In re the Marriage of Ackerson

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

_______________

No. 24-1809

Filed August 19, 2026

_______________

In re the Marriage of Tia Marie Ackerson and Billy James Ackerson Upon the Petition of Tia Marie Ackerson, Petitioner–Appellee,

And Concerning Billy James Ackerson, Respondent–Appellant.

_______________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Butler County, The Honorable Gregg R. Rosenbladt, Judge.

_______________

AFFIRMED

_______________

Billy James Ackerson, New Hartford, self-represented appellant.

Joshua M. Moon (until withdrawal) and Saje J. Williams of JSC Legal, P.L.C., Cedar Falls, attorney for appellee.

_______________

Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., Langholz, J., and Mullins, S.J.

Opinion by Mullins, S.J.

2

MULLINS, Senior Judge.

Billy Ackerson appeals the district court’s decree dissolving his eighteen-year marriage to Tia Ackerson. At trial, the parties disputed most aspects of the dissolution—including physical care and visitation for their minor son, the appropriate amount of child support, the scope and division of their marital estate, and the disposition of a support and maintenance award from a separate domestic abuse case. Billy asks us to revisit these issues on appeal. Our review is de novo. In re Marriage of Meester, 32 N.W.3d 22, 27 (Iowa Ct. App. 2026).

Physical Care and Visitation. The district court placed the parties’

eight-year-old son in their joint legal custody and Tia’s primary physical care, with visitation for Billy on alternating weekends. The child has special needs, and the district court found a placement with Tia—his longtime primary caregiver—could better provide the “predictability, structure and supervision” the boy requires. It also cited Billy’s substance use, mental health issues, and tumultuous relationship with Tia as factors that weighed against shared care. Billy urges us to reach the opposite conclusion, pointing to his important contributions to the child’s upbringing, Tia’s busy schedule as a working student, and the district court’s decision to award Billy the family home. But after considering all the relevant factors, see In re Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 697–700 (Iowa 2007), we agree that the court’s placement decision is in the child’s best interests. And for the same stability concerns discussed in the decree, we decline Billy’s request to increase his weeknight and holiday time.

Child Support. Although Billy was unemployed at the time of trial, the district court imputed him with a gross annual income of $60,000 due to his experience as a truck driver. Based on that figure, it imposed a guidelines

3

child support award of $690.96 per month. Billy contends the court’s income finding is unsupported by the evidence, as his commercial driving privileges are restricted by his medical conditions. However, Billy testified that his physician had recently cleared him to return to work and that he remained licensed to operate within state lines. We therefore agree that a substantial injustice would occur if child support were calculated by Billy’s actual income at the time of trial. See Iowa Ct. R. 9.11(4)(d). Weighing the relevant factors under rule 9.11(4), we see no reason to disturb the district court’s finding on Billy’s earning capacity, which was consistent with the net income he claimed from his former independent hauling operation.

Property Division. At the time of trial, the parties were substantially indebted and short on cash. Their principal asset was the marital home, which was gifted by Billy’s parents and encumbered by a mortgage. Because the home was in need of repairs that Billy was better equipped to perform, the district court assigned it to Billy along with any responsibility for outstanding property taxes and utility bills. The court also ordered Billy to make a $17,500 equalization payment to Tia for half of their equity in the home. Billy challenges that decision on appeal, arguing the house was a gift to him alone—even though the 2010 deed from his parents named both parties as the grantees. He asks that we modify the property award to exclude the home from the divisible estate. Because we agree that the house was marital property, we decline to do so.

We also reject Billy’s alternative request to vacate his equalization payment and reallocate the parties’ debts. The district court has “considerable latitude” in crafting the economic terms of a decree, and we “will disturb a ruling only when there has been a failure to do equity.” In re Marriage of Smith, 573 N.W.2d 924, 926 (Iowa 1998) (cleaned up). While the

4

parties agree that the district court’s distribution will leave Tia in a somewhat better financial position,1 we find this outcome equitable under the circumstances. See In re Marriage of Schriner, 695 N.W.2d 493, 499 (Iowa 2005) (“An equitable distribution does not mean an equal division.”). Tia faced a greater need for cash at the time of dissolution given her relocation from the marital home and her lower short-term earning capacity. See Iowa Code § 598.21(5)(f )–(g) (2023).

Support and Maintenance Judgment. A few months before filing for divorce, Tia brought a separate action against Billy seeking relief from domestic abuse under Iowa Code chapter 236. The court in that case entered a protective order that, among other things, required Billy to pay $7,000 per month in temporary support and maintenance. See Iowa Code § 236.5(1)(b)(6). The order required these funds to be used for the parties’ mortgage, vehicle loans, utilities, and similar expenses. But over the course of the next ten months, Billy paid only $1,100 of this obligation. Following the dissolution trial, Tia requested—and the district court granted—a judgment for $68,900 in unpaid support.

Billy does not contest the district court’s authority to enter judgment for the unpaid temporary support in its final dissolution decree. See Britven v. Britven, 145 N.W.2d 450, 456 (Iowa 1966). Instead, he argues that Tia failed to show she made any of the debt payments for which the temporary funds were supposed to be used. As a factual matter, we cannot agree. Tia testified that she continued to make out-of-pocket payments on the parties’

1 According to Billy’s math, the court’s distribution and equalization scheme left Tia with approximately $15,000 payable by Billy. It left Billy with a net liability of approximately $4,500. These figures do not include the debt associated with an overleveraged semi-truck. The court ordered the parties to sell the truck and share responsibility for any deficit owed to the bank, which was expected to be around $14,000.

5

mortgage and vehicle loans during the dissolution process, and bank statements in our record corroborate that claim. But in any event, whether the chapter 236 support award was proportionate to Tia’s financial need is not a question properly before us in this appeal. To the extent Billy wished to challenge that award, his opportunity to do so was in an appeal from the protective order. See In re Marriage of Prybil, 230 N.W.2d 487, 488 (Iowa 1975) (finding a challenge to an award of temporary alimony was not reviewable on appeal from a final decree). There is no dispute that $68,900 in unpaid temporary support had accrued by the time of trial. The district court’s judgment may stand.

* * *

We have considered each of the issues raised by Billy on appeal.

Because a more robust opinion would not augment or clarify the existing case law, we affirm without further discussion. See Iowa Ct. R. 21.26(1)(e). The parties shall bear their own appellate fees.

AFFIRMED.