In re the Marriage of McDade

Court of Appeals of Oregon

In re the Marriage of McDade

812 P.2d 1390, 107 Or. App. 567, 1991 Ore. App. LEXIS 863

CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon

DecidedJune 12, 1991

Docket89C-31370; CA A65741

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 812 P.2d 1390 (In re the Marriage of McDade) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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In re the Marriage of McDade, 812 P.2d 1390, 107 Or. App. 567, 1991 Ore. App. LEXIS 863 (Or. Ct. App. 1991).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM

Wife appeals a so-called supplemental judgment modifying the property division in the original dissolution judgment.¹ We vacate the supplemental judgment.

On February 28,1990, the trial court signed a judgment of dissolution awarding custody and child support to wife. On March 2, 1990, before the judgment was entered, husband filed a “Motion for Reconsideration,” requesting that the court reconsider the amount of child support awarded. No new evidence supporting the motion was offered or claimed to exist, and husband did not claim any legal error or authority to support his motion. The judgment was entered on March 19, 1990. Nevertheless, over wife’s objection, the court conducted a hearing on April 10 on husband’s motion and entered the supplemental judgment. That judgment purported to amend the original judgment to award husband an Individual Retirement Account that had previously been awarded to wife. Child support, which was the basis for husband’s motion, was not changed. Wife contends that the trial court was without authority to amend the judgment.

The general rule is that a trial court cannot modify property division provisions of a dissolution judgment. ORS 107.135(1); Garnett v. Garnett, 270 Or 102, 526 P2d 549 (1974); Adams and Adams, 107 Or App 93, 811 P2d 919 (1991); Renninger and Renninger, 82 Or App 706, 730 P2d 37 (1986).

Supplemental judgment vacated; remanded for reentry of original judgment. No costs to either party.

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PER CURIAM

Wife appeals a so-called supplemental judgment modifying the property division in the original dissolution judgment.¹ We vacate the supplemental judgment.

On February 28,1990, the trial court signed a judgment of dissolution awarding custody and child support to wife. On March 2, 1990, before the judgment was entered, husband filed a “Motion for Reconsideration,” requesting that the court reconsider the amount of child support awarded. No new evidence supporting the motion was offered or claimed to exist, and husband did not claim any legal error or authority to support his motion. The judgment was entered on March 19, 1990. Nevertheless, over wife’s objection, the court conducted a hearing on April 10 on husband’s motion and entered the supplemental judgment. That judgment purported to amend the original judgment to award husband an Individual Retirement Account that had previously been awarded to wife. Child support, which was the basis for husband’s motion, was not changed. Wife contends that the trial court was without authority to amend the judgment.

The general rule is that a trial court cannot modify property division provisions of a dissolution judgment. ORS 107.135(1); Garnett v. Garnett, 270 Or 102, 526 P2d 549 (1974); Adams and Adams, 107 Or App 93, 811 P2d 919 (1991); Renninger and Renninger, 82 Or App 706, 730 P2d 37 (1986).

Supplemental judgment vacated; remanded for reentry of original judgment. No costs to either party.

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812 P.2d 1390, 107 Or. App. 567, 1991 Ore. App. LEXIS 863, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-the-marriage-of-mcdade-orctapp-1991.

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