In re the Marriage of Clark

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: December 17, 2025
• Docket: 25-0422
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 25-0422 Filed December 17, 2025

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF THEODORE CLARK AND KARA CLARK

Upon the Petition of THEODORE CLARK, Petitioner-Appellee,

And Concerning KARA CLARK, Respondent-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Christopher Kemp,

Judge.

A woman appeals the district court’s modification of the decree dissolving

the marriage between her and her former husband. AFFIRMED.

Andrew B. Howie of Shindler, Anderson, Goplerud & Weese, P.C., West

Des Moines, for appellant.

Jessica Shannon of Dentons Davis Brown PC, Des Moines, for appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and

Sandy, JJ. 2

SANDY, Judge.

Kara Clark appeals the district court’s modification of the decree dissolving

the marriage between her and Theodore (Ted) Clark. On appeal, Kara requests

that she be given sole legal custody and physical care of the parties’ children, that

we remand to set Ted’s visitation and support, and that appellate attorney fees and

costs be assessed to Ted. We agree with the district court that “Ted is able to

provide a more stable, consistent, and safe environment for the children. It is in

the children’s best interests that Ted be awarded primary physical care, subject to

Kara’s reasonable rights of visitation.” We thus affirm. Each party shall be

responsible for their own appellate attorney fees.

I. Background Facts & Procedural Posture.

This appeal arises from a post-dissolution custody modification concerning

the minor children of Ted and Kara following registration of their Kansas dissolution

decree. The parties share two children in common: C.C., born in 2018, and R.C.,

born in 2020. The parties married in August 2017, and a September 2022 Kansas

divorce decree awarded joint legal custody and shared physical care of the parties’

children. It further ordered Ted to pay Kara $436 per month in child support, while

affirming an $8,352 judgment for unpaid temporary support.

Soon thereafter, both parties relocated to Iowa. In November 2022, Ted

registered the Kansas decree in Iowa and petitioned to modify the decree, seeking

physical care as well as direction relating to the school district the children were to

attend. Kara answered and counterclaimed, requesting physical care. She later

filed a June 2023 contempt application concerning the $8,352 judgment and a

$45,000 property settlement issued by the Kansas court. However, trial did not 3

occur. In July 2023, the parties stipulated to maintain joint legal custody and

shared physical care while modifying the parenting schedule, engaging in

co-parenting counseling, eliminating child support prospectively, splitting

child-related expenses equally, and providing that Ted would pay Kara $350

monthly toward the $8,352 and $45,000 obligations until paid. The court adopted

the stipulation in August and dismissed the contempt application.

However, within about five months the parties found themselves back

before the court. In January 2024, Kara filed a domestic-abuse petition in Polk

County, alleging threats made by Ted, and contemporaneously petitioned to

modify the decree to seek physical care. Kara alleged a disputed incident at a

Wal-Mart custody exchange had occurred that month. That incident involved a

disagreement over R.C.’s antibiotics for strep throat. Kara reported that Ted

threatened to kill her, used slurs, and came within inches of her while the children

were present and upset. Ted later asserted Kara had weaponized the judicial

system. The parties subsequently stipulated to a consent agreement requiring Ted

to stay away and prohibiting direct communication except through a co-parenting

app.

In February, the parties stipulated to temporary matters, maintaining joint

legal custody and shared physical care while modifying the schedule and

exchanges and appointing a social worker as an evaluator to conduct a custody

evaluation. The court approved the temporary order and later formally appointed

the evaluator in August with an expectation that Ted continue therapeutic services

through the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (the “VA”) and provide

confirmation to the evaluator. After a May contempt hearing, the district court 4

found Ted in contempt for violating the protective order by going to C.C.’s school

(Kara’s workplace) to have a non-emergency conversation. The court imposed a

thirty-day sentence with mittimus withheld, conditioned on compliance.

The custody modification trial occurred in December over the course of

three days.1 At that time C.C. was in first grade and R.C. attended daycare and

was to start kindergarten in the fall 2025. Kara resided in Adel and worked

approximately thirty-seven hours per week as an assistant teacher for

prekindergarten and kindergarten at C.C.’s school. Ted lived in De Soto and

received military disability following his 2017-2022 service in the Army.

The court heard testimony from the coparenting counselor. She described

some of Ted’s behavior and communications, specifically, past suicidal ideations

(which she never contacted authorities about). Ted complied with addressing his

mental health through the VA, but she still observed Ted to be very angry and

reactive, including calling her thirty-two times when she was unavailable. She

documented that Ted made negative statements about Kara to the children and

questioned them about Kara’s behavior.

Pursuant to the stipulation, the court-appointed evaluator conducted a

custody evaluation via meetings, home visits, and review of materials. The

evaluator described the relationship between Ted and Kara as extremely high

conflict. She found Kara honest and engaged and assessed Ted as very negative,

angry, and volatile toward Kara, with concerns about lack of insight, impulsivity,

boundary violations, and enmeshment affecting the children. She recommended

1 The parties stipulated to submit the issue of legal custody to the court. 5

that Kara have sole legal custody and physical care, opining that Kara was best

suited as the primary legal decision-maker for the children’s medical, educational,

and extracurricular needs and that, if a single decision-maker was required, it

should be Kara.

The district court received evidence about Kara’s relationships, including

prior involvement with S.D., who had a felony child-endangerment conviction, and

frequent overnights by K.B. Testimony revealed that K.B. had an active Iowa

Department of Health and Human Services investigation for sexual abuse of his

own sons. The court found Kara did not inform Ted about these men’s presence

around the children. The parties also disputed medical decision-making, including

Ted’s denial or initial refusal of R.C.’s asthma diagnosis and treatment and Kara’s

resulting lack of trust in his medical capability.

On January 17, 2025, the court entered its modification order, finding that

joint legal custody was no longer appropriate due to the parties’ communication

failures and concluding that Ted should have sole legal custody. The court also

awarded Ted physical care and set Kara’s visitation and child support obligations.

The court denied each party’s request for attorney fees. In its credibility findings,

the court observed that Ted made no attempt to downplay his vitriol toward Kara

and was unable to say anything positive about her, while nevertheless determining

that he provided a more stable, consistent, and safe environment and that the

opposite arrangement from the evaluator’s recommendation was in the children’s

best interests.

The court found that Kara told people what they wanted to hear but kept

important information from Ted and was less than forthcoming. For example, even 6

when confronted with messages showing Ted informed her about injuries she

claimed he never disclosed, Kara testified that the details of his information were

not sufficient—but never raised that complaint to Ted. She also brought the

children to a new pediatrician, evidently without notifying Ted and over his

objection.

The custody evaluator’s thirty-eight-page report, admitted at trial, offered

valuable insight into the family dynamics and recommended Kara as the sole legal

custodian and physical caretaker with Ted having liberal access, while articulating

concerns about Ted’s lack of insight, volatility toward Kara, and boundary issues.

Of note, the custody evaluator was not apprised of Kara’s relationship with K.B.

The coparenting counselor corroborated aspects of Ted’s reactivity and contact

patterns. The court weighed this against evidence concerning Kara’s relationships

with S.D. and K.B. and her nondisclosure to Ted, concluding those choices

presented a significant risk to the children’s physical health and wellbeing and

supported its decision to place sole legal custody and physical care with Ted.

The decree included detailed provisions governing exchanges and

communications in light of the no-contact order then in effect, directed exchanges

occur at a public place with video recording, and specified that those directives

would control over restrictions imposed in the domestic-abuse case for exchange

purposes. The court ordered Kara to pay monthly child support of $597.63 for two

children beginning in February 2025 (reducing to $399.11 when only one child was

eligible), set medical support allocations with Ted paying the first $250 per child

annually and then splitting uncovered expenses 51%/49% (Ted/Kara), allocated 7

tax dependency exemptions, and split custody evaluation costs equally while

otherwise taxing court costs to Kara.

Kara filed a Rule 1.904(2) motion seeking reconsideration on several

issues, including schedule adjustments, holidays, child support, and costs. On

February 18, the district court granted the motion in part and denied it in part. The

court changed Kara’s mid-week overnight from Wednesday to Thursday due to

animosity between the parents and exchange issues, and it denied her request for

summer shared care based on concerns about the men she brought around the

children and her secrecy regarding the same. The court noted the evaluator’s view

that frequent contact with both parents benefits the children and added “Beggar’s

Night” to the holiday schedule with alternating years. It also corrected child support

by adopting Kara’s guidelines to set her monthly obligation at $526.78 for two

children (reducing to $349.81 for one child) and clarified that any portion of the

coparenting counselor’s final invoice exceeding the retainer and not paid in

advance of trial would be split equally while remaining court costs would be paid

by Kara.

Kara filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, Kara requests that sole

legal custody and physical care be given to her and that we remand to set Ted’s

visitation and support, as well as that appellate attorney fees and costs be

assessed to Ted.

II. Standard of Review.

“Petitions to modify the physical care provisions of a divorce decree lie in

equity,” and we review de novo. In re Marriage of Hoffman, 867 N.W.2d 26, 32

(Iowa 2015). “We give weight to the findings of the district court, particularly 8

concerning the credibility of witnesses.” In re Marriage of Harris, 877 N.W.2d 434,

440 (Iowa 2016) (citation omitted). We are only to disturb the district court’s ruling

when the ruling fails to do equity. In re Marriage of Towne, 966 N.W.2d 668, 674

(Iowa Ct. App. 2021).

III. Analysis.

“To change a custodial provision of a dissolution decree, the applying party

must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that conditions since the

decree was entered have so materially and substantially changed that the

children’s best interests make it expedient to make the requested change.” In re

Marriage of Winnike, 497 N.W.2d 170, 173 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992). “The party

seeking modification of a decree’s custody provisions must also prove a superior

ability to minister to the needs of the children.” Harris, 877 N.W.2d at 440.

The parties do not dispute that a material and substantial change in

circumstances has occurred since the decree so as to warrant modification. Both

sides agree that the current arrangement is not workable and they are back in court

for the third time in the last three years. Their efforts at utilizing a parenting

coordinator and stipulating to adjustments have not solved their issues. We agree

with the district court that it was “in the children’s best interest to make a change

with respect to legal custody, physical care and visitation, and the accompanying

adjustment to child support pursuant to the guidelines.” The parties are “no longer

able to cooperate” in any meaningful sense. In re Marriage of Rolek, 555

N.W.2d 675, 677 (Iowa 1996). Thus, the only issue remaining is which party

should have sole legal custody and physical care of the children. 9

A. Legal Custody

Joint custody arrangements between “parents who demonstrate they are

able to put aside their differences for the sake of their child” should generally be

maintained. Harris, 877 N.W.2d at 440. “On the other hand, modification is

generally appropriate when shared custody provisions incorporated into the

decree have not evolved as envisioned by either of the parties or the court or when

the parents simply cannot cooperate or communicate in dealing with their children.”

In re Marriage of Beasley, No. 21-1986, 2022 WL 16985437, at *7 (Iowa Ct. App.

Nov. 17, 2022) (cleaned up). As the parties both agree, the custody provisions of

the decree contemplated their ability to maintain coparenting duties and

responsibilities. Although the court was hopeful that the parties could cooperate

in those matters affecting the best interests of their children, “it is now quite clear

that this is not the case.” Id. (cleaned up).

The district court summed it up well, stating:

Because both parents are opposed to joint custody, the Court is required to examine the factors in section 598.41(3) and make a legal custody determination that is in the children’s best interests. Doing so leads to the conclusion that joint legal custody is not appropriate in this case. The parents cannot effectively communicate with each other, and sadly still have not shown they can support the other parent’s relationship with the children. While the acrimonious relationship has not yet led to a legal custody dispute that has prevented the children from getting their needs met, it is likely only a matter of time. The parents could not agree on where to enroll the oldest in school, and Ted ultimately acquiesced and moved closer to Kara so the children [could attend the same district].

Kara and Ted both deeply mistrust the other, do not believe the other parent communicates about the children as they should, and feel the other parent does whatever they want. The need for one parent to have sole legal custody is most evident by the fact that they unfathomably take the children to two different pediatricians: 10

Ted continues to take the children to the provider that they first selected when they moved to Iowa even though that doctor is in Pleasant Hill, and Kara takes the children to a provider closer to her home. As the statutory definition of joint custody currently mandates “an all-or-nothing proposition that ‘leaves no room for a parceling of rights,’” the Court must determine which parent should have sole legal custody.

As a starter, we agree with the district court that “neither parent is without

fault.” But we defer to the credibility determinations of the court when it assessed

both parties’ candor in their testimony. We decline to recount and parse the

parties’ lengthy trial testimony in which they challenged nearly every aspect of the

other's parenting capacities.

“[W]hen we say a case is reviewed de novo, this does not mean that we

decide the case in a vacuum or approach it as though the trial court had never

been involved.” Hora v. Hora, 5 N.W.3d 635, 645 (Iowa 2024) (cleaned up). To

the contrary, while not bound by the district court’s findings, we give them weight

and “defer especially where the credibility of witnesses is a factor in the outcome.”

Id. (cleaned up); see also Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(3)(g). Here, the district court,

expressly considered Kara and Ted’s credibility and made a decision after careful

consideration of its observations of the parties’ testimony. Indeed, those

observations were an important factor in the outcome of the case because the

district court explicitly told us they were.2

2 The court noted: “The Court had the opportunity to observe the parents during

their testimony. . . . The Court finds Ted is better suited to have sole legal custody . . . .” 11

We conclude Ted met his burden to show a substantial change in

circumstances and a superior parenting ability, and we affirm the district court's

decision to modify the legal-custody provisions of the parties’ dissolution decree.

B. Physical Care

Physical care determinations are not resolved based upon the perceived

fairness to the spouses involved. In re Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 695

(Iowa 2007). Rather, our primary consideration focuses on what is in the best

interest of the child. Id. Ultimately, the objective of a physical-care determination

is to put the children in the environment most likely to bring them to physical and

mental health, and to social maturity. Id.

Or, as the district court aptly recited, “[d]etermining what custodial

arrangement will best serve the long-range interest of a child frequently becomes

a matter of choosing the least detrimental available alternative for safeguarding

the child’s growth and development.” In re Marriage of Winter, 223 N.W.2d 165,

167 (Iowa 1974) (citing Goldstein, Freud & Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the

Child (The Free Press 1973)). The district court was faced with a difficult decision

with no ideal option either way. Importantly, the trial court had “a front-row seat to

the live testimony, viewing the demeanor of both the witness as [they] testifie[d]

and the parties while they listen[ed], whereas our review is limited to reading black

words on a white page of a sterile transcript.” Hora, 5 N.W.3d at 645.

Ted’s inability to find fault in himself or adjust could hamper the children’s emotional development. However, he does not do anything to endanger the children’s physical wellbeing, and does what he believes is best for the children.

Kara, on the other hand, while more polished, knows what people want to hear. Kara’s family members talked about their 12

Christian values and Kara even noted that the family says their daily prayers when discussing her routine with the children. Kara’s family did not seem to know about her exploration of spiritual practices such as paganism and earth centered beliefs. While her spiritual curiosity in and of itself is not a factor in her ability to parent, it is an example of how she says and shows one side of herself, and lives another. Most glaring and troubling example is her choice in relationships.

[The evaluator]’s report indicated Kara was engaging in therapy and making progress in addressing her relationship issues; this progress was likely based on self-report, and Kara did not disclose her relationship with [K.B.] to [the evaluator]. Even on the witness stand, Kara downplayed the relationship by saying they are friends exploring a relationship, despite having him consistently spend the night in her home, even while the children are present. Kara reports she has been working on unhealthy relationships after [S.D.], but then brought another man into her home and the children’s lives with a concerning criminal history and pending allegations, and did not feel the need to mention that to Ted or anyone else. Her choices, lack of insight, and placing her own needs and desires over the best interests of the children poses a significant risk of not only emotional disruption for the children, but in the cases of these two men, presents a significant risk to the children’s physical health and wellbeing.

We see no reason to disturb the district court’s analysis. We give great weight to

the district court’s findings because the witnesses were before it and the district

court was in a far better position to pass upon their credibility. Davis-Eisenhart

Mktg. Co. v. Baysden, 539 N.W.2d 140, 142 (Iowa 1995). Unlike us, the trial court

was “greatly helped in making a wise decision about the parties by listening to

them and watching them in person.” In re Marriage of Vrban, 359 N.W.2d 420,

423 (Iowa 1984) (citation omitted).

The crux of Kara’s argument on appeal asks us to weigh the negatives of

Ted more heavily than the negatives of Kara. But that weighing is often best done

by observation. And as an appellate court we are denied the impression created

by the demeanor of each and every witness as the testimony was presented. Id.; 13

see also In re Marriage of Callahan, 214 N.W.2d 133, 136 (Iowa 1974). We agree

with the district court that “Ted is able to provide a more stable, consistent, and

safe environment for the children. It is in the children’s best interests that Ted be

awarded primary physical care, subject to Kara’s reasonable rights of visitation.”

C. Appellate Attorney Fees

“Appellate attorney fees are not a matter of right, but rather rest in this

court’s discretion.” In re Marriage of Sullins, 715 N.W.2d 242, 255 (Iowa 2006).

We hold that Ted and Kara shall each be responsible for their own appellate

attorney fees.

AFFIRMED.