This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A22-1608
In re the Marriage of:
Any K. Arensberg, petitioner, Appellant,
vs.
Nicholas Shamus Arensberg, Respondent.
Filed January 8, 2024 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded Bratvold, Judge
Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-FA-21-4526
John T. Burns, Jr., Burns Law Office, Burnsville, Minnesota (for appellant)
Nicholas Shamus Arensberg, Burnsville, Minnesota (pro se respondent)
Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Schmidt, Judge; and Cleary,
Judge. *
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
In this appeal from the district court’s post-dissolution order awarding custody and
establishing child support, appellant argues that the district court erred by awarding joint
* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. physical custody and in determining the amount of child support. First, we conclude that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding joint physical custody. Second,
we conclude that the district court committed several errors in its calculation of child
support. Thus, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
FACTS
Appellant Any K. Arensberg (mother) and respondent Nicholas Shamus Arensberg
(father) married in 2018. They have one joint child, born in 2015. The parties separated on
March 1, 2019, and mother petitioned for dissolution on August 31, 2021. In mother’s
petition, she requested joint legal custody, sole physical custody, and “appropriate levels
of child support pursuant to the guidelines,” along with retroactive child support. Father’s
answer sought joint legal custody and joint physical custody.
The district court held a bench trial on July 28, 2022, on the issues of custody and
parenting time, child support, and property division. During trial, mother sought joint legal
custody and sole physical custody, subject to father’s parenting time. Both parties testified,
and no other witnesses were called. The district court issued findings of fact, conclusions
of law, and an order for judgment on October 3, 2022, granting the parties joint legal and
joint physical custody, setting parenting time, 1 awarding child support, and resolving the
property division.
1 The district court established a parenting-time schedule that gave each parent seven days in a fourteen-day period.
2 Mother appeals. 2
DECISION
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding joint physical custody.
Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion when it concluded that
joint physical custody was in the child’s best interests. She contends that the district court
erred by applying a presumption of joint physical custody.
When determining custody and parenting time, a district court must evaluate the
best interests of the child, including “all relevant factors.” Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a)
(2022). Minnesota law explicitly identifies twelve best-interests factors. 3 Id. “The court
2 Father did not file a brief in this appeal, and this court ordered that the appeal would proceed on the merits as provided in Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 142.03. 3 The twelve best-interests factors are as follows: (1) a child’s physical, emotional, cultural, spiritual, and other needs, and the effect of the proposed arrangements on the child’s needs and development; (2) any special medical, mental health, developmental disability, or educational needs that the child may have that may require special parenting arrangements or access to recommended services; (3) the reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of sufficient ability, age, and maturity to express an independent, reliable preference; (4) whether domestic abuse, as defined in section 518B.01, has occurred in the parents’ or either parent’s household or relationship; the nature and context of the domestic abuse; and the implications of the domestic abuse for parenting and for the child’s safety, well-being, and developmental needs; (5) any physical, mental, or chemical health issue of a parent that affects the child’s safety or developmental needs;
3 must make detailed findings on each of the factors in paragraph (a) based on the evidence
presented and explain how each factor led to its conclusions and to the determination of
custody and parenting time.” Id., subd. 1(b)(1) (2022). Reversal is appropriate where a
district court fails to apply relevant statutory criteria that would have weighed in favor of
the appellant. See Weatherly v. Weatherly, 330 N.W.2d 890, 892-93 (Minn. 1983).
The application of these factors is governed by related statutory provisions.
Relevant to this appeal, the district court “shall consider that it is in the best interests of the
child to promote the child’s healthy growth and development through safe, stable, nurturing
(6) the history and nature of each parent’s participation in providing care for the child; (7) the willingness and ability of each parent to provide ongoing care for the child; to meet the child’s ongoing developmental, emotional, spiritual, and cultural needs; and to maintain consistency and follow through with parenting time; (8) the effect on the child’s well-being and development of changes to home, school, and community; (9) the effect of the proposed arrangements on the ongoing relationships between the child and each parent, siblings, and other significant persons in the child’s life; (10) the benefit to the child in maximizing parenting time with both parents and the detriment to the child in limiting parenting time with either parent; (11) except in cases in which domestic abuse as described in clause (4) has occurred, the disposition of each parent to support the child’s relationship with the other parent and to encourage and permit frequent and continuing contact between the child and the other parent; and (12) the willingness and ability of parents to cooperate in the rearing of their child; to maximize sharing information and minimize exposure of the child to parental conflict; and to utilize methods for resolving disputes regarding any major decision concerning the life of the child. Id.
4 relationships between a child and both parents.” Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(b)(2) (2022)
(emphasis added). And,
[t]he court shall consider both parents as having the capacity to develop and sustain nurturing relationships with their children unless there are substantial reasons to believe otherwise. In assessing whether parents are capable of sustaining nurturing relationships with their children, the court shall recognize that there are many ways that parents can respond to a child’s needs with sensitivity and provide the child love and guidance, and these may differ between parents and among cultures.
Id., subd. 1(b)(3) (2022). Importantly, “[t]here is no presumption for or against joint
physical custody.” Id., subd. 1(b)(7) (2022).
A district court has broad discretion to provide for the custody of children. Hansen
v. Todnem, 908 N.W.2d 592, 596 (Minn. 2018). The “law leaves scant if any room for an
appellate court to question the [district] court’s balancing of best-interests considerations.”
Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468, 477 (Minn. App. 2000). “A district court abuses
its discretion by making findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying
the law, or delivering a decision that is against logic and the facts on record.” Woolsey v.
Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022). Appellate courts will defer to the district
court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous and defer to the district court’s
credibility determinations. Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988).
Here, the district court analyzed the best interests of the child under Minn. Stat.
§ 518.17, subd. 1 (2022), and found that eight factors favored joint physical custody (i.e.,
factors 1, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12) and that four factors were neutral (i.e., factors 2, 3, 4,
5 and 5). After balancing these factors, the district court concluded that the child’s best
interests supported an award of joint physical custody.
Before turning to mother’s arguments, we note that mother does not challenge the
district court’s analysis of the four neutral factors. Nor does mother challenge the district
court’s determination that factors 9, 11, and 12 favor joint physical custody. We briefly
review the district court’s analysis of factors 9, 11, and 12. The district court found that
factor 9, “the effect of the proposed arrangements on the ongoing relationships between
the child and each parent,” favored joint physical custody because both mother and father
have extended family with whom it would be in the child’s best interests to maintain
relationships. Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a)(9). The district court found that factor 11,
“the disposition of each parent to support the child’s relationship with the other parent,”
favored joint physical custody. Id., subd. 1(a)(11). In part, the district court stated that it
had “significant concerns about mother’s willingness to support the child’s relationship
with father” and noted that mother “appears to have disdain towards father.” The district
court found that factor 12, “the willingness and ability of parents to cooperate in the rearing
of their child,” favored joint physical custody. Id., subd. 1(a)(12). The district court stated
its “concerns” about mother’s “ability to co-parent with father,” even though it believed
that completing a bridging conflict course would “significantly help the parties co-parent.”
With these three best-interests factors in mind, we consider mother’s arguments that
the district court erred in evaluating five other best-interests factors.
6 Factor 1: Child’s Physical, Emotional, Cultural, Spiritual, and Other Needs
Mother argues that the district court effectively imposed a “presumption in favor of
joint physical custody” by “requiring a showing that joint physical custody will not harm
the child” in its discussion of factor 1.
In considering factor 1, the district court found that “[t]he parties do not have
significantly different abilities to meet the needs of the child” and that “both parties
testified that they would be able to get the child to and from school.” In this section of its
analysis, the district court found that “the child will be able to explore his cultural and
spiritual needs at both parents’ houses” and would “not be harmed by an equal parenting
time schedule” regarding the child’s cultural and spiritual needs. (Emphasis added.) The
district court concluded that “[b]oth parents are able to support the child’s physical,
emotional, cultural, spiritual and other needs,” which favored joint physical custody.
Mother’s challenge focuses on the district court’s reference to the child not being
harmed by an equal parenting-time schedule. We are not persuaded that the district court
imposed a presumption in favor of joint physical custody when we review all of the district
court’s analysis of factor 1. The district court evaluated both parties’ testimony about the
child’s needs and each parent’s ability to meet the child’s needs and concluded that both
parents were capable. The district court found that Lao culture and the child’s education in
a Chinese immersion school were important and that there was no evidence that father did
not support these needs. And both parents testified that they would support the child’s
needs. Thus, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that
factor 1 favored joint physical custody.
7 Factor 6: History and Nature of Each Parent’s Participation in Providing Care for the Child
Mother argues that the district court erred in its analysis of factor 6 because it
“effectively imposed a presumption in favor of joint physical custody by changing this
factor to mean that any ‘significant care’ is sufficient to favor joint physical custody.” She
also argues the district court erred in weighing this factor in favor of joint physical custody
based on mother’s role in bringing the child to medical appointments and mother’s
involvement in the child’s activities. Mother also argues that the district court speculated
by implying that she withheld father’s parenting time without justification.
In analyzing factor 6, the district court found that mother limited father’s time with
the child because she “held a grudge against father for some perceived slight.” The district
court described mother’s limitation of parenting time as a “unilateral decision” that was
not in the child’s best interests. The district court first found that father was the primary
caregiver initially after separation and that mother has been the primary caregiver since
August 2020. The district court also found that after August 2020, mother limited father’s
access to the child. The district court explained that the parties’ testimony reflected
“different narratives” on parent participation and credited father’s testimony that he was
the primary caregiver when the parties first separated.
We are not persuaded that the district court imposed a presumption of joint physical
custody in its analysis of factor 6. First, we note that mother’s brief to this court appears to
concede that she limited father’s parenting time and argues about her reasons for doing so.
Second, the district court found that both parents provided care for the child and that
8 father’s testimony was more credible about his role as primary caregiver after the initial
separation. We defer to a district court’s credibility determination. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d at
210. Third, the record supports the district court’s finding that both parents have
participated in the care of the child, and so the finding is not clearly erroneous. Although
the district court’s order does not specifically mention some of the evidence summarized
in mother’s brief, it need not do so. Thus, we conclude that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in finding that factor 6 favored joint physical custody.
Factor 7: Willingness and Ability of Each Parent to Provide Ongoing Care for the Child
Mother argues that the district court “did not find that both [parents] were willing
and able to maintain consistency and follow through with parenting time.” She contends
that the record shows father “has had difficulty with consistency and follow through with
parenting time.” She also urges that joint physical custody is “undermined” by the parties’
demonstrated “lack of ability to communicate and coordinate.”
In its discussion of factor 7, the district court found that father “will likely be an
active and committed parent and will support the child in all areas of his life.” The district
court summarized father’s testimony that he would help with homework, do projects, and
support the child’s activities. Although the district court did not address every aspect of
factor 7 in the order, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
finding that factor 7 favored joint physical custody.
9 Factor 8: The Effect on the Child’s Well-Being and Development of Changes to Home, School, and Community
Mother argues that the district court adopted “an interpretation of the best interest
statute that effectively creates a presumption in favor of joint physical custody” when it
evaluated factor 8 and found there would be “minimal changes” for the child under either
parent’s custody proposal. Mother appears to imply that a finding of minimal change
should make this factor neutral and that the district court erred by concluding that it favored
joint physical custody.
In analyzing factor 8, the district court found that father has had parenting time every
other weekend since August 2022, the child “is familiar with both parents’ homes,” and
the child will “stay enrolled in his current school.” The district court concluded that there
would be “minimal changes” for the child under either joint or sole physical custody.
We agree with mother that finding “minimal changes” should not weigh in favor of
joint physical custody. But mother must prove error and prejudice to obtain relief on
appeal. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 (requiring courts to ignore harmless error); Grein v. Grein,
364 N.W.2d 383, 387 (Minn. 1985) (concluding that remand was unnecessary where the
district court would ultimately reach the same result). Even though the district court erred
by finding that factor 8 favored joint physical custody, we conclude that mother was not
prejudiced by this error. As discussed above, seven of the twelve best-interests factors favor
an award of joint physical custody and no factors favor sole physical custody.
10 Factor 10: Benefit to the Child in Maximizing Parenting Time with Both Parents
Mother argues that “there is no basis for the court’s statement that ‘the child
consistently saw his father up until July 23, 2020.’” She also argues that “[c]onsistent
adherence to parenting time in the sole custody arrangement will better further the
relationship between father and son without the drastic detriment of removing him from
his regular schedule and support.”
In considering factor 10, the district court again discussed the “conflicting testimony
as to how much parenting time father had up until July 2020.” The district court found
credible father’s testimony that he had the child for three months after the parties’
separation and on a week-on, week-off schedule for at least a year. The district court also
found mother’s testimony not credible because she provided inconsistent explanations
about who cared for the child more recently. We defer to the district court’s findings of
fact unless they are clearly erroneous and defer to the district court’s credibility
determinations. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d at 210. The district court also discussed that mother
limited father’s parenting time and that joint physical custody would benefit the child’s
relationship with father and allow them to “repair any damage to their relationship.”
In her brief to this court, mother acknowledges that the district court’s determination
that father credibly testified about his role in caring for the child until July 2020 was
“entitled to deference on appeal.” Still, mother argues that father did not prove any
“interaction” with the child during the time that father worked “out of town.” And she
argues that the district court had no evidence of “damage” to father’s relationship with the
child. We are not persuaded. As discussed, not only does the record support—and mother
11 concede—that she limited father’s parenting time, but also, father credibly testified that he
participated in caring for the child before mother limited his parenting time. The district
court also did not specifically find “damage” to the father-child relationship; it considered
whether joint physical custody would allow repair of “any damage.” (Emphasis added.)
We conclude that the record supports the district court’s analysis of this factor. Therefore,
the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that factor 10 favored joint physical
custody.
In sum, because at least seven of twelve best-interests factors favor joint physical
custody, at least four factors are neutral, no factors favor awarding mother sole physical
custody, and the record supports the district court’s findings of fact, we conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding joint physical custody.
II. The district court erred in its calculation of child support.
Mother argues the district court abused its discretion in setting child support in four
ways: (1) erroneously calculating father’s gross income, (2) improperly requiring mother
to pay father for the child’s healthcare insurance, (3) erroneously determining father’s
share of childcare expenses, and (4) erroneously declining to award retroactive child
support.
The district court found that mother’s gross monthly income is $3,810 and that
father’s gross monthly income is $4,503. It found that each party testified that their
healthcare insurance would cover the child, but father had been providing healthcare
insurance for the child, and mother asked for this to continue. The district court found that
father’s healthcare insurance costs $200 per month for the child. The district court
12 concluded that father must pay $52 per month to mother in basic child support, father must
provide healthcare insurance for the child, mother must pay $92 per month to father for
healthcare insurance for the child, and mother incurs childcare costs of $98 per month. The
district court’s analysis resulted in a net payment of $40 per month from mother to father.
The district court also denied mother’s request for retroactive child support.
We consider each of mother’s four arguments in turn.
Father’s Gross Income
Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion in calculating father’s
gross income. Father did not file a financial affidavit. 4 At trial, father testified that he is
employed, makes $26 an hour, and works at least 40 hours per week. The district court
found that father’s monthly gross income is $4,503, father’s hourly pay rate is $26, and he
works 40 hours per week.
Mother points out that father testified he works 40-45 hours per week, but that the
district court calculated father’s income based on a 40-hour week. She argues the district
court did not make the findings necessary to omit father’s additional five hours of income
per week. Minnesota law provides that gross income does not include compensation
4 “In any case where the parties have joint children for which a child support order must be determined, the parties shall serve and file with their initial pleadings or motion documents, a financial affidavit, disclosing all sources of gross income . . . .” Minn. Stat. § 518A.28(a) (2022). But if a parent does not serve and file a financial affidavit, “the court shall set income for that parent based on credible evidence before the court or in accordance with section 518A.32.” Id. (c) (2022). The district court may consider “credible evidence” such as “documentation of current or recent income, testimony of the other parent concerning recent earnings and income levels, and the parent’s wage reports filed with the Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development.” Id.
13 received by a party for employment in excess of a 40-hour work week, as long as certain
requirements are met, and the court makes certain findings. Minn. Stat. § 518A.29(b)
(2022). 5 We agree with mother that the district court did not make the specific findings
required by section 518A.29(b).
Still, we are not persuaded that the district court erred by not finding that father
worked 45 hours a week. Rather, the district court found that father worked 40 hours per
week, and the record supports that finding. Father testified that he worked “40, sometimes
45, at most, usually” hours per week. (Emphasis added.) The district court’s finding that
father worked 40 hours per week was not clearly erroneous. Thus, the district court did not
omit or exclude five hours per week from father’s gross income, nor did it err by failing to
make findings under Minn. Stat. § 518A.29(b).
5 Section 518A.29(b) provides the following requirements and findings: (1) child support is ordered in an amount at least equal to the guideline amount based on gross income not excluded under this clause; and (2) the party demonstrates, and the court finds, that: (i) the excess employment began after the filing of the petition for dissolution or legal separation or a petition related to custody, parenting time, or support; (ii) the excess employment reflects an increase in the work schedule or hours worked over that of the two years immediately preceding the filing of the petition; (iii) the excess employment is voluntary and not a condition of employment; (iv) the excess employment is in the nature of additional, part-time or overtime employment compensable by the hour or fraction of an hour; and (v) the party’s compensation structure has not been changed for the purpose of affecting a support or maintenance obligation. Id.
14 Mother also argues the district court erred by not including as gross income bonuses
that father receives. “[G]ross income includes any form of periodic payment . . . .” Id. (a)
(2022). “[B]onuses are forms of periodic payment and therefore income.” Novak v. Novak,
406 N.W.2d 64, 68 (Minn. App. 1987), rev. denied (Minn. July 22, 1987). “[T]he public
policy giving children the right to enjoy the benefit of their parents’ increased income is
paramount.” Desrosier v. Desrosier, 551 N.W.2d 507, 509 (Minn. App. 1996).
In Desrosier, we determined the district court erred by not including a parent’s
annual bonus when calculating child support. Id. We reasoned that the parent’s annual
bonus payments were a dependable form of periodic payment that the children were
entitled to share, even though the bonuses may not be guaranteed or certain as to amount.
Id. We also considered that the record showed the bonuses were a “high percentage” of the
parent’s income and therefore reversed and remanded for a recalculation of child support.
Id. We note that Desrosier was interpreting a previous child-support statute, Minn. Stat.
§ 518.54 (1994). Id. Still, both the previous and the current child-support statutes define
income as “any form of periodic payment to an individual.” Id. (quoting former section
518.54); Minn. Stat. § 518A.29(a). Desrosier is therefore still applicable today.
Here, mother argues that father receives regular bonuses of up to $1,000 per month.
Father testified that his employer had started a bonus structure, which he described as a
“monthly bonus.” In response to questioning from the district court, father clarified that
the bonus is based on his performance and is not automatic. Father stated that he receives
up to $1,000 in monthly bonuses.
15 We observe that father’s monthly bonus is about 22% of father’s monthly income
and, if included in the child-support calculation, would increase father’s share of parental
income from 54% to 59%. In Desrosier, as in this case, the bonuses were not guaranteed
and were uncertain as to amount. Thus, we conclude the district court erred by not including
father’s bonuses in its calculation of father’s gross income.
Cost of the Child’s Healthcare Insurance
Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion by requiring her to
contribute to the cost of health insurance for the child. In support of her argument, mother
cites Minn. Stat. § 518A.41, subd. 5(d) (2022), which provides that a district court must
not order a parent to contribute to healthcare-insurance costs under certain circumstances:
If the party ordered to carry health care coverage for the joint child already carries dependent health care coverage for other dependents and would incur no additional premium costs to add the joint child to the existing coverage, the court must not order the other party to contribute to the premium costs for coverage of the joint child.
Minn. Stat. § 518A.41, subd. 5(d) (emphasis added).
Mother contends that the record shows the required circumstances. Mother points
to father’s testimony about his out-of-pocket costs for healthcare insurance.
THE COURT: Let me ask you: Do you know how much extra you pay each month for [the joint child] to be covered under your plan? FATHER: I cover my [non-joint] daughter, as well. So, it’s a family plan, like, I couldn’t really say. I know an individual plan is, like, $400, or something, and I pay, like, $800; so, maybe $200 extra, if I would split the extra $400 in half because two kids.
16 THE COURT: So, for the family plan, it doesn’t matter how many kids you have. If you’ve got two on it, it’s $800, if you have four on it, it would be $800. Am I getting that right? FATHER: I—I believe so. I don’t know how far—how high it goes. THE COURT: Okay. FATHER: But I know two is the same as one. THE COURT: So, you’d say about $200 of that, you would attribute to money that you’re paying for [the joint child] every month, in terms of the medical coverage? FATHER: Yeah.
We agree with mother’s view of the record. Father’s statement, “I know two is the
same as one,” indicates that father does not pay an extra premium cost to include the child
on his healthcare plan. The district court found that it “costs approximately $200 per month
[for father] to have the [c]hild on his plan.” While it is true that $200 is half of the $400
father pays to include dependents on his healthcare plan, the district court’s reasoning
misapplied the statute. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d at 506 (stating that a district court abuses its
discretion if its findings improperly apply the law). Here, the record establishes that father
pays the same premium whether he includes one child or two on his healthcare plan. Thus,
under Minn. Stat. § 518A.41, subd. 5(d), the district court abused its discretion in ordering
mother to contribute to the child’s healthcare premium.
Childcare Expenses
Mother argues that the district court clearly erred in finding childcare expenses were
$98 per month because she testified that they were $300 per month.
The district court findings on this issue cited an exhibit showing mother’s historic
childcare costs, and the district court noted that it placed “greater weight on the
documentary evidence” than on mother’s testimony. The receipts mother submitted show
17 childcare costs of $1,240 over ten months, or $124 per month. The district court did not
abuse its discretion in electing to use the exhibits proffered by mother and rejecting
mother’s testimony. Appellate courts do not reweigh the evidence when reviewing findings
of fact. In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021). But the
record does not support the district court’s finding of $98 in childcare costs per month
because the receipts show an average cost of $124 per month. Thus, the district court
clearly erred in determining the amount of childcare expenses.
Retroactive Child Support
Mother argues that the district court erred by not awarding her retroactive child
support of $19,000. The district court reasoned that the parties’ testimony conflicted about
how much parenting time each party had as well as how much child support father paid
mother before the dissolution trial. The district court concluded that it “was not presented
with enough evidence to comfortably establish [retroactive] child support during the
pendency of this action.”
The Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that “a parent’s obligation to support
[their] children commences with the child’s birth.” Jacobs v. Jacobs, 309 N.W.2d 303, 305
(Minn. 1981); see also Korf v. Korf, 553 N.W.2d 706, 710 (Minn. App. 1996) (ordering,
in a final decree, retroactive child support dating back to the parties’ date of separation). A
district court generally “may not order retroactive child support for dates prior to the
commencement of an action under chapter 518.” Korf, 553 N.W.2d at 710. Under the
Minnesota Child Support Guidelines Worksheet, several factors determine the amount of
18 child support, one of which is the percentage of parenting time each party receives. Minn.
Stat. §§ 518A.34(b)(6), .36 (2022).
Here, the district court found that there was insufficient evidence to establish
retroactive child support. The district court focused on the lack of evidence showing the
amount of parenting time each party had received. As we have already discussed, the
parties’ testimony was very general and conflicted. Mother testified that before the
dissolution, she was the sole caregiver, that parenting time was week-on, week-off for a
few months, and that she eventually limited father’s parenting time. But the district court
found mother’s testimony inconsistent and not credible. The district court found credible
father’s testimony that he was the sole caregiver when the parties separated, followed by a
week-on, week-off parenting-time schedule. Father testified that after the dissolution, he
received inconsistent parenting time: “whenever [mother] feels like it . . . [she is] not
allowing me [to see] him every other weekend.” Based on our review of the record, the
evidence does not establish how much father had paid to mother in child support before
the dissolution trial. Thus, we conclude that district court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that the evidence was insufficient to establish retroactive child support and
therefore declining to award it.
In sum, we agree with the district court’s determination that father’s basic income
is $4,503 monthly. We reverse and remand for the district court to recalculate child support
and to include father’s bonuses in its calculation of father’s gross income, to remove the
requirement for mother to reimburse father for the child’s healthcare insurance, and for a
19 revised calculation of childcare expenses based on the record evidence. We affirm the
district court’s decision to deny retroactive child support.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.