In re the Marriage of Dow

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: June 23, 2026
• Docket: 1-24-2393
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2026 IL App (1st) 242393-U

SECOND DIVISION June 23, 2026

No. 1-24-2393

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

In re THE MARRIAGE OF: ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of BRYAN DOW, ) Cook County ) Petitioner-Appellant, ) 2022 D 430325 ) and ) Honorable ) William Stewart Boyd, KARI DOW, ) Bradley R. Trowbridge, ) Judges Presiding Respondent-Appellee. ) _____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE ELLIS delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Van Tine and Justice McBride concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: Affirmed. Court did not err in denying petition to return minor child to Illinois or in allowing child to remain in Florida. Court did not err in award of child support.

¶2 In 2022, Bryan and Kari Dow separated after four years of marriage. Kari permanently

moved to Florida with the couple’s only child. Bryan claims he never agreed to the move and,

shortly after filing for divorce in Illinois, sought to force Kari to return the child to this state.

After a lengthy hearing, the trial court denied that request.

¶3 The case then continued as a fairly routine marital-dissolution case, culminating in a trial.

The court entered an Allocation Judgment that allowed Kari and the minor child to remain in No. 1-24-2393

Florida. The court’s dissolution judgment also required Bryan to pay child support. In

determining the amount of support, the court declined to consider substantial sums of money

Kari was receiving from her father every month, as the court was persuaded by Kari’s unrebutted

testimony that the money was a loan she was required to repay.

¶4 On appeal, Bryan challenges both the order allowing the child to remain in Florida and

the court’s child-support calculation. We find no error and affirm.

¶5 BACKGROUND

¶6 Bryan and Kari were married in February 2018. Kari gave birth to their son in January

2019. Throughout the marriage, Bryan worked as a union pipefitter; Kari did not work. Until

2022, they owned a home and lived in Illinois.

¶7 In early 2022, the couple was experiencing marital problems. They sold their home in

May 2022. They put most of their possessions in storage and, for a short time, stayed either with

friends or in a hotel. They discussed a move to Florida, though they disagreed at trial on how

concrete that plan was; Kari said it was firm, while Bryan said it was preliminary.

¶8 Either way, not long after selling their house, Bryan drove Kari and their son to Kari’s

father’s condo in Florida. Bryan then drove back to Illinois, rented a truck, loaded much of the

contents of the storage unit into his truck, and drove them down to Florida. He later helped ship

other items, including furniture and Kari’s car, to Florida.

¶9 As noted, Bryan testified that he didn’t consider the move to Florida permanent. He

thought their plan was to buy a new house somewhere and work on their marriage. Florida was

one option, he said, but not the only one. He returned to Illinois only so he could find work while

Kari and their son stayed in Florida for the summer.

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¶ 10 Kari unequivocally testified that, though he discussed other places, Bryan agreed to move

to Florida. The plan was to move down there and allow the couple to work on their marriage.

¶ 11 In late May and June, with Bryan in Illinois and Kari and their child in Florida, the

parties exchanged text messages that illustrate the rocky and tense nature of their marriage. For

example, on May 28, Bryan wrote, “if you want it to end OK I accept it,” “I’m starting the

separation process,” and “I borderline don’t want anything from you anymore other than to take

care of my son,” while also stating such sentiments as “I love you[,] you just keep pushing me

away.” On June 1, Kari wrote: “I’m stupid for even thinking I could communicate with you.”

And this from Bryan: “I'm done with your silence, I’m assuming our marriage is over” and

“[e]ventually we’re going to need to bring the courts into this and establish legal boundaries.”

¶ 12 On June 4, Bryan texted Kari a photo of a firearm, telling her that “[t]hey’re about to

enforce [the Covid-19] lockdown again” and “[b]e vigilant my wife.” Kari twice asked Bryan if

that gun was his, but he did not respond. Bryan testified that it was his father’s gun and he was

not threatening Kari: “that was a Marine husband telling his wife” “to be safe.”

¶ 13 On July 22, Kari obtained the Florida equivalent of an emergency order of protection

against Bryan. She alleged that Bryan was physically abusive to her and their son and mentally

abusive to her. The order of protection prohibited Bryan from all contact with both Kari and their

child. Bryan was aware of the order of protection no later than September, when it was served by

the police. There was evidence that he had actual notice of the order in July. (The order of

protection became permanent and was still in effect at the time of trial.)

¶ 14 In August 2022, Bryan filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in Illinois.

¶ 15 On October 31, 2022, Bryan filed an emergency motion to return the minor child to

Illinois. In that petition, Bryan alleged that Kari’s move to Florida with their child violated

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section 609.2 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (the “MDMA”), 750

ILCS 5/609.2 (West 2022), which governs a parent’s relocation involving minor children. At the

hearing, Bryan stated that Kari had “kidnapped” or “stolen” their son, and that Kari did not

follow the procedure outlined in section 609.2, rendering the relocation “illegal.”

¶ 16 Judge Boyd held a three-day evidentiary hearing. The testimony primarily focused on the

events leading to the move to Florida and whether Bryan agreed to the relocation. On August 18,

2023, the court entered a written memorandum order denying Bryan’s motion.

¶ 17 The court gave two reasons. First, section 609.2 was inapplicable, as a dissolution of

marriage proceeding had not yet been filed in May 2022, so the MDMA did not apply when Kari

moved with her son to Florida. And second, the court found that Bryan was aware of and

consented to the move, regardless of technical compliance with section 609.2. The court found

Bryan’s testimony to the contrary “evasive” and “not credible.”

¶ 18 The case was reassigned to Judge Trowbridge, who presided over the trial in summer

2024. On the topic of the child’s relocation, the court advised the parties that it read Judge

Boyd’s order and the record and would not relitigate the three days of testimony leading to that

order. Instead, he would judicially notice Judge Boyd’s order and hear any evidence or

allegations on the topic of returning the child to Illinois that post-dated Judge Boyd’s order.

¶ 19 The trial focused almost exclusively on the parties’ finances. As Bryan’s arguments on

this topic are limited, we can be brief. Suffice it to say that, at the time of trial, Bryan was on

disability and unemployment benefits due to a motorcycle accident. He could not lift more than

40 pounds. His current goal was rehabilitation and returning to work as a pipefitter.

¶ 20 While Kari was now employed, she only received sales commissions. In the year before

trial, she had only earned about $500 in commissions. Most of her funding came from her father,

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who provided her about $6,000 a month and was also paying her legal bills. According to Kari,

“[e]verything that’s being given to me including your legal bills are [my] responsibility to repay

when I can and am able to.”

¶ 21 On August 2, 2024, the court entered the Allocation Judgment after trial. That judgment

provided, in relevant part, that:

“The minor child shall reside with KARI, which may be in the state of Florida where they

presently reside. On August 18, 2023, the Honorable Judge Boyd ruled in this matter that

KARI shall be entitled to reside in Florida. KARI is granted leave to continue to reside in

Florida with the minor child.”

Given the order of protection in Florida, the court “reserved” Bryan’s visitation with their son

but noted that it would reconsider the issue if the Florida order were modified or terminated.

¶ 22 A separate Dissolution Judgment, also entered on August 2, ordered Bryan to pay

maintenance and child support. The court based its figures on the Illinois child support

worksheet, which it attached to its order. The order required Bryan to pay $833 a month in child

support while under the obligation to pay maintenance and $1,246 “[o]nce maintenance

terminates.” In reaching these figures, the court found that Bryan’s gross income was “9,165”

per month, while Kari’s was “42” a month.

¶ 23 Bryan moved to reconsider both orders. On November 15, 2024, the court slightly

modified its orders. First, the court recognized that it erred in awarding Kari maintenance, “as the

parties had stipulated that each would waive maintenance.” The court then found that it was

required to set child support at $1,300—instead of $1246—in light of its vacatur of maintenance.

In reaching this number, the court revisited its income calculations. Instead of the original

income amounts, the court determined that Bryan’s income was “$9917 monthly” while Kari’s

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was “$25 monthly.” The court specifically found “that [Kari’s] monthly payments from her

father are not income for child support purposes, as [she] testified that the sums were loans from

her father, and that there was no evidence presented at trial to the contrary.”

¶ 24 Bryan timely filed his notice of appeal, which listed, among many others, Judge Boyd’s

order, the Allocation Judgment, and the Dissolution Judgment.

¶ 25 Despite being a case relating to the care and custody of a minor, Bryan’s notice of appeal

did not indicate that this was an expedited case per Illinois Supreme Court Rule 311(a) (eff. July

1, 2018). When Kari informed this court that Bryan failed to follow the protocol for an expedited

case, Bryan indicated that he was not seeking expedited consideration of this appeal, despite our

rules requiring him to do so. As such, this case was never docketed as an expedited appeal.

¶ 26 ANALYSIS

¶ 27 On appeal, Bryan claims two errors in the court’s judgment. First, the court erred on the

relocation issue, as it failed to follow the procedures outlined in section 609.2 of the MDMA.

Second, it was error to consider the $6,000 a month Kari receives from her father as a loan, not

income, in calculating child support.

¶ 28 Preliminarily, Kari takes issue with the argumentative nature of Bryan’s statement of

facts. Her point is well taken. Bryan’s statement of facts contains several unsupported or

argumentative assertions. For example, he refers to Kari’s “perjury” in securing her order of

protection without any basis for saying so. He suggests that she initially moved to Florida,

“unbeknownst to Bryan,” under the “guise” of a short visit. That claim is not only one-sided and

unsupported but contrary to what the court found—that the parties intended to relocate to

Florida, and that Bryan’s testimony to the contrary was not credible.

¶ 29 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(6) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) requires that the appellant’s

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brief contain facts free of argument and with citation to the record. We would be within our

rights to strike the statement of facts or even the brief in its entirety. Wilson v. University of

Chicago Medical Center, 2023 IL App (1st) 230078, ¶ 17. Instead, we will merely “disregard

arguments and unsupported statements” in his statement of facts. Id.

¶ 30 I. Relocation

¶ 31 Before addressing the merits of the relocation issue, Kari argues that Bryan has forfeited

his challenge because he raises no specific criticism of the Allocation Judgment itself. Rather, he

focuses on Judge Boyd’s original order from a year earlier, which is now moot. It is a valid point

in one sense; the question at trial was whether the child should now be returned to Illinois so

Bryan could have visitation rights, not whether the original relocation was valid.

¶ 32 On the other hand, as noted above, Judge Trowbridge told the parties before trial that he

did not want to re-litigate Judge Boyd’s order blow by blow, but he would hear any new

evidence or argument that post-dated that order and was relevant to the question of relocating the

child. And in his final judgment, he all but adopted Judge Boyd’s order.

¶ 33 So while we agree that it might not be the most effective argument to relitigate a year-old

ruling instead of focusing on what is best for the child now—“now” being the summer of 2024,

the time of trial—the fact remains that an attack on Judge Boyd’s ruling is, in one sense, an

indirect attack on the Allocation Judgment that adopted that ruling. If that is how Bryan chooses

to mount his challenge, we will hear him out.

¶ 34 That said, for the same reasons Judge Boyd gave, we find no merit to Bryan’s challenge.

His only complaint is that neither Kari nor Judge Boyd followed the procedures outlined in

section 609.2 to adjudicate relocations of parents with minor children. See 750 ILCS 5/609.2

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(West 2022). Specifically, he says Kari failed to give written notice or file a petition seeking

relocation, and the court failed to make findings on the various factors governing relocation.

¶ 35 But Judge Boyd was correct that section 609.2 was not applicable when Kari moved with

her son to Florida. The parties had not initiated dissolution proceedings yet. Section 609.2 does

not apply every time a spouse moves a child out of state. It only applies to “[a] parent who has

been allocated a majority of parenting time or *** equal parenting time.” Id. § 609.2(b). Nothing

of the kind had yet occurred when Kari moved with the child to Florida. There was no allocation

judgment or parenting time; the parties were still married and had not yet filed for dissolution.

¶ 36 Indeed, even after dissolution proceedings have begun, we have found section 609.2

inapplicable without an allocation of parenting time. See Tyler A. Z. v. Lauren A. R., 2021 IL

App (3d) 210360-U, ¶ 23; In re Marriage of Whitney H. and Daniel B., 2021 IL App (4th)

210357-U, ¶¶ 39, 42. Needless to say, section 609.2 does not apply before a spouse even files for

divorce. The court correctly found section 609.2 inapplicable.

¶ 37 Bryan warns that our ruling will incentivize parents to quickly whisk their children away

from the state before a dissolution action is filed. But custody and parenting time are central

issues in any marital-dissolution action involving minor children, and nothing prevents a parent

from litigating these questions once the dissolution action is filed. Nor do the criminal laws

against child abduction and kidnapping cease to exist, where appropriate. In any event, we are

required to enforce the statute as written; we cannot force its application onto a set of facts to

which it clearly does not apply. We uphold the court’s finding.

¶ 38 II. Child Support

¶ 39 Next, Bryan claims the court erred in refusing to consider the $6,000 a month Kari

received from her father as “income” and in finding, instead, that the money is a loan to be

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repaid. Notably, he does not argue that the trial court’s finding was against the manifest weight

of the evidence. Instead, he argues that “loans” are income, period, and thus the court committed

legal error in ruling otherwise. That is incorrect.

¶ 40 The MDMA calculates child support based on a parent’s monthly net income. 750 ILCS

5/505(a) (West 2022). Net income is gross income “minus enumerated standardized tax amounts

and adjustments.” In re Marriage of Ash and Matschke, 2021 IL App (1st) 200901, ¶ 34; see 750

ILCS 5/505(a)(3)(B) (West 2022). As Bryan notes, “gross income” is “the total income from all

sources,” less benefits not relevant here. Id. § 505(a)(3)(A). Our supreme court recognized that,

under the MDMA, “income” is expansive and includes things that may not constitute “income”

under the Internal Revenue Code. In re Marriage of Rogers, 213 Ill. 2d 129, 137 (2004).

¶ 41 When it comes to loans, the statute is silent. Our supreme court in Rodgers declined “to

address whether and under what circumstances loan proceeds are properly regarded as an

element of income for child support purposes” because, in that case, the “loans” were “loans in

name only.” Id. at 140. So Bryan’s argument that Rogers held that “loans made to the payor were

to be considered as income” is flat wrong, which may be why he cited to the decision generally

and not to a specific page of the decision. Rogers held no such thing.

¶ 42 Indeed, since Rodgers, we have repeatedly recognized that whether loans count as

income depends on the facts of a given case. For example, in In re Marriage of Tegeler, 365 Ill.

App. 3d. 448, 458 (2006), we noted that “in general, loans should not be considered income.”

(Emphasis added.) In Vance v. Joyner, 2019 IL App (4th) 190136, ¶ 61, we agreed with Tegeler

that generally loans are not income but recognized that “when a purported loan requires no

repayment or returned obligation, the proceeds should be considered income and included as part

of a parent’s monthly net income.” Id.

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¶ 43 A textbook example of a loan that is not income is “a residential mortgage loan, made by

a bona fide lender.” In re Marriage of Baumgartner, 384 Ill. App. 3d 39, 52 (2008). On the other

hand, familial “ ‘loans’ without repayment,” properly characterized as “gifts,” are considered

income. In re Marriage of Anderson and Murphy, 405 Ill. App. 3d 1129, 1137 (2010).

¶ 44 Obviously, then, whether money given to a spouse is a bona fide loan or a “loan in name

only” (Rogers, 213 Ill. 2d at 140) requires the court to “examine the evidence and determine

whether the payment’s features fit within the plain meaning of income.” Vance, 2019 IL App

(4th) 190136, ¶ 61. The ultimate determination is one of law (Ash and Matschke, 2021 IL App

(1st) 200901, ¶ 33), but the character and nature of the loan is undeniably a factual finding

resolved by the trial court. In the context of child support, as always, we review the circuit

court’s “independent factual findings” to determine whether they are against the manifest weight

of the evidence. In re Marriage of Saracco, 2014 IL App (3d) 130741, ¶ 16.

¶ 45 Here, Bryan does not attack, or even address, the court’s specific factual finding that the

payments from Kari’s father were not income. The court credited Kari’s testimony that she was

expected to repay her father the money and noted that her testimony was unrebutted. As Bryan

does not challenge that finding, relying instead on a black-letter legal argument (incorrect though

it is), we are in no position to disturb the factual finding that the loans from Kari’s were just

that—bona fide loans and thus not income. We uphold this finding as well.

¶ 46 CONCLUSION

¶ 47 The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

¶ 48 Affirmed.

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