In Re the Marriage of: Travis Edwards v. Valerie Edwards

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: July 31, 2019
• Docket: 19A-DR-509
• Status: Published

Opinion

FILED Jul 31 2019, 10:30 am

CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Cynthia A. Marcus Carmel, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In Re the Marriage of: July 31, 2019

Travis Edwards, Court of Appeals Case No. 19A-DR-509 Appellant-Respondent, Appeal from the Hamilton v. Superior Court The Honorable Michael A. Casati, Valerie Edwards, Judge The Honorable Todd L. Ruetz, Appellee-Petitioner. Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 29D01-0901-DR-42

Riley, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-DR-509 | July 31, 2019 Page 1 of 9 STATEMENT OF THE CASE [1] Appellant-Respondent, Travis Edwards (Edwards), appeals the trial court’s

partial denial of his motion for relief from judgment.

[2] We affirm.

ISSUE [3] Edwards presents us with three issues on appeal, which we consolidate and

restate as: Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it partially denied

his Trial Rule 60(B) motion for relief from judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY [4] During the marriage of Edwards to Valerie Edwards (Valerie), Edwards was in

active duty in the United States Army. Edwards’ last deployment was to Iraq.

Edwards was injured in combat during that deployment and was eventually

diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and a traumatic brain injury.

[5] On February 23, 2010, the marriage of Edwards and Valerie was dissolved

pursuant to an agreement that provided that Valerie would “be entitled to 50%

of the monthly pension benefit accrued during the course of the marriage to and

including the date of the final dissolution to be received by [Edwards] from the

U.S. Military . . . .” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 35). At the time the

dissolution was entered, Edwards was still on active duty. On October 7, 2011,

Edwards retired from the military, having completed almost twenty-three years

of service. During the months of May 2012 through August 2012, Valerie

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-DR-509 | July 31, 2019 Page 2 of 9 received 50% of Edwards’ military pension benefit, as provided for by the

dissolution decree. Thereafter, Edwards elected to receive combat-related

service compensation (CRSC). As a result of that election, Edwards was

required to waive his right to his military pension benefit. In September 2012,

Valerie, who was unaware that Edwards had elected to receive CRSC, received

notice from the entity administering Edwards’ pension that she would no longer

receive 50% of Edwards’ pension benefit because he had discontinued receiving

it. After electing to receive CRSC, Edwards did not make any payments to

Valerie to replace the 50% of his pension benefit she had lost as a result of that

election.

[6] On November 12, 2014, Valerie filed a contempt motion seeking an order

directing Edwards to pay her the pension benefit arrears that had accumulated

and to continue to pay her 50% of the pension benefit, as provided in the

dissolution decree. On September 29, 2015, the trial court held a hearing on

Valerie’s contempt motion. Edwards’ counsel argued that Edwards had been

required to waive his military pension benefit as a result of his election to

receive CRSC and that CRSC was non-divisible income pursuant to federal

law. Edwards’ counsel also directed the trial court to Mansell v. Mansell, 490

U.S. 581, 109 S.Ct. 2023, 104 L.Ed.2d 675 (1989), which he contended stood

for the proposition that the trial court could not order Edwards to indemnify

Valerie for her loss of the 50% pension benefit amount. On December 18, 2015,

the trial court found Edwards in contempt and ordered him to pay Valerie the

amount she lost as a result of his election to receive CRSC. The trial court

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-DR-509 | July 31, 2019 Page 3 of 9 relied on this court’s decision in Bandini v. Bandini, 935 N.E.2d 253, 264 (Ind.

Ct. App. 2010), which it cited as holding that “[a] military spouse may not, by a

post-decree waiver of retirement pay in favor of disability benefits of CRSC,

unilaterally and voluntarily reduce the benefits awarded the former spouse in a

dissolution decree.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 38). The trial court also

ordered Edwards to pay $47,263.75 1 in accumulated arrears.

[7] Edwards did not appeal the trial court’s December 18, 2015 Order (the 2015

Order). On May 3, 2018, Edwards filed his Verified Motion to Vacate

Judgment Pursuant to Trial Rule 60(B)(6) in which he argued that in Howell v.

Howell, 581 U.S. —, 137 S.Ct. 1400, 197 E.Ed.2d 781 (2017), the United States

Supreme Court had held that state courts were not permitted to order a veteran

to indemnify a divorced spouse for the loss of the spouse’s portion of the

veteran’s retirement pay caused by the veteran’s waiver of retirement pay to

receive service-related disability benefits. Pursuant to Howell, Edwards

contended that the trial court’s 2015 Order was void for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction.

[8] On December 5, 2018, the trial court held a hearing on Edwards’ motion, and,

on January 23, 2019, the trial court issued an order partially denying Edwards

relief. The trial court found that Edwards had not appealed the 2015 Order; the

2015 Order was, thus, binding on the parties; and the Howell decision, while

1 The trial court offset this amount with a credit for overpayment of child support, and judgment was entered in the amount of $44,338.75.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-DR-509 | July 31, 2019 Page 4 of 9 overruling Bandini, did not render the 2015 Order void because it did not

indicate that its application was to be retroactive. Nevertheless, in light of

Howell and treating Edwards’ motion as one made pursuant to Trial Rule

60(B)(7), the trial court held that it was no longer equitable for the 2015 Order

to have prospective effect. The trial court denied Edwards’ request to set aside

the previously-entered $44,338.75 judgment but ordered that the 2015 Order

was set aside and vacated effective May 3, 2018, the date of Edwards’ motion to

set aside.

[9] Edwards now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION I. Standard of Review

[10] We begin by noting that Valerie did not file an appellate brief in this matter.

We do not develop arguments on behalf of an appellee who fails to file a brief.

WindGate Props., LLC v. Sanders, 93 N.E.3d 809, 813 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). In

such cases, we will reverse if the appellant establishes prima facie error, meaning

error at first sight or error on the face of it. Id. However, even in light of this

relaxed standard, we still have the obligation to correctly apply the law to the

facts in the record to determine whether reversal is required. Id.

[11] Edwards appeals following the trial court’s partial denial of his Trial Rule 60

motion to vacate judgment. Such motions entail the equitable discretion of the

trial court, and, as a general rule, we review the denial of such motions for an

abuse of the trial court’s discretion. In re Paternity of P.S.S., 934 N.E.2d 737,

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-DR-509 | July 31, 2019 Page 5 of 9 740-41 (Ind. 2010). Edwards offers us three related arguments all stemming

from his contention that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to

enter the 2015 Order because federal law and United States Supreme Court

precedent precluded it. Whether a trial court has jurisdiction is a question of

law that we review de novo. Kondamuri v. Kondamuri, 799 N.E.2d 1153, 1156

(Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied.

II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

[12] Edwards argues that the 2015 Order was void ab initio because, in entering what

he contends was an order in contravention of federal law and binding

precedent, the trial court acted outside of its subject matter jurisdiction.

“Indiana courts only have jurisdiction to the extent that jurisdiction has been

granted to them by the constitution or by statute.” In re Custody of M.B., 51

N.E.3d 230, 234 (Ind. 2016). The question of whether a trial court has subject

matter jurisdiction “entails a determination of whether a court has jurisdiction

over the general class of actions to which a particular case belongs.” Troxel v.

Troxel, 737 N.E.2d 745, 749 (Ind. 2000). “Real jurisdictional problems would

be, say, a juvenile delinquency adjudication entered in a small claims court, or a

judgment rendered without any service of process.” K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d

538, 542 (Ind. 2006) (emphasis in original). Our supreme court has also noted

that

[t]he fact that a trial court may have erred along the course of adjudicating a dispute does not mean it lacked jurisdiction. As Justice Arterburn wrote four decades ago:

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-DR-509 | July 31, 2019 Page 6 of 9 Far too often there is an inclination in a law suit to attempt to convert a legal issue into one of “jurisdiction” and from that point contend all actions of the court are void, and that the question of jurisdiction may be raised at any time or that the proceedings are subject to collateral attack and are a matter of original writs in this court.

Id. (quoting J.I. Case Co. v. Sandefur, 245 Ind. 213, 217-18, 197 N.E.2d

519, 521 (1964)).

[13] Here, the Hamilton County Superior Court No. 1 had original and concurrent

jurisdiction in all civil cases. Ind. Code § 33-29-1-1.5(1). Indiana Code section

31-15-2-2, which establishes a cause of action for the dissolution of marriage,

grants broad discretion to trial courts to entertain dissolution proceedings and

establishes subject matter jurisdiction over those proceedings. Kondamuri, 799

N.E.2d at 1158. Thus, the trial court unquestionably had subject matter

jurisdiction to entertain issues related to the civil matter of the division of

Edwards’ and Valerie’s assets pursuant to a dissolution proceeding. Whether

the trial court applied the correct law in this case, be it federal or state law, is a

question of legal error, not a question of subject matter jurisdiction. See Neese v.

Kelley, 705 N.E.2d 1047, 1051 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that mere errors of

law do not deprive a court of its jurisdiction or open its judgment to collateral

attack and that such errors can only be corrected on direct appeal).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-DR-509 | July 31, 2019 Page 7 of 9 III. Res Judicata

[14] Edwards did not appeal the 2015 Order, which was a final appealable judgment

because it disposed of all issues as to all parties, thus ending the case. See

Georgos v. Jackson, 790 N.E.2d 448, 451 (Ind. 2003); see also Ind. Appellate Rule

2(H)(1). The doctrine of res judicata prevents the re-litigation of issues that are

essentially the same. See Earl v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 91 N.E.3d 1066,

1074 n. 5 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. The doctrine of res judicata

encompasses the principles of issue preclusion and claim preclusion. Freels v.

Koches, 94 N.E.3d 339, 342 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). Claim preclusion applies

when a final judgment on the merits has been entered and acts as a complete

bar to subsequent litigation on the same claim between identical parties. M.G.

v. V.P., 74 N.E.3d 259, 264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).

When claim preclusion applies, all matters that were or might have been litigated are deemed conclusively decided by the judgment in the prior action. Claim preclusion applies when the following four factors are present: (1) the former judgment was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) the former judgment was rendered on the merits; (3) the matter now at issue was, or could have been, determined in the prior action; and (4) the controversy adjudicated in the former action was between parties to the present suit or their privies.

Id. (quotation omitted). In addition, “the res judicata consequences of a final,

unappealed judgment on the merits [are not] altered by the fact that the

judgment may have been wrong or rested on a legal principle subsequently

overruled in another case.” Perry v. Gulf Stream Coach, Inc., 871 N.E.2d 1038,

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-DR-509 | July 31, 2019 Page 8 of 9 1048 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S.

394, 398, 101 S.Ct. 2424, 2428, 69 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981)).

[15] Here, the unappealed 2015 Order was res judicata as to the parties and

precluded further litigation on the same issue of whether Valerie was entitled to

the value of 50% of Edwards’ pension benefit, regardless of whether the case

relied upon by the trial court, Bandini, was subsequently overruled by Howell.

See id. Edwards’ only argument that res judicata did not apply to the 2015 Order

is that it was not rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. That argument

fails for the reasons already decided. Because lack of subject matter jurisdiction

for the 2015 Order was the basis for all of Edwards’ appellate claims, we

conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it partially denied

Edwards’ motion to vacate judgment. See P.S.S., 934 N.E.2d at 740. For the

same reason, we conclude that Edwards has not demonstrated reversible error,

even in light of the relaxed standard of review applied to this appeal. See

WindGate Props., 93 N.E.3d at 813.

CONCLUSION [16] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court had subject matter

jurisdiction to enter the challenged order and, therefore, that Edwards has failed

to demonstrate even prima facie error as a result of the trial court’s partial denial

of his motion for relief from judgment.

[17] Affirmed.

[18] Vaidik, C. J. and Bradford, J. concur Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-DR-509 | July 31, 2019 Page 9 of 9