A. Standard of Review and Relevant Principles of Statutory Interpretation ¶14 Our court reviews questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Bill Barrett Corp. v. Lembke, 2020 CO 73, ¶ 14, 474 P.3d 46, 49. In interpreting a statute, our goal is to ascertain and effectuate the legislature's intent. Id. We always look first to the plain language of the statute. People in Interest of G.S.S., 2020 CO 32, ¶ 11, 462 P.3d 592, 595. "If the statutory language is clear, we apply it as written and need not resort to other rules of statutory construction." Dep't of Revenue v. Agilent Techs., Inc., 2019 CO 41, ¶ 16, 441 P.3d 1012, 1016. When a statutory term is not defined, we construe it in accordance with its ordinary and natural meaning. Cowen v. People, 2018 CO 96, ¶ 14, 431 P.3d 215, 218.
¶15 We must give consistent effect to all parts of a statute, ensuring that each provision exists in harmony with the overall legislative design. Mook v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 2020 CO 12, ¶ 24, 457 P.3d 568, 574. As well, we are required to "adopt a construction that avoids or resolves potential conflicts" with other statutes and gives "effect to all legislative acts, if possible." Id., 457 P.3d at 575 (quoting People v. Stellabotte, 2018 CO 66, ¶ 32, 421 P.3d 174, 180 ).
¶16 Section 14-10-113, which addresses the "[d]isposition of property" in a dissolution proceeding, requires the district court to "divide the marital property, without regard to marital misconduct, in such proportions as the court deems just after considering all relevant factors." § 14-10-113(1). Subsection (2) of the same statute generally defines "marital property" as "all property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage." § 14-10-113(2). But there are four exceptions to this definition:
(a) Property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent;
(b) Property acquired in exchange for property acquired prior to the marriage or in exchange for property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent;
(c) Property acquired by a spouse after a decree of legal separation; and
(d) Property excluded by valid agreement of the parties.
Id.
¶17 In line with subsection (2), subsection (3) creates a "presumption of marital property" with respect to "all property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage and prior to a decree of legal separation." § 14-10-113(3) (emphasis added). However, that presumption "is overcome by a showing that the property was acquired by a method listed" in one of the four exceptions set forth in subsection (2). Id.
¶18 The district court determined that the ITD did not constitute a "valid agreement" under exception (d) because it was "signed by [H]usband" but "not by [W]ife." The division agreed. Blaine , ¶ 17. So do we.
¶19 As relevant here, the UPMAA defines a "marital agreement" as "an agreement between spouses who intend to remain married which affirms, modifies, or waives a marital right or obligation during the marriage or at ... marital dissolution." § 14-2-302(2), C.R.S. (2020). Hence, an agreement between such spouses to exclude property from the marital estate —i.e., to treat as separate any property that would otherwise be presumed to be marital at a dissolution proceeding —is a marital agreement under the UPMAA.
¶20 Significantly, the UPMAA requires that a marital agreement "be in a record and signed by both parties." § 14-2-306, C.R.S. (2020). Indeed, "[a] marital agreement is effective on signing by both parties." § 14-2-307, C.R.S. (2020).4 Thus, an agreement between spouses intending to remain married, which seeks to exclude property from the marital estate, cannot be a "valid agreement" under exception (d) unless it is in writing and signed by both parties.
¶21 Because the ITD was not signed by both parties, it was not a "valid agreement" for purposes of exception (d). But after correctly discerning as much, the division held that the ITD "was nonetheless effective" to convey Husband's interest in the Dublin home to Wife "as her separate property." Blaine, ¶ 19. The division did so, however, without the benefit of findings in the record as to whether exceptions (a) through (c) applied and without exploring any of those exceptions. Instead, the division created a new exception: "[P]roperty can be excluded from a marital estate by a deed conveying such property from one spouse to the other as separate property, provided that there is also evidence of the conveying spouse's intent to exclude the property." Id. at ¶ 14. This was error. "We do not add words to a statute." Boulder Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs v. HealthSouth Corp., 246 P.3d 948, 951 (Colo. 2011). "We only go where the statute takes us." Ziegler v. Park Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 2020 CO 13, ¶ 19, 457 P.3d 584, 589.
¶22 The division's reliance on In re Marriage of Bartolo, 971 P.2d 699 (Colo. App. 1998), and In re Marriage of Vickers, 686 P.2d 1370 (Colo. App. 1984), was misplaced. Neither case supports the division's holding.
¶23 In Bartolo, the division upheld the district court's finding that the husband there "had made a gift" to his wife by conveying his interest in a residence through a quitclaim deed. 971 P.2d at 700. Rather than endorse a new ITD exception to the marital property presumption, however, the Bartolo division simply concluded that the wife in that case had overcome the presumption by presenting "clear and convincing evidence" that the conveyance was a gift, which is part of exception (a). Id. at 700-01.
¶24 Similarly, in Vickers, the division didn't usher in a new ITD exception to the marital property presumption. It merely applied exception (d). Vickers , 686 P.2d at 1371. The Vickers division noted that the parties had executed "a valid and binding agreement which included, as their separate property, ... the increases in value of any separate property." Id. (emphasis added). Because the couple's residence was the separate property of the wife in that case, it was error under the parties' valid agreement for the trial court to have considered the increase in the residence's value as marital property. Id.
¶25 Here, by contrast, in concluding that Wife had overcome the presumption of marital property in the district court, the division didn't identify a statutory exception that applied to Husband's conveyance of his interest in the Dublin home. That Husband's conveyance was through an ITD and was accompanied by his intent to exclude the Dublin home from the marital estate did not suffice to overcome the presumption. That's because there is no ITD exception in section 14-10-113(2) —even if the ITD is accompanied by the conveying spouse's intent to exclude the property in question from the marital estate.
¶26 On remand, the division should return the case to the district court with instructions to make findings as to whether any statutory exception not previously addressed applies. See § 14-10-113(2)(a)-(c). We realize that the district court found that the eleven transfers totaling $296,500 constituted marital property. But, having determined that these funds constituted marital property, the court did not further consider whether Husband's subsequent conveyance of his interest in the Dublin home to Wife through the ITD fell within one of the exceptions listed in section 14-10-113(2)(a)-(c).
¶27 In sum, the ITD may be evidence of one of the statutory exceptions to the marital property presumption. But the ITD — even if accompanied by Husband's intent to exclude the Dublin home from the marital estate — cannot give birth to a new exception to the presumption. "Of our three branches of government, only the General Assembly has the power to make law." Amica Life Ins. Co. v. Wertz, 2020 CO 29, ¶ 17, 462 P.3d 51, 54.