This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A25-0142 A25-0425
In re the Marriage of:
Laura Marie Knutsen, petitioner, Appellant,
vs.
Peder Nels Knutsen, Respondent.
Filed June 22, 2026 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Jesson, Judge *
Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-FA-21-4113
Seungwon R. Chung, DeWitt LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)
Sam Khoroosi, Jessica Sampson, Khoroosi Law Office, P.A., St. Louis Park, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Bond, Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.
* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JESSON, Judge
After 30 years of marriage and three children, appellant Laura Marie Knutsen filed
a petition for dissolution of marriage from respondent Peder Nels Knutsen. 1 Over four
years of litigation later, their case arrives here. Laura alleges that the district court (1) made
multiple errors in calculating the distribution of marital property, (2) incorrectly
determined Laura’s spousal maintenance award, and (3) abused its discretion by denying
her request for need-based attorney fees. Peder filed a notice of related appeal, arguing
that the district court abused its discretion in the amount it granted Peder in conduct-based
fees and in its valuation of the couple’s Florida property.
We affirm the district court’s decision as to the valuation and forced sale of the
Florida property, each parties’ request for attorney fees, and parts of the allocation of
marital assets. However, we reverse the district court’s award of spousal maintenance to
Laura and parts of the court’s allocation of martial assets. Accordingly, we affirm in part,
reverse in part and remand.
FACTS
Laura and Peder were married in 1991, and have three children who, at the time of
the proceedings, were all over 18 years old. Laura filed a petition for dissolution of
1 Because they share the same last name, we refer to Peder and Laura Knutsen by their first names throughout the rest of this opinion.
2 marriage in Minnesota in August 2021. The district court eventually ordered October 12,
2021, as the valuation date for the proceedings. 2
Events leading up to dissolution
At the time of their marriage, Laura worked as a financial planner and Peder was
enrolled in medical school at the University of Minnesota studying to become an
anesthesiologist. While Peder was in school, Laura supported the family but in 2003 left
her career to stay home and raise the children. Peder completed his residency in 1998 and
joined Midwest Anesthesiologist, P.A. (MAPA), 3 becoming a shareholder and president of
the organization in 2001. The MAPA stock purchase agreement (buy-sell agreement)
required a buy-in of $5,000 for shareholders, which Peder paid for his shares.
While at MAPA, Peder helped to expand the business by securing exclusive
contracts while Laura assisted by hosting numerous social events for the shareholders and
maintaining the family home while Peder worked. Peder’s annual income at MAPA varied
but at times was over $1 million.
In 2015, Laura and the three children moved first to Florida and then to Oklahoma
because of the children’s increased educational needs and their involvement in prestigious
tennis training academies. Peder continued to reside in the family home in Minnesota but
visited the family about a week each month or whenever he had a vacation from work.
Throughout the marriage, both parties enjoyed a high standard of living. Laura was
2 We take the following facts from the record of the trial and other relevant proceedings before the district court. 3 MAPA is a group of physicians that offer medical services to hospitals, clinics, and other locations.
3 responsible for the family’s finances during the marriage and was in charge of building
another family home in Naples, Florida, and then in Tulsa, Oklahoma, with both
construction projects eventually going over budget by hundreds of thousands of dollars.
Laura testified at trial that the parties had expensive country club memberships during the
marriage and that her hobby was buying designer clothing. Throughout this time, the
family accumulated a significant amount of debt.
After time apart and significant financial pressure, the marriage eventually broke
down. In July 2021, Peder commenced a divorce action in Tulsa, Oklahoma, where Laura
and the children were living. Before service could be completed, Laura commenced a
marriage-dissolution action in Minnesota in August 2021. Over the next two years,
litigation ensued regarding proper jurisdiction for the divorce proceedings. Jurisdiction
was eventually transferred to Minnesota in April 2023.
During this time, Peder left his employment at MAPA and began working at South
Valley Anesthesia P.A. (South Valley). Peder testified that he was burned out by his time
at MAPA and that he stepped down because he was facing pressure from other shareholders
about the future of the business. He explained that he sold his shares back to the company
at the buy-sell price of $5,000 and then used that money to buy in as a shareholder at South
Valley. Peder also owns 200 shares of Health Billing Systems (HBS), which is the billing
company used by anesthesiologist groups such as MAPA and South Valley.
4 Trial Proceedings Regarding Property Division
The parties appeared for a trial on the dissolution in June 2024. Each testified about
the marital assets and debts claimed by each side, 4 each party’s monthly income and
expenses, and the valuation of their Florida property. Both Peder and Laura raised multiple
arguments at trial, including how to value Peder’s business; multiple allegations of
dissipation of marital assets; and how to value the Florida property.
Business Valuation
Each party presented expert witness testimony regarding the valuation of Peder’s
business at trial. Laura’s valuation expert estimated MAPA’s value at $970,000 and HBS’s
value at $311,000 based on a hypothetical sale to a third party and not the buy-sell
agreement. Peder estimated that the value of his MAPA share was worth $5,000 per the
buy-sell agreement as that is what his shares were ultimately sold for, and that the value of
his HBS share was worth $180,000. Peder’s expert testified that he used the buy-sell
agreement to determine valuation because it was more reflective of the company’s actual
value and that MAPA “has strictly adhered to the buy-sell agreement for the last two years.”
He also noted that Peder did not have a controlling share of MAPA, could not force a sale
of the company, and that the rest of the group at MAPA was not willing to sell the company.
4 Marital assets are those gained during the marriage that are to be split equitably by the district court between the parties upon dissolution of the marriage. Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3b (2024). Nonmarital assets are those acquired before the marriage, by one party during the marriage as a gift or inheritance, after the valuation date, or precluded from consideration as part of the marital estate by a valid antenuptial agreement. Id. Nonmarital assets are not divided between the parties upon dissolution.
5 Dissipation-Related Issues
Several issues raised at trial—and on appeal—relate to Peder’s claims about Laura’s
spending during, or shortly before, the dissolution proceedings. This included Laura
allegedly obtaining a fraudulent mortgage on the Oklahoma home that sold prior to trial;
that Laura’s refusal to file taxes jointly in 2022 and 2023 led to tax fines assigned to Peder;
and that Laura dissipated certain marital funds through purchase of cashier’s checks and a
Porsche Cayenne. Laura also claimed that Peder’s expert double counted some of her funds
and incorrectly categorized debt.
With regard to the mortgage issue, it is undisputed that in August 2021, Laura took
out a second mortgage on the couple’s Tulsa, Oklahoma home for $249,000. Laura
testified that she and Peder had talked about taking out the second mortgage; however,
Peder testified that the mortgage was fraudulently obtained and that he believed Laura had
one of their sons forge his signature on a power of attorney document for Peder so she
could obtain the loan without Peder’s knowledge. Peder eventually discovered Laura had
deposited the second mortgage funds into her personal account with TTCU Federal Credit
Union (TTCU). After learning of the mortgage, Peder filed a police report and a report
with the FBI for mortgage fraud.
Laura claimed the funds she received for the second mortgage were used to pay
household bills; however, Peder requested that the $208,440.60 in Laura’s personal TTCU
account be counted as marital property as those funds are attributed to the second mortgage.
Laura testified that TTCU brought suit against her for the mortgage amount and she had to
6 borrow $242,809 from her parents to satisfy the loan and that the amount should be
included on the court’s balance sheet as a marital debt. 5
Turning to the tax issue, according to Peder’s testimony, he incurred $52,209 of tax
debt because Laura filed her 2022 and 2023 taxes as married filing separately, whereas he
filed a joint tax return. Peder requested that the district court order Laura to amend her tax
returns for 2022 and 2023 as filing jointly so they “don’t incur $100,000 of marital
dissipation.” Peder then stated that, “in the alternative,” if the district court was unwilling
to order Laura to amend her tax returns, “that the Court order [her] to reimburse [him] for
the shortfall in 2022 and 2023.”
Peder also alleged that Laura dissipated marital funds three additional times
throughout the dissolution proceedings. Peder first testified that, on February 18, 2021,
Laura took out a cashier’s check from the parties’ joint Well Fargo account for $50,000
and transferred it to her own personal account. Laura testified that the money was put into
the couple’s joint account in Tulsa. Second, Laura withdrew another $55,000 from their
joint account on May 17, 2021, that Peder stated he intended to use to pay their tax debt.
Laura said that the $55,000 was used to pay basic family expenses and that she deposited
it, in addition to the previous $50,000, into one of the parties’ joint accounts. The final
dissipation claim was for the Porsche Cayenne that Laura purchased in 2020. Laura
testified that she and Peder discussed buying the Porsche and that it was an appropriate
5 Minnesota courts recognize and routinely use balance sheets in marriage dissolution proceedings as financial documents that list the parties’ total assets and liabilities to determine net worth available for equitable distribution.
7 purchase because it was typical of the cars that she and Peder drove throughout their
marriage.
At trial, Laura’s expert also testified about the marital and nonmarital asset amounts
presented by each party at trial and the differences or mistakes in Peder’s asset reports,
particularly those related to the TTCU mortgage and the dissipation claims. When asked
about Laura’s personal Bank of America (BOA) account, her expert noted that the account
was not opened until December 2021, making it a post-valuation-date account. He stated
that the $70,500 in the BOA account came from the TTCU savings account that listed a
$208,440 figure, and that by including both assets in the balance sheet, it was
double-counting the funds. He also noted multiple times where Peder’s balance sheet
double-counted funds on Laura’s behalf in regard to the dissipated funds: that the $50,000
cashier’s check that was taken out of the Wells Fargo account on February 18, 2021, was
then deposited into the couple’s shared Vast Bank account; that the $55,000 for 2020 tax
payments was also deposited into the parties’ Wells Fargo account; and that the value of
the Porsche was already assigned to Laura, so including dissipation funds for the same
asset was essentially double-counting her marital property.
Florida Property
In addition to the business valuation and dissipation issues, the parties disagreed on
the value and the sale of the Florida property. Laura’s appraiser valued the property at
$417,000 using the valuation date and comparing sales in the same neighborhood of the
property to determine value after adjusting the amount to account for differences in age,
view, square footage, and rooms. Peder’s appraiser did not consider any of the property
8 values in the immediate neighborhood and instead looked to properties in different
neighborhoods, some “several miles away” that were in different gated communities with
different amenities. Peder’s appraiser valued the property $825,000 using May 20, 2022,
as the valuation date without explaining why the October 12, 2021, valuation date was not
used. Peder requested to sell the property and split the proceeds; however, Laura wished
to be awarded the property.
Trial Proceedings Regarding Spousal Maintenance
When asked about spousal maintenance, Laura testified that she was concerned
about her ability to earn a living after being out of the workforce for over two decades and
that without a college degree it would be difficult for her to find adequate employment.
Besides the temporary spousal maintenance ordered by the court and any future potential
employment, Laura reported no other source of income. Laura presented a detailed
spending analysis to the court that spanned 273 pages and included a proposed budget of
$25,842/month. Laura requested between $21,000 and $22,000 in monthly spousal
maintenance.
In regard to his income concerning a maintenance award, Peder testified that in
addition to his employment at South Valley, he was working part time at Mayo Clinic due
to the extra expenses of the dissolution proceedings and the overspending he and Laura
participated in during their marriage. He stated that it was not the marital standard for him
to work two jobs and requested the district court issue an order that did not force him to
continue working a second job. Peder requested the court issue Laura a spousal
maintenance award of $10,000/month for 60 months. Peder presented a proposed budget
9 that included payment for his and Laura’s adult children’s college expenses at
$7,000/month with a total monthly budget of about $41,000.
District Court’s Judgment and Decree
The district court entered its final, amended judgment and decree in November
2024. 6 In the final assignment of marital assets, the district court awarded $722,673 to
Laura from Peder’s retirement accounts as a pre-tax retirement equalizer and ordered that
Laura pay Peder $270,863 as a cash equalizer. The district court noted that the amount
“shall be paid out of [Laura’s] share” of the Minneapolis home or the Florida home and
that, until it was paid, Peder had a marital lien against her for that amount.
To reach these valuation amounts, as relevant on appeal, the court found Peder’s
expert credibly valued his MAPA shares at $5,000 and his HBS shares at $180,000. The
district court noted that Peder already “realized the full benefit of his [MAPA] shares,” the
amount was controlling, and the HBS valuation was persuasive because, in the last ten
sales of HBS stock, 200 shares—which is the number of shares Peder owned—were
purchased for $180,000. The district court also concluded in its order that a portion of
Peder’s bonuses from 2021 would be used to adjust his proposed balance sheet in the
amount of $81,714 and $14,167 as after-tax marital payments, and for $34,808 in property
6 The district court filed its initial order directing entry of a judgment and decree of dissolution in October 2024. The district court entered an amended judgment and decree correcting clerical errors later that month, and again in November 2024.
10 taxes for the Oklahoma home as an adjustment to Peder’s assets. However, these amounts
did not appear on the court’s final balance sheet.
Dissipation Issues
As for the allegations of dissipation and mishandling of funds, the district court
assigned $208,440 to Laura as marital funds for the fraudulently obtained mortgage and
assigned her the loan from her parents to pay the mortgage as her nonmarital debt. 7 The
court ordered Laura to amend her tax returns for the years 2022 and 2023 to file jointly so
as to cure the fines awarded to Peder and also assigned tax debt to Peder in marital funds
equaling $102,000 ($52,209 for 2022 and $50,000 for 2023). The order assigned an
additional $140,000 to Laura as marital property in dissipated funds: $50,000 for the
cashier’s check, $55,000 for the tax payment, and $35,000 for the Porsche down payment.
Both Laura’s BOA and TTCU account assets were also included as Laura’s marital
property on the final balance sheet.
Regarding the Florida property, the court found that Laura’s $417,000 valuation was
a more reasonable value for the property and that the home “should be promptly placed for
sale” but that Laura could purchase the property from Peder if she wanted to retain it for
7 Though the district court noted in its findings that the debt amount from the mortgage was Laura’s nonmarital debt, the amount listed on the balance sheet is $133,225, which appears to be from a prior debt owed to Laura’s parents that Laura and Peder borrowed in 2019 to finish construction on their Oklahoma home. Laura testified that they borrowed $100,000 during the marriage and that, with interest, the loan amount is now equal to $133,225 and should be calculated as marital debt between the parties. This issue is further discussed below.
11 her residence. The district court gave Laura 60 days from the date of entry of judgment to
close on a purchase for the price of the home.
Maintenance
In addition to the findings related to property division, the district court addressed
the factors to determine spousal maintenance, pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section
518.552, subd. 1 (2024). In its order, the court noted the vocational evaluator’s
determination that Laura was fit for employment such as a bank teller, that she could earn
$37,024 per year, and that she could increase her earnings to $41,600 within two years.
The court found it appropriate to impute income to Laura in the amount of $40,000 per
year and that, based on that amount, Laura was still in need of spousal support to meet her
needs. The court also found that Peder had a gross monthly income of $28,686, based on
Peder’s exhibit of his net monthly cash flow, entered at trial. Because it was “not the
marital standard of living” for Peder to work two jobs, the district court concluded that the
Mayo Clinic income would not be considered for purposes for spousal maintenance.
In its findings, the court stated that the parties enjoyed a high standard of living
during the marriage and that Peder was unaware of the extent of the family’s financial
troubles during the marriage, that Laura was in charge of the family’s finances throughout
the marriage, and that she was responsible for building the marital homes in Florida and
Oklahoma which both went well over budget. The court noted that Laura knew about the
family’s spending outpacing their income but that she “chose to ignore it” and continued
to “spend lavishly” instead of alerting Peder to their financial troubles. In analyzing the
standard of living, the court included consideration of Laura and Peder’s adult children’s
12 college tuitions and that Peder testified that he intended to pay the college expenses. The
court considered Peder’s ability to pay, and Laura’s potential employment, age, and
conduct in “depreciating the marital estate” when determining an award amount.
The district court determined Laura’s monthly expenses amounted to $10,612 and
included a breakdown of each of her expenses. The order found that Peder’s expenses
amounted to $41,000 but provided no detailed breakdown of said expenses, citing only to
an exhibit in the record that showed Peder’s monthly net cash flow—his South Valley and
HBS income minus the proposed maintenance award, retirement contributions, and tax
payments. The court noted the children’s education cost would be factored into Peder’s
budget for maintenance purposes, which was not included in the cited exhibit, and awarded
Laura $12,000/month in spousal maintenance. The following chart summarizes the district
court’s income decisions regarding maintenance, in pretax dollars.
Peder Laura
Income $737,786 (South Valley $41,600 (Imputed income) Anesthesia) Less: retirement-account ($15,980) - contributions HBS distributions $103,553 -
Maintenance payments ($144,000) $144,000
Total cash income $681,359 $185,600 8
8 This portion of the exhibit, cited by the district court, is updated with the accurate spousal maintenance amount awarded to Laura based on the court’s final order.
13 Attorney Fees
Turning to attorney fees, the district court awarded Peder conduct-based attorney
fees. The court found that throughout the proceedings, Laura’s actions “made things more
complicated and expensive than they would have been if she had acted in good faith” and
that her “duplicitous and disingenuous conduct has substantially increased the length and
expense of this proceeding.” The court directed Peder to submit an attorney-fee affidavit
within 14 days of the order. The district court then denied Laura’s request for need-based
attorney fees.
Following filing of the district court’s order, Peder’s attorney filed an attorney-fee
affidavit to illustrate his attorneys’ fees and costs related to the dissolution due to Laura’s
alleged misconduct throughout the proceedings. Peder requested $250,000 of conduct-
based attorney fees from the district court. The district court filed an order in January 2025,
awarding Peder $990 in conduct-based fees. The next month, the court ordered the Florida
property sold because Laura failed to purchase the property before the stated deadline,
although that order and payment of the equalizer were stayed by the district court pending
appeal.
Both parties assert challenges to the district court’s judgment on appeal.
DECISION
Laura argues the district court abused its discretion by (1) improperly dividing
marital property; (2) improperly determining spousal maintenance; and (3) denying her
request for need-based attorney fees. Peder argues on notice of related appeal that the
14 district court abused its discretion both by undervaluing the Florida home and by awarding
him minimal conduct-based attorney fees. We address each argument in turn.
I. The district court erred in dividing some of the parties’ marital property.
With certain exceptions, property acquired by husband and wife—or either of
them—during their marriage, but prior to the date of valuation, constitutes “marital
property.” Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3b. Marital property is to be divided equitably,
not necessarily equally, upon dissolution of a marriage. See Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1
(2024) (requiring the district court to “make a just and equitable division of the marital
property of the parties” based on “all relevant factors” and considering “the contribution
of each in the acquisition, preservation, depreciation or appreciation in the amount or value
of the marital property”). A district court has broad discretion in this division and its
decision will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. Bogen v. Bogen, 261
N.W.2d 606, 609 (Minn. 1977); accord. Antone v. Antone, 645 N.W.2d 96, 100 (Minn.
2002). Determining the value of an asset is a finding of fact we review for clear error.
Maurer v. Maurer, 623 N.W.2d 604, 606 (Minn. 2001). And in reviewing property
evaluation findings, we require only that the valuation falls within a reasonable range of
figures. Johnson v. Johnson, 277 N.W.2d 208, 211 (Minn. 1979) (citing Hertz v. Hertz,
229 N.W.2d 42, 44 (Minn. 1975)). But whether a property is marital or nonmarital is a
question of law, which we review de novo, while deferring to a district court’s factual
findings. Olsen v. Olsen, 562 N.W.2d 797, 800 (Minn. 1997).
Here, Laura asserts that the district court erred in dividing the couple’s property,
resulting in a miscalculation that “took over half a million dollars from her share of the
15 estate.” Laura argues that the district court (1) clearly erred in valuing Peder’s business
using the buy-sell agreement; (2) improperly attributed mortgage proceeds to her as a
marital asset; (3) double-counted her bank-account balance and Peder’s tax debt while
omitting other assets; (4) misapplied the dissipation statute; and (5) abused its discretion
by forcing a sale of the Florida property. Peder argues that the district court clearly erred
in its valuation of the Florida property.
A. The district court did not clearly err in valuing Peder’s business shares using the buy-sell agreement.
Laura argues the district court clearly erred in valuing Peder’s business shares
because it ignored the fair market value of Peder’s businesses and adopted the buy-sell
prices instead, whereas her expert followed the law by assuming a sale of the entire
business and a willing buyer.
Minnesota courts have relied on different methods for calculating the value of
different businesses. Nardini v. Nardini, 414 N.W.2d 184, 189-90 (Minn. 1987) (using
eight factors to determine a “reasonable valuation” for a closely held corporation). One
such method is a buy-sell agreement. See Nelson v. Nelson, 411 N.W.2d 868, 872 (Minn.
App. 1987) (using three methods to value a service-based business: (1) adjusted book
value, (2) capitalization of income, and (3) a buy-sell agreement). No one method is
suitable for every situation, and each requires consideration of factors that can affect the
16 accuracy of the valuation. Prevost v. Prevost, No. A13-1320, 2014 WL 1344312, at *3
(Minn. App. Apr. 7, 2014). 9
Here, the district court found Peder’s expert credible regarding the valuation of
Peder’s MAPA and HBS shares. The court determined that, since there was not a willing
buyer for his MAPA shares and Peder already sold them for $5,000, that amount was
controlling. The district court also found that the $180,000 valuation of HBS was
persuasive because the purchase history of HBS shares for the previous ten years
corroborated this value.
We discern no clear error in this evaluation. The district court heard testimony from
both parties’ experts regarding valuation of Peder’s businesses and determined the proper
valuations for Peder’s businesses. And where expert witnesses offer conflicting opinions
that each have a reasonable basis in fact, it is the responsibility of the trier of fact to
determine which opinion is more credible, and that determination will not be disturbed on
appeal. Griepp v. Griepp, 381 N.W.2d 865, 869 (Minn. App. 1986). The difference
between expert witnesses’ valuations is “inescapably a credibility issue.” Bury v. Bury,
416 N.W.2d 133, 137 (Minn. App. 1987). Therefore, we affirm the district court on this
issue.
To persuade us otherwise, Laura cites Rogers v. Rogers, 296 N.W.2d 849, 852
(Minn. 1980), to assert that a buy-sell agreement is “not dispositive.” However, the
question in Rogers was related to the court’s valuation of an ongoing closely-held marital
9 Nonprecedential opinions are not binding authority but can be cited for their persuasive value. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
17 business, which required estimation. 296 N.W.2d at 852. The husband in Rogers owned
85% of a business that was essentially a one-person operation, and he continued to own
and operate the business after the marital dissolution. Id. at 851. Here, unlike in Rogers,
the valuation is not for a closely-held marital business. Nor did Peder own a majority of
the business. Peder owned a noncontrolling portion of MAPA shares and would not have
been able to force a sale of the business. See Petterson v. Petterson, 366 N.W.2d 685, 688
(Minn. App. 1985) (distinguishing Rogers because husband lacked the ability to modify
the buy-sell agreement, there was no other market for the husband’s stock, and there was
no evidence before the trial court that the buy-sell agreement could be modified). In light
of the facts of this case and the actual price Peder received for the MAPA shares, the district
court’s valuation is not clearly erroneous.
B. The district court did not clearly err in attributing the value of the second mortgage to Laura as marital property.
Laura asserts that the district court clearly erred by finding she had over $208,000
in her bank accounts attributable to the proceeds of the second mortgage on the Oklahoma
home, but “ignored the almost $250,000 debt that funded it.” If the court determined that
the loan proceeds were marital property, Laura contends, so should the debt (the loan from
her parents to pay off the mortgage) be marital debt. Further, she claims that Peder was
aware of the second mortgage on the Oklahoma home and that the district court’s finding
that she fraudulently procured the loan is clearly erroneous and should be reversed.
The second mortgage on the Oklahoma home was procured six days before Laura
petitioned for dissolution of marriage. As a result, Minnesota law imposes a fiduciary duty
18 “for any profit or loss derived by the party, without the consent of the other, from a
transaction or from any use by the party of the marital assets.” Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd.
1a. If the court finds that a party (here, allegedly Laura) has acted without the consent of
the other party in so doing, it shall compensate the other party. Id. The statute states as
follows.
[I]n contemplation of commencing, or during the pendency of, the current dissolution, separation, or annulment proceeding, transferred, encumbered, concealed, or disposed of marital assets except in the usual course of business or for the necessities of life, the court shall compensate the other party by placing both parties in the same position that they would have been in had the transfer, encumbrance, concealment, or disposal not occurred.
Id. (emphasis added).
Here, the district court found the second mortgage for the Oklahoma home was
fraudulently obtained by Laura. While there was competing testimony on whether Peder
consented to the second mortgage, the court found Peder, not Laura, credible on this issue.
It then applied the statute and concluded that Laura breached her fiduciary duty to Peder
by encumbering the Oklahoma home. As a result, it awarded the debt from Laura’s parents
to Laura as non-marital debt.
We affirm the district court’s assessment: both the finding that the loan was not
consented to and the attribution of the loan as an individual obligation pursuant to the
statute. The district court is in the best position to determine credibility,
see In re Welfare of A.D., 535 N.W.2d 643, 648 (Minn. 1995) (noting that the district court
stands in a superior position in assessing credibility of witnesses), and upon finding Peder’s
19 testimony credible, the court properly assigned the debt for repayment of the mortgage loan
as Laura’s nonmarital debt. See Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1a (stating that, in dividing
marital property, the court “may impute the entire value of an asset and a fair return on the
asset to the party who transferred, encumbered, concealed, or disposed of it”).
While the district court did not err in attributing the debt on the mortgage to Laura,
it appears that the $133,225 nonmarital debt on the court’s final balance sheet does not
pertain to the mortgage loan, 10 but instead to the 2019 construction loan Laura’s parents
gave Peder and Laura for their Oklahoma property. That separate construction loan should
have been categorized as marital debt. As a result, while we direct the district court to add
the 2019 $133,225 obligation as marital debt on the balance sheet, we conclude the district
court did not clearly err in finding the debt funding the $208,440 second mortgage of the
Oklahoma home to be Laura’s nonmarital debt. 11
C. The district court clearly erred by double-counting Laura’s marital assets and Peder’s tax debts, and by failing to adequately account for certain assets in the division of marital property.
Laura argues that the district court double-counted some of her assets by counting
the amount of a bank account that was opened after the valuation date, miscounted some
of Peder’s tax debts, and omitted other assets. We address each issue below.
10 The loan for the Oklahoma property mortgage was $208,440. 11 However, the nonmarital debt amount for the Oklahoma mortgage does not affect the overall calculation of marital property because it is only assigned to Laura.
20 Bank of America Account
Laura first asserts that the district court “captured the value” of her Bank of America
(BOA) account twice because the account did not exist “on the valuation date and . . . had
a balance of $70,500 several months later,” which the district court then included in its
balance sheet determining the couple’s marital property. Laura claims that these funds
were transferred from her TTCU account, which had a $208,440 value before the transfer,
and that, since the court counted both the TTCU account at $208,440 and the BOA account
at $70,500, it counted the $70,500 amount twice.
The record supports Laura’s assertion. Bank statements show that, on the valuation
date, the TTCU account did in fact have an amount of $208,440.60. The district court also
notes in its order that the BOA account was opened after the valuation date of October 12,
2021. The district court found that Peder “includes the $70,500 in [Laura’s] account on
December 20, 2021, on his balance sheet” but does not explain why this would be included
in the marital property as it was opened after the valuation date. In addition, the record
shows that $75,000 was removed from the TTCU account on December 30, 2021, and that
$500 was deposited into the BOA account on December 20, 2021, with another $70,000
on January 3, 2022, all well after the valuation date.
Still, Peder asserts that the district court has “discretion in determining the value”
of Laura’s accounts and the valuations of marital property “need not be exact” but “must
only lie within a reasonable range of figures.” Johnson, 277 N.W.2d at 211. However,
generally, nonmarital property includes what was acquired after the valuation date,
Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3b, and the district court’s use of an incorrect figure when
21 dividing the marital property is an abuse of discretion. Blessing v. Blessing, No. A21-1709,
2023 WL 1093864, at *6 (Minn. App. Jan. 30, 2023) (remanding the district court’s
judgment “for correction” because the court double-counted an asset when calculating
petitioner’s marital assets and “[s]uch double counting constitutes an abuse of discretion”).
In sum, while exactitude is not required in asset evaluation, in this case an additional
$70,500 is not within a reasonable range of figures and amounts to clear error. Nor does
the scope of the district court’s discretion allow it to count the same asset twice when, over
time, the record shows that the asset simply moved from one point in a marital estate to
another point in the estate, here from one account to another. This $70,500 error has a
substantial effect on Laura’s equalizer amount. Accordingly, we remand for the district
court to remove the BOA account from the balance sheet.
Tax Debts
Laura also asserts that the district court improperly double-counted the division of
tax debt in its order. The district court assigned $50,000 in tax debt to Peder for 2023 and
$52,209 for 2022 because Laura filed her tax returns as married filing separately, which
created separate filing costs for Peder. But the district court also ordered Laura to amend
her returns for those years to reflect a joint filing status.
While the decision to require the parties to file a joint tax return is a question of
property division within the district court’s broad discretion, Theroux v. Boehmler, 410
N.W.2d 354, 356 (Minn. App. 1987), the district court did not explain why Peder would
still be responsible for the tax debts if Laura amends her 2022 and 2023 filings. And we
note that, at trial, Peder requested that the district court order them to file joint tax returns
22 for 2022 and 2023 if the district court was unwilling to order Laura to amend her tax returns
and order her to reimburse Peder.
In sum, Laura could be responsible for the tax debt by amending her tax returns or
by paying for the relevant amounts through the equalizer. The district court erred in
assigning the 2022 and 2023 tax debts to Peder and ordering Laura to amend her tax filings
for those years. We remand to the district court to amend its final order to either assign the
2022 and 2023 tax debts to Peder or order Laura to amend her tax filings, but not both.
Other Omitted Assets
Laura also argues that the district court erred by ignoring Peder’s bonuses when
assigning marital property and failing to adjust for property taxes that were Peder’s
responsibility. She asserts that the district court agreed that Peder’s bonus amounts
equaling $95,881, and the $34,808 in property taxes Peder was responsible for, should have
been included on the final balance sheet.
Because we have determined that a “bonus is a marital asset which should” be
divided by the lower court, In re Marriage of Steffan, 423 N.W.2d 729, 733 (Minn. App.
1988), and the district court stated in its findings that the bonus amounts were in fact
“marital payments,” we are unsure why the district court did not include the bonuses on
the final balance sheet. Based on the record, it appears the district court failed to include
the bonus and property tax amounts on the balance sheet and did not explain in its order
why the amounts were omitted. We remand for further explanation by the district court
regarding the omission of the amounts for the bonus and property tax stated in its order and
for any appropriate adjustments.
23 D. The district court partially erred in finding Laura dissipated marital funds.
Laura argues that the district court erred by crediting her with $140,000 in
dissipation “for simply transferring money between marital accounts or buying an asset
included elsewhere.” She argues that, because the $55,000 withdrawal was used for family
expenses, the $50,000 withdrawal was put into a joint bank account, and the Porsche
payment was not a dissipation of funds, these items should be removed from the district
court’s final balance sheet.
As noted above, Minnesota law prevents parties to a pending marriage dissolution
from dissipating marital property without the consent of the other party in contemplation
of or during a dissolution. Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1a. Dissipation of marital assets is
a question of fact and we review the district court’s decision on factual questions for clear
error. Id. (“If the court finds . . . .” (emphasis added)). And the party alleging dissipation
has the burden of proof. Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1a.
$55,000 Tax Amount
Laura claims that she withdrew $55,000 from the marital funds in May 2021 for
“basic family expenses for [herself] and the kids.” However, the district court determined
that Laura’s testimony was not credible and that the $55,000 transfer to her own account
qualified as dissipation.
While Laura cites an exhibit in the record that shows the transfer of the funds into
her Wells Fargo account and then a transfer of $26,373.07 to a platinum card and $10,000
to an American Express card, she does not explain how that establishes that the district
24 court clearly erred by not finding that she used the $55,000 for basic family expenses. As
we do not reassess credibility of witnesses on review and the district court is in the position
to judge the credibility of the evidence and testimony, see In re Welfare of A.D., 535
N.W.2d at 648, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in its determination
that this transfer constituted dissipation of assets.
$50,000 into Joint Account
Laura also challenges the district court’s dissipation finding for the $50,000
cashier’s check that Laura withdrew in February 2021. She claims this amount went from
“one joint account to another” and that she merely withdrew the $50,000 and put it into the
Vast Bank account that was used for family expenses. Peder claims that Laura transferred
these funds into her personal account but cites nowhere in the record to support this
assertion.
The record shows that $49,000 was deposited into the Vast Bank account on March
3, 2021. The Vast Bank account is a joint account, and therefore marital property. 12 As a
result, the district court did clearly err in assigning $50,000 to Laura for dissipated funds
for the cashier’s check and we remand to remove those funds from the balance sheet.
Porsche Amount
Regarding the final dissipation claim, Laura argues that the district court erred by
assigning her the value of the Porsche as marital property because the court did not make
any findings that she bought the Porsche in anticipation of the divorce.
12 The district court lists the Vast Bank account as marital property on the final balance sheet.
25 The relevant part of the standard for a finding of dissipation of funds is not financial
hardship but “in contemplation of commencing, or during the pendency of, the current
dissolution.” Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1a. The district court made no such finding
regarding Laura’s purchase of the Porsche. Instead, the court found that Laura purchased
the Porsche without informing Peder at a time they were concerned about their future
income. But the Porsche was purchased in December 2020, well before the valuation date
or the dissolution proceedings began in the summer of 2021. Laura also testified that
buying the Porsche was in line with the parties’ lifestyle at the time and their prior car
purchases, which included a 2017 Audi Q7. Therefore, we remand to the district court to
remove this amount from the balance sheet or to support its conclusion with further
findings.
E. The district court did not clearly err in its valuation of the Florida property or abuse its discretion in directing its sale.
Finally, both parties challenge the district court’s handling of the Florida property.
Peder asserts that the district court clearly erred in valuing the Florida property at $417,000
and should have adjusted the value for market-based gains and losses. In contrast, Laura
contends that a forced sale of the property may be unnecessary if this court finds error in
the district court’s marital property calculation so that her ability to purchase the property
could be more plausible.
Valuation
We begin with the district court’s valuation of the Florida property. The value of
an asset is a factual finding that we will not set aside unless it is clearly erroneous. Maurer,
26 623 N.W.2d at 606. A finding is clearly erroneous if it is against the weight of the evidence
or not “reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” Kiya v. Jackson, 23 N.W.3d
857, 863 (Minn. App. 2025), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 21, 2025). We uphold a district
court’s valuation if it falls within a range of credible estimates and does not need to coincide
with any one estimate. Maher v. Maher, 393 N.W.2d 190, 193 (Minn. App. 1986).
Here, the district court heard testimony from both parties’ experts at trial as to the
valuation of the Florida property and found that Laura’s expert properly used the valuation
date to determine value of the property, while Peder’s expert used a date in May 2022
“without explanation as to why.” Laura’s expert compared other house sales in the same
neighborhood when determining the value of the property, whereas Peder’s expert
compared homes outside of the neighborhood, some even “several miles away” and in
different gated developments with different amenities. Based on the record, the district
court properly found that Laura’s valuation was reasonable and more credible. We affirm
the district court’s valuation of the Florida property.
Forced Sale
While a district court must make a “just and equitable division” of marital property
by considering, among other things, each spouse’s contributions to the property’s value,
Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1, this court does not disturb an appropriate order to enforce
the terms of a decree. See Nelson v. Nelson, 806 N.W.2d 870, 871 (Minn. App. 2011)
(concluding that a district court may issue an order to enforce the provisions of a decree so
long as it does not change any substantive rights). The district court has the authority to
27 order the sale of a marital homestead “upon the issuance of a final decree of marriage
dissolution.” Melamed v. Melamed, 286 N.W.2d 716, 718 (Minn. 1979).
Here, the district court gave Laura 60 days after the order for judgment was filed to
purchase the Florida property if she desired to keep it. Though Laura claimed that she had
a private equity investor willing to purchase the home for her, those funds never
materialized and she did not make the purchase. Because the district court has authority to
order the sale of marital property, we see no abuse of discretion in ordering the sale of the
Florida home.
II. The district court abused its discretion in calculating Laura’s spousal maintenance award.
Laura next argues that the district court abused its discretion in determining her
spousal-maintenance award while Peder contends that the court properly assigned spousal
maintenance based on a reasonable standard of living compared to the inflated spending
the parties participated in during the marriage.
Spousal maintenance means “payments from the future income or earnings of one
spouse for the support and maintenance of the other.”
Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3a (2024). A party must show need to receive an award of
spousal maintenance, which is appropriate when a spouse cannot “provide for reasonable
needs” or “is unable to provide adequate self-support.” Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 1(a)-
(b) (2024); Honke v. Honke, 960 N.W.2d 261, 266 (Minn. 2021). We review a district
court’s decision concerning the amount and duration of an award of spousal maintenance
28 for an abuse of discretion. Erlandson v. Erlandson, 318 N.W.2d 36, 38 (Minn. 1982);
Schmidt v. Schmidt, 964 N.W.2d 221, 226 (Minn. App. 2021).
The district court awarded Laura $12,000/month in spousal maintenance based on
her potential earning ability and Peder’s proposed monthly budget of $41,000. In the
court’s calculation, it did not include Peder’s Mayo Clinic income as part of his monthly
net cash flow because it was not the marital standard of living for Peder to work two jobs.
But the district court did include the children’s college tuition as part of Peder’s expenses
when awarding maintenance.
First, we conclude that the district court acted within its discretion when it declined
to use Peder’s Mayo Clinic income to determine maintenance. Peder testified that he
worked part time at Mayo Clinic, that he did not plan to continue his work there after the
dissolution concluded, and that the extra expenses of the proceedings necessitated
temporary additional income. The district court, finding Peder’s testimony regarding the
Mayo Clinic income credible, determined that it was not the marital standard of living for
Peder to work two jobs. And as the district court is in the best position to judge the
credibility of the evidence and testimony, we defer to the court’s determination.
See In re Welfare of A.D., 535 N.W.2d at 648.
However, in considering Peder’s monthly expenses, the court failed to adequately
explain how it calculated his budget when assessing maintenance. 13 The decree simply
states, “Husband’s reasonable monthly expenses are $41,000,” which includes household
13 Nor does it explain why Laura’s expenses failed to include essential needs such as health and dental insurance.
29 expenses and Laura’s maintenance award. In addition, the court determined that the
$41,000 is inclusive of $7,000 for the children’s college tuition. But under Minnesota law,
the district court cannot consider the needs of the adult children when determining spousal
maintenance. Musielewicz v. Musielewicz, 400 N.W.2d 100, 103 (Minn. App. 1987),
rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 25, 1987).
From the exhibit submitted at trial of each party’s net cash flow, and updated with
the accurate amount of spousal maintenance, each party is assigned a significantly different
income. Peder’s monthly income equals $26,685.83 whereas Laura’s amounts to
$14,849.50. Without a clearer understanding of Peder’s expenses, minus consideration of
the adult children’s college tuition costs, and given possible alterations in the underlying
property division, we are unable to evaluate Laura’s spousal maintenance award.
We remand this issue back to the district court for further review to determine
spousal maintenance. We afford the district court discretion to reopen the record so that it
may be presented with information necessary to provide a baseline of its considerations for
the award, with the caveat that, for effective review in case of future appeal, we need a
thorough record regarding both parties’ expenses. See Maschoff v. Leiding, 696 N.W.2d
834, 840 (Minn. App. 2005) (noting importance of identifying baseline circumstances in
stipulated dissolution judgments). This not only ensures an accurate finding of a spousal
maintenance award but also that there is a reliable factual foundation in the event future
modification is requested by either party. See Sinda v. Sinda, 949 N.W.2d 170, 177 (Minn.
App. 2020) (“In maintenance-modification proceedings, particularized findings are
necessary to show that relevant statutory factors have been considered.”) (quotation
30 omitted). Because we remand the district court’s award of spousal maintenance for further
analysis, we decline to consider the rest of Laura’s challenges on this issue.
III. The district court did not err in determining attorney fees for each party.
Both parties challenge the district court’s ruling on their requests for attorney fees.
Laura argues the district court erred by denying her request for need-based attorney fees
while Peder contends that the district court abused its discretion because it only awarded
Peder $990 in conduct-based fees, which “does not reflect the substantial findings made by
the Court regarding [Laura’s] conduct.”
Attorney fees in a family-law matter may be need- or conduct-based.
Minn. Stat. § 518.14 (2024). We review a district court’s decision regarding both types of
attorney fees for an abuse of discretion. Backman v. Backman, 990 N.W.2d 478, 489
(Minn. App. 2023) (need-based); Madden v. Madden, 923 N.W.2d 688, 702-03 (Minn.
App. 2019) (conduct-based).
Need-Based Fees
A district court “shall” award attorney fees to a party to enable them to continue on
in the proceedings if the court finds the following factors:
(1) that the fees are necessary for the good faith assertion of the party’s rights in the proceedings and will not contribute unnecessarily to the length and expense of the proceedings; (2) that the party from whom fees . . . are sought has the means to pay them; and (3) that the party to whom fees . . . are awarded does not have the means to pay them.
31 Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1. A district court may consider a party’s property award in
assessing need for fees. See Schallinger v. Schallinger, 699 N.W.2d 15, 24 (Minn. App.
2005) (affirming denial of need-based fees when party paid fees in part with “advance
marital fund distribution”), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 28, 2005); cf. Beck v. Kaplan, 566
N.W.2d 723, 727 (Minn. 1997) (affirming award of need-based fees based on finding that
requesting party would have to “deplete ‘the limited capital assets available to her for her
retirement’” to pay fees). A district court’s determination regarding a party’s ability to pay
fees is a factual finding that we review for clear error. Muschik v. Conner-Muschik, 920
N.W.2d 215, 225 (Minn. App. 2018).
The district court denied Laura’s request for need-based fees, finding that Peder’s
ability to pay the fees is “unclear at best” and that he has “substantial expenses to pay in
terms of the parties’ debts and fixed expenses.” The court found that Peder’s ability to pay
any need-based fees is limited and that Laura “already used significant portions of the
marital estate to pay her attorneys and has received $10,000 per month in temporary
maintenance” and that she has failed “and even refused to explain where her money goes
each month.”
Though it appears there was error by the district court in assigning some of the
marital property, this would not alter Peder’s income or the court’s findings that Laura
receives a monthly maintenance amount. In fact, by remanding the above issues, Laura’s
equalizer payment will be reduced, freeing more funds for her expenses and attorney fees.
Therefore, we affirm the district court’s denial of need-based fees.
32 Conduct-Based Fees
A district court “may” award additional conduct-based fees “against a party who
unreasonably contributes to the length or expense of the proceeding.”
Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1a. Conduct-based fees may be based on a party’s pursuit of
“frivolous or bad-faith claims.” Baertsch v. Baertsch, 886 N.W.2d 235, 239 (Minn. App.
2016). If a party takes positions that are “duplicitous and disingenuous” and further delays
litigation and increases the expense of the proceedings, then an award of conduct-based
attorney fees is appropriate. Redmond v. Redmond, 594 N.W.2d 272, 276 (Minn. App.
1999). A finding of bad faith is not required for an award of conduct-based attorney fees.
Geske v. Marcolina, 624 N.W.2d 813, 818-19 (Minn. App. 2001).
Here, the district court made ample findings on Laura’s delay of the proceedings
and her frivolous claims. It found that she delayed the sale of the Oklahoma property for
two years of the proceeding and did not cooperate with the sale. The district court also
noted that she had not slept in the marital home since 2015 but still demanded a walk
through after the dissolution began and then took valuable items from the home, dragged
mud through the home, and left a sex toy on the counter after she left. Based on Laura’s
conduct, the district court found it appropriate to award Peder $990 in conduct-based
attorney fees. Because the district court has discretion regarding whether to award Peder
fees, and, if so, in what amount, and because the court’s findings are supported by the
record, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s award.
In sum, we affirm part of the district court’s calculation of marital property, namely
the valuation of Peder’s business, assigning the TTCU mortgage debt to Laura as marital
33 property, the $55,000 in dissipated funds, and the forced sale and valuation of the Florida
property. We also affirm the court’s refusal to consider Peder’s Mayo Clinic income in
determining spousal maintenance and the court’s order regarding both parties’ request for
attorney fees. We reverse and remand the remaining marital property challenges, including
double-counting Laura’s BOA account opened after the valuation date, granting Peder
credit for the tax debt for 2022 and 2023 while also ordering Laura to amend her tax filings
for those years, failing to account for Peder’s bonus and his property tax responsibility for
the Oklahoma property, the $50,000 and Porsche payment assigned as dissipated funds,
and the characterization of the 2019 construction loan as nonmarital debt. We also reverse
and remand the district court’s spousal-maintenance award for additional findings on
Peder’s expenses and reexamination of the award in light of these findings. On remand the
district court shall have discretion to reopen the record, and to make whatever adjustments
in its rulings it deems necessary to equitably resolve the case.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.