In re the Marriage of Cowden

18 P.3d 479, 172 Or. App. 343
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
DecidedFebruary 7, 2001
Docket9503-63280; CA A104972
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 18 P.3d 479 (In re the Marriage of Cowden) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re the Marriage of Cowden, 18 P.3d 479, 172 Or. App. 343 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).

Opinion

KISTLER, J.

Husband appeals from a judgment denying his motion to terminate or modify spousal support. Wife cross-appeals, assigning error to the trial court’s findings relating to the parties’ incomes and to the trial court’s decision to reduce child support. On de novo review, we modify spousal support and remand for recalculation of child support.

The parties were married in August 1982 and divorced in December 1995. The judgment of dissolution gave wife custody of the parties’ two children. Husband was ordered to pay child support in the amount of $1,101 per month until October 1, 1996, after which his obligation increased to $1,153 per month. Husband was also ordered to pay spousal support for six years as follows: $3,000 per month through September 1996, $2,500 per month through September 1998, and $2,000 per month for an additional three years through September 2001. Husband’s spousal support obligations terminate at the end of the six-year period.

The terms of the judgment were based, in part, on findings regarding the parties’ income. At that time, husband was making $9,583 per month as an attorney. Wife testified that she was a self-employed "unit coordinator” and was working as an independent contractor for John Carroll, a longtime friend and real estate developer. Based on wife’s testimony, the trial court found that her income was $1,333 per month. The trial court also found that "there is no indication that at least for the next couple of years that that income situation is likely to significantly change.”

On October 24, 1995, approximately three weeks after the dissolution trial ended, wife received $9,000 from Carroll for services performed from July 15 to October 15, 1995.1 Carroll continued to pay wife $3,000 per month for several months thereafter. During 1996, Carroll’s monthly [346]*346payments to wife increased to $3,500 and then to $4,000. In addition, wife received separate bonuses totaling $36,000 in 1996. Throughout 1997, wife continued to be paid at a rate of $4,000 per month.

On June 1, 1998, husband moved to modify spousal and child support. His motion was based primarily on the unanticipated increase in wife’s income. At the modification hearing, the evidence established that Carroll was paying wife $4,000 per month. Wife, however, claimed that she incurred reasonable and necessary business expenses of $1,075 per month and that her monthly income should be reduced accordingly. Wife also testified that the current project she was working on was nearing completion and that she doubted whether Carroll would hire her for future projects. One of wife’s expert witnesses testified that, given wife’s academic credentials and employment experience, her current monthly income of $4,000 was higher than she normally would be earning and that her income was likely to decrease in the future.

Evidence regarding husband’s income was also offered at the modification hearing. Husband’s testimony, which was verified by representatives of his law firm, showed that his projected annual income for 1998 was $120,000, a figure that included an estimated bonus for that year. Due to the compensation plan adopted by husband’s firm, husband was receiving 75 percent of his monthly pay, or $7,500 per month, and would receive the balance of the $120,000 sometime later that year if the law firm reached certain profitability goals.

The trial court denied husband’s motion to modify or terminate spousal support. However, it granted his motion to modify the child support order and reduced husband’s monthly child support obligation to $950. The court based its decision to modify child support on its findings that husband’s income was $10,000 per month, that wife’s income was $4,000 per month, and that wife was incurring $312 per month in reasonable work-related day care expenses.

[347]*347On appeal, husband assigns error to the trial court’s denial of his motion to terminate or reduce his spousal support obligation. He argues that wife’s increase in income constitutes an unanticipated and substantial change in circumstances since the date of the dissolution judgment. Wife cross-appeals, assigning error to three rulings. First, wife argues that the trial court erred in finding her income to be $4,000 per month at the time of the modification hearing because it failed to properly take into account her ordinary and necessary business expenses. Second, wife assigns error to the trial court’s finding that husband’s monthly income was $10,000, arguing that the court failed to account for husband’s annual receipt of bonuses, and for the fact that husband “receive[d] substantial recurring expense reimbursements from his employer and gifts from his mother.” Third, wife assigns error to the trial court’s decision to reduce husband’s child support obligation, arguing that the decision was based on erroneous findings regarding the parties’ incomes.

We review domestic relations cases de novo. ORS 19.415(3). The initial issue in a modification hearing is whether there has been a substantial, unanticipated change in circumstances since the date of the dissolution judgment. ORS 107.135(2). Because both parties’ arguments turn on the amount of their respective incomes, we begin with wife’s income and then turn to husband’s income.

As wife points out, the trial court found her income to be $4,000 without further explanation. She argues that, in so doing, the trial court erred in two respects. She argues initially that, although she was currently receiving $4,000 a month, the project on which she was working was scheduled to end in a few weeks. Carroll, the project’s general contractor, testified to that effect. Additionally, wife’s expert witness testified that, if wife’s current situation were to change, she could only expect to earn between $30,000 and $35,000 per year based upon her qualifications. In response, husband argues, among other things, that the trial court was free to discount wife’s testimony because she and Carroll had misled the court in the initial dissolution proceeding.

[348]*348The evidence at the modification hearing established that wife was receiving $4,000 per month at the time of the modification hearing and had been for quite some time. In finding that $4,000 was an accurate measure of wife’s income, the trial court necessarily discredited wife’s testimony that she would not continue to earn that level of income. The evidence in the record supports the trial court’s implicit credibility determination, and we accept its determination.

Wife also argues that the trial court failed to take into account her reasonable business expenses as a self-employed individual as required by OAR 137-050-0350.2 The evidence at the hearing demonstrates that wife is, in fact, a self-employed individual and is receiving $4,000 per month in that capacity. The evidence also establishes that wife incurs reasonable and necessary expenses in the course of operating her business.3

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
18 P.3d 479, 172 Or. App. 343, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-the-marriage-of-cowden-orctapp-2001.