FILED
APRIL 11,2013
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
W A State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
In re the Marriage of: ) No. 28760-2-111 ) LILIA VALENTYNIVNA KOZNIUK, ) ) Respondent, ) ) v. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) GEORGE MEDISON SLAUGHTER, ) ) Appellant. )
BROWN, J. - George M. Slaughter appeals the trial court's marriage dissolution
decree following his brief marriage to Lilia V. Kozniuk. Mr. Slaughter contends the trial
court erred in not declaring the marriage invalid, making certain evidentiary rulings, and
requiring him to pay $750 per month maintenance for six months. We affirm.
FACTS
The parties met online and began a two-year courtship. Mr. Slaughter visited
Ms. Kozniuk in the Ukraine three times. Mr. Slaughter proposed. Ms. Kozniuk and her
son initiated the visa process to travel to the United States. To facilitate the visas, Mr.
Slaughter signed an affidavit of support. The affidavit states he would, "provide all
necessary support. Support includes room, board, coverage, and educational, cost if No. 28760-2-111 In re Marriage of Kozniuk & Slaughter
necessary." Report of Proceedings (RP) at 100. Both Ms. Kozniuk and her son
received visas and, in December 2007, they arrived in the United States.
The parties were married on January 7,2008 in Pasco, Washington. They
separated on February 3, 2008 after she called police to their residence to report Mr.
Slaughter's threats to shoot her and her son. She left the parties' home with her son
and went to stay with her brother. Ms. Kozniuk petitioned to dissolve the marriage
about one year later, alleging the marriage was irretrievably broken. Mr. Slaughter
responded by requesting a declaration of invalidity alleging Ms. Kozniuk fraudulently
induced him to marry so she could immigrate to the United States.
During trial, the trial court refused as hearsay a police report offered by Mr.
Slaughter containing Ms. Kozniuk's statements during the investigation at their house.
During trial, the court learned Mr. Slaughter had a digital recorder in his pocket. The
court ordered the bailiff to confiscate the recorder. Mr. Slaughter sought to admit as
evidence the conversations on the device. The court ruled the conversations would be
inadmissible recordings without consent unless Mr. Slaughter could prove otherwise.
The parties went on with the trial without further discussion.
The court denied Mr. Slaughter's request to declare the marriage invalid and, on
disputed evidence, decided no fraud occurred. The court dissolved the marriage and
ordered Mr. Slaughter to pay $750 per month in spousal maintenance for six months to
Ms. Kozniuk. Mr. Slaughter appealed.
No. 28760-2-111 In re Marriage of Kozniuk & Slaughter
ANALYSIS
A. Evidence Rulings
The issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the police
officer's statement and the conversations on Mr. Slaughter's recording device. Mr.
Slaughter argues both of these items should have been admitted.
We review a court's evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. State v.
Brown, 132 Wn.2d 529,571-72,940 P.2d 546 (1997). A court abuses its discretion
when its decision is manifestly unreasonable or exercised on untenable grounds or for
untenable reasons, i.e., if the court relies on unsupported facts or takes a view no
reasonable person would take; the standard is violated when the trial court makes a
reasonable decision but applies the wrong legal standard or bases its ruling on an
erroneous view of the law. State v. Hudson, 150 Wn. App. 646, 652,208 P.3d 1236
(2009).
Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered "to prove the truth of the matter
asserted." ER 801 (c). Unsworn police statements recounting a victim's statement are
considered double hearsay and are inadmissible. State v. Pollard, 66 Wn. App. 779,
786,834 P.2d 51 (1992). The court stated tenable grounds to exclude the police report.
The Privacy Act in Washington protects private conversations, "by any device
electronic or otherwise designed to record or transmit such conversation regardless how
the device is powered or actuated without first obtaining the consent of all the persons
engaged in the conversation." RCW 9.73.030(b). The legislature intended broad
protection of individuals' privacy rights. State v. Williams, 94 Wn.2d 531, 548,617 P.2d
1012 (1980). Recordings or information obtained in violation of the Privacy Act are
inadmissible in court. RCW 9.73.050. Here, the record does not show the required
consent. Therefore, tenable grounds exist for the court's ruling.
B. Maintenance
The next issue is whether the trial court erred in awarding Ms. Kozniuk spousal
maintenance. Mr. Slaughter contends the award is based on his affidavit of support,
which should not be considered in determining maintenance.
We review a maintenance award for abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Zahm,
138 Wn.2d 213, 226-27, 978 P.2d 498 (1999). A court's findings in support of such
award are reviewed for substantial evidence. In re Marriage of Wilson, 165 Wn. App.
333, 340, 267 P.3d 485 (2011). "Substantial evidence exists if the record contains
evidence of sufficient quantity to persuade a fair-minded, rational person of the truth of
the declared premise." Bering v. SHARE, 106 Wn.2d 212, 220, 721 P.2d 918 (1986).
The dissolution court has discretion to order maintenance "in such amounts and
for such periods of time as the court deems just, without regard to misconduct, after
considering all relevant factors." RCW 26.09.090(1). A nonexclusive list of factors
includes: (a) the financial resources of the party seeking maintenance; (b) the time
necessary for the maintenance seeker to become employed; (c) the marital standard of
living; (d) the marriage's duration; (e) the maintenance seeker's age, physical and
mental condition, and finanoial obligations; and (f) the ability of the maintenance payer
to meet his needs in addition to those of the maintenance seeker. RCW 26.09.090.
Here, the court awarded maintenance based on, "the wife has a need for spousal
maintenance and the husband has the ability to pay." Clerk's Papers at 97. In its oral
ruling, the court noted this case involved "some extenuating circumstances," including
Ms. Kozniuk "immigrated from the Ukraine to come here. And that could be seen as a
benefit as well as a burden." RP at 137. The court noted Ms.
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FILED
APRIL 11,2013
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
W A State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
In re the Marriage of: ) No. 28760-2-111 ) LILIA VALENTYNIVNA KOZNIUK, ) ) Respondent, ) ) v. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) GEORGE MEDISON SLAUGHTER, ) ) Appellant. )
BROWN, J. - George M. Slaughter appeals the trial court's marriage dissolution
decree following his brief marriage to Lilia V. Kozniuk. Mr. Slaughter contends the trial
court erred in not declaring the marriage invalid, making certain evidentiary rulings, and
requiring him to pay $750 per month maintenance for six months. We affirm.
FACTS
The parties met online and began a two-year courtship. Mr. Slaughter visited
Ms. Kozniuk in the Ukraine three times. Mr. Slaughter proposed. Ms. Kozniuk and her
son initiated the visa process to travel to the United States. To facilitate the visas, Mr.
Slaughter signed an affidavit of support. The affidavit states he would, "provide all
necessary support. Support includes room, board, coverage, and educational, cost if No. 28760-2-111 In re Marriage of Kozniuk & Slaughter
necessary." Report of Proceedings (RP) at 100. Both Ms. Kozniuk and her son
received visas and, in December 2007, they arrived in the United States.
The parties were married on January 7,2008 in Pasco, Washington. They
separated on February 3, 2008 after she called police to their residence to report Mr.
Slaughter's threats to shoot her and her son. She left the parties' home with her son
and went to stay with her brother. Ms. Kozniuk petitioned to dissolve the marriage
about one year later, alleging the marriage was irretrievably broken. Mr. Slaughter
responded by requesting a declaration of invalidity alleging Ms. Kozniuk fraudulently
induced him to marry so she could immigrate to the United States.
During trial, the trial court refused as hearsay a police report offered by Mr.
Slaughter containing Ms. Kozniuk's statements during the investigation at their house.
During trial, the court learned Mr. Slaughter had a digital recorder in his pocket. The
court ordered the bailiff to confiscate the recorder. Mr. Slaughter sought to admit as
evidence the conversations on the device. The court ruled the conversations would be
inadmissible recordings without consent unless Mr. Slaughter could prove otherwise.
The parties went on with the trial without further discussion.
The court denied Mr. Slaughter's request to declare the marriage invalid and, on
disputed evidence, decided no fraud occurred. The court dissolved the marriage and
ordered Mr. Slaughter to pay $750 per month in spousal maintenance for six months to
Ms. Kozniuk. Mr. Slaughter appealed.
No. 28760-2-111 In re Marriage of Kozniuk & Slaughter
ANALYSIS
A. Evidence Rulings
The issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the police
officer's statement and the conversations on Mr. Slaughter's recording device. Mr.
Slaughter argues both of these items should have been admitted.
We review a court's evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. State v.
Brown, 132 Wn.2d 529,571-72,940 P.2d 546 (1997). A court abuses its discretion
when its decision is manifestly unreasonable or exercised on untenable grounds or for
untenable reasons, i.e., if the court relies on unsupported facts or takes a view no
reasonable person would take; the standard is violated when the trial court makes a
reasonable decision but applies the wrong legal standard or bases its ruling on an
erroneous view of the law. State v. Hudson, 150 Wn. App. 646, 652,208 P.3d 1236
(2009).
Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered "to prove the truth of the matter
asserted." ER 801 (c). Unsworn police statements recounting a victim's statement are
considered double hearsay and are inadmissible. State v. Pollard, 66 Wn. App. 779,
786,834 P.2d 51 (1992). The court stated tenable grounds to exclude the police report.
The Privacy Act in Washington protects private conversations, "by any device
electronic or otherwise designed to record or transmit such conversation regardless how
the device is powered or actuated without first obtaining the consent of all the persons
engaged in the conversation." RCW 9.73.030(b). The legislature intended broad
protection of individuals' privacy rights. State v. Williams, 94 Wn.2d 531, 548,617 P.2d
1012 (1980). Recordings or information obtained in violation of the Privacy Act are
inadmissible in court. RCW 9.73.050. Here, the record does not show the required
consent. Therefore, tenable grounds exist for the court's ruling.
B. Maintenance
The next issue is whether the trial court erred in awarding Ms. Kozniuk spousal
maintenance. Mr. Slaughter contends the award is based on his affidavit of support,
which should not be considered in determining maintenance.
We review a maintenance award for abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Zahm,
138 Wn.2d 213, 226-27, 978 P.2d 498 (1999). A court's findings in support of such
award are reviewed for substantial evidence. In re Marriage of Wilson, 165 Wn. App.
333, 340, 267 P.3d 485 (2011). "Substantial evidence exists if the record contains
evidence of sufficient quantity to persuade a fair-minded, rational person of the truth of
the declared premise." Bering v. SHARE, 106 Wn.2d 212, 220, 721 P.2d 918 (1986).
The dissolution court has discretion to order maintenance "in such amounts and
for such periods of time as the court deems just, without regard to misconduct, after
considering all relevant factors." RCW 26.09.090(1). A nonexclusive list of factors
includes: (a) the financial resources of the party seeking maintenance; (b) the time
necessary for the maintenance seeker to become employed; (c) the marital standard of
living; (d) the marriage's duration; (e) the maintenance seeker's age, physical and
mental condition, and finanoial obligations; and (f) the ability of the maintenance payer
to meet his needs in addition to those of the maintenance seeker. RCW 26.09.090.
Here, the court awarded maintenance based on, "the wife has a need for spousal
maintenance and the husband has the ability to pay." Clerk's Papers at 97. In its oral
ruling, the court noted this case involved "some extenuating circumstances," including
Ms. Kozniuk "immigrated from the Ukraine to come here. And that could be seen as a
benefit as well as a burden." RP at 137. The court noted Ms. Kozniuk was working full
time for minimum wage, going to school, taking care of her son, and "needs a little
support." RP at 140. Mr. Slaughter, while unemployed, is an architect with several
years of experience. The court clarified the maintenance award is distinct from any
obligation of support Mr. Slaughter may have "under the immigration laws." RP at 140.
Based on this record, the court's finding that Ms. Kozniuk has need and Mr.
Slaughter has the ability to pay is supported by substantial evidence. This record does
not show the maintenance award was based on the affidavit of support. Given all,
tenable grounds exist to support the court's exercise of discretion.
C. Marriage Invalidity Request
The issue is whether the trial court erred in declining to declare the marriage
invalid. Mr. Slaughter contends Ms. Kozniuk fraudulently induced him 0 marry her.
Generally, we review a trial court's fraud determination for abuse of discretion.
See In re Patterson, 93 Wn. App. 579, 586, 969 P.2d 1106 (1999) ("The trial court did
not abuse its discretion by failing to find fraud."). Under RCW 26.09.040(4)(b)(i), a party
may request to have a marriage declared invalid if that person was "induced to enter
into the marriage or domestic partnership by force or duress, or by fraud."
Where the trial court has weighed the evidence, the reviewing court's role is to
determine whether substantial evidence supports the findings of fact and, if so, whether
the findings in turn support the trial court's conclusions of law. In re Marriage of
Greene, 97 Wn. App. 708, 714, 986 P.2d 144 (1999). An appellate court should "not
substitute [its] judgment for the trial court's, weigh the evidence, or adjudge witness
credibility." Id.
This case involves conflicting evidence. Mr. Slaughter contends Ms. Kozniuk did
not intend to be married to him but merely wanted entrance into the United States. Ms.
Kozniuk denied Mr. Slaughter's assertion and claimed she was in love with Mr.
Slaughter but he became abusive, evidenced by her call for police assistance. The trial
court found Ms. Kozniuk to be more credible. We must leave credibility determinations
to the trier of fact.
Finally, Mr. Slaughter argues the court should have heard testimony about the
parties' religious beliefs in evaluating the fraud allegation. The court excluded this
evidence as irrelevant. Solely relevant evidence is admissible. ER 402. Evidence is
relevant if it makes a fact of consequence more or less likely to be true. ER 401. In this
case, the parties' religious beliefs did not bear on the validity of the parties' marriage.
Thus, the court properly excluded it.
No. 28760-2-111
In re Marriage of Kozniuk & Slaughter
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW
2.06.040.
Brown, J.
WE CONCUR:
~.J Sid~'o-'