This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A16-0518
In re the Marriage of: Christopher John Anton, petitioner, Respondent,
vs.
Romona L. Sparks, f/k/a Romona L. Anton, Appellant.
Filed December 19, 2016 Affirmed Bratvold, Judge
Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-FA-13-6573
Jaime Driggs, Henson & Efron, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Beau D. McGraw, McGraw Law Firm, P.A., Lake Elmo, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and Hooten,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
In this appeal from a marital dissolution judgment between appellant-wife and
respondent-husband, wife argues that the district court erred by: (1) awarding husband a
nonmarital interest in various trust funds and awarding permanent spousal maintenance without determining husband’s income from the trust funds; (2) denying wife’s motion to
vacate a partial judgment that adopted a settlement agreement wife claims she signed when
she lacked capacity; and (3) awarding conduct-based attorney fees to husband. Because
(1) wife failed to preserve any issue regarding husband’s trust funds and income from the
trust funds; (2) the district court correctly concluded that wife did not establish grounds for
vacating a partial dissolution judgment based on lack of capacity; and (3) the district court
did not abuse its discretion in determining that wife’s conduct unreasonably contributed to
the length of these proceedings, we affirm.
FACTS
Christopher Anton (husband) and Romona Sparks (wife) married in 1991. In
September 2013, husband filed a petition for dissolution of the marriage. Relevant to the
issues on appeal, the parties conducted discovery regarding husband’s interest in various
trust funds. The district court ordered the trustees to produce the trust instruments and make
them available for attorneys’ eyes only. According to the trustees’ affidavits, the trusts are
discretionary and give husband the opportunity to withdraw funds, but the only distribution
from any of the trusts was a $45,000 distribution in 2007.
On January 16, 2015, husband and wife engaged in a day-long mediated settlement
conference. Negotiations continued via phone and email for the next several days. The
resulting settlement agreement, signed by both parties, awarded permanent spousal
maintenance to wife and divided property and debts between husband and wife.
After the parties informed the district court that they had signed a settlement
agreement, the district court cancelled the scheduled trial. The parties, however, did not
2 sign or agree to a proposed stipulated judgment and decree. Instead, husband and wife
brought separate motions to enforce the settlement agreement and attached separate
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. There were only a few differences
between the parties’ proposed orders and none of the differences are raised in this appeal.
After conducting a hearing on the motions to enforce, the district court on May 29,
2015, filed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order for Partial Judgment and Partial
Judgment and Decree (partial judgment). The district court directed entry of a partial
judgment that reflected all agreed-upon terms, resolved minor disagreements over wording,
and expressly reserved two issues: (1) whether husband is entitled to conduct-based
attorney fees; and (2) the amount of wife’s income, which was needed to set a baseline for
future modification of spousal maintenance. Relevant to this appeal, the partial judgment
decreed that wife is entitled to permanent spousal maintenance and that husband has a
nonmarital interest in four different trust funds. 1
Although the district court noted that “a disproportionate share of the fault” for the
disagreement on the dissolution terms was due to wife’s changing positions, the district
court actually adopted some of wife’s proposed findings over husband’s proposed findings.
For example, the district court adopted wife’s proposed finding related to husband’s
income, which anticipated a higher salary after a recent promotion. This meant that
husband’s gross annual income was determined to be $126,000, not $110,000, as husband
proposed.
1 Wife filed a notice of appeal from the partial judgment, but this court questioned jurisdiction and wife voluntarily dismissed her appeal.
3 Five months after entry of the partial judgment, wife filed a motion to vacate it,
claiming for the first time that she lacked the “proper mental capacity” when she signed
the settlement agreement. In support of her motion, wife filed an affidavit in which she
averred that, during the settlement conference, she was ill and “in pain as I could barely
even sit up in a chair.” Wife also averred she was taking pain medication as well as “other
medications prescribed by cardiac and respiratory doctors.” She also stated that the
mediator “pressured” her and told her to accept the proposed settlement because “it was
the best deal that I could hope for considering the Judge I was assigned to.” Wife attested
that she “decided not to sign anything” on the day of the settlement conference because she
“did not feel it was in my best interests, especially considering the state of my health and
the condition I was in.”
Wife’s affidavit also averred that, on the evening of January 22, 2015, her attorney
brought the settlement agreement to her home, and she was in the same physical and
psychological condition, stating: “I was ill and under severe duress during this process.”
Wife added that she “could not stand the pressure any longer and I simply agreed to sign.”
Her affidavit also stated that she intended to call witnesses to support her motion to vacate,
specifically, the mediator, her former attorney, and a doctor. Husband opposed wife’s
motion, and moved for conduct-based attorney fees and other relief.
The district court heard wife’s motion to vacate along with argument on the issues
reserved in the partial judgment. During the hearing, the parties agreed that wife’s baseline
yearly gross income was $12,500. On February 5, 2016, the district court issued an order
and entered judgment (February judgment) denying wife’s motion to vacate, deciding the
4 reserved issues, and awarding husband $18,286 in conduct-based attorney fees. Wife
appeals the partial judgment and the February judgment.
DECISION
I. The district court did not err in entering a partial judgment based on the parties’ settlement agreement and the proposed findings submitted by the parties.
Wife challenges the district court’s determinations regarding spousal maintenance
and marital property. We accord district courts broad discretion in determining spousal
maintenance and property division and reverse only if there has been an abuse of discretion.
Dobrin v. Dobrin, 569 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Minn. 1997); Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 615
N.W.2d 405, 412 (Minn. App. 2000), review denied (Minn. Oct. 25, 2000). A district court
abuses its discretion where it “acts against logic and the facts on record, or if it enters fact
findings that are unsupported by the record, or if it misapplies the law.” In re Adoption of
T.A.M., 791 N.W.2d 573, 578 (Minn. App. 2010) (quotation and citation omitted).
In determining the amount of spousal maintenance, a court must consider “the
financial resources of the party seeking maintenance” and “the ability of the spouse from
whom maintenance is sought to meet needs while meeting those of the spouse seeking
maintenance.” Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2 (2014). In dividing marital property, the
district court considers a number of relevant factors to “make a just and equitable division.”
Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1 (2014). What is “marital property” is a mixed question of law
and fact. Baker v. Baker, 753 N.W.2d 644, 649 (Minn. 2008).
In this case, the partial judgment awarded permanent spousal maintenance to wife
at $2,000 per month and increased maintenance to $4,000 per month three months after
5 wife vacated the homestead. The partial judgment also divided the parties’ marital property
and, adopting language proposed by both parties, specifically determined that husband has
a nonmarital interest in several trusts.
Wife argues that spousal maintenance should be “reopened” because it is not “fair,
just and equitable under the circumstances.” Wife also argues the property division should
be “reopened” to “ensure an equitable distribution.” An appellant must show both error
and prejudice resulting from the error. Midway Ctr. Assocs. v. Midway Ctr., Inc., 306 Minn.
352, 356, 237 N.W.2d 76, 78 (1975). This court will deem an error harmless where the
appellant fails to allege or show prejudice as a result of the court error. Senglaub v.
Senglaub, 302 Minn. 547, 550, 224 N.W.2d 514, 516 (1974).
Wife’s brief does not clearly articulate how she was prejudiced by the award of
permanent spousal maintenance or the property division. Therefore, her arguments
regarding spousal maintenance and the property division are not properly before this court.
See Dep’t of Labor & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn.
App. 2007) (declining to address an inadequately briefed question); Broadsky v. Broadsky,
733 N.W.2d 471, 479 (Minn. App. 2007) (citing this aspect of Wintz). Further, even if we
were to assume prejudice, wife’s arguments on these points are not persuasive, as set out
below.
At oral argument, wife’s counsel contended that the district court erred in its
determination that husband’s interest in the trust funds is nonmarital property and that wife
might have received a higher spousal maintenance award if husband’s income from the
trust funds had been taken into account. While this appears to be unsupported speculation,
6 we will nevertheless address wife’s argument concerning spousal maintenance after we
address her arguments about the nonmarital property and husband’s income from the trust
funds.
First, the district court did not err in its determination that husband’s interest in the
trust funds is nonmarital property. With their motions to enforce the settlement agreement,
the parties separately submitted proposed findings of fact. While the settlement agreement
did not refer to husband’s trust funds, both parties proposed that the district court find
husband’s interest in the trust funds to be nonmarital property. While identical proposed
findings are not the same as a stipulation, our case law regarding stipulations is instructive.
When a district court enters a judgment based on a stipulation of the parties, the
court either adopts the stipulated terms or gives notice to the parties of the portions of the
stipulation it deems unacceptable so that the parties have an opportunity to be heard.
Toughill v. Toughill, 609 N.W.2d 634, 638 n.1 (Minn. App. 2000) (“[W]hile a district court
may reject all or part of a stipulation, generally, it cannot, by judicial fiat, impose conditions
on the parties to which they did not stipulate and thereby deprive the parties of their ‘day
in court.’”). When a court has adopted a factual finding from the parties’ stipulated facts,
its determination will be upheld on appeal. Anderson v. Anderson, 303 Minn. 26, 31, 225
N.W.2d 837, 840 (1975) (rejecting appellant’s argument that the district court’s finding
failed for lack of evidence because the claim “ignores the legal effect of a stipulation”).
In this case, the parties submitted identical proposed findings on husband’s interest
in the trust funds. These proposed findings had the same effect as a stipulation. Thus the
district court did not err in adopting a proposed finding that was submitted by both parties.
7 See generally Toughill, 609 N.W.2d at 638 (holding a district court may adopt the parties’
stipulated terms and, if one party seeks to repudiate or withdraw from the stipulation, the
party must have the other party’s consent or the court’s permission).
Stated somewhat differently, wife failed to preserve any challenge to the district
court’s determination that husband’s interest in the trust fund is nonmarital property. Wife
cannot challenge on appeal what she proposed to the district court and did not identify as
a contested issue. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (“A reviewing court
must generally consider only those issues that the record shows were presented and
considered by the trial court in deciding the matter before it.”) (quotation omitted); see also
Majerus v. Guelsow, 262 Minn. 1, 11, 113 N.W.2d 450, 457 (1962) (“[A] party cannot
avail himself of invited error.”). Here, wife did not object to the district court’s finding that
husband’s interest in the trust fund is nonmarital property. Because wife proposed the
finding that was adopted by the district court and never objected to it, wife is challenging
the district court’s determination for the first time on appeal. We will not consider an issue
raised for the first time on appeal. Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 582 (noting that appellate courts
do not address or decide issues raised “for the first time on appeal”).
Second, wife also failed to preserve any challenge to the partial judgment based on
the district court’s failure to include a finding about husband’s trust income. When the
district court independently calculates income, a failure to include a known income source
may be an error requiring remand. See Koury v. Koury, 410 N.W.2d 31, 33 (Minn. App.
1987) (remanding a child-support case to the district court for a new net income calculation
to include a previously not included income tax refund). We will also remand to the district
8 court for appropriate findings where the district court rejects a calculation made by a party
but does not “perform[] the analyses and modifications necessary to reach a figure that it
deem[s] reasonable.” Bliss v. Bliss, 493 N.W.2d 583, 587 (Minn. App. 1992), review
denied (Minn. Feb. 12, 1993).
In this case, however, neither party proposed findings regarding husband’s trust
income. Rather, both parties proposed a finding regarding husband’s income that was based
solely on husband’s salary from employment, and the district court adopted wife’s
proposed finding in the partial judgment. Wife failed to raise any issue regarding husband’s
trust income until she filed this appeal; thus we do not consider the issue. Thiele, 425
N.W.2d at 582. We also note that the record includes no evidence of regular income from
the trusts and documents only a single trust distribution in 2007. This suggests that if any
error occurred, it did not prejudice wife. Senglaub, 302 Minn. at 550, 224 N.W.2d at 516.
The district court’s failure to make an express determination about husband’s trust income
was therefore not an abuse of discretion.
Because wife’s only allegation of error concerning spousal maintenance is related
to husband’s trust funds and related income, her challenge fails for the reasons already
discussed. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion with regard to
spousal maintenance or property division as set out in the partial judgment.
II. The district court did not err in denying wife’s motion to vacate the partial judgment based on wife’s alleged lack of capacity at the time she signed the settlement agreement.
Wife argues that the district court erred in denying her motion to vacate the partial
judgment based on her claim that she lacked capacity when she signed the settlement
9 agreement, giving two reasons. First, wife asserts that the district court erred by applying
the standard set out in Minnesota Statute section 518.145, subdivision 2. Second, wife
contends the district court erred in denying the motion to vacate without conducting an
evidentiary hearing. We will address each argument in turn.
A. Application of Minnesota Statutes section 518.145, subdivision 2
“The sole relief from [a dissolution] judgment and decree lies in meeting the
requirements of Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2.” Shirk v. Shirk, 561 N.W.2d 519, 522
(Minn. 1997) (holding that a stipulation merged into a judgment cannot be vacated because
of incompetent counsel). Here, the district court denied wife’s motion because lack of
capacity is not an enumerated statutory ground to reopen a judgment under section 518.145.
Wife argues that section 518.145 applies only to final judgments and that the partial
judgment was not a final judgment. Legal questions regarding which standard the court
should apply to a motion to vacate are reviewed de novo. Id. at 521.
Wife contends that the district court erred because it did not apply the standard set
out in Toughill, which considered a husband’s appeal from a district court’s decision
denying his motion to vacate a marital termination agreement. The husband claimed on
appeal that the agreement was void for fraud and duress. Toughill, 609 N.W.2d at 639.
Relying on Shirk, Toughill held that a district court may relieve a party from the terms of
a stipulation “which has not yet been incorporated into a dissolution judgment, [and] the
district court is to consider whether the stipulation was ‘improvidently made and in equity
and good conscience ought not to stand.’” Id. (quoting Shirk, 561 N.W.2d at 522). In
contrast, “when a judgment and decree is entered based upon a stipulation, . . . the
10 stipulation is merged into the judgment and decree and the stipulation cannot thereafter be
the target of attack by a party seeking relief from the judgment and decree.” Shirk, 561
N.W.2d at 522. We conclude that wife misconstrues Toughill, which held that the correct
standard depends on whether the settlement agreement has been adopted or incorporated
into a dissolution judgment.
Here, the district court entered the partial judgment based on the settlement
agreement and the parties’ competing submissions of proposed findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and orders for judgment. Notably, the partial judgment explicitly
incorporated the parties’ settlement agreement by stating it “reflect[s] all agreed-upon
terms, resolv[es] disputes over minor disagreement[s] in wording, and order[s] other
relief.” Because wife did not seek relief from the settlement agreement before the partial
judgment was entered, Toughill does not apply, and the district court properly applied
section 518.145.
We review the district court’s decision not to vacate the partial judgment under
section 518.145 for an abuse of discretion. Kornberg v. Kornberg, 542 N.W.2d 379, 386
(Minn. 1996). “If there is evidence to support the district court’s decision, an abuse of
discretion will not be found.” Thompson v. Thompson, 739 N.W.2d 424, 428 (Minn. App.
2007).
“Minn. Stat. § 518.145 was carefully crafted by the legislature to provide limited
areas of relief to those seeking vacation of judgment.” Shirk, 561 N.W.2d at 522 n.3. The
statute provides an exclusive list of reasons a district court may reopen or grant other relief
from a dissolution judgment. The reasons include:
11 (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence . . . ; (3) fraud whether denominated intrinsic or extrinsic, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment and decree or order is void; or (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged, . . .
Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2 (2014). The statute also expressly allows a district court to
“set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court.” Id.; see Alam v. Chowdhury, 764 N.W.2d
86, 89 (Minn. App. 2009) (affirming the reopening of a judgment after a showing of fraud
upon the court). “The moving party must prove at least one of the statutory grounds for
vacating by a preponderance of the evidence.” Knapp v. Knapp, 883 N.W.2d 833, 835
(Minn. App. 2016).
Wife’s sole argument for vacating the partial judgment is lack of capacity, which is
not an enumerated ground under section 518.145, subdivision 2, and wife does not assert
that it fits into any of the statutorily listed grounds. While not argued by either party,
relevant case law establishes that “[a] stipulation and judgment tainted by a party’s
incompetency may amount to a fraud upon the court.” Blattner v. Blattner, 411 N.W.2d
24, 27 (Minn. App. 1987), review denied (Minn. Oct. 30, 1987); see Minn. Stat. § 518.145,
subd. 2 (noting that the statute does not limit the court’s power to grant relief for fraud on
the court).
Because wife did not argue that her lack of capacity amounted to fraud on the court,
the issue is not before us and we need not decide it. Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 582. We note,
however, that wife did not allege any facts supporting a claim of fraud on the court. Fraud
on the court is “an intentional course of material misrepresentation or non-disclosure,
12 having the result of misleading the court and opposing counsel and making the . . .
settlement grossly unfair.” Maranda v. Maranda, 449 N.W.2d 158, 165 (Minn. 1989).
Specifically, wife does not allege that anyone engaged in an “intentional course” of
misrepresentation or non-disclosure about her incapacity, or that the settlement agreement
was “grossly unfair.” Id.
Moreover, the district court correctly noted that wife’s motion to vacate must rebut
the presumption that she was competent at the time she signed the settlement agreement.
“In Minnesota there is a presumption of competence.” Fisher v. Schefers, 656 N.W.2d 592,
595 (Minn. App. 2003). Competence means having “the ability to understand, to a
reasonable extent, the nature and effect of what she is doing.” State Bank of Cologne v.
Schrupp, 375 N.W.2d 48, 51 (Minn. App. 1985), review denied (Minn. Dec. 13, 1985).
Wife’s affidavit stated that during the settlement process, she was “ill,” “in pain,”
and was on medication with “widely known psychological side effects.” But this does not
rebut the presumption of competence because wife also averred that, on the day of
negotiations, she “ultimately decided not to sign anything” because she “did not feel it was
in my best interests, especially considering the state of my health and the condition I was
in.” Further, wife attested that she later signed the settlement agreement because “I could
not stand the pressure any longer and I simply agreed to sign.”
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded
that wife’s affidavit “evinces an intimate knowledge of the proceedings surrounding and
including the moderated settlement conference,” and therefore fails to establish that wife
did not understand what she was doing. Certainly, feeling “pressure” when signing a
13 settlement agreement is insufficient to establish lack of competence, much less fraud on
the court. Additionally, we note that wife’s affidavit offers no evidence about her
competence during the time she filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement and
submitted proposed findings, many of which were adopted by the district court.
We conclude that the district court properly applied section 518.145, subdivision 2.
Because wife’s motion to vacate and affidavit did not support any of the statutory grounds
for granting relief from the partial judgment, the district court did not abuse its discretion
in denying wife’s motion. We therefore need not consider the district court’s other reasons
for denying wife’s motion. 2
B. Lack of an evidentiary hearing
Wife argues that the district court erred when it made factual determinations about
her competence without an evidentiary hearing. A district court has discretion whether to
hold an evidentiary hearing, a decision that this court reviews for abuse of discretion. Anh
Phuong Le v. Holter, 838 N.W.2d 797, 800 (Minn. App. 2013), review denied (Minn. Dec.
31, 2013).
In family law cases, motions other than those involving contempt are decided
without holding an evidentiary hearing, unless the court orders a hearing for good cause.
Doering v. Doering, 629 N.W.2d 124, 130 (Minn. App. 2001), review denied (Minn. Sept.
11, 2001). Where a party does not request a hearing, motions are “submitted on affidavits,
2 In addition to determining that wife did not meet the standard for relief from a marital dissolution judgment under section 518.145, the district court rejected wife’s motion as the partial judgment was barred by rule 13.01 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure and the doctrine of res judicata.
14 exhibits, documents subpoenaed to the hearing, memoranda, and arguments of counsel.”
Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 303.03(d)(1). To present oral testimony in support of a motion, a party
must request to do so “by motion served and filed not later than the filing of that party’s
initial motion documents.” Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 303.03(d)(2).
Although wife referred to witnesses in her affidavit, she never made a motion asking
the district court to take oral testimony. Even if we construe wife’s affidavit to be a motion
for an evidentiary hearing, the district court did not abuse its discretion in implicitly
denying it. As discussed above, wife’s evidence, which failed to rebut the presumption of
competence, also failed to establish good cause for a hearing given the available grounds
for relief under section 518.145, subdivision 2. As aptly stated by the district court, “[e]ven
assuming Wife’s allegations are true on their face, it is clear that, while she may have been
stressed and ‘feeling an enormous amount of pressure to reach an agreement[,]’ Wife
understood the nature and effect of her actions” when she signed the settlement agreement.
Because wife did not request an evidentiary hearing and her submissions failed to establish
good cause for a hearing, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied wife’s
motion to vacate based on the parties’ written submissions and without holding an
evidentiary hearing.
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding conduct-based attorney fees.
In the February judgment, the district court determined that wife “unnecessarily
contributed to the length and expense of this proceeding,” and awarded husband conduct-
based attorney fees in the amount of $18,286 under Minnesota Statute section 518.14,
15 subdivision 1. Wife acknowledges that the district court awarded attorney fees because she
refused to accept the settlement agreement, but argues that the district court erred because
she was “not unreasonable.”
The district court may require a party who “unreasonably contributes to the length
or expense of [a] proceeding” to pay attorney fees to the other party. Minn. Stat. § 518.14,
subd. 1 (2014). No showing of bad faith is necessary. Geske v. Marcolina, 624 N.W.2d
813, 818 (Minn. App. 2001). Unlike need-based attorney fees, conduct-based attorney fees
may be awarded “regardless of the recipient’s need for fees [or] the payor’s ability to
contribute.” Id. We review a district court’s award of conduct-based attorney fees for
abuse of discretion. Brodsky v. Brodsky, 733 N.W.2d 471, 476 (Minn. App. 2007). The
district court must make findings explaining its award of conduct-based attorney fees. Id.
at 477.
Here, the district court awarded attorney fees arising from wife’s motion to vacate,
husband’s motion to enforce the partial judgment, and husband’s motion to enforce the
settlement agreement. The district court supported its decision by identifying several ways
in which wife unreasonably delayed the proceedings, including:
• “[P]roposing to use $12,500 as her baseline income and then reneging on that agreement after Husband accepted her proposal,” which caused the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue, and “delay[ed] final adjudication by five months after Wife knew . . . that she had already agreed to use the $12,500 figure.” • Removing items of property allocated to husband in the judgment, “promp[ting] Husband to move the Court to enforce these provisions.” • Insisting on adding terms to the judgment that were not in the settlement agreement.
16 • Requesting relief contrary to the terms of the settlement agreement.
Wife does not argue that the district court misapplied the law or made findings
unsupported by the record. We conclude that the record supports the district court’s
determination that wife’s conduct contributed to the length and expense of the proceedings
by requiring husband to bring enforcement motions after wife reneged on the settlement
agreement and, later, when wife refused to comply with the partial judgment. Our case law
establishes that “[e]nforcement proceedings can be a basis for a conduct-based fee award.”
Brodsky, 733 N.W.2d at 477.
Citing no supporting legal authority, wife argues that her actions were not
unreasonable. This argument essentially asks us to second-guess the district court’s factual
determination that wife “unreasonably contributed” to the length of the proceedings, which
is not the province of this court. Cf. Rask v. Rask, 445 N.W.2d 849, 855 (Minn. App. 1989)
(affirming a conduct-based attorney fee award where it had “some support in the record”).
Also, wife’s argument appears to assume that bad faith is required to award conduct-based
fees. It is not. Geske, 624 N.W.2d at 818. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in awarding conduct-based attorney fees to husband.
Affirmed.