In re the Marriage of Haley
This text of 672 P.2d 1222 (In re the Marriage of Haley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
This is a domestic relations case in which a child support obligor father moved the trial court for an amendment to the dissolution decree’s child support provisions to eliminate a requirement that he pay support for two adopted daughters. The motion was made on the theory that the adoption of the children was void. The trial court granted the motion. Mother appeals. We reverse.
Mother was divorced from one Wymer on February 14, 1976. That marriage had produced the two children who are the subject of this case. Mother was awarded custody of the children. On June 20, 1979, mother was divorced from her second husband, one Meredith. On July 26, 1979, more than a month after her second divorce, Wymer consented, in writing, to the adoption of the two children. Apparently — for some reason neither Wymer’s consent nor the adoption decree appears in the record — Meredith was named in the consent as the adopting parent, although he was no longer married to mother. Mother and husband were married on February 11, 1980. Using Wymer’s written consent, husband adopted the two children on March 30, 1981.
Petitioner’s first two assignments of error are that the circuit court erred in allowing husband to challenge the adoption decree in the face of ORS 109.381. Husband argues that ORS 109.381 does not apply, because the adoption decree is void for want of valid consent by the natural father. Husband argues that, without such consent, the court did not have jurisdiction and therefore its decree is a nullity subject to collateral attack.
ORS 109.350 provides that when a court approves a petition for adoption “* * * a decree shall be made setting forth the facts, and ordering that from the date of the decree the child, to all legal intents and purposes, is the child of the petitioner.” We presume that the decree of adoption issued in this case on March 30, 1981, is valid on its face,1 ORS [40]*40109.381(1);2 the parties do not contend otherwise. Given that, there are at least three compelling reasons why the circuit court should not have allowed husband to challenge the decree:
First, husband was a party to the adoption proceedings and is therefore bound by the decree. ORS 109.381(2).3
Second, the decree of adoption in this case was entered on March 30, 1981, and husband’s challenge was not filed until November 24, 1982, about 20 months after the decree was entered. Husband was therefore precluded from challenging the decree by ORS 109.381(3).4
Third, the rights that husband is attempting to assert in this case are those of the natural father, who consented in writing to the adoption of his children at a time when mother was not married. The natural father’s consent has never been revoked, there is no allegation that it was a product of undue influence and the natural father is not a party to these [41]*41proceedings. There is no evidence that the natural father did, or wanted to, object to the adoption proceedings at issue in this case. To the extent that the consent statutes5 are designed to protect a natural parents’ rights, particularly when that parent does not have custody of the child, the policy of these statutes is not implicated in this case. Whether the natural father could object to the adoption proceedings we need not decide.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Costs to appellant.
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672 P.2d 1222, 66 Or. App. 37, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-the-marriage-of-haley-orctapp-1983.