In Re The Marriage Of: ELIZABETH D. FARRIS and ERIC A. FARRIS ELIZABETH D. FARRIS, Petitioner-Respondent v. ERIC A. FARRIS

485 S.W.3d 827
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals
DecidedApril 18, 2016
DocketSD33837
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 485 S.W.3d 827 (In Re The Marriage Of: ELIZABETH D. FARRIS and ERIC A. FARRIS ELIZABETH D. FARRIS, Petitioner-Respondent v. ERIC A. FARRIS) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re The Marriage Of: ELIZABETH D. FARRIS and ERIC A. FARRIS ELIZABETH D. FARRIS, Petitioner-Respondent v. ERIC A. FARRIS, 485 S.W.3d 827 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016).

Opinion

DON E. BURRELL, P.J.

Eric A. Farris (“Husband”) appeals the judgment that dissolved his marriage. to Elizabeth D. -Farris -(“Wife”). Husband alleges eleven points of' reversible error, but we need address only two. Because Husband was deprived of his right to present relevant evidence and have his case tried before an impartial fact-fínder, we reverse the judgment and remand the case for a new trial before a different judge; 1

. Usual Standard of Review

In reviewing á dissolution judgment, we would typically reverse only if we concluded that the judgihent was against the weight of the evidence, was not supported by substantial evidence, or misstated or misapplied the law. Ludwig v. Ludwig, 126 S.W.3d 466, 474 (Mo.App.W.D. 2004). In this case, however, because a reasonable person would find an appearance’ of impropriety and doubt the impartiality of the trial court, we must reverse the judgment without reaching the merits of any of Husband’s challenges to its content.

Applicable Due-Process Standards

“Under both the federal and state constitutions, [t]he fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Jamison v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., Div. of Family Servs., 218 S.W.3d 399, 405 (Mo. banc 2007) (internal quotations omitted). Implicit in the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner is the notion of an impartial decision maker. 2 “Although the trial court has broad *830 discretion in the conduct of a trial, its power is not without limitation.” In re Crist, 732 S.W.2d 587, 589 (Mo.App.E.D. 1987). A trial court “should not prevent a full presentation of relevant evidence. The court should not adopt or exhibit a hostile attitude toward a party, his counsel, or a witness.” Id. at 590.

We must base our review on the objective facts of the record from the perspective of a reasonable and disinterested bystander, unacquainted with the personality, integrity, and dedication of the judge. State v. Lovelady, 691 S.W.2d 364, 367 (Mo.App.W.D.1985). We presume that a judge will act honestly and with integrity and will not preside over a trial if he or she cannot be impartial. Smulls v. State, 10 S.W.3d 497, 499 (Mo. banc 2000). “This presumption is overcome and disqualification is required if a reasonable person would find an appearance of impropriety and doubt the impartiality of the court.” Id. Indeed, the recusal rule, Rule 2-2.11(A), “is not limited to actual prejudice[.]” Anderson v. State, 402 S.W.3d 86, 91 (Mo. banc 2013). We must review the entire record when determining whether the facts support disqualification. Id. at 92.

The trial judge’s comments must also be considered in the context of all the judge’s statements and the circumstances surrounding such statements. Haynes v. State, 937 S.W.2d 199, 204 (Mo. banc 1996). The common theme in cases requiring re-cusal “is either a fact from which prejudgment of some evidentiary issue in the case by the judge may be inferred or facts indicating the judge considered some evidence properly in the case for an illegitimate purpose.” Id.

Background

Husband and Wife- married on December 3, 1994, and they separated on April 23, 2013. Wife filed her petition for dissolution of marriage on June 21, 2013. Husband and Wife have four children, D.F., I.F., N.F., and A.F., who at the time of trial were, respectively, 9, 11, 13, and 16 years old.

From its commencement, this was a highly contentious dissolution case that could be expected to challenge the patience of any trial judge. Multiple pre-trial motions were filed and heard, several judges recused during the course of the case, and several guardians ad litem (“GAL”) were appointed and later allowed to withdraw. Husband and Wife each filed motions seeking a psychological evaluation of the other, and Wife filed a motion requesting the appointment of a GAL for the minor children. 3 Wife’s motion for psychological evaluation of Husband alleged, inter alia, that Husband “hit [D.F.] on the head and dragged him by the arm.” The motion also alleged that Husband had threatened to abandon D.F. if he misbehaved. Husband’s motion for a psychological evaluation of Wife questioned Wife’s ability to care for and parent the children, and it claimed that Wife had “encouraged an alienation of the children toward [Husband].” An amended motion for temporary custody filed by Husband alleged that Wife had psychologically abused the children.

*831 A judge previously assigned to the case granted the parties an interlocutory dissolution of marriage on July 17, 2014. 4 By the time the case was tried on January 9, 2015, Husband had filed eight motions for contempt. Four of the motions, which alleged that Wife had contumaciously dissipated marital property during the pen-dency of the casé, were to be heard with the trial. The day before trial, Husband’s attorney filed a motion for continuance that claimed his wife had a medical emergency. The trial court denied the motion, and Husband, a licensed attorney at the time, proceeded to trial pro se.

On January 20, 2015, eleven days after the “trial” 5 concluded, the trial court sent an email (the subject line of which was entitled “Judgment”) to the parties and court clerk that included findings of fact and conclusions of law. Earlier that same day, Husband had filed an application for change of judge. 6 The next day, the trial court made a docket entry that it had failed to address the issue of GAL fees, and it directed that the remaining fees would be taxed to Husband as costs; The parties and the trial court continued to exchange multiple emails about requested corrections or modifications to Wife’s proposed parenting plan.until the judgment Husband now appeals (“the judgment”) was entered on February 13, 2015.

The judgment awarded the parties joint legal and physical custody of the children, and it granted Husband limited parenting time with the children, that included overnights on alternating holidays and a week during the summer. The judgment ordered Husband to pay monthly child support of $1,000.00, awarded each party the property he or , she had in their physical possession, equally divided the life insurance policy proceeds of $68,000.00, and awarded Husband a real estate lot and a vehicle.

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Bluebook (online)
485 S.W.3d 827, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-the-marriage-of-elizabeth-d-farris-and-eric-a-farris-elizabeth-d-moctapp-2016.