In re the Estate of Yula

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

In re the Estate of Yula

128 A.D.2d 539, 512 N.Y.S.2d 471, 1987 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 44228

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMarch 2, 1987

StatusPublished

This text of 128 A.D.2d 539 (In re the Estate of Yula) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

In re the Estate of Yula, 128 A.D.2d 539, 512 N.Y.S.2d 471, 1987 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 44228 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1987).

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Opinion

In a probate proceeding, the objectant appeals from a decree of the Surrogate’s Court, Nassau County (Radigan, S.), dated November, 19, 1985, which, inter alia, set aside a jury verdict that the testatrix was not of sound mind when she executed the will, and admitted the will to probate.

Ordered that the decree is affirmed, with costs payable by appellant personally.

The jury’s determination that the testatrix did not possess testamentary capacity at the time she executed the will is unsupported by the record and was thus properly set aside (see, Matter of Hedges, 100 AD2d 586). At trial, the two [540]*540subscribing witnesses, as well as the attorney who drafted the will, testified that the testatrix was of sound mind, which testimony was unrebutted (see, Matter of Kumstar, 66 NY2d 691; Matter of Hedges, supra). Mollen, P. J., Lawrence, Kunzeman and Sullivan, JJ., concur.

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In a probate proceeding, the objectant appeals from a decree of the Surrogate’s Court, Nassau County (Radigan, S.), dated November, 19, 1985, which, inter alia, set aside a jury verdict that the testatrix was not of sound mind when she executed the will, and admitted the will to probate.

Ordered that the decree is affirmed, with costs payable by appellant personally.

The jury’s determination that the testatrix did not possess testamentary capacity at the time she executed the will is unsupported by the record and was thus properly set aside (see, Matter of Hedges, 100 AD2d 586). At trial, the two [540]*540subscribing witnesses, as well as the attorney who drafted the will, testified that the testatrix was of sound mind, which testimony was unrebutted (see, Matter of Kumstar, 66 NY2d 691; Matter of Hedges, supra). Mollen, P. J., Lawrence, Kunzeman and Sullivan, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

128 A.D.2d 539, 512 N.Y.S.2d 471, 1987 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 44228, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-the-estate-of-yula-nyappdiv-1987.

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