In re the Marriage of Dickey

Court of Appeals of Iowa·Decided August 19, 2020·No. 19-0097·Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 19-0097

Filed August 19, 2020

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF JODIE LYNN DICKEY AND WILLIAM MARK DICKEY

Upon the Petition of JODIE LYNN DICKEY, Petitioner-Appellee,

And Concerning WILLIAM MARK DICKEY, Respondent-Appellant.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Madison County, Thomas P. Murphy, Judge.

The husband in this dissolution of marriage proceeding appeals the property division provisions of the district court’s decree. AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED AND REMANDED.

G. Stephen Walters of Jordan, Oliver, Walters & Smith, P.C., Winterset, for appellant.

Andrea M. Flanagan of Flanagan Law Group, PLLC, Des Moines, for appellee.

Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Mullins and Ahlers, JJ.

AHLERS, Judge.

Jodie and William Dickey married in 1996. They had two children, K.M.D.

(born in 1997) and A.P.D. (born in 2002). The wife also has a daughter from a prior relationship, A.T., who is an independent adult. The parties reached a settlement with respect to all issues pertaining to the children but went to trial regarding property division, spousal support, and attorney fees.

The district court issued a ruling dividing the property of the parties, declining to award spousal support to either party, and declining to award attorney fees to either party. As part of the property division, the district court ordered the husband to transfer numerous shares of bank stock and portions of his 401(k) to the wife and also ordered the husband to pay a property division equalization payment to the wife.

The husband appeals. The wife does not cross-appeal, but she requests appellate attorney fees. The husband claims the district court erred by (1) including assets in the marital estate that were not owned by the parties, (2) ordering the transfer of numerous shares of bank stock, (3) ordering transfer of portions of his 401(k) rather than dividing the parties’ respective retirement accounts using a percentage formula, and (4) ordering an excessive equalization payment. Finding the district court improperly included assets that no longer belonged to the parties in determining the property division and equalization payment calculation, we modify the district court’s order as stated in this opinion. I. Standard of Review.

Dissolution of marriage actions are reviewed de novo. In re Marriage of McDermott, 827 N.W.2d 671, 676 (Iowa 2013). “Accordingly, we examine the

entire record and adjudicate anew the issue of the property distribution.” Id. While we give weight to the findings of the district court, particularly concerning the credibility of witnesses, we are not bound by them. Id. The district court’s ruling will only be disturbed when the ruling fails to do equity. Id. II. Concessions of the Parties Regarding Premarital Assets.

Before discussing the details, we first highlight concessions made by the parties regarding premarital assets. “The partners in the marriage are entitled to a just and equitable share of the property accumulated through their joint efforts.” In re Marriage of Hazen, 778 N.W.2d 55, 59 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009). Of course, the court’s first task when it comes to property division is to identify and value all assets and debts subject to division. See McDermott, 827 N.W.2d at 678. “To identify divisible property, the district court looks for all marital assets that exist at the time of the divorce, with the exception of gifts and inheritances to one spouse. Premarital property may be included in the divisible estate.” Id. While premarital property may be considered part of the marital estate, based on our review of the record and the briefs, we find the parties have conceded that any premarital assets and debts should be excluded from the marital estate with any appreciation of an asset during the marriage considered marital property. Based on these concessions when considered with the equities of this case, we find it equitable to generally set aside premarital assets and debts by not including them in the marital estate. III. Treatment of KAW, LLC.

KAW, LLC is a limited liability company that the husband organized in 2007.

Upon creation of the LLC, 10,000 membership units were issued, with 3400 issued

to the husband and 3300 issued to each of the parties’ two children (K.M.D. and A.P.D.). As explained in section VI.A.2 below, KAW owns three distinct assets, giving the LLC a total value of $304,803.

The district court “awarded all right title and interest in KAW” to the husband, apparently considering the entire value of the LLC—minus premarital value of the assets—as marital property. The husband argues the court erred in disregarding the interest held by the parties’ children, and we agree. Treating the husband as the owner of all membership units would ignore the law of business associations, as an LLC is an entity distinct from its members. See Iowa Code § 489.104(1) (2018); see also Hollingshead v. DC Misfits, LLC, 937 N.W.2d 616, 620 (Iowa 2020) (McDonald, J., dissenting). The husband organized KAW in 2007, transferring the membership units—thirty-four percent to himself and thirty-three percent to each of the children—at the time of organization. The husband transferred the lion’s share of assets to the LLC in 2008, long before either party was planning to divorce. Consequently, this is not a situation in which the husband dissipated marital assets to avoid division of them. See In re Marriage of Kimbro, 826 N.W.2d 696, 700–01 (Iowa 2013) (discussing the dissipation doctrine that applies when a spouse’s conduct during the period of separation results in loss or disposal of property otherwise subject to division). We find no impropriety in this action, and we will not consider the children’s sixty-six percent ownership interest in KAW as marital property. This change alone necessitates further modification of the property division, as discussed in section VI.

However, we recognize the husband—in his role as the member-manager of KAW—has shown confusion over what constitutes “his” property and what

constitutes jointly-owned property or other people’s property. Thus, we find additional steps are necessary to protect the children’s interests.

A.P.D., who owns thirty-three percent of the membership units, is still a minor and subject to the Iowa Uniform Transfers to Minors Act. See Iowa Code chapter 565B (2020). On remand, the district court shall issue appropriate orders appointing a chapter 565B custodian of A.P.D.’s membership units in KAW. The district court shall have the authority to remove the current custodian and shall determine an appropriate custodian, whether that is the husband, the wife, or some other person or entity, taking into account who will best protect the child’s interests.

K.W.D., who owns the remaining thirty-three percent of membership units, is no longer a minor subject to chapter 565B. On remand, the district court shall also issue an order requiring the husband to take all steps needed to notify K.W.D. of her ownership of these membership units and to allow K.W.D. to have full control over them. Additionally, the district court shall have the authority to issue any orders necessary to effectuate these changes and prevent the husband from interfering with the children’s ownership of or benefits from their membership units. IV. Transfer of F&M Bancorp Shares.

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