Opinion of the Court by
LIM, J.
Maternal grandmother and grandfather (collectively, the Grandparents) appeal the July 9, 2003 order of the family court of the first circuit,1 made upon findings of fact and conclusions of law entered on June 17, 2003, that denied their January 9, 2003 petition for co-guardianship of the person of their then four-year-old grandson.2 The Grandparents [77]*77also appeal the family court’s July 9, 2008 order that denied their June 17, 2003 motion for reconsideration.
The Grandparents first contend the family court erred in deciding whether the natural father3 was an unfit parent, In re Guardianship of John Doe, 7 Haw.App. 575, 581, 786 P.2d 519, 523 (1990) (“in a contest between the mother and the paternal grand mother for a child’s custody, the mother must prevail absent a valid finding that she is not a fit and proper person or has a home that is not stable and wholesome”); In re Guardianship of Jane Doe, 93 Hawai'i 374, 381, 4 P.3d 508, 515 (App.2000) (quoting In re Guardianship of John Doe, supra), because the family court applied the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof4 to that question. We agree.
The heightened standard of proof is applied in termination of parental rights cases under Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 571-61 et seq. (1998) because,
The very act of severing the parent-child relationship is cognizably absolute and irrevocable.... [Standards of proof function to indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate decision and to allocate the risk of error between litigants accordingly.... Termination is a drastic remedy and is of such weight and gravity that due process requires the state to justify termination of the parent-child relationship by proof more substantial than a preponderance of the evidence.
Woodruff v. Keale, 64 Haw. 85, 100-101, 637 P.2d 760, 770 (1981) (citations, internal quotation marks and block quote format omitted). See also HRS § 587-73(a) (Supp.2003) (requiring “clear and convincing evidence” before the family court may terminate parental rights in a child protective act permanent plan hearing); In re Jane Doe, 95 Hawai'i 183, 192, 20 P.3d 616, 625 (2001) (“the [child protective act, HRS ch. 587 (1993 & Supp. 2003),] does not allow for the divestiture of parental rights absent clear and convincing evidence” (emphasis in the original)).
While a termination of parental rights is “absolute and irrevoeable[,]” Woodruff, 64 Haw. at 100, 637 P.2d at 770; see also In re Jane Doe, 95 Hawai'i at 192-193, 20 P.3d at 625-26; HRS § 587-2 (1993) (definition of “permanent custody”), “a guardian may be appointed for a minor even where the parental rights of the minor’s parents have not been terminated.” In re Guardianship of Jane Doe, 93 Hawai'i at 383, 4 P.3d at 517.
We have held that,
Because [the] concepts [of custody and guardianship] share common attributes, we construe the custody guardianship provision of HRS § 560:5-209 [ (1993) ] and the custody provision in HRS § 571-46 [ (Supp.2003) ] in pan materia5 in order to [78]*78determine the appropriate standard to be applied where conflicting claims between parents and non-parents are made in a guardianship hearing. See HRS § 1-16 (1993) (“Laws in pari materia, or upon the same subject matter, shall be construed with reference to each other.”).
Id. (footnote supplied).' Accordingly, we observe that a guardianship of the person of a minor, while it bestows “the powers and responsibilities of a parent who has not been deprived of custody of the parent’s minor and unemancipated child,” HRS § 560:5-209; see also In re Guardianship of Jane Doe, 93 Hawai'i at 382, 4 P.3d at 516 (“guardians of a minor have the powers and responsibilities otherwise inherent in parenthood”); HRS § 571-2 (1993) (definition of “legal custody”), nevertheless remains “subject to residual parental rights and responsibilities!;,]” id., meaning “those rights and responsibilities remaining with the parent after the transfer of legal custody or guardianship of the person, including, but not necessarily limited to, the right to reasonable visitation, consent to adoption or marriage, and the responsibility for support.” Id. (definition of “residual parental rights and responsibilities”); cf. HRS § 571-46(7) (Supp.2003) (unless detrimental to the best interests of the child, reasonable visitation rights “shall be awarded to parents, grandparents, siblings, and any person interested in the welfare of the child in the discretion of the court”). Furthermore, a guardian of the person of a minor always remains subject to removal, as such. HRS § 560:5— 212 (1993); cf. HRS § 571-46(6) (Supp.2003) (a custody award “shall be subject to modification or change whenever the best interests of the child require or justify the modification or change”).
Hence, a guardianship of the person of a minor is neither absolute nor irrevocable, and the heightened standard of proof attendant upon those attributes of a termination of parental rights need not attend here.6 We conclude the family court erred in applying a heightened standard of proof to the question of the fitness of the natural father.
The family court found that the Grandparents “have provided the minor child, their grandson, with a home, food[,] shelter, education and affection, together with the minor child’s siblings. The Court finds on the basis of the evidence submitted and the lack of any contrary evidence, that they are fit and competent persons to serve as Guardians of the minor child.” See HRS § 560:5-204 (1993) (“The family court may appoint any competent person whose appointment would be in the best interest of the minor as a guardian of the person for an unmarried minor.”); HRS §
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Opinion of the Court by
LIM, J.
Maternal grandmother and grandfather (collectively, the Grandparents) appeal the July 9, 2003 order of the family court of the first circuit,1 made upon findings of fact and conclusions of law entered on June 17, 2003, that denied their January 9, 2003 petition for co-guardianship of the person of their then four-year-old grandson.2 The Grandparents [77]*77also appeal the family court’s July 9, 2008 order that denied their June 17, 2003 motion for reconsideration.
The Grandparents first contend the family court erred in deciding whether the natural father3 was an unfit parent, In re Guardianship of John Doe, 7 Haw.App. 575, 581, 786 P.2d 519, 523 (1990) (“in a contest between the mother and the paternal grand mother for a child’s custody, the mother must prevail absent a valid finding that she is not a fit and proper person or has a home that is not stable and wholesome”); In re Guardianship of Jane Doe, 93 Hawai'i 374, 381, 4 P.3d 508, 515 (App.2000) (quoting In re Guardianship of John Doe, supra), because the family court applied the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof4 to that question. We agree.
The heightened standard of proof is applied in termination of parental rights cases under Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 571-61 et seq. (1998) because,
The very act of severing the parent-child relationship is cognizably absolute and irrevocable.... [Standards of proof function to indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate decision and to allocate the risk of error between litigants accordingly.... Termination is a drastic remedy and is of such weight and gravity that due process requires the state to justify termination of the parent-child relationship by proof more substantial than a preponderance of the evidence.
Woodruff v. Keale, 64 Haw. 85, 100-101, 637 P.2d 760, 770 (1981) (citations, internal quotation marks and block quote format omitted). See also HRS § 587-73(a) (Supp.2003) (requiring “clear and convincing evidence” before the family court may terminate parental rights in a child protective act permanent plan hearing); In re Jane Doe, 95 Hawai'i 183, 192, 20 P.3d 616, 625 (2001) (“the [child protective act, HRS ch. 587 (1993 & Supp. 2003),] does not allow for the divestiture of parental rights absent clear and convincing evidence” (emphasis in the original)).
While a termination of parental rights is “absolute and irrevoeable[,]” Woodruff, 64 Haw. at 100, 637 P.2d at 770; see also In re Jane Doe, 95 Hawai'i at 192-193, 20 P.3d at 625-26; HRS § 587-2 (1993) (definition of “permanent custody”), “a guardian may be appointed for a minor even where the parental rights of the minor’s parents have not been terminated.” In re Guardianship of Jane Doe, 93 Hawai'i at 383, 4 P.3d at 517.
We have held that,
Because [the] concepts [of custody and guardianship] share common attributes, we construe the custody guardianship provision of HRS § 560:5-209 [ (1993) ] and the custody provision in HRS § 571-46 [ (Supp.2003) ] in pan materia5 in order to [78]*78determine the appropriate standard to be applied where conflicting claims between parents and non-parents are made in a guardianship hearing. See HRS § 1-16 (1993) (“Laws in pari materia, or upon the same subject matter, shall be construed with reference to each other.”).
Id. (footnote supplied).' Accordingly, we observe that a guardianship of the person of a minor, while it bestows “the powers and responsibilities of a parent who has not been deprived of custody of the parent’s minor and unemancipated child,” HRS § 560:5-209; see also In re Guardianship of Jane Doe, 93 Hawai'i at 382, 4 P.3d at 516 (“guardians of a minor have the powers and responsibilities otherwise inherent in parenthood”); HRS § 571-2 (1993) (definition of “legal custody”), nevertheless remains “subject to residual parental rights and responsibilities!;,]” id., meaning “those rights and responsibilities remaining with the parent after the transfer of legal custody or guardianship of the person, including, but not necessarily limited to, the right to reasonable visitation, consent to adoption or marriage, and the responsibility for support.” Id. (definition of “residual parental rights and responsibilities”); cf. HRS § 571-46(7) (Supp.2003) (unless detrimental to the best interests of the child, reasonable visitation rights “shall be awarded to parents, grandparents, siblings, and any person interested in the welfare of the child in the discretion of the court”). Furthermore, a guardian of the person of a minor always remains subject to removal, as such. HRS § 560:5— 212 (1993); cf. HRS § 571-46(6) (Supp.2003) (a custody award “shall be subject to modification or change whenever the best interests of the child require or justify the modification or change”).
Hence, a guardianship of the person of a minor is neither absolute nor irrevocable, and the heightened standard of proof attendant upon those attributes of a termination of parental rights need not attend here.6 We conclude the family court erred in applying a heightened standard of proof to the question of the fitness of the natural father.
The family court found that the Grandparents “have provided the minor child, their grandson, with a home, food[,] shelter, education and affection, together with the minor child’s siblings. The Court finds on the basis of the evidence submitted and the lack of any contrary evidence, that they are fit and competent persons to serve as Guardians of the minor child.” See HRS § 560:5-204 (1993) (“The family court may appoint any competent person whose appointment would be in the best interest of the minor as a guardian of the person for an unmarried minor.”); HRS § 560:5-206 (1993) (same); HRS § 560:5-207(b) (1993) (where the family court finds, inter alia, that “the requirements of section 560:5-204 have been met, and the welfare and best interests of the minor will be served by the requested appointment, it shall make the appointment”); cf. HRS § 571-46(2) (Supp.2003) (custody may be awarded to a non-parent “whenever the award serves the best interest of the child. Any person who has had de facto custody of the child in a stable and wholesome home and is a fit and proper person shall be entitled prima facie .to an award of custody”). The family court concluded that, “It is in the best interest of the minor child to remain with [the Grandparents], and his siblings.” See HRS § 560:5-204; cf. HRS § 571-16(2). And despite the parental preference we recognized in HRS § 571-46(1) (Supp.2003) (custody “should be awarded to either parent [79]*79or to both parents according to the best interests of the child”) and applied in pari materia to HRS § 560:5-204 petitions, In re Guardianship of Jane Doe, 93 Hawai'i at 385-86, 4 P.3d at 519-20, the family court concluded that the natural father “is not now, and will not be a candidate for custody of the minor child for the foreseeable future.” See In re Guardianship of John Doe, 7 Haw. App. at 581, 786 P.2d at 523; In re Guardianship of Jane Doe, 93 Hawai'i at 381, 4 P.3d at 515.
This ostensibly prima facie case for the Grandparents notwithstanding, the family court ultimately concluded that the Grandparents
have not carried their burden of proving that [the natural father] is not a “fit and competent” person, by clear and convincing evidence. [The natural father’s] present marriage, and his present employment, along with his completion of a drug treatment course and avoidance of criminal activities, all serve to off set [sic] the evidence against him.
The Court’s decision in this case should not be construed as an endorsement of [the natural father] as a candidate for an award of custody of the minor child. Rather, it is a reflection of the extremely difficult burden of proof undertaken by [the Grandparents] in this Petition. [The natural father’s] problems with the [Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement of the Department of Homeland Security], his failure, refusal and neglect to pay child support for an extended period of time, his lack of contact and frankly his lack of curiosity as to the circumstances of the minor child for the past 15 months leád the Court to conclude that [the natural father] is not now, and will not be a candidate for custody of the minor child for the foreseeable future.
(Enumeration omitted; emphasis supplied.) Clearly, the court’s error as to the applicable standard of proof was singularly dispositive below and must remain similarly dispositive on appeal. The Grandparents ultimately urge on appeal that we should reverse the family court and award them guardianship of the person of their grandson on the strength of the prima facie case they presented below. However, the weighing of the proper quantum of proof of the natural father’s unfitness vel non, as between the contrapuntal considerations found by the family court in the evidence adduced, including the evidence of the natural father’s criminal record, remains with the family court. HRS § 560:5-207(b).
We therefore vacate the orders and findings of fact and conclusions of law appealed from in this case and remand to the family court for reconsideration consistent with this opinion.