In re the Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Synder

1 Pow. Surr. 185, 21 N.Y.S. 430, 48 N.Y. St. Rep. 643
CourtNew York Surrogate's Court
DecidedNovember 28, 1891
StatusPublished

This text of 1 Pow. Surr. 185 (In re the Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Synder) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Surrogate's Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re the Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Synder, 1 Pow. Surr. 185, 21 N.Y.S. 430, 48 N.Y. St. Rep. 643 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1891).

Opinion

Collier, S.

The settlement of the accounts in this matter involves the construction of the last, will and testament, and codicil thereto, of the said deceased. A proper and legal construction must first he determined upon and settled before any decree can he made for settlement.

[186]*186John Snyder died on or about the 4th day of July, 1889. He left a last will and testament, which bears date December 30, 1885. He made and executed a codicil to said will, which bears date the 12th day of May, 1889. The will and codicil were proven and admitted to probate by the surrogate on the 11th day of July, 1889, and letters testamentary thereon were issued, to Mercy Snyder, Lillie E. Gillett, Jennie A. Lent, James M. Gillett and James E. Snyder, the executrices and executors therein nominated and appointed. By the will of said deceased, dated December 30, 1885, the testator, after making provision for a monument, by the third clause of said will gave and bequeathed to his wife, Mercy Snyder, the sum of $12,000 in cash, and devised to her absolutely his private residence in Yalatie, in tire town of .Kinderhook, and all the lands belonging thereto, containing about eight acres, and also all the personal property attached thereto, such as household furniture,"carpets, beds and bedding, horses, carriages, sleighs, robes, harness, and all the personal property of every description in and about his private residence, and this provision for his wife, in and by the' fourth clause of said will, is declared to be in lieu of her right •of dower.

By the fifth, six and seventh clauses of his will he gives and bequeathes to each of his three children the sum of $8,000, and1 by the eighth clause states that his children and his wife are to have the above sums in cash as soon as practical after his decease. By the ninth clause of his will the balance of his personal property and real estate is to' be appraised, and he directs that it shall be divided equally between his three children, and by the tenth' clause he gives to' each of his grandchildren $400, to be taken out of the real estate before it is divided.

In this plain and simple manner he disposed of his whole estate by his will. But some time after making his will, and on May 12, 1889, the testator made a codicil to said will, and after-reciting the fact of the making of said will, and the fact that in and by it he had given and bequeathed the balance of his personal property and real estate as stated, in the ninth clause of [187]*187said will, and directing that the codicil should be taken as a part thereof, he proceeds in substance as follows: “To order and declare, give, devise and bequeath to his wife, Mercy Snyder, and his daughters, Lillie E. Grillett and Jennie A. Snyder (now Jennie A. Lent), in trust for the uses and purposes hereinafter named,” certain real estate, describing it, then in use in his business of manufacture and sale of tin-ware, rags, junk, iron, glass, etc., and certain other real’ estate, describing or designating it, also gives, devises and bequeaths to his said trustees, in trust, as aforesaid, for the uses hereinafter mentioned, all his horses, carts, wagons, harness, sleighs, goods, chattels, credits and merchandise, which then was, or shall be in use as a part of the business conducted by him, and also that of the moneys on deposit to his credit, the sum of $3,000 be taken by his trustee or trustees, and used by her or them for the uses and purposes hereinafter mentioned, and as a part, of the trust created by this codicil; and directs his trustee or trustees to- use the property mentioned for the purpose of carrying on the business of the manufacture and sale of tinware, rags, junk, iron, glass, etc., as then conducted by him, for the term of three years from and after his death, or, if in the discretion of his trustees it may be deemed advisable for the best interests of his estate, such business and such trust may be continued until the expiration of five years after his decease; and directs- that his wife,’ Mercy Snyder (one of said trustees named), shall act as sole trustee, with power to sign all checks until the termination of the trust, or until her decease, but in the event of her death before the termination of the trust, then, and in that event, his daughters (the other trustees named) shall act as trustees until the termination thereof, and directs and orders that the property therein mentioned should, upon his decease, be set apart from the residue of his estate for the purpose of carrying on such trust, and his trustees are directed to use no part of his property other than the property therein devised in connection with such business. That all other property of which he might die seized or possessed should be kept separate and apart from such trust [188]*188estate, and. should vest upon his decease in the legatees named in his said will and testament as tlierein provided. .

Upon the termination of the trust, the trust estate should be disposed of for the payment of any unpaid legacies given by his last will and testament, and the residue and remainder be divided equally between his son, James E. Snyder, and his daughters Lillie E. Gillett and Jennie A. Snyder, now Jennie A. Lent.

And the testator in this same clause of the codicil directs his trustees, in their discretion, to use from his trust estate, before the termination of the trust, such sums of money as they may deem advisable for the payment of the specific legacies given by his will, and the said legacies for which there is not sufficient property outside of such trust estate to pay shall, in the option of the trustees, not be payable until the termination of the trust, and then, following in the same clause, directs his trustees to employ Thomas Garrigan as superintendent of the business created by the trust, and James M. Gillette as assistant, at certain salaries during the period of such trust. Directs that an inventory of the property covered by the trust be made at least once each year, and delivered to his wife. And then, following right on, in this same clause the testator says: “I further authorize and empower my said wife as aforesaid to collect all my interest money and rentals of my property during her life*time or until the estate is finally settled, and apply the same to* her own use.” Such now are the .provisions of the will and codicil which, taken together, stands as the last will and testament of said deceased.

By the account filed it appears that the estate, outside of the property and money so given in trust, amounted to about the sum of $23,678.51, besides certain real estate not given in trust.

And it is claimed by the widow that under the will and codicil she is entitled to the whole income of the estate until the trust estate is finally settled.

And by James E. Snyder that she is only entitled to income and rental until the estate in the hands of the executors should have been finally settled by law. The trustees claim that the [189]*189widow is entitled to tlic income and rental of the property so placed in trust during her life, but not exceeding the time limited by the trust; all claiming under that clause in said codicil wherein he authorizes and empowers his wife to collect all of his interest moneys and rentals of his property during her lifetime or until the estate is finally settled, and apply the same to her own use.

Now, leaving the question of the validity of the trust out of question, in order to get at the intent and meaning of the clause, we must assume that the testator by his codicil intended to create a valid trust.

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Related

Haynes v. . Sherman
22 N.E. 938 (New York Court of Appeals, 1889)
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41 N.Y. 328 (New York Court of Appeals, 1869)

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Bluebook (online)
1 Pow. Surr. 185, 21 N.Y.S. 430, 48 N.Y. St. Rep. 643, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-the-judicial-settlement-of-the-estate-of-synder-nysurct-1891.