In re the Marriage of Dickey

CourtCourt of Appeals of Iowa
DecidedAugust 19, 2020
Docket19-0097
StatusPublished

This text of In re the Marriage of Dickey (In re the Marriage of Dickey) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re the Marriage of Dickey, (iowactapp 2020).

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 19-0097 Filed August 19, 2020

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF JODIE LYNN DICKEY AND WILLIAM MARK DICKEY

Upon the Petition of JODIE LYNN DICKEY, Petitioner-Appellee,

And Concerning WILLIAM MARK DICKEY, Respondent-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Madison County, Thomas P. Murphy,

Judge.

The husband in this dissolution of marriage proceeding appeals the property

division provisions of the district court’s decree. AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED AND

REMANDED.

G. Stephen Walters of Jordan, Oliver, Walters & Smith, P.C., Winterset, for

appellant.

Andrea M. Flanagan of Flanagan Law Group, PLLC, Des Moines, for

appellee.

Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Mullins and Ahlers, JJ. 2

AHLERS, Judge.

Jodie and William Dickey married in 1996. They had two children, K.M.D.

(born in 1997) and A.P.D. (born in 2002). The wife also has a daughter from a

prior relationship, A.T., who is an independent adult. The parties reached a

settlement with respect to all issues pertaining to the children but went to trial

regarding property division, spousal support, and attorney fees.

The district court issued a ruling dividing the property of the parties,

declining to award spousal support to either party, and declining to award attorney

fees to either party. As part of the property division, the district court ordered the

husband to transfer numerous shares of bank stock and portions of his 401(k) to

the wife and also ordered the husband to pay a property division equalization

payment to the wife.

The husband appeals. The wife does not cross-appeal, but she requests

appellate attorney fees. The husband claims the district court erred by

(1) including assets in the marital estate that were not owned by the parties, (2)

ordering the transfer of numerous shares of bank stock, (3) ordering transfer of

portions of his 401(k) rather than dividing the parties’ respective retirement

accounts using a percentage formula, and (4) ordering an excessive equalization

payment. Finding the district court improperly included assets that no longer

belonged to the parties in determining the property division and equalization

payment calculation, we modify the district court’s order as stated in this opinion.

I. Standard of Review.

Dissolution of marriage actions are reviewed de novo. In re Marriage of

McDermott, 827 N.W.2d 671, 676 (Iowa 2013). “Accordingly, we examine the 3

entire record and adjudicate anew the issue of the property distribution.” Id. While

we give weight to the findings of the district court, particularly concerning the

credibility of witnesses, we are not bound by them. Id. The district court’s ruling

will only be disturbed when the ruling fails to do equity. Id.

II. Concessions of the Parties Regarding Premarital Assets.

Before discussing the details, we first highlight concessions made by the

parties regarding premarital assets. “The partners in the marriage are entitled to

a just and equitable share of the property accumulated through their joint efforts.”

In re Marriage of Hazen, 778 N.W.2d 55, 59 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009). Of course, the

court’s first task when it comes to property division is to identify and value all assets

and debts subject to division. See McDermott, 827 N.W.2d at 678. “To identify

divisible property, the district court looks for all marital assets that exist at the time

of the divorce, with the exception of gifts and inheritances to one spouse.

Premarital property may be included in the divisible estate.” Id. While premarital

property may be considered part of the marital estate, based on our review of the

record and the briefs, we find the parties have conceded that any premarital assets

and debts should be excluded from the marital estate with any appreciation of an

asset during the marriage considered marital property. Based on these

concessions when considered with the equities of this case, we find it equitable to

generally set aside premarital assets and debts by not including them in the marital

estate.

III. Treatment of KAW, LLC.

KAW, LLC is a limited liability company that the husband organized in 2007.

Upon creation of the LLC, 10,000 membership units were issued, with 3400 issued 4

to the husband and 3300 issued to each of the parties’ two children (K.M.D. and

A.P.D.). As explained in section VI.A.2 below, KAW owns three distinct assets,

giving the LLC a total value of $304,803.

The district court “awarded all right title and interest in KAW” to the husband,

apparently considering the entire value of the LLC—minus premarital value of the

assets—as marital property. The husband argues the court erred in disregarding

the interest held by the parties’ children, and we agree. Treating the husband as

the owner of all membership units would ignore the law of business associations,

as an LLC is an entity distinct from its members. See Iowa Code § 489.104(1)

(2018); see also Hollingshead v. DC Misfits, LLC, 937 N.W.2d 616, 620 (Iowa

2020) (McDonald, J., dissenting). The husband organized KAW in 2007,

transferring the membership units—thirty-four percent to himself and thirty-three

percent to each of the children—at the time of organization. The husband

transferred the lion’s share of assets to the LLC in 2008, long before either party

was planning to divorce. Consequently, this is not a situation in which the husband

dissipated marital assets to avoid division of them. See In re Marriage of Kimbro,

826 N.W.2d 696, 700–01 (Iowa 2013) (discussing the dissipation doctrine that

applies when a spouse’s conduct during the period of separation results in loss or

disposal of property otherwise subject to division). We find no impropriety in this

action, and we will not consider the children’s sixty-six percent ownership interest

in KAW as marital property. This change alone necessitates further modification

of the property division, as discussed in section VI.

However, we recognize the husband—in his role as the member-manager

of KAW—has shown confusion over what constitutes “his” property and what 5

constitutes jointly-owned property or other people’s property. Thus, we find

additional steps are necessary to protect the children’s interests.

A.P.D., who owns thirty-three percent of the membership units, is still a

minor and subject to the Iowa Uniform Transfers to Minors Act. See Iowa Code

chapter 565B (2020). On remand, the district court shall issue appropriate orders

appointing a chapter 565B custodian of A.P.D.’s membership units in KAW. The

district court shall have the authority to remove the current custodian and shall

determine an appropriate custodian, whether that is the husband, the wife, or some

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Related

In Re the Marriage of Brown
776 N.W.2d 644 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 2009)
In Re the Marriage of Benson
545 N.W.2d 252 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1996)
In Re the Marriage of Hazen
778 N.W.2d 55 (Court of Appeals of Iowa, 2009)
In Re the Marriage of Sullins
715 N.W.2d 242 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 2006)

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