This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A23-1644
In re the Marriage of:
Robert Thomas Nord, petitioner A, Respondent,
vs.
Katherine Elizabeth Bowers, petitioner B, Appellant.
Filed May 6, 2024 Affirmed Reilly, Judge *
Anoka County District Court File No. 02-FA-22-1752
William D. Siegel, Tarshish Cody, PLC, Richfield, Minnesota (for respondent)
William L.H. Lubov, Lubov Law, LLC, Golden Valley, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and
Reilly, Judge.
* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
Appellant-wife challenges the district court’s denial of her motion to reopen the
parties’ stipulated dissolution judgment and decree (stipulated J&D) under Minnesota
Statutes section 518.145 (2022) for excusable neglect and fraud. See Minn.
Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2(1), (3). Wife also challenges the district court’s denial of her
motion for attorney fees. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying
wife’s motions, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Katherine Elizabeth Bowers (wife) and respondent Robert Thomas Nord
(husband) were married in July 2002. On October 28, 2022, the parties submitted a joint
petition to dissolve their marriage. Neither party was represented by legal counsel at the
time or throughout the dissolution proceedings. The district court rejected the parties’ joint
petition because it contained confidential financial information. The parties resubmitted
the joint petition without the confidential financial information on November 18, 2022.
Apart from omitting the confidential financial information, the resubmitted joint petition
was identical to the original joint petition.
The joint petition provided details about the parties’ financial status and indicated
that each party wished to waive spousal maintenance. When the joint petition was
executed, husband was employed and earned a salary of $82,000 per year—about
$5,344.13 per month. During this same time, wife was not employed but received about
$770 per month in social-security-disability benefits. Despite this discrepancy in monthly
2 incomes, husband and wife claimed that they were “fully capable of self-support” and did
not require spousal maintenance. Accordingly, wife and husband waived spousal
maintenance pursuant to the following provision:
Neither party is awarded spousal maintenance. Both [p]etitioners have waived any claims to spousal maintenance for the past, present, or future, and expressly waive all rights to modify their waivers of maintenance. This court is divested of jurisdiction to award or modify maintenance in the future pursuant to Karon v. Karon, 435 N.W.2d 501 (Minn. 1989).
Husband and wife asserted that their waiver of spousal maintenance was “fair and
equitable,” “supported by the above consideration,” and “signed by both parties after full
financial disclosure to each other.”
The joint petition also divided the parties’ marital assets. The joint petition provided
that the parties would sell their largest asset, their homestead, and equally divide the net
proceeds. The joint petition also divided the parties’ other assets: husband’s and wife’s
individual bank accounts, husband’s 401(k) retirement plan, the parties’ shared vehicle,
and a few small material possessions. The joint petition indicated that neither party owned
any nonmarital property.
On November 29, 2022, the district court granted the parties’ joint petition and filed
an order to dissolve the parties’ marriage by stipulated judgment and decree (J&D). The
district court entered judgment on the J&D on December 1, 2022.
On December 5, 2022, husband brought wife to a hospital emergency department
after she threatened to shoot herself. Wife’s family members told hospital personnel that
wife had recently traveled to Las Vegas and had been using THC products and exhibiting
3 paranoid, delusional, and aggressive behavior since she returned. According to wife’s
hospital records, wife has a history of obsessive-compulsive disorder, post-traumatic stress
disorder, and borderline personality disorder, as well as a family history of schizophrenia.
Based on this information, the county petitioned for judicial commitment of wife as a
person who poses a risk of harm because of mental illness and recommended that she be
held at a local hospital, pending a hearing.
On December 20, 2022, the district court found that wife posed a risk of harm based
on “Substance (Delta-9) - Induced Psychotic Disorder” and determined that she satisfied
the statutory criteria for civil commitment. But the district court stayed civil-commitment
proceedings for six months, pursuant to several stipulated conditions.
On April 26, 2023, wife moved to reopen the parties’ stipulated J&D under section
518.145 and filed a motion for attorney fees under Minnesota Statutes section 518.14,
subdivision 1 (2022). In a supporting affidavit, wife argued that the parties’ stipulated J&D
should be reopened because husband committed fraud by failing to disclose her “severe
mental health problems” to the district court, which in turn deprived her of spousal
maintenance, her alleged nonmarital interest in the parties’ homestead, and her alleged
marital share of any “workers’-compensation and personal-injury claims” that husband
may have. Wife asked the district court to award her permanent spousal maintenance, her
marital share of husband’s alleged legal claims, and attorney fees of $2,000.
Husband opposed wife’s motions. Husband argued that wife was fully competent
throughout the dissolution proceedings and that her mental-health issues did not arise until
after the parties executed the joint petition. To support his argument, husband submitted a
4 personal affidavit along with affidavits from wife’s two adult children and husband’s
stepfather.
In husband’s affidavit, husband stated that the parties “had detailed discussions
regarding the division of [their] assets and liabilities” and that wife “made intelligent
contributions to these conversations.” Husband explained that, while the parties were
drafting the joint petition, wife went to the county courthouse and worked with a family-
law clinic on multiple occasions to ensure that the petition “was drafted correctly and
provided all necessary information.” Husband also stated that wife intended to move to
Las Vegas after the divorce was finalized and planned to supplement her income by
working as a bartender. Husband explained that wife had “[run] the numbers related to her
income and estimated budget” and determined that she did not “need or want any spousal
maintenance” given her plans. Husband stated that wife “was logical, coherent, and
levelheaded” throughout the dissolution proceedings and while she was planning her move
to Las Vegas. Husband explained that wife left for Las Vegas on October 29, 2022, and
returned in mid-November 2022, when she began “exhibiting bizarre behavior, including
delusions and signs of paranoia.” Husband attributed wife’s erratic behavior to her
increased intake of THC products, which she had acquired in Las Vegas.
Wife’s children and husband’s stepfather corroborated husband’s statements.
Wife’s son stated that wife “was coherent, competent and able bodied” during dissolution
proceedings and did not start exhibiting bizarre behavior until she returned from
Las Vegas. Likewise, wife’s daughter stated that wife “was fully aware of what was going
on” during dissolution proceedings and did not show signs of “serious mental health issues”
5 until after she returned from Las Vegas. Finally, husband’s stepfather described wife as
“sharp” and “competent” and stated that her “psychotic break” occurred after the parties’
divorce was finalized.
The district court denied wife’s motion to reopen the parties’ stipulated J&D.
Crediting the affidavits of husband, wife’s children, and husband’s stepfather, and
discrediting the affidavit of wife, the district court found that wife actively participated in
preparing the joint petition and competently planned her move to Las Vegas. The district
court likewise found that wife “was fully aware of what she was doing [during dissolution
proceedings], made informed decisions relating to the dissolution of marriage, and
indicated that she was satisfied with the decisions that had been made.” And the district
court found that wife showed no signs of paranoia or psychosis before the parties executed
the joint petition or at the time of execution. Based on these findings, the district court
concluded that wife had not shown that husband “committed fraud upon the [c]ourt” or that
there was a “reasonable excuse for her failure . . . to act.” Accordingly, the district court
determined that wife was not entitled to relief from the stipulated J&D under
section 518.145, subdivision 2(1), (3). The district court also determined that wife was not
entitled to an evidentiary hearing or attorney fees.
Wife appeals.
DECISION
Wife argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying her motion to
reopen the parties’ stipulated J&D and her motion for attorney fees. We address each
issue in turn.
6 I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying wife’s motion to reopen the parties’ stipulated J&D.
Wife first challenges the district court’s denial of her motion to reopen the stipulated
J&D. The use of stipulations in dissolution proceedings is a judicially favored “means of
simplifying and expediting litigation.” Shirk v. Shirk, 561 N.W.2d 519, 521 (Minn. 1997).
“Stipulations are therefore accorded the sanctity of binding contracts” and “cannot be
repudiated or withdrawn from one party without the consent of the other, except by leave
of the court for cause shown.” Id. at 521-22 (quotation omitted). A party may seek to
reopen a stipulated J&D under section 518.145, subdivision 2, however, for five statutorily
prescribed reasons, including “excusable neglect” and “fraud . . . misrepresentation, or
other misconduct of an adverse party.” Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2(1), (3); see also
Shirk, 561 N.W.2d at 522 (“The sole relief from [a stipulated J&D] lies in meeting the
requirements of [section] 518.145, [subdivision] 2.”). The party seeking to reopen a
stipulated J&D bears the burden of proving at least one statutory ground by a
preponderance of the evidence. Knapp v. Knapp, 883 N.W.2d 833, 835 (Minn. App. 2016).
We will not disturb a district court’s denial of a motion to reopen a stipulated J&D
under section 518.145, subdivision 2, absent an abuse of discretion. Kornberg v. Kornberg,
542 N.W.2d 379, 386 (Minn. 1996). “A district court abuses its discretion by making
findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying the law, or rendering a
decision that is against logic and the facts on record.” Knapp, 883 N.W.2d at 835
(quotation omitted).
7 Likewise, we will not set aside a district court’s finding of fact unless it is clearly
erroneous. Kornberg, 542 N.W.2d at 386. A finding is clearly erroneous if it is “manifestly
contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a
whole.” In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021) (quotation
omitted). “In applying the clear-error standard, we view the evidence in a light favorable
to the findings.” Id. We also defer to the district court’s credibility determinations. Sefkow
v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988); see also Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607
N.W.2d 468, 472 (Minn. App. 2000). “That the record might support findings other than
those made by the [district] court does not show that the court’s findings are defective.”
Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d at 474.
Wife argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying her motion to
reopen the stipulated J&D because (1) husband committed fraud and misrepresentation by
failing to inform the district court of wife’s “psychological condition” and neglecting to
disclose certain assets; (2) wife’s failure to correct the joint petition before it was entered
into judgment constituted excusable neglect because wife’s mental-health issues prevented
her from understanding its terms; (3) the district court should have held an evidentiary
hearing before deciding wife’s motion to reopen the stipulated J&D; (4) the district court
failed to consider whether the parties’ waiver of spousal maintenance was fair and
equitable; and (5) the district court failed to order an equitable division of the parties’
marital and nonmarital property because certain assets were omitted from the marital estate.
We consider each argument in turn.
8 A. Fraud or Misrepresentation
A district court may relieve a party from a dissolution judgment and “order a new
trial or grant other relief as may be just” if the other party committed fraud. Minn.
Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2(3). Where, as here, a party requests relief under section 518.145,
subdivision 2(3), within one year of entry of judgment, the moving party need only show
ordinary fraud, not fraud upon the court. Doering v. Doering, 629 N.W.2d 124, 129-30
(Minn. App. 2001), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 11, 2001). “Ordinary fraud, in a dissolution
context, does not require an affirmative misrepresentation or an intentional course of
concealment because parties to a marriage dissolution have a duty to disclose all assets and
liabilities completely and accurately.” Id. at 130.
We review a district court’s decision on whether to reopen a dissolution judgment
based on fraud for an abuse of discretion. Thompson v. Thompson, 739 N.W.2d 424, 428
(Minn. App. 2007). But we review the factual findings that support a district court’s
decision on this issue for clear error. Haefele v. Haefele, 621 N.W.2d 758, 763 (Minn.
App. 2001), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 21, 2001). “Where evidence relevant to a factual issue
consists of conflicting testimony, the district court’s decision is necessarily based on the
credibility of the witnesses.” Id. In these situations, we afford district courts broad
discretion “because they are in the best position to determine which witnesses are credible
and to weigh the evidence.” Id. This deference extends to district court credibility
determinations that are based on conflicting affidavits. Knapp, 883 N.W.2d at 837. “If
there is evidence to support the district court’s decision, an abuse of discretion will not be
found.” Thompson, 739 N.W.2d at 428.
9 1. Husband’s alleged nondisclosure of wife’s mental-health issues
Wife first contends that husband committed fraud or misrepresentation by failing to
inform the district court about wife’s mental-health issues. In making this argument, wife
appears to assert that the district court clearly erred by finding that she “did not begin
exhibiting mental health issues until several weeks after the [j]oint [p]etition was executed”
and by crediting the statements of husband, wife’s children, and husband’s stepfather as
stated in their affidavits. We are not persuaded.
We first address wife’s argument that the district court clearly erred by finding that
wife did not begin exhibiting signs of mental illness until several weeks after the parties
executed the joint petition. Based on our review of the record, this finding is not clearly
erroneous. In making this finding, the district court credited the affidavits of husband,
wife’s children, and husband’s stepfather. In these affidavits, wife’s family members
consistently described wife as being aware of her actions, involved in preparing the joint
petition, and capable of making plans for the future. Wife’s family members also
consistently explained that wife did not begin exhibiting signs of mental illness until after
she returned from Las Vegas, several weeks after the parties executed the joint petition.
This evidence is sufficient to support the district court’s finding about wife’s metal illness.
See id.
We next address wife’s argument that the district court clearly erred by crediting the
statements of husband, wife’s children, and husband’s stepfather, as set forth in their
affidavits. Wife argues that the district court clearly erred by crediting these statements
because they are not admissible as expert testimony under Minnesota Rule of
10 Evidence 702. Husband agrees that the family-member statements are not admissible
under rule 702 but contends that they are admissible as opinion testimony under Minnesota
Rule of Evidence 701. We agree with husband.
We conclude that the district court did not clearly err by crediting the statements of
husband, wife’s children, and husband’s stepfather because these statements fall within the
scope of rule 701. Rule 701 authorizes lay witnesses to provide testimony on opinions
“which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness; (b) helpful to a clear
understanding of the witness’ testimony or the determination of a fact in issue; and (c) not
based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of
[r]ule 702.” Minn. R. Evid. 701; see also In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76,
93 (Minn. App. 2012). “The key question is whether the witness personally knows what
he or she is talking about and whether the testimony will be helpful to the [fact-finder].”
J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 93 (alteration in original) (quotation omitted). As husband correctly
notes, the statements of husband, wife’s children, and husband’s stepfather were not based
on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge. Instead, these statements were
based on the family members’ direct observations of wife before, during, and after the
parties executed the joint petition. Accordingly, the family members’ statements constitute
lay testimony under rule 701, not expert testimony under rule 702. See Minn. R.
Evid. 701-702; J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 93. Wife’s argument that the district court clearly
erred by crediting these statements because they are inadmissible under rule 702 is
therefore unavailing.
11 2. Husband’s alleged nondisclosure of certain assets
Wife next contends that husband committed fraud or misrepresentation by violating
his duty to disclose the parties’ assets to the district court. To facilitate the equitable
division of property during a dissolution proceeding, the parties to the proceeding “must
make a full and accurate disclosure of their assets and liabilities.” Bollenbach v.
Bollenbach, 175 N.W.2d 148, 155 (Minn. 1970). Failure to do so constitutes fraud and is
grounds for reopening a dissolution judgment. Ronnkvist v. Ronnkvist, 331 N.W.2d 764,
766 (Minn. 1983); see also Doering, 629 N.W.2d at 129 (explaining that caselaw indicates
“that the failure of a party to a dissolution to make a full and complete disclosure constitutes
sufficient reason to reopen the dissolution judgment for fraud”).
Wife asserts that husband violated his duty to disclose the parties’ assets by failing
to inform the district court about (1) wife’s purported nonmarital interest in the parties’
homestead, (2) husband’s purported worker’s-compensation and personal-injury claims,
and (3) husband’s 401(k) plan. 1 We are not persuaded.
We conclude that wife has not met her burden of proving that she is entitled to
reversal based on husband’s nondisclosure of the assets she identifies. As for wife’s
1 Wife also appears to argue that the district court abused its discretion by not reopening
the stipulated J&D based on fraud because wife did not consult counsel and therefore “did not understand the concept of waiver as it related to spousal maintenance.” As husband notes, wife does not provide any authority to support this argument. We therefore decline to consider it. See Waters v. Fiebelkorn, 13 N.W.2d 461, 464-65 (Minn. 1944) (“[O]n appeal error is never presumed. It must be made to appear affirmatively before there can be reversal. . . . [and] the burden of showing error rests upon the one who relies upon it.”); Loth v. Loth, 35 N.W.2d 542, 546 (Minn. 1949) (quoting Waters); Luthen v. Luthen, 596 N.W.2d 278, 283 (Minn. App. 1999) (applying Loth).
12 purported nonmarital interest in the parties’ homestead, wife has presented no evidence to
support this alleged interest. Additionally, wife cites no authority to support her apparent
assertion that husband was required either to disclose this alleged interest during the
proceedings or to anticipate and preemptively defend against it. Regarding husband’s
purported workers’-compensation and personal-injury claims, wife again has presented no
evidence to show that these legal claims exist or to support her stake in them. Finally, as
for husband’s 401(k), the stipulated J&D lists this asset and explains how it should be
divided among the parties. Thus, there is no basis for concluding that husband’s 401(k)
was excluded from the marital estate. For these reasons, wife has not met her burden of
proving that she is entitled to relief based on husband’s alleged nondisclosure of wife’s
purported nonmarital interest in the parties’ homestead, husband’s purported legal claims,
or husband’s 401(k). See Waters, 13 N.W.2d at 464-65; Luthen, 596 N.W.2d at 283.
In sum, wife has not established that she is entitled to relief from the stipulated J&D
based on husband’s alleged nondisclosure of her mental-health issues or husband’s alleged
nondisclosure of certain assets. We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse
its discretion by denying wife’s motion to reopen the stipulated J&D based on fraud. See
Knapp, 883 N.W.2d at 835.
B. Excusable Neglect
Wife also argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying her motion
to reopen the stipulated J&D based on excusable neglect.
Under section 518.145, subdivision 2(1), a district court may relieve a party from a
dissolution judgment and order a new trial or other just relief for “excusable neglect.”
13 Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2(1). The language in section 518.145, subdivision 2(1), is
identical to the language in Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(a), and this court has “addressed both
the statute and the rule in appeals from district court orders denying motions to vacate
dissolution judgments.” Knapp, 883 N.W.2d at 836. As a result, a district court may
analyze a party’s motion to reopen a dissolution judgment for excusable neglect under
rule 60.02. See id. at 836-37.
To be entitled to relief under rule 60.02, the moving party “must establish (1) a
reasonable case on the merits; (2) a reasonable excuse for the failure to act; (3) action with
due diligence after entry of judgment; and (4) lack of prejudice to the opposing party.”
Reid v. Strodtman, 631 N.W.2d 414, 419 (Minn. App. 2001) (citing Finden v. Klaas, 128
N.W.2d 748, 750 (Minn. 1964)). While the moving party must satisfy all four of these
factors, “a weak showing on one factor may be offset by a strong showing on the others.”
Id.
In denying wife’s motion to reopen the stipulated J&D for excusable neglect, the
district court found that wife did not satisfy the first and second factors under rule 60.02
because wife “failed to demonstrate that her mental or emotional condition at the time she
signed the [j]oint [p]etition prevented her from fairly and reasonably understanding what
she was agreeing to.” The district court also found that wife did not satisfy the fourth rule
60.02 factor because reopening the stipulated J&D would “substantial[ly] prejudice”
husband, “given that the parties’ divorce has been finalized for approximately ten (10)
months.”
14 Wife asserts that the district court’s findings on these factors are clearly erroneous
because (1) she established a reasonable case on the merits by showing “more than a
reasonable likelihood that she should be awarded permanent spousal maintenance,” a share
of the assets she alleges husband failed to disclose, and attorney fees; (2) she was
reasonably excused from failing to challenge the joint petition because she did not
understand it because of her mental illness; and (3) reopening the stipulated J&D would
not substantially prejudice husband. We disagree.
At a minimum, the record shows that wife has not satisfied the second rule
60.02 factor and is thus not entitled to relief for excusable neglect. See Reid, 631 N.W.2d
at 419. As discussed above, the district court did not clearly err by finding that wife did
not show any signs of mental illness until several weeks after she executed the joint
petition. For these reasons, the district court did not clearly err by finding that wife failed
to establish “a reasonable excuse for [her] failure to act” under rule 60.02. See id. Because
wife has not satisfied the second rule 60.02 factor, she is not entitled to relief under rule
60.02(a) or its statutory corollary, section 518.145, subdivision 2(1). See id. We therefore
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying wife’s motion to
reopen the stipulated J&D based on excusable neglect. See Knapp, 883 N.W.2d at 835.
C. Denial Without a Hearing
Wife next contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying her
motion to reopen the stipulated J&D because the district court “failed to adequately
consider” whether an evidentiary hearing was warranted under Minnesota Statutes section
15 518.13, subdivision 5 (2022). 2 Under section 518.13, subdivision 5(1), a dissolution
judgment and decree “must be submitted to the court for approval and filing without a final
hearing” when “there are no minor children of the marriage” and “the parties have entered
into a written stipulation.” (Emphasis added.) But a district court “shall schedule the
matter for hearing in any case where the proposed judgment and decree . . . is contrary to
the interests of justice.” Minn. Stat. § 518.13, subd. 5. Wife asserts that the stipulated J&D
“is contrary to the interest[s] of justice” because it was executed while wife was suffering
from mental illness and because it is not fair and equitable. Wife argues that the district
court should have held an evidentiary hearing, given these circumstances.
Motions in family-law cases generally “are decided without an evidentiary hearing,
unless otherwise ordered by the court for good cause shown.” Doering, 629 N.W.2d at
130 (quoting Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 303.03(d)). Minnesota courts have not yet defined “good
cause” in the context of motions to reopen dissolution judgments. See id.; see also
Thompson, 739 N.W.2d at 430. But this court has held that a district court may not resolve
a motion to reopen a dissolution judgment without an evidentiary hearing unless “there is
no genuine issue of material fact in dispute and . . . a determination of the applicable law
will resolve the controversy.” Doering, 629 N.W.2d at 130 (quotation omitted). When
determining whether an evidentiary hearing is required in this context, “the district court
may not weigh the evidence.” Id. “Instead, the district court must view the evidence in
2 Wife also argues that the district court abused its discretion by “not schedul[ing] a hearing
before approving the [stipulated J&D].” Wife cites no authority to support this argument. Accordingly, we decline to consider it. See Waters, 13 N.W.2d at 464-65; Luthen, 596 N.W.2d at 283.
16 the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id. “Whether to hold an evidentiary
hearing on a motion generally is a discretionary decision of the district court, which we
review for an abuse of discretion.” Thompson, 739 N.W.2d at 430. “But whether the
district court applied the correct legal standard is a question of law, which we review de
novo.” Id.
In denying wife’s motion to reopen the stipulated J&D, the district court found that
“viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to [wife], . . . [wife]’s affidavit is
insufficient to present a fact question of fraud and/or excusable neglect.” Accordingly, the
district court found that there was “not good cause for an evidentiary hearing” on wife’s
motion to reopen the stipulated J&D. We agree with the district court.
Wife’s motion to reopen the stipulated J&D was insufficient to create a genuine
issue of material fact about whether wife was entitled to relief from the stipulated J&D
based on fraud or excusable neglect. To support her motion to reopen the stipulated J&D,
wife submitted a brief affidavit; a county civil-commitment screening report, dated
December 7, 2022; and a civil-commitment order, dated December 20, 2022. The county
report stated that wife was placed on a 72-hour medical hold because of mental-health
issues exhibited on December 5, 2022. And wife’s affidavit stated that she “did not
understand the terms of the [j]oint [p]etition,” including her waiver of spousal maintenance,
because she “was having severe mental health problems” when the parties executed the
petition. At most, this evidence establishes that wife experienced mental-health issues
more than one month after the parties executed the joint petition. Without more, wife’s
bare assertion that she experienced these mental-health issues earlier is insufficient to
17 create a genuine issue of material fact on the issues of fraud or excusable neglect. See
Doering, 629 N.W.2d at 132 (concluding that appellant’s detailed affidavits were
“sufficient to present a fact question of fraud” and that appellant therefore “established
good cause for an evidentiary hearing on his motion to reopen the judgment”). We thus
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying wife an evidentiary
hearing on her motion to reopen the stipulated J&D. See Thompson, 739 N.W.2d at 430.
D. Waiver of Spousal Maintenance
Wife next argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying her motion
to reopen the stipulated J&D because the district court failed to consider whether the
parties’ waiver of spousal maintenance was fair and equitable considering the discrepancy
between the parties’ incomes. Wife also contends that the district court failed to make
necessary findings under Minnesota Statutes section 518.552, subdivision 5 (2022), which
governs “[p]rivate agreements” related to the waiver or restriction of spousal maintenance.
These arguments are unavailing.
Wife’s assertion that the district court failed to adequately consider the parties’
waiver of spousal maintenance fails because it is not properly before us. In making this
argument, wife challenges the district court’s entry of judgment on the parties’
stipulation—not the district court’s denial of wife’s motion to reopen the stipulated J&D.
In Shirk, the supreme court held that a stipulation “merge[s]” into a judgment and decree
when the judgment and decree is based on the stipulation and “cannot thereafter be the
target of attack by a party seeking relief from the judgment and decree.” 561 N.W.2d at
522. The supreme court then clarified that “[t]he sole relief from the judgment and decree
18 lies in meeting the requirements of [section] 518.145, [subdivision] 2.” Id. As discussed
above, wife has not met the requirements of section 518.145, subdivision 2. Wife therefore
has not established that she is entitled to relief from the stipulated J&D and may not
challenge the district court’s decision to enter judgment on the parties’ stipulation.
E. Equitable Division of Assets
Lastly, wife contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying her
motion to reopen the stipulated J&D because the district court did not fairly and equitably
divide the parties’ assets due to husband’s alleged failure to disclose wife’s purported
nonmarital interest in the parties’ homestead and wife’s purported marital interest in
husband’s purported worker’s-compensation claims, husband’s purported personal-injury
claims, and husband’s 401(k) account. To support her argument, wife cites Minnesota
Statutes section 518.58 (2022), which requires the district court to “make a just and
equitable division of the marital property of the parties.” Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1.
Wife also cites Pooley v. Pooley, where the supreme court held that a party could bring a
motion to reopen a dissolution judgment outside the one-year statute of limitations set forth
in section 518.145, subdivision 2, if the motion sought the equitable division of “major
assets” that were omitted from the dissolution judgment. 979 N.W.2d 875, 877 (Minn.
2022). Wife therefore appears to argue that her purported nonmarital interest in the parties’
homestead, and purported marital interest in certain assets of husband were “omitted” from
the stipulated J&D and the district court should have reopened the stipulated J&D to ensure
that these assets are equitably divided.
19 Once again, wife has not established that she is entitled to relief. As discussed
above, wife has presented no evidence to substantiate her purported nonmarital interest in
the parties’ homestead or her purported marital interest in husband’s purported legal claims
or husband’s 401(k). And the stipulated J&D expressly lists husband’s 401(k) as an asset
and explains how it should be divided between the parties. Thus, there is no basis for
concluding that the listed assets were “omitted” from the stipulated J&D or that the
stipulated J&D should be reopened to allow for their equitable division. See id. at 878-79
(reversing and remanding to allow district court to equitably divide parties’ assets that were
undisputedly omitted from dissolution judgment); Waters, 13 N.W.2d at 464-65; Luthen,
596 N.W.2d at 283. We therefore decline to reverse the district court’s decision on this
basis.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying wife’s motion for attorney fees.
Wife also challenges the district court’s denial of her motion for attorney fees under
section 518.14, subdivision 1. We review a district court’s decision regarding attorney fees
for an abuse of discretion. Haefele, 621 N.W.2d at 767.
“Generally, attorney fees in dissolution cases are governed by [section] 518.14,
[subdivision] 1, which allows both need-based and conduct-based fee awards.” Geske v.
Marcolina, 624 N.W.2d 813, 816 (Minn. App. 2001). A district court “shall” award need-
based attorney fees to a party if the district court finds that (1) the fees are necessary for
the recipient to make a good-faith assertion of their rights, (2) the payor has the means to
pay the fees, and (3) the recipient does not have the means to pay the fees. Minn.
20 Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1; see also Geske, 624 N.W.2d at 816. A district court may award
conduct-based attorney fees “against a party who unreasonably contributes to the length or
expense of the proceeding.” Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1; see also Geske, 624 N.W.2d at
818. The party seeking attorney fees under section 518.14, subdivision 1, bears the burden
of showing the propriety of the requested award. Phillips v. LaPlante, 823 N.W.2d 903,
907 (Minn. App. 2012) (need-based attorney fees); Geske, 624 N.W.2d at 819 (conduct-
based attorney fees).
The district court denied wife’s motion for attorney fees under section 518.14,
subdivision 1, because her motion to reopen the stipulated J&D “[had to] be denied.” Wife
argues that she was entitled to attorney fees under section 518.14, subdivision 1, because
she “satisfie[d] all statutory criteria for such an award.” We are not persuaded.
The record shows that wife has not met her burden under section 518.14,
subdivision 1. As for her request for need-based attorney fees, wife failed to prove that she
satisfied any of the statutory criteria for such an award, let alone all three criteria. See
Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1; see also Phillips, 823 N.W.2d at 907 (explaining that “[t]he
party seeking need-based attorney fees must prove” the three criteria set forth in section
518.14, subdivision 1). Regarding her request for conduct-based attorney fees, wife
similarly failed to establish that husband’s conduct during litigation “unreasonably
contribute[d] to the length or expense of the proceeding.” See Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd.
1; see also Geske, 624 N.W.2d at 818-19. Because wife has not met her burden of proving
that she was entitled to need-based or conduct-based attorney fees under section 518.14,
21 subdivision 1, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying wife’s motion for
attorney fees.
Affirmed.