In re the Judicial Dissolution of 212 East 52nd Street Corp.

185 Misc. 2d 95, 712 N.Y.S.2d 777, 2000 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 331
New York Supreme Court·Decided June 27, 2000·Published

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

Nicholas Figueroa, J.

[96] Respondents’ motion for the posting of a bond by the petitioner evolves out of the latter’s petition for judicial dissolution of a close corporation under New York Business Corporation Law. The original petition came before this court pursuant to Business Corporation Law § 1104 wherein petitioner, a 50% shareholder in the 212 East 52nd Street Corporation (Corporation), alleged shareholder “deadlock” based on subdivisions (a) (1), (3), and (c) thereunder.1

Respondents now move pursuant to CPLR 6313, as well as Business Corporation Law §§ 1113, 1115 and 1118 (c) (2), to have petitioner post a bond of $250,000 to secure corporate assets during the dissolution. Previously, respondents had cross-moved under CPLR 6313 for an injunction staying petitioner from collecting rents or taking action on behalf of the Corporation and directing the building’s subtenants to pay rent into court pending the motion’s disposition. Respondents also moved for an indemnity under the same provision and an accounting pursuant to Business Corporation Law § 720. As a result of conferences with this court, the parties reached a settlement on all of these issues, except the bond, and a consent order was drawn up accordingly.

Petitioner argues that a bond is inappropriate because it is respondents, and not petitioner, who seek injunctive relief. Petitioner also claims that under CPLR 6313, it is invariably “the plaintiff who will move for a preliminary injunction and [97] TRO”2 and, therefore, it is respondents who should post a bond for the protection of the petitioner.3

Background

The 212 East 52nd Street Corporation was incorporated under the laws of the State of New York in February 1984 for the purpose of acquiring real property. At the time of incorporation, it issued 200 shares that were distributed equally between petitioner and respondents, each having invested $100,000 in the business. The Corporation ran smoothly until October 1995, at which time the parties began to encounter difficulties in their corporate, as well as personal, relationship.

For instance, respondents allege that for the year preceding March 1995, petitioner withheld rent for his occupancy of the first and second floors of 212 East 52nd Street, the principal corporate asset, on which he operated a restaurant. This resulted in a severe financial drain on the Corporation, causing it to incur significant legal fees and penalties in order to avoid foreclosure of the building’s mortgage in September 1994.

Respondents also claim that petitioner stole from the Corporation and conducted unlawful business activities in its name, such as leasing the third floor of 212 East 52nd Street to a commercial tenant in September 1994, while misrepresenting himself as the sole owner of the building. This misconduct by petitioner was repeated in April 1999, when petitioner again subleased the first and second floors to a third-party tenant, without respondents’ knowledge or consent.

In light of the foregoing allegations of corporate looting and misconduct by petitioner,4 respondents argue that a bond is imperative in order to protect the Corporation’s property and assets pending dissolution. In respondents’ opinion, a bond is [98] essential because the Corporation’s sole asset, 212 East 52nd Street, is largely occupied by petitioner.5 Since the Corporation’s only source of income is the building’s rental stream, respondents believe this income will be jeopardized without a bond due to petitioner’s prior history of rent defaults, suggesting future deficits as well.

Discussion

Petitioner moves under Business Corporation Law § 1104 (a) for judicial dissolution alleging shareholder deadlock. This section does not pertain to claims of corporate looting or oppressive conduct and lacks. the protective scope available to shareholders under section 1104-a, the provision governing such applications.6 Section 1104 (a) is predicated upon irreconcilable differences or deadlock between shareholders representing 50% or more of a corporation’s outstanding shares, [99] while shareholders owning at least 20% of a corporation’s outstanding shares may petition for dissolution under section 1104-a.

Respondents’ answer and cross motion pleaded grounds typically falling under section 1104-a and their request for an injunction, as well as a bond, was based upon petitioner’s alleged corporate looting and misconduct.7 Consequently, respondents are relying on section 1118 (c) (2) to support their request for a bond.8 As previously noted, this provision is applicable to dissolution motions under section 1104-a and operates in conjunction with the election remedy of section 1118. The primary purpose of the bond requirement under section 1118 (c) (2) is to protect minority shareholders against tactical fluctuations in their share prices during the valuation process. (Matter of Smith v Russo, 230 AD2d 863 [1996].)

Petitioner, based upon the holding in Margolies v Encounter, Inc. (42 NY2d 475), contends that because he commenced the dissolution proceeding without seeking injunctive relief, it necessarily precludes respondents from pursuing such relief as well. This reasoning is flawed for a number of reasons.9 First, petitioner consented to all but one of respondents’ requests for [100] injunctive relief under CPLR 6313, which culminated in the consent order issued by this court. Having consented to these demands, petitioner should not be permitted to deny respondents legal entitlement to them.

Next, although petitioner’s opposition papers emphasize the nonviability of a CPLR 6313 undertaking in these particular circumstances, they completely ignore the grounds respondents advance under the Business Corporation Law, which support a motion for a bond pending dissolution. In Matter of Elliot Kastle, Inc. (234 AD2d 181 [1996]), the First Department held it was reversible error not to set an undertaking when there were “serious allegations” of financial impropriety. In the instant case, there are serious allegations of the diversion of corporate assets and fraudulent conduct by petitioner, which the court cannot afford to overlook, especially since they are undisputed by petitioner.

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In re the Judicial Dissolution of 212 East 52nd Street Corp., 185 Misc. 2d 95, 712 N.Y.S.2d 777, 2000 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 331 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 2000).

185 Misc. 2d 95 (In re the Judicial Dissolution of 212 East 52nd Street Corp.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Margolies v. Encounter, Inc.
368 N.E.2d 1243 (New York Court of Appeals, 1977)
Smith v. Russo
230 A.D.2d 863 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1996)
Toscano v. Southampton Brick & Tile, Inc.
233 A.D.2d 515 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1996)
In re the Dissolution of Elliot Kastle, Inc.
234 A.D.2d 181 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1996)