In re the Estate of Woods

533 S.W.2d 38, 1975 Tex. App. LEXIS 3229
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedNovember 14, 1975
DocketNo. 4829
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 533 S.W.2d 38 (In re the Estate of Woods) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re the Estate of Woods, 533 S.W.2d 38, 1975 Tex. App. LEXIS 3229 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975).

Opinions

WALTER, Justice.

This is a will contest case. M. L. Woods died May 8, 1973. He was ninety-one or ninety-two at the time of his death. His will dated August 7,1964, with codicil dated May 16, 1972, was admitted to probate. Thereafter, Orville Lucille Woods Brown filed suit to set it aside which was denied. On appeal to the District Court, judgment was rendered setting aside and cancelling the judgment of the probate court which admitted Mr. Woods’ will to probate.

Fred McCright, independent executor of the Estate of M. L. Woods, Deceased, Owen [39]*39E. Rose, Robert Stephenson, Carolyn L. Braddoek, Neita Faye Rose Melton, Johnnie Owen Rose, and Shirley Ann Rose, hereinafter referred to as proponents, have appealed.

The jury found at the time Woods executed his will and codicil he was acting under undue influence and at the time of executing the codicil of May 16, 1972, he was not of sound mind.

The proponents contend there is no evidence to support the jury’s answers. They also contend the court erred in admitting the testimony of Mrs. Euna Woods and Maureen Bratton.

To determine the question of whether there is any evidence of probative force to support the jury’s findings we must follow the principle of law announced in Martinez v. Delta Brands, Inc., 515 S.W.2d 263 (Tex.1974), wherein the court said:

“When a party asserts that there is no evidence to support jury findings, we must review the evidence in its most favorable light, considering only the evidence and inferences which support the findings, and rejecting the evidence and inferences contrary to the findings. Butler v. Hanson, 455 S.W.2d 942 (Tex.1970); Langlotz v. Citizens Fidelity Insurance Company, 505 S.W.2d 249 (Tex.1974). It would be our duty to affirm the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals if the evidence offered to show negligence were proven to be no more than a scintilla of proof. Thus if the evidence created nothing more than a mere surmise or suspicion of the existence of negligence, such evidence would be, in legal effect, no evidence. Joske v. Irvine, 91 Tex. 574, 44 S.W. 1059 (1898). But if negligence may be reasonably inferred from direct evidence, then there is more than a scintilla of evidence. Calvert, ‘No Evidence’ and ‘Insufficient Evidence’ Points of Error, 38 Texas Law Review 361, 363 (I960).”

In Pearce v. Cross, 414 S.W.2d 457 (Tex.1966), at page 458 our Supreme Court sets forth the elements of undue influence as follows:

“ . . . The correct rule with respect to declarations of the testator in undue influence cases is succinctly summarized in McCormick & Ray, Texas Law of Evidence, § 894 (2d ed. 1956), as follows:
Undue influence as an invalidating fact consists of two elements: first, the external, the words or acts of third persons which bring the pressure to bea.r; second, the internal, the collapse of the testator’s own will, produced by such external conduct. It is held that declarations of the testator, of whatever type, are no evidence of the former but only of the latter elements.
We reaffirmed the rule as recently as 1964. Bee Lindley v. Lindley, 384 S.W.2d 676, 682 (Tex.Sup.1964).”

Every case of undue influence must be decided on its own peculiar facts. Rothermel v. Duncan, 369 S.W.2d 917 (Tex.1963). Undue influence may be established by circumstantial as well as direct evidence. “Undue influence is usually a subtle thing, and by its very nature it usually involves an extended course of dealings and circumstances.” Rothermel v. Duncan, supra.

The evidence shows Mr. Woods was old, hard of hearing, could not see well and had a back injury. This evidence may be considered as establishing Mr. Woods’ physical incapacity to resist or the susceptibility of his mind to an influence exerted. Rothermel v. Duncan, supra.

By his will dated March 21, 1962, Morris L. Woods appointed W. H. Cooper his independent executor and left all his property to Orville Lucille Woods Brown and Susie M. Bratton.

Thereafter on August 7, 1964, he executed another will revoking the 1962 will. In his 1964 will, he devised to Owen E. Rose and Beatrice L. Rose the surface only to approximately 300 acres of land subject to a life estate which he devised to Robert Stephenson.

[40]*40He devised the surface to other land which he owned to Carolyn L. Braddock, Neita Faye Rose, Johnnie Owen Rose, Shirley Ann Rose and Susie Maureen Bratton. The rest and residue of his estate was left to Owen E. Rose, Beatrice L. Rose, Carolyn L. Braddock, Neita Faye Rose, Johnnie Owen Rose, Shirley Ann Rose, and Susie Maureen Bratton, share and share alike.

On May 16, 1972, Mr. Woods executed a codicil excluding Susie Maureen Bratton from his will and leaving her one dollar.

Maureen Bratton testified substantially as follows:

I have known Morris Woods since I was nineteen years of age and I am fifty-two now. So I guess I have known him for about thirty-three years. I worked for him for about sixteen years beginning in 1956. His wife was living when I started working for him but she died in 1962. After Mrs. Woods passed away, Morris asked me if I would move down to his place. I had my grandchildren with me then and he built a room for them. Owen Rose is my brother. He asked me if I would get him a job with Mr. Woods. This was about 1963. He wasn’t living here in 1956 when I started working for Mr. Woods. He was living in Lufkin and he did not know Mr. Woods until after I talked to Morris about hiring him to go to work. I had been helping Morris doctor cattle and brand them so after he hired my brother, Owen, that was the job he started doing. He started to work for Mr. Woods and worked for him up until Mr. Woods’ death. I continued to work except for the last year before Mr. Woods’ death because:
“Owen Rose and his family moved my furniture out down there, moved it into a store room, and I didn’t have a place to stay.”
I continued to work for Morris until January or February of 1972. Morris came down to my house in 1962 and told me that he had made a will and had named Lucille Brown and me his beneficiaries. This is the will dated in 1962. He told me that W. H. Cooper was his executor. He and Mr. Cooper had been friends for many years. Later on Morris talked to me about another will. He asked me to find out about a will or some papers that he had signed and he wasn’t sure which it was or what the contents were.

She was asked the following questions and she gave the following answers:

“Q All right, did you attempt to find out what it was?
A Yes sir, he told me, he said, T either signed a will or some papers’, and he said, ‘Maureen, I don’t know what was in them’, and he said, ‘I want you to go and find out for me’, and so I asked him where they were at, and he said .

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Related

Matter of Estate of Woods
542 S.W.2d 845 (Texas Supreme Court, 1976)

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Bluebook (online)
533 S.W.2d 38, 1975 Tex. App. LEXIS 3229, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-the-estate-of-woods-texapp-1975.