In Re the Marriage of Hammill

732 P.2d 403, 225 Mont. 263
CourtMontana Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 4, 1987
Docket86-136
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 732 P.2d 403 (In Re the Marriage of Hammill) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Montana Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re the Marriage of Hammill, 732 P.2d 403, 225 Mont. 263 (Mo. 1987).

Opinion

MR. JUSTICE SHEEHY

delivered the Opinion of the Court.

Carla Willey Hammill appeals the disposition of marital property and award of joint custody ordered by the District Court, Eleventh Judicial District, County of Flathead. The valuation and division of marital property is affirmed; the issue of child custody is remanded.

Carla Willey Hammill and Gary Douglas Hammill were married June 3, 1967 in Iowa. They both attended Iowa State University, and upon their graduation in 1969, moved to Whitefish, Montana where Gary had a job as a veterinarian. Carla taught art and physical education in Whitefish until she became pregnant with her first son, Chet. Chet was born in September, 1971. A second son, Curt, was born in May, 1974.

The family moved to Kalispell in 1971, where Gary opened his own practice at Ashley Creek Animal Clinic. He suffered a severe back injury in 1972 when a metal kennel gate fell on his back. The pain caused by the injury led him to curtail his veterinary practice. He took on a partner in 1983, and eventually sold out his interest to the partner in January, 1985.

Carla and Gary separated in 1982, and the petition for dissolution was filed December 2, 1982. The couple entered into a temporary joint custody agreement on September 6, 1983, whereby the primary *266 residency of the two boys was to be with their mother, the father having the boys every other weekend and six weeks during the summer. Gary also agreed to pay $250.00 per child per month in child support.

On December 13, 1983, the District Court appointed an attorney, Robert Allison, to represent the boys in this proceeding. A bench trial took place before the Honorable James M. Salansky on June 14, 1984. Attorneys for all parties were present, and a request that the court talk with the children in chambers was taken under advisement. The children-did not testify at this time, and when the parties rested, the entire proceeding was taken under advisement. Mr. Allison also submitted a report to the court on the matter of custody arrangements, this report also being taken under advisement.

Judge Salansky’s subsequent illness and death prevented a final disposition of the matter. The Honorable Nat Allen was appointed to the case, and another bench trial was held December 5, 1985, at which time the marital property division and permanent custody arrangements were decided. For some reason, the children’s attorney was not notified of this trial, and no evidence or testimony other than that of the parents was presented on the children’s behalf. Each boy was briefly and separately interviewed by Judge Allen in chambers, with a court reporter present.

At the end of the trial, Judge Allen stated he was going to keep the boys together rather than split custody between the parents, and that physical custody would alternate annually between mother and father. He stated that while the parties were free to propose findings otherwise, he was deciding custody as indicated. Both parties submitted findings of fact and conclusions of law as to the value of marital assets, the division of assets and liabilities, and child custody arrangements. The court adopted the husband’s findings verbatim, and the wife appeals the decision.

Carla Hammill sets forth the following issues on appeal:

(1) Whether the District Court erred in evaluating the marital property as of December, 1985 (the date of the dissolution), rather than as of October, 1982 (the date of the parties’ separation)?

(2) Whether the District Court erred in dividing the marital property on a 50-50 basis?

(3) Whether the District Court erred in adopting the husband’s findings verbatim?

*267 (4) Whether the District Court can determine contested custody without stating its reasons therefor?

(5) Whether the District Court determined custody without considering the best interests of the children?

The younger son, Curt, also appeals the custody order through his co-counsel, William Boggs. Mr. Boggs was appointed co-counsel with Mr. Allison, and given leave to file a brief by order of this Court dated August 21, 1986. The issues raised by Curt are:

1. Whether a custody decree can stand where the attorney appointed to represent the children was not notified of and did not participate in the trial which determined custody?

2. Whether the District Court considered all five factors affecting the best interests of the children, as required by 40-4-212, MCA?

3. Whether joint custody is in the best interests of the children?

Property Disposition

In reviewing the division of property made by a district court, we will not disturb the decision absent a clear abuse of discretion. The test of abuse of discretion is whether the trial court acted arbitrarily without employment of conscientious judgment or exceeded the bounds of reason resulting in substantial injustice. In Re Marriage of Rolfe (Mont. 1985), [216 Mont. 39,] 699 P.2d 79, 83, 42 St.Rep. 623, 626.

Carla Hammill first challenges the valuation date used by the District Court. She argues the court should have used 1982 values for the marital property — 1982 being the date of the parties’ separation — rather than 1985 values — 1985 being the date of the dissolution of the marriage.

The general rule in Montana is that “[a] proper disposition of marital property in a dissolution proceeding requires a finding of the net worth of the parties at or near the time of the dissolution.” In Re Marriage of Loegering (Mont. 1984), [212 Mont. 499,] 689 P.2d 260, 264, 41 St.Rep. 1892, 1896. (Emphasis added.) The policy of using the dissolution date for valuation of property is that this valuation date most clearly reflects the status of the property at the time of trial. In Re Marriage of Hamilton (1980), 186 Mont. 282, 283, 607 P.2d 102. In this case, Carla does not argue that the 1985 values were inaccurate or incorrect in themselves. Rather, she argues that the court should have adopted the 1982 values which she proposed. A trial judge is free to select whatever value he or she wishes, so long as there is substantial credible evidence to support the value se *268 lected. In Re Marriage of Staudt (Mont. 1985), [216 Mont. 196,] 700 P.2d 175, 177, 42 St.Rep. 740, 743.

There is no evidence in the record which conflicts with the 1985 values adopted by the District Court, and we therefore hold the court did not abuse its discretion in adopting the 1985 valuation date.

The second issue Carla raises is whether the court erred in dividing the marital property on a 50-50 basis. The marital property was divided as follows:

Property To Husband To Wife

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Bluebook (online)
732 P.2d 403, 225 Mont. 263, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-the-marriage-of-hammill-mont-1987.