scholarships. Moreover, petitioner made no effort to distinguish payments made before the petition
was filed (in January 2023) from those made after. See 750 ILCS 5/513(k) (West 2022) (“The
establishment of an obligation to pay under this Section is retroactive only to the date of filing a
petition.”). Regardless, without petitioner having established what was paid, or how it was paid,
we agree with the trial court that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case for “how much”
respondent should contribute. See Keller, 382 Ill. App. 3d at 879.
¶ 56 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 57 In sum, the trial court identified multiple deficiencies in petitioner’s claim for contribution
that warranted a directed finding in favor of respondent, and we find no error in its conclusions.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of De Kalb County.
- 21 - ¶ 58 Affirmed.
- 22 -