IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 20-0189 Filed October 7, 2020
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF ASHLEY KAY SEEHASE AND CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL SEEHASE
Upon the Petition of ASHLEY KAY SEEHASE, Petitioner-Appellee,
And Concerning CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL SEEHASE, Respondent-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Chickasaw County, Richard D.
Stochl, Judge.
Christopher Michael Seehase appeals the child custody and property
distribution provisions of the decree dissolving his marriage to Ashley Kay
Seehase. AFFIRMED.
Elizabeth M. Wayne of Papenheim Law Office, Parkersburg, for appellant.
Teresa Rastede of Klatt, Augustine, Treinen & Rastede, Waterloo, for
appellee.
Considered by Bower, C.J., and May and Ahlers, JJ. 2
BOWER, Chief Judge.
Christopher Michael Seehase appeals the child custody and property
distribution provisions of the decree dissolving his marriage to Ashley Kay
Seehase. We affirm.
Ashley and Christopher were married on August 12, 2006. Ashley was
nineteen years old at that time and Christopher twenty-four. Their marriage was
dissolved on December 4, 2019. At that time, their two children, J.S. and L.S.,
were ages three and six. Prior to the temporary custody order, Ashley was the
primary caregiver. At the time of the dissolution trial, both parents lived in close
proximity, were working full time, had homes suitable for their children, were
capable parents, and had the support of their extended families. They both
testified counseling would help them co-parent more effectively.
In relation to Ashley’s joint physical care request, the district court wrote:
The parties have not communicated effectively during the pendency of this action. They have each acted out of anger and been vindictive as a result of the “intervention” and resulting no-contact order. This court believes with some counseling and with the dismissal of the no- contact order, that inability can be [remedied]. It cannot be questioned that cooperation and communication between the parents is essential in joint custodial arrangements. However, our legislature was aware that in a divorce the parties are generally not getting along well and a custody contest magnifies the adversarial nature of the dissolution proceeding. To be significant enough to justify a denial of joint custody, a lack of ability to communicate must be something more than the usual acrimony that accompanies a divorce. Tension between the parents is not alone sufficient to demonstrate joint physical placement will not work. .... The parties are awarded joint legal custody of the minor children. The issue of physical placement is far more complicated. Christopher has enjoyed primary placement since December of 2018. L.S. did not [th]rive emotionally or academically in his care alone. However, both children are bonded to both parents and each ha[s] demonstrated a current ability to provide for their needs. While 3
communication has been very poor, the court believe[s] the children will benefit most by being in the equal care of both parents. They live in the same school district and each ha[s] solid family support. Ashley has repaired her relationship with her family and Christopher remains close with his. The court now believes the parties are capable of successfully co-parenting their children. They are awarded shared physical custody with the children being exchanged each week on Fridays after school or at 5:00 p.m. when school is not in session.
The court divided the parties’ assets and liabilities and ordered Christopher
to make an equalization payment to Ashley in the amount of $2800. Christopher
appeals.
Because marriage dissolution proceedings are equitable proceedings, our
review is de novo. See Iowa Code § 598.3 (2018); In re Marriage of Mauer, 874
N.W.2d 103, 106 (Iowa 2016).
[W]e examine the entire record and adjudicate anew the issue of the property distribution. We give weight to the findings of the district court, particularly concerning the credibility of witnesses; however, those findings are not binding upon us. We will disturb the district court’s ruling “only when there has been a failure to do equity.”
In re Marriage of McDermott, 827 N.W.2d 671, 676 (Iowa 2013) (citations omitted).
“Joint physical care” means an award of physical care of a minor child to both joint legal custodial parents under which both parents have rights and responsibilities toward the child including but not limited to shared parenting time with the child, maintaining homes for the child, providing routine care for the child and under which neither parent has physical care rights superior to those of the other parent.
Iowa Code § 598.1(4).
Pursuant to Iowa Code section 598.41(1)(a), joint custody may be ordered
and the court’s custody determination is to “assure the child the opportunity for the
maximum continuing physical and emotional contact with both parents after the
parents have separated or dissolved the marriage” and “will encourage parents to 4
share the rights and responsibilities of raising the child.” The court must consider
granting joint custody upon a parent’s request, and “[i]f the court does not grant
joint custody under this subsection, the court shall cite clear and convincing
evidence . . . that joint custody is unreasonable and not in the best interest of the
child.” Id. § 598.41(2), (3).
Christopher argues shared care is not in the children’s best interests. He
repeats his complaints about communication the parties have experienced during
the parties’ separation.1 We have already noted the trial court’s acknowledgement
of that issue. Yet, we agree with the district court the parties’ conflict is not so
unusual as to preclude shared care. See In re Marriage of Bolin, 336 N.W.2d 441,
446 (Iowa 1983) (“Although cooperation and communication are essential in joint
custody, tension between the parents is not alone sufficient to demonstrate it will
not work.”). Ashley and Christopher have both shown they are able to
communicate about the children’s care and both agreed their communication could
be aided with counseling. We encourage them to attempt to let go of their past
grievances and follow through with counseling so they can positively support their
children.
Christopher next challenges the property division ordered by the court. “In
dissolution-of-marriage cases, marital property is to be divided equitably,
considering the factors outlined in Iowa Code section 598.21[(5)].” In re Marriage
of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 702 (Iowa 2007). “An equitable distribution of marital
1The parties’ descriptions of their interactions—not surprisingly—is very different. The trial court’s findings of facts tended to support Christopher’s version of events. Our reading of the transcript might lead to different findings. However, it is clear both parties love and are capable of providing care to the children. 5
property, based upon the factors in 598.21(5), does not require an equal division
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 20-0189 Filed October 7, 2020
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF ASHLEY KAY SEEHASE AND CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL SEEHASE
Upon the Petition of ASHLEY KAY SEEHASE, Petitioner-Appellee,
And Concerning CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL SEEHASE, Respondent-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Chickasaw County, Richard D.
Stochl, Judge.
Christopher Michael Seehase appeals the child custody and property
distribution provisions of the decree dissolving his marriage to Ashley Kay
Seehase. AFFIRMED.
Elizabeth M. Wayne of Papenheim Law Office, Parkersburg, for appellant.
Teresa Rastede of Klatt, Augustine, Treinen & Rastede, Waterloo, for
appellee.
Considered by Bower, C.J., and May and Ahlers, JJ. 2
BOWER, Chief Judge.
Christopher Michael Seehase appeals the child custody and property
distribution provisions of the decree dissolving his marriage to Ashley Kay
Seehase. We affirm.
Ashley and Christopher were married on August 12, 2006. Ashley was
nineteen years old at that time and Christopher twenty-four. Their marriage was
dissolved on December 4, 2019. At that time, their two children, J.S. and L.S.,
were ages three and six. Prior to the temporary custody order, Ashley was the
primary caregiver. At the time of the dissolution trial, both parents lived in close
proximity, were working full time, had homes suitable for their children, were
capable parents, and had the support of their extended families. They both
testified counseling would help them co-parent more effectively.
In relation to Ashley’s joint physical care request, the district court wrote:
The parties have not communicated effectively during the pendency of this action. They have each acted out of anger and been vindictive as a result of the “intervention” and resulting no-contact order. This court believes with some counseling and with the dismissal of the no- contact order, that inability can be [remedied]. It cannot be questioned that cooperation and communication between the parents is essential in joint custodial arrangements. However, our legislature was aware that in a divorce the parties are generally not getting along well and a custody contest magnifies the adversarial nature of the dissolution proceeding. To be significant enough to justify a denial of joint custody, a lack of ability to communicate must be something more than the usual acrimony that accompanies a divorce. Tension between the parents is not alone sufficient to demonstrate joint physical placement will not work. .... The parties are awarded joint legal custody of the minor children. The issue of physical placement is far more complicated. Christopher has enjoyed primary placement since December of 2018. L.S. did not [th]rive emotionally or academically in his care alone. However, both children are bonded to both parents and each ha[s] demonstrated a current ability to provide for their needs. While 3
communication has been very poor, the court believe[s] the children will benefit most by being in the equal care of both parents. They live in the same school district and each ha[s] solid family support. Ashley has repaired her relationship with her family and Christopher remains close with his. The court now believes the parties are capable of successfully co-parenting their children. They are awarded shared physical custody with the children being exchanged each week on Fridays after school or at 5:00 p.m. when school is not in session.
The court divided the parties’ assets and liabilities and ordered Christopher
to make an equalization payment to Ashley in the amount of $2800. Christopher
appeals.
Because marriage dissolution proceedings are equitable proceedings, our
review is de novo. See Iowa Code § 598.3 (2018); In re Marriage of Mauer, 874
N.W.2d 103, 106 (Iowa 2016).
[W]e examine the entire record and adjudicate anew the issue of the property distribution. We give weight to the findings of the district court, particularly concerning the credibility of witnesses; however, those findings are not binding upon us. We will disturb the district court’s ruling “only when there has been a failure to do equity.”
In re Marriage of McDermott, 827 N.W.2d 671, 676 (Iowa 2013) (citations omitted).
“Joint physical care” means an award of physical care of a minor child to both joint legal custodial parents under which both parents have rights and responsibilities toward the child including but not limited to shared parenting time with the child, maintaining homes for the child, providing routine care for the child and under which neither parent has physical care rights superior to those of the other parent.
Iowa Code § 598.1(4).
Pursuant to Iowa Code section 598.41(1)(a), joint custody may be ordered
and the court’s custody determination is to “assure the child the opportunity for the
maximum continuing physical and emotional contact with both parents after the
parents have separated or dissolved the marriage” and “will encourage parents to 4
share the rights and responsibilities of raising the child.” The court must consider
granting joint custody upon a parent’s request, and “[i]f the court does not grant
joint custody under this subsection, the court shall cite clear and convincing
evidence . . . that joint custody is unreasonable and not in the best interest of the
child.” Id. § 598.41(2), (3).
Christopher argues shared care is not in the children’s best interests. He
repeats his complaints about communication the parties have experienced during
the parties’ separation.1 We have already noted the trial court’s acknowledgement
of that issue. Yet, we agree with the district court the parties’ conflict is not so
unusual as to preclude shared care. See In re Marriage of Bolin, 336 N.W.2d 441,
446 (Iowa 1983) (“Although cooperation and communication are essential in joint
custody, tension between the parents is not alone sufficient to demonstrate it will
not work.”). Ashley and Christopher have both shown they are able to
communicate about the children’s care and both agreed their communication could
be aided with counseling. We encourage them to attempt to let go of their past
grievances and follow through with counseling so they can positively support their
children.
Christopher next challenges the property division ordered by the court. “In
dissolution-of-marriage cases, marital property is to be divided equitably,
considering the factors outlined in Iowa Code section 598.21[(5)].” In re Marriage
of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 702 (Iowa 2007). “An equitable distribution of marital
1The parties’ descriptions of their interactions—not surprisingly—is very different. The trial court’s findings of facts tended to support Christopher’s version of events. Our reading of the transcript might lead to different findings. However, it is clear both parties love and are capable of providing care to the children. 5
property, based upon the factors in 598.21(5), does not require an equal division
of assets.” In re Marriage of Kimbro, 826 N.W.2d 696, 703 (Iowa 2013). The value
of the assets is to “be determined as of the date of trial.” In re Marriage of Driscoll,
563 N.W.2d 640, 642 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997).
Christopher objects to the amount of the equalization payment, the
valuation and division of one of his retirement accounts,2 and the court’s equal
allocation of the debt remaining from a vehicle the court ordered sold. The
valuations made by the court were within the range of evidence, and we do not
disturb them. See Hansen, 733 N.W.2d at 703. Christopher gives no compelling
reason to deviate from the general rule that valuations are to be made as of the
date of trial. And while one might quibble with a particular finding as to the value
of one asset or another, overall we find no failure to do equity in the court’s property
distribution, and we affirm. See McDermott, 827 N.W.2d at 676.
Both parties seek an award of appellate attorney fees. “Appellate attorney
fees are not a matter of right, but rather rest in this court’s discretion.” Id. at 687
(citation omitted). “In determining whether to award appellate attorney fees, we
consider ‘the needs of the party seeking the award, the ability of the other party to
pay, and the relative merits of the appeal.’” Id. (citation omitted). In light of
Christopher’s lack of success on the merits of his appeal and greater ability to pay,
he shall pay $2000 toward Ashley’s appellate attorney fees. Costs are assessed
to Christopher.
AFFIRMED.
2Christopher did not initially disclose this account but acknowledged its existence and value at trial.