In re the Judicial Settlement of the Account of Proceedings of Oakley

67 A.D. 493, 74 N.Y.S. 206
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York·Decided July 1, 1902·Published·Cited by 8 cases

Opinions

O’Brien, J.:

tlpoñ the accounting of the executor of William H. Oakley, who died in Yew York city January 24, 1893, leaving a last will and testament, the question arose whether under such will his daughter Louise S. Berlin, who was a widow and living with the testator at the time, of his death, was entitled to receive the entire income of •the estate, or whether it should be divided between her and her brothers and sister, William H. Oakley, Charles S. Oakley and Clara Meyerkort and the son of her deceased sister Kate Oakley Brown, Oakley K. Brown. Although Louise S. Berlin was married when the will was made, her husband had died during the life of the testator and she had not remarried. Clara Meyerkort was [495] married in the lifetime of the testator and her husband was still living. Kate O. Brown had married and died during the testator’s life, her only child being Oakley K. Brown, who is now living with his father.

The testator in his will, after making minor bequests to his several children, forgiving them any sums advanced to them and stating that his life insurance was to be divided equally among them, which he considered would “ supply them with sufficient funds for present purposes,” provided that “inasmuch as it is my desire that my country place * * * be for a reasonable time maintained in its present condition for the purpose of affording a home for such of my daughters as remain unmarried and such, if any, as become and remain widows and the minor children if any of such widowed daughters,” the rest of his property was given in trust to his executors “ for and during the lives respectively of my two daughters, Louise and Clara, and the survivor of them, but not exceeding, however, the term of twenty-five years,” to invest all his personal estate except the country home, to pay taxes thereupon and insurance, and in case of fire to rebuild the same with the insurance moneys, and “ the balance of the income of my entire estate so long as any of my daughters shall remain unmarried, my said trustees shall pay in quarterly yearly instalments to such of my daughters who are at the time unmarried, and such of my daughters who having been married are then in a state of widowhood, share and share alike, that is to say, the whole balance of such income shall be equally divided between my daughters then unmarried or widowed for their support and maintenance, provided, however, that if such widowed daughter or daughters shall die while in the state of widowhood leaving issue, such issue shall have the share of such income which the widowed mother of such issue would have received if living, for its or their support and maintenance. * * * If at any time there shall be but one daughter and she unmarried, entitled to receive income under the foregoing provisions, she shall receive the whole of such income until by reason of widowhood any of her sisters, or by death of such widowed sister, any of such widowed sister’s children become entitled to share therein with her.” The next paragraph, which is the “Fourth,” provides: “If all my daughters living shall have married before [496] the term limited for the termination of the trusts herein provided, thenceforth, namely, from the time of the marriage of my last living unmarried daughter, I direct the net income of my entire income bearing estate to be divided among and paid quarterly to all my children then living, share and share alike. If any shall have died or shall die thereafter and during the continuance of said trusts, leaving issue, such issue shall receive the share of said income which the parent if living would, have taken.” The following or 5th clause of the will provides: “ It is my desire that só long as any of my daughters remain unmarried, they jointly, or if but one, she, continue to occupy and make a home at my said country place * * * provided, however, that if any of my daughters who has or shall hereafter marry shall become a widow she and her children shall be entitled to share jointly with the other occupants or occupant in the use and occupation of said premises.” Further, it is provided that if during the term limited for the trust the said house should be without an occupant the executors may rent it for yearly leases, and, finally, when the period is ended, the residue of the estate should be divided between the five children, share and share alike.

Louise S. Berlin, who at the death of the testator was a widow,. claims that she is entitled to the whole of the income tinder the clause that “If * * * there shall be but one daughter and she unmarried, entitled to receive income, * * * she shall receive the whole of such income until by reason of widowhood ”'of any of her sisters they share with her. In opposition to this claim it is contended that Louise S. Berlin was not “ unmarried,” but, on the contrary, had been married and was a widow, and, therefore, the income of the estate should be divided equally among the five children under the 4th clause. The surrogate found in favor of Louise S. Berlin, and from the decree awarding her the entire income the other children of the testator appeal.

The appellants contend that the ordinary meaning of the word “ unmarried,” i. e., never having been married, should be given, and our attention has been called to the case of Dalrymple v. Hall (16 Ch. Div. 717), wherein it was held, as stated in the head note, that “ In the absence of context showing a contrary intention the word unmarried ’ must be construed according to its ordinary or primary meaning as never having been married,’ and, therefore, that the gift [497] to the children of B. did not take effect,” he being a widower. That case, however, is equally an authority for holding that where the context does show a different intention, the word unmarried ” should not be defined as “ never having been married.”

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In re the Judicial Settlement of the Account of Proceedings of Oakley, 67 A.D. 493, 74 N.Y.S. 206 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1902).

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