In re the Marriage of Stocker

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-1199 Filed December 17, 2025

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF ROSA STOCKER AND CHAD MICHAEL STOCKER

Upon the Petition of ROSA STOCKER, n/k/a ROSA NICOSIA, Petitioner-Appellee,

And Concerning CHAD MICHAEL STOCKER, Respondent-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Scott J. Beattie, Judge.

A husband appeals various provisions of the decree dissolving his marriage

with his former wife. AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED AND REMANDED WITH

INSTRUCTIONS.

Anjela A. Shutts and Sydnee M. Waggoner of Whitfield & Eddy, P.L.C., Des

Moines, for appellant.

J.D. Hartung and Suzane L. Woollums of Hartung Schroeder Law Firm, Des

Moines, for appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Schumacher, P.J., and Buller and

Sandy, JJ. 2

SANDY, Judge.

Chad Stocker appeals the June 2024 order dissolving his marriage with

Rosa Stocker. Chad argues the district court erred in distributing the property of a

business entity, using the wrong date as the date of retirement account valuation,

failing to apply an income equalization pursuant to the temporary matters

stipulation, failing to order Rosa to amend 2023 income tax returns, and failing to

equitably distribute certain assets and liabilities. Both parties request appellate

attorney fees. We modify the decree by applying a 2022 income equalization and

assessing additional income to Rosa for the year 2023. We affirm in all other

respects, remand to the district court for entry of an order consistent with this

opinion, and decline to award either party appellate attorney fees. Costs of the

appeal shall be divided equally between the parties.

BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Chad and Rosa were married in April 2004. At that time, Rosa had physical

care of her two children from her previous marriage and was a nurse working in

labor and delivery at Illini Hospital in Silvis, Illinois. Chad had no children and was

attending his internal medicine residency program following completion of medical

school in Des Moines. The district court found that “[n]either party had significant

pre-marital assets” but Chad “brought in significant debt from medical school.” A

firm amount for Chad’s pre-marital medical school debt was not established, but

he “testified that it was in excess of $200,000.” Shortly after they were married,

Chad obtained his Iowa medical license.

The parties had two children during the marriage, born in 2005 and 2006.

During the marriage, Rosa was the primary caretaker for the parties’ children in 3

addition to her two other children.1 Even while acting as primary caretaker, she

continued to work weekend shifts at Methodist Hospital in Des Moines as a labor

and delivery nurse.

Following completion of his residency, Chad worked as a hospitalist at

Mercy Hospital in Des Moines on a “week-on/week-off” shift. The district court

found that Rosa continued to provide most of the care for the children during

Chad’s “off-weeks.” During this time, Rosa was also working towards a Bachelor

of Science in Nursing at Graceland University, which she finished in 2009, as well

as a Master of Science in Nursing through the University of Cincinnati. Following

completion of her master’s degree, Rosa became licensed as an Advanced

Registered Nurse Practitioner (ARNP).

After becoming licensed as an ARNP, Rosa worked as a dermatology

specialist at Iowa Dermatology and its sister company, Radiant Complexions

Dermatology2 (together, “RC”), starting in 2011. During her four-year tenure at

RC, Rosa referred Chad to the company and helped him obtain employment as a

physician at the Marshalltown office in 2012.

In 2014, Chad and Rosa started a company named CNR Development, LLC

(CNR). That entity was formed for the purpose of operating as a MaidPro

franchisee, a national franchise providing residential and commercial cleaning

services. According to Chad, the MaidPro franchise served “as a proof of concept

that we could actually run a business successfully with the idea to eventually sell

1 All issues relating to custody and care of the children were resolved following the

district court’s approval of the parties’ “Stipulation and Agreement re Custody.” 2 Although always owned by the same individual, Iowa Dermatology was

eventually merged into Radiant Complexions Dermatology. 4

that franchise and then transition into a [dermatology] practice.” The CNR

operating agreement established that Rosa and Chad were the two members,

each with a fifty percent ownership interest. The operating agreement also

provides that the members agree to refrain from competing with CNR. Due to

dissatisfaction with the company, Rosa quit her job at RC shortly after the

formation of CNR. Because she had a three-year noncompete contract with RC,

Rosa managed CNR’s MaidPro operations for about three years following her

resignation from RC.

Chad and Rosa sold the MaidPro franchise in 2018, and Rosa then started

working as a dermatology specialist at Skin Gym Dermatology in West Des

Moines. Around this time, Rosa began identifying locations around central Iowa

that would be a good fit for her and Chad to start a dermatology business. She

sought out communities that were underserved in the field. The parties then

started Dermatology of Central Iowa (DCI),3 which is operated through the CNR

business entity. DCI’s first three locations were established in Newton, Pella, and

Ottumwa in 2019. DCI expanded into Centerville and Nevada, Iowa, in 2020.

Rosa coordinated most of DCI’s startup, negotiated the initial leases, and was the

initial practitioner. Chad contributed to the business by tracking taxes and

financials for approximately five hours per week. Rosa provided all revenue-

generating services, alternating locations based on the day of the week. The

district court found that differing visions relating to DCI’s management led to

increased friction between Chad and Rosa.

3 While we refer to the business operations as DCI and the legal entity as CNR,

DCI is simply the d/b/a of CNR. 5

Chad was fired from RC in early 2020 and found work as an internal

medicine physician at Iowa Clinic in Ankeny around a year later in summer 2021.

Rosa filed for divorce in September 2021. At the time of Rosa’s filing, Chad was

working full time at Iowa Clinic. Rosa continued running most operations at DCI

until Chad was fired from Iowa Clinic in spring 2022. Chad and Rosa came to a

temporary matters agreement in February 2022 which reiterated the terms of the

CNR operating agreement and set Rosa’s salary at DCI to be equal to Chad’s Iowa

Clinic salary “during the pendency of” the dissolution proceedings.

Around the time of his firing, Chad began taking a greater role in DCI’s

business operations, including keeping tabs on Rosa’s patient scheduling and

chastising her for taking time off or long lunches. They had many disagreements

over management of the company. One such disagreement was based out of

Rosa’s departure from the Pella and Ottumwa clinics. Rosa wanted to send letters

to patients explaining the turnover to a new provider but Chad disagreed, arguing

that such a letter would “cost thousands” and come across as negative. He hired

staff and caused some staff members to leave the company. One assistant later

explained in her exit letter that she “adore[d]” working for Rosa but that “Chad has

made [her] work experience unpleasant to say the least.” The assistant also stated

that Chad would put her in the middle of conflicts between him and Rosa and

threatened to sue her on her last day.

The increasing tension between Chad and Rosa and the staff led to a

number of filings in the dissolution proceedings. Chad filed a petition to modify the

temporary stipulation seeking to reduce Rosa’s salary, reasoning that the loss of

his job at the Iowa Clinic required “re-equaliz[ing] the parties’ earnings during the 6

pendency of this case.” Rosa then filed an application for rule to show cause,

arguing Chad had violated the parties’ February temporary matters agreement,

arguing Chad had been making unilateral decisions regarding DCI’s management,

and requesting the business be evenly split between Rosa and Chad.

The district court subsequently granted that request to split the business,

observing that Chad and Rosa “[b]oth make accusations against each other, so it

is obvious they have reached a point where the business would benefit by this

move. This will allow each party to focus on their assigned locations without

looking over their shoulder.” Following that split, Rosa began operating her

locations—Newton, Nevada, and Centerville—through an existing entity called

Frontline Dermatology, LLC (Frontline). Chad was awarded Pella, Ottumwa, and

Marshalltown. Rosa had created the Frontline entity in July 2022 in anticipation

that the dissolution would be resolved via settlement and that Chad would buy her

out of CNR. By early 2023, Rosa was providing dermatology services in Spencer

through Frontline. Although Rosa assisted Chad in management of his locations

following the district court’s split of CNR, the parties did eventually fully separate

their businesses. The district court found that this split ended “the daily discord

between them.”

Following the September 2023 trial and post-trial filings which were

submitted by April 2024, the district court issued its dissolution decree later that

month on April 20. The parties filed motions to reconsider which the district court 7

addressed in a June 2024 order. The court clarified portions of the original

dissolution decree in an order nunc pro tunc.4

Chad now appeals from the dissolution decree.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review dissolution proceedings de novo. In re Marriage of Hansen, 733

N.W.2d 683, 690 (Iowa 2007). But we give the district court’s factual findings

weight, “especially to the extent credibility determinations are involved.” Id.

DISCUSSION

Chad argues the district court failed to exercise equity in (1) its distribution

of CNR between the parties, (2) failing to use the close-of-evidence date as the

retirement-account-valuation date, (3) failing to equalize the parties’ 2022

incomes, (4) failing to order Rosa to amend 2023 tax returns to reflect fringe

benefits from CNR , and (5) improperly including certain assets in its property

division. Chad and Rosa both request appellate attorney fees.

I. Distribution of CNR

The district court is tasked with equitably distributing all marital property at

the time of the dissolution, which does not include inherited property or property

gifted to one spouse. In re Marriage of Keener, 728 N.W.2d 188, 193 (Iowa 2007);

see also Iowa Code § 598.21(5) (2024). Although equity is not synonymous with

equality, equality of distribution is most often the most equitable distribution.

Keener, 728 N.W.2d at 193.

4 In its order nunc pro tunc, the district court also amended the original decree in

respect to the time limit for sale of the marital residence, Rosa’s payment of taxes and expenses, and payment of the children’s automobile expenses. 8

The district court “must identify all of the assets held in the name of either

or both parties as well as the debts owed by either or both of them.” Id. Asset

values should be assessed as of the date of trial, which serves the purpose of an

equitable distribution. See id. “The purpose of determining the value is to assist

the court in making equitable property awards and allowances.” Id. (citation

omitted). But closely held businesses are difficult to accurately value. In re

Marriage of Wiedenmann, 402 N.W.2d 744, 749 (Iowa 1987). We thus give

deference to the district court’s findings if they are “well within the range of the

evidence.” See id.

For assets that are not easily divisible, it is often easiest to order the asset’s

sale and then divide the proceeds. See In re Marriage of McDermott, 827 N.W.2d

671, 683 (Iowa 2013). Yet because forced sales often bring lower values, this is

not the preferred method of division. See id. Thus, an equalization payment is

preferred where the asset cannot be easily divided. Id. But division is nonetheless

preferred above sale or an equalization payment when feasible See id.

Chad makes two arguments regarding the district court’s distribution of

CNR. First, that the district court failed to do equity when it declined to assess a

specific value to CNR. Second, he argues the district court should have awarded

him CNR and required an equalization payment be made to Rosa. We will first

address Chad’s second argument because our analysis on that issue is dispositive

as to his valuation argument.

The district court decreed that

Rosa’s proposed resolution to split [CNR] by locations is a reasonable and more equitable approach. In handling the division in that manner, the market value of CNR is not crucial. Instead, each 9

party would be awarded three CNR locations and be allowed to operate them as s/he deems appropriate. While not typically done, this approach suits this case well. The business is far easier to divide than most businesses; both parties are deeply involved in the business, and the parties have been operating in a divided manner for some time. As such, the Court will divide the business in the manner previously ordered by the Court in its Order Modifying Temporary Stipulation of November 4, 2022.

Chad contends that he should have been awarded the entirety of CNR and

ordered to make an equalization payment to Rosa. We disagree. Chad’s

argument largely revolves around the fact that the split ordered by the district court

is not the typical method for dividing businesses. We do not divide assets by

determining what method is most common, rather, we ask what division does

equity. See Keener, 728 N.W.2d at 193.

Chad takes issue with the court referring to Rosa’s locations as Frontline

and his locations as CNR when all locations are technically part of CNR. But we

find that this argument supports the district court’s decision to split the company.

Chad admits that Rosa has been operating her Newton, Nevada, and Centerville

locations as a part of her Frontline entity since the split by the district court in

November 2022. So by the date that the court entered its dissolution decree,

Rosa’s locations had functionally been operating as a separate entity for over a

year and a half. And as the district court found—and the parties do not dispute—

the tension between the parties vastly declined after the split. The time between

the temporary stipulation and the decree proved that the separate businesses

could thrive under the conditions the district court permanently enshrined in the

decree. 10

We are not compelled by Chad’s argument that “economies of scale” make

the split inequitable. There is no dispute that having more locations allows certain

costs to be more diffused, but based on the year and a half these businesses have

been operating separately, the slightly increased overhead has not been fatal to

the businesses’ viability.

Each party was awarded three locations. Chad was awarded two of CNR’s

three original locations. CNR was successful enough in those original locations

that it was able to expand significantly. And Chad now has the advantage of an

established client base that CNR lacked when it was first starting. Chad has not

presented evidence that CNR cannot run profitably under the new division. 5

Next we address Chad’s claim that the district court should have assigned

a value to CNR. We agree with Chad here; the law is clear that the district court

“must identify all of the assets held in the name of either or both parties,” and “[t]he

assets should then be given their value as of the date of trial.” Keener, 728 N.W.2d

at 193. While our case law recognizes that closely held businesses are difficult to

value, that does not lessen the court’s duty to assign such a value. See

McDermott, 827 N.W.2d at 683.

Yet, in light of our decision that evenly splitting the business was equitable,

we do agree with the district court that “the market value of CNR is not crucial” to

an equitable distribution under the specific circumstances of this case. Even if we

5 Chad additionally claims that the court’s order to transfer all patient records to

the location where they seek treatment “ignores the practical hurdles of transferring patient files and confidential medical records.” But he does not provide further explanation or authority for this claim, so we will not speculate further. 11

accepted Chad’s expert’s valuation that the company is worth $550,000, it does

not change our determination that CNR should be evenly split.

We thus find equity was served through the district court’s division of CNR.

II. Date of Retirement Account Valuation

Chad next argues that the district court should not have used the date of

the close of evidence (April 1, 2024) rather than the date of trial (September 23-

26, 2023) as the valuation dates for the parties’ retirement accounts. The district

court used the parties’ financial disclosures that had been most recently submitted

at the time of trial which reflected June 2023 retirement account values.

Chad’s argument on this issue is vague and speculative. He simply

contends that “[t]he trial court failed to consider the most accurate and recent

values of the parties’ retirement accounts which resulted in a failure to do equity

with the property distribution.” But there are no more recent financial disclosures

available in the record. Chad’s motion to reopen the record contained no request

for updated financial documents from Rosa, and he subsequently failed to file any

exhibits updating the values of his own retirement accounts. And the district court

had reopened the record on Chad’s request to allow him “to file any affidavits

and/or exhibits he desires.”

The district court arrived at its valuation based on the information provided

by the parties at the time of trial. Due to the inadequate evidence available in the

record to value the retirement accounts on April 1, 2024, it was equitable for the

district court to abide by the general rule that “[m]arital property typically is valued

as of the date of the trial.” In re Marriage of Thatcher, 864 N.W.2d 533, 545 (Iowa

2015). 12

III. 2022 Income Equalization

Chad argues that the district court failed to act equitably when it failed to

equalize his and Rosa’s incomes for 2022, as required by the parties’ temporary

matters stipulation adopted by the district court. We agree. Indeed, the stipulation

set Rosa’s 2022 salary at $235,000, equal to Chad’s salary at Iowa Clinic. Yet,

the agreement expressly provided that the parties’ 2022 incomes were to be

equalized: “Should it become clear that the party’s respective net incomes were

not equalized as was the intention, the individual and separate funds will be utilized

to equalize their net incomes.”

Rosa incorrectly asserts that “there was no provision to ‘equalize’ the

parties’ incomes,” which directly contradicts the aforementioned temporary-

matters-agreement provision. Rosa’s position also contradicts Chad’s unrebutted

assertion that Rosa made a $131,488 equalization payment to him for 2022.

Rosa’s own exhibit suggests that, following that first equalization payment, she still

owes Chad $32,522 to equalize the parties 2022 incomes. Rosa does not dispute

Chad’s equalization calculations; she only disputes whether income equalization

is required. Since equalization is required under the parties’ 2022 temporary

matters agreement, we remand to the district court for entry of an order directing

Rosa to make a $32,522 equalization payment to Chad.

IV. 2023 Tax Returns

Chad next contends that the district court improperly failed to consider

Rosa’s personal vehicle lease payments as income. Rosa’s vehicle lease was

paid by CNR in 2023. Chad argues this was a fringe benefit paid by CNR, and as

such, should have been considered as income by the district court. Because the 13

district court failed to consider those payments as Rosa’s income, Chad argues he

was saddled with the tax burden of those payments when paying CNR’s 2023

income taxes.

Rosa does not contest Chad’s assertions that CNR covered the costs of her

personal vehicle lease. She instead argues that “each party was on his/her own

to operate their separate locations as they deemed appropriate.” This may be true,

but the parties’ authority to operate independently of one another did not include

authority to intermingle personal expenses with business expenses. See In re

Marriage of Orton, No. 24-0891, 2025 WL 3022709, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 29,

2025) (“[The] district court properly increased self-employed [spouse]’s income by

amounts taken from business for personal use but claimed as business expenses

on [spouse]’s tax returns.) Personal expenses paid for by the business should be

classified as personal income, see id., and Rosa does not deny that the vehicle

lease was a personal expense, nor does she argue that the vehicle was a

corporate-owned vehicle that she also used personally, cf. In re Marriage of

Mahoney, 977 N.W.2d 518 (Iowa Ct. App. 2022) (explaining that personal use of

a corporate vehicle is an employment benefit not encompassed within “the

definition of net monthly income” (citation omitted)).

Further, there is no evidence in the record supporting or assigning a

reasonable dollar amount to Rosa’s suggestion that the 2023 services she

provided to Chad’s half of the business would balance out any income she derived

from the vehicle lease payments. We remand to the district court for entry of an

order directing that Rosa’s 2023 IRS Form K-1 from CNR should include any 14

payments made on Rosa’s personal vehicle lease within that tax year in addition

to the $39,000 assessed in the court’s order nunc pro tunc.

V. Asset Distribution

Chad lastly argues that two of his individual assets were erroneously

categorized as marital assets—his 2015 Jeep Cherokee, valued at $8,515, and an

investment valued at $5,175. He also asserts that the remaining proceeds to be

paid on the MaidPro sale were incorrectly valued by the district court at $65,000.

Chad assesses the value of those proceeds at $39,962.

But as Rosa points out, the district court allocated $1,107,649 in assets to

Chad and $1,084,493 to Rosa. Further, the district court’s decision to forgo

awarding Rosa any spousal support should be considered when assessing its

distribution of marital assets. In re Marriage of Trickey, 589 N.W.2d 753, 756 (Iowa

Ct. App. 1998). The removal of the Jeep and Chad’s investment from the slate of

marital assets would still result in Chad being awarded a greater share of the total

marital assets. And even if we additionally accepted Chad’s valuation for the

MaidPro sale, his total share of the marital assets would only fall to $1,068,921—

making each spouse’s respective share of the marital assets within two percent of

the other spouse’s share.

We do not find that result to be inequitable and thus decline to tinker with

the district court’s marital-asset determination.

VI. Appellate Attorney Fees

“Appellate attorney fees are not a matter of right, but rather rest in this

court’s discretion.” In re Marriage of Sullins, 715 N.W.2d 242, 255 (Iowa 2006). In

light of the parties similar financial positions and the fact that Chad and Rosa each 15

prevailed in part on this appeal, we hold that Chad and Rosa shall each be

responsible for their own appellate attorney fees. Chad and Rosa shall equally

split appellate costs.

CONCLUSION

In sum, we modify the decree by applying a 2022 income equalization and

assessing additional income to Rosa for the year 2023. We affirm in all other

respects, remand to the district court for entry of an order consistent with this

opinion, and do not award either party appellate attorney fees. Costs of the appeal

are split equally between the parties.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.