IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Marriage of DIVISION ONE STUART J. SINSHEIMER, No. 78697-1-1 Respondent,
and UNPUBLISHED OPINION
ELIZABETH L. KRUGER, FILED: July 29, 2019
DWYER, J. — Elizabeth Kruger and Stuart Sinsheimer have been
embroiled in a four-years-long dispute over postsecondary expenses for their
son, Jared. In this appeal, Kruger avers that the superior court committed
reversible error in an order clarifying the parties' obligations. Finding no merit in
any of her contentions, we affirm.
I
This is the second appeal to us in this action. See In re Marriage of
Sinsheimer & Kruger, No. 75675-3-1,(Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2018)
(unpublished), http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/756753.pdf.
On June 22, 2016, as a remedy to address the parties' ongoing acrimony
and to reduce the need for further court intervention, the superior court ordered
that, "[Moing forward," Jared shall provide online access to his college financial No. 78697-1-1/2
account "as a condition of his parents' post-secondary support obligations." In
rejecting Kruger's appeal of the imposition of this condition, we concluded that,
while the court cannot enforce the requirement that Jared provide access to his financial accounts, such as by holding him in contempt, the payment of support can be conditioned on Jared's action. . . . Thus, under the trial court's order, Jared has a choice, he can provide access in which case his parents must pay their equal share of his postsecondary tuition and expenses, or he can elect to withhold access and perhaps lose his financial support.
Sinsheimer, No. 75675-3-1, slip op. at 11.
On March 21, 2018, Jared gave Sinsheimer online access to his college
financial account. That same day, Kruger requested that Sinsheimer reimburse
her for his share of postsecondary expenses incurred between July 2016 and
February 2018. Sinsheimer then tendered Kruger a check for most, but not all, of
those expenses.1 Afterward, they disputed the balance owed and, again, sought
court intervention.
On June 14, 2018, Sinsh.eimer asked the superior court to declare that he
had no postsecondary support obligations after June 22, 2016 or had satisfied .
his obligation with the check tendered to Kruger. The next day, Kruger moved to
enforce the postsecondary support obligation and asked that Sinsheimer be
ordered to pay the full amount of her reimbursement request and her attorney
fees.
On July 5, 2018, the superior court granted Sinsheimer's motion and
denied Kruger's. It found that the expenses for which Kruger was seeking
1 The record is unclear as to whether Kruger ever deposited the check she received from Sinsheimer. .
-2 No. 78697-1-1/3
reimbursement were incurred "during a period when Jared had not provided
online account access to Sinsheimer" and concluded, consequently, that
Sinsheimer was not obligated to pay those expenses.
Kruger appeals.
Kruger first contends that the superior court's July 2018 order improperly
modified the parties' postsecondary support obligation. She is incorrect.
A modification occurs when the effect of the court's ruling causes a party's
right to be "either extended beyond or reduced from those originally intended in
the decree," In re Marriage of Christel, 101 Wn. App. 13, 22, 1 P.3d 600 (2000),
whereas a clarification "is merely a definition of the rights which have already
been given and those rights may be completely spelled out if necessary." Rivard
v. Rivard, 75 Wn.2d 415, 418, 451 P.2d 677(1969). "A court may clarify a
decree by defining the parties' respective rights and obligations, if the parties
cannot agree on the meaning of a particular provision." Christel, 101 Wn. App. at
22.
Here, in June 2018, after Jared gave his parents online access to his
college financial account, both Sinsheimer and Kruger asked the superior court
to intervene and clarify the extent of Sinsheimer's postsecondary support
obligation for expenses incurred between July 2016 and February 2018. After
addressing the impact of its June 2016 order, the superior court, as requested,
clarified Sinsheimer's support obligation. The superior court's July 2018 order
was not a modification.
-3 No. 78697-1-1/4
III
Kruger next contends that the superior court erred by retroactively
imposing a deadline by which Jared was to provide his parents with online
access to his financial account and then imposing a consequence for failing to
meet that previously unknown deadline. She is wrong.
The superior court did not retroactively impose the condition that resulted
in Jared losing his postsecondary support. As the superior court aptly explained
in its July 2018 order,
The condition entered on June 22, 2016, left Jared with options: "Jared has a choice, he can provide access in which case his parents must pay their equal share of his postsecondary tuition and expenses, or he can elect to withhold access and perhaps lose his financial support." Despite the June 22, 2016 Order. ... Jared did not give Sinsheimer online access to Jared's financial account at the college until March 21, 2018.
The superior court's June 22, 2016 order was effective when entered.2 In
ruling on the parties' June 2018 motions, the superior court did nothing more
than apply its June 2016 order to the facts and evidence presented. There was
no error.
Iv
Kruger also contends that the superior court's July 2018 order, which
resulted in Jared losing his postsecondary support for failing to timely provide
online account access, runs afoul of Washington's public policy for child support.
We disagree.
2 Although Kruger appealed the June 2016 order to us, she did not attempt to secure a stay of enforcement of that order pending appeal. See RAP 8.1. Instead, Kruger, like Jared, simply ignored the June 2016 order until March 2018.
-4 No. 78697-1-1/5
"It is not the policy of this State to require divorced parents to provide adult
children with a college education in all circumstances." Childers v. Childers, 89
Wn.2d 592, 601, 575 P.2d 201 (1978). Payment of postsecondary support may
be conditioned on acts within the control of the adult child. Sinsheimer, No.
75675-3-1, slip op. at 11 (citing In re Marriage of Kelly, 85 Wn. App. 785, 795, 934
P.2d 1218 (1997)).
Moreover, the superior court's order was governed by the law of the case.
Once an appellate court has ruled on an issue, the appellate court's decision
becomes the "law of the case"3 and the trial court is bound by the appellate
court's determination. State v. Strauss, 119 Wn.2d 401, 412, 832 P.2d 78
(1992). In Kruger's first appeal, we concluded that "payment of support can be
conditioned on Jared's action" and that Jared could choose to provide access
that would require his parents to "pay their equal share of his postsecondary"
expenses, or he could "elect to withhold access and perhaps lose his financial
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Marriage of DIVISION ONE STUART J. SINSHEIMER, No. 78697-1-1 Respondent,
and UNPUBLISHED OPINION
ELIZABETH L. KRUGER, FILED: July 29, 2019
DWYER, J. — Elizabeth Kruger and Stuart Sinsheimer have been
embroiled in a four-years-long dispute over postsecondary expenses for their
son, Jared. In this appeal, Kruger avers that the superior court committed
reversible error in an order clarifying the parties' obligations. Finding no merit in
any of her contentions, we affirm.
I
This is the second appeal to us in this action. See In re Marriage of
Sinsheimer & Kruger, No. 75675-3-1,(Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2018)
(unpublished), http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/756753.pdf.
On June 22, 2016, as a remedy to address the parties' ongoing acrimony
and to reduce the need for further court intervention, the superior court ordered
that, "[Moing forward," Jared shall provide online access to his college financial No. 78697-1-1/2
account "as a condition of his parents' post-secondary support obligations." In
rejecting Kruger's appeal of the imposition of this condition, we concluded that,
while the court cannot enforce the requirement that Jared provide access to his financial accounts, such as by holding him in contempt, the payment of support can be conditioned on Jared's action. . . . Thus, under the trial court's order, Jared has a choice, he can provide access in which case his parents must pay their equal share of his postsecondary tuition and expenses, or he can elect to withhold access and perhaps lose his financial support.
Sinsheimer, No. 75675-3-1, slip op. at 11.
On March 21, 2018, Jared gave Sinsheimer online access to his college
financial account. That same day, Kruger requested that Sinsheimer reimburse
her for his share of postsecondary expenses incurred between July 2016 and
February 2018. Sinsheimer then tendered Kruger a check for most, but not all, of
those expenses.1 Afterward, they disputed the balance owed and, again, sought
court intervention.
On June 14, 2018, Sinsh.eimer asked the superior court to declare that he
had no postsecondary support obligations after June 22, 2016 or had satisfied .
his obligation with the check tendered to Kruger. The next day, Kruger moved to
enforce the postsecondary support obligation and asked that Sinsheimer be
ordered to pay the full amount of her reimbursement request and her attorney
fees.
On July 5, 2018, the superior court granted Sinsheimer's motion and
denied Kruger's. It found that the expenses for which Kruger was seeking
1 The record is unclear as to whether Kruger ever deposited the check she received from Sinsheimer. .
-2 No. 78697-1-1/3
reimbursement were incurred "during a period when Jared had not provided
online account access to Sinsheimer" and concluded, consequently, that
Sinsheimer was not obligated to pay those expenses.
Kruger appeals.
Kruger first contends that the superior court's July 2018 order improperly
modified the parties' postsecondary support obligation. She is incorrect.
A modification occurs when the effect of the court's ruling causes a party's
right to be "either extended beyond or reduced from those originally intended in
the decree," In re Marriage of Christel, 101 Wn. App. 13, 22, 1 P.3d 600 (2000),
whereas a clarification "is merely a definition of the rights which have already
been given and those rights may be completely spelled out if necessary." Rivard
v. Rivard, 75 Wn.2d 415, 418, 451 P.2d 677(1969). "A court may clarify a
decree by defining the parties' respective rights and obligations, if the parties
cannot agree on the meaning of a particular provision." Christel, 101 Wn. App. at
22.
Here, in June 2018, after Jared gave his parents online access to his
college financial account, both Sinsheimer and Kruger asked the superior court
to intervene and clarify the extent of Sinsheimer's postsecondary support
obligation for expenses incurred between July 2016 and February 2018. After
addressing the impact of its June 2016 order, the superior court, as requested,
clarified Sinsheimer's support obligation. The superior court's July 2018 order
was not a modification.
-3 No. 78697-1-1/4
III
Kruger next contends that the superior court erred by retroactively
imposing a deadline by which Jared was to provide his parents with online
access to his financial account and then imposing a consequence for failing to
meet that previously unknown deadline. She is wrong.
The superior court did not retroactively impose the condition that resulted
in Jared losing his postsecondary support. As the superior court aptly explained
in its July 2018 order,
The condition entered on June 22, 2016, left Jared with options: "Jared has a choice, he can provide access in which case his parents must pay their equal share of his postsecondary tuition and expenses, or he can elect to withhold access and perhaps lose his financial support." Despite the June 22, 2016 Order. ... Jared did not give Sinsheimer online access to Jared's financial account at the college until March 21, 2018.
The superior court's June 22, 2016 order was effective when entered.2 In
ruling on the parties' June 2018 motions, the superior court did nothing more
than apply its June 2016 order to the facts and evidence presented. There was
no error.
Iv
Kruger also contends that the superior court's July 2018 order, which
resulted in Jared losing his postsecondary support for failing to timely provide
online account access, runs afoul of Washington's public policy for child support.
We disagree.
2 Although Kruger appealed the June 2016 order to us, she did not attempt to secure a stay of enforcement of that order pending appeal. See RAP 8.1. Instead, Kruger, like Jared, simply ignored the June 2016 order until March 2018.
-4 No. 78697-1-1/5
"It is not the policy of this State to require divorced parents to provide adult
children with a college education in all circumstances." Childers v. Childers, 89
Wn.2d 592, 601, 575 P.2d 201 (1978). Payment of postsecondary support may
be conditioned on acts within the control of the adult child. Sinsheimer, No.
75675-3-1, slip op. at 11 (citing In re Marriage of Kelly, 85 Wn. App. 785, 795, 934
P.2d 1218 (1997)).
Moreover, the superior court's order was governed by the law of the case.
Once an appellate court has ruled on an issue, the appellate court's decision
becomes the "law of the case"3 and the trial court is bound by the appellate
court's determination. State v. Strauss, 119 Wn.2d 401, 412, 832 P.2d 78
(1992). In Kruger's first appeal, we concluded that "payment of support can be
conditioned on Jared's action" and that Jared could choose to provide access
that would require his parents to "pay their equal share of his postsecondary"
expenses, or he could "elect to withhold access and perhaps lose his financial
support." Sinsheimer, No. 75675-3-1, slip op. at 11.
Our decision in the prior appeal constitutes the law of this case and bound
the parties and the superior court in the 2018 proceedings. The superior court
did not abuse its discretion by ordering that Sinsheimer was not obligated to pay
postsecondary expenses during the period Jared failed to provide online account
access.
3 The law of the case doctrine is applied in order -to avoid indefinite relitigation of the same issue, to obtain consistent results in the same litigation, to afford one opportunity for argument and decision of the matter at issue, and to assure the obedience of lower courts to the decisions of appellate courts." State v. Harrison, 148 Wn.2d 550, 562, 61 P.3d 1104(2003) (quoting 5 Am.JuR.2d Appellate Review § 605(2d ed. 1995)).
-5- No. 78697-1-1/6
V
Kruger contends that two of the superior court's findings of fact—one
regarding the amount of the parties' bickering and the other regarding the
credibility of Kruger's proof of expenses—are not supported by the evidence. We
deem it unnecessary to discuss these findings. This is so because they are
immaterial. Even if the findings were unsupported, the error was harmless and
would not warrant reversal, given our resolution of the decisive issues in this
case. See McLeod v. Keith, 69 Wn.2d 201, 203-04, 417 P.2d 861 (1966)(when
ample evidence supports the decisive issues "the presence of unsupported and
immaterial findings is of no consequence").
VI
Kruger argues that the superior court should have entered an award of
attorney fees in her favor for having to seek enforcement of a support obligation.
Both parties request an award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to RCW
26.18.160.4 Because Kruger is not the prevailing party, she is not entitled to an
award of attorney fees at trial or on appeal. Nor is Sinsheimer entitled to an
award of attorney fees. Although Kruger did not prevail, there was no finding that
she acted in bad faith.
4 In any action to enforce a support or maintenance order, RCW 26.18.160 mandates that "the prevailing party is entitled to a recovery of costs, including an award for reasonable attorney fees. An obligor may not be considered a prevailing party under this section unless the obligee has acted in bad faith in connection with the proceeding in question." This rule applies to actions at trial and on appeal. See Rhinevault v. Rhinevault, 91 Wn. App. 688, 696, 959 P.2d 687(1998) (citing In re Marriage of Capetillo, 85 Wn. App. 311, 932 P.2d 691 (1997)).
-6 - No. 78697-1-1/7
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
Tcc_Q-u\Ne (1-
_7