In re the Estate of Steelman

99 A. 612, 87 N.J. Eq. 270, 2 Stock. 270, 1917 N.J. Prerog. Ct. LEXIS 32
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
DecidedJanuary 5, 1917
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 99 A. 612 (In re the Estate of Steelman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re the Estate of Steelman, 99 A. 612, 87 N.J. Eq. 270, 2 Stock. 270, 1917 N.J. Prerog. Ct. LEXIS 32 (N.J. Ct. App. 1917).

Opinion

Leaming, Vice-Ordinary.

The object of this appeal is to reduce the allowances which have been made by the orphans court of Atlantic county to certain executors for their commissions and for certain services of their proctors.

Testator died November 29th, 1914. His will and codicil were probated December 10th, 1914, and letters testamentary were issued on that day to the two executors named in his will.

The provisions of the will and codicil, so far as material herein, are as follows: After directing the payment of debts and funeral expenses and providing that his widow may occupy a certain property during her lifetime, free from rent and cost, of upkeep and municipal charges, testator bequeathed and devised to the two persons whom he appointed executors all his property, real and personal, subject to the charge just named in favor of his widow in trust. The trust, as declared by testator, .directs the trustees to manage, sell, invest and reinvest the entire estate, except the property which the widow was allowed to occupy, and to pay the rents, issues and profits thereof to testator’s widow and to certain other persons therein specified during their respective lifetimes in equal shares, such payments to begin six months after testator’s decease. Detailed provisions are then made for the distribution of the income at the death of the respective beneficiaries and also for a final distribution of the corpus.

One year after testator’s death final accounts of the executors were filed and noticed for settlement as such on December 29th, 1915. No one appeared to object to the. accounts and they were allowed as filed except that the judge of the orphans cou'rt [272]*272entered in the accounts as allowances $3,000 as commissions for the executors and $150 as an allowance for their proctor.

The specific grounds of appeal as set forth in the petition of appeal are—first, that the allowance of $3,000 as commissions to the executors is grossly excessive and should not exceed $1,200; second, that no legal services were performed for the executors other than those for which payments had already been made and entered in the accounts as filed as expenditures.

The accounts, as stated and allowed, first charged accountants with the amount of the inventory and appraisement:

§25',6S4.91
Then charged as the purchase price of real estate sold by the executors........................... 87,500.00
Then charged, in detail, as net income from rents.... 3,545.54
Then charged as income from investments.......... 3,712.6S
Making a total of assets....................if120,443.13

The allowances embraced all money that had been expended and included $5,220 which had been distributed to the several cestuis que trust, pursuant to the trust created by the will, as well as all items of expenditures touching the real estate.

It will be thus observed that the settlement made by the executors included all cash that had been received for the estate from any source, irrespective of whether it could appropriately be said to have come to their hands in their capacity as executors or as trustees, and all expenditures of cash- for all purposes, whether such expenditures should have been appropriately made by them as executors or as trustees, and that the commissions which were allowed were approximately two and one-half per cent, on the aggregate amount received for the estate from all sources.

Appellant, accordingly, now objects to the allowance of the accounts in that manner, and urges that the accounts should be restated and be made to exclude all transactions that should have been performed by the accountants in their capacity as trustees.

That objection, however well founded, cannot be ndw considered, except for the purpose of ascertaining whether the allowances for commissions and proctor fees were erroneous, for the [273]*273petition of appeal specifically designates only those two items for purposes of review. Rule 62 of this court restricts the operation of. the appeal to the items specifically designated in the petition of appeal so far as concerns the allowance or.rejection of items of charge and discharge. •

But if the orphans court has allowed .commissions to the executors, as such, for services which could be only performed' bj1' them in their capacity as trustees, and there has thus resulted an excessive allowance, that error should be here corrected.

It has been specifically determined by our court of errors and appeals that where the same person is an executor and a trustee under a will, he cannot, in his administration of. any part of the property committed to him, be said to act in a duplex character; that "each act done must, in contemplation of law, be that of an executor or that of a trustee.” Pitney v. Everson, 42 N. J. Eq. 361. As already stated, the accounts which were filed by the executors as such, and allowed by-the court, included all transactions of the executors as well as all transactions of the trustees. The receipts included the proceeds of sale of real estate and rents therefrom. The will by its terms vested the title to this real estate as well as the title to all personal property in the two accountants as trustees for the purposes of the trust. That trust title was necessarily subservient to the right-of the executors to receive and administer so much of the trust property as should be required to satisfy all legal obligations of the estate; but the personal property left bjr testator was far in excess of all such needs and the power of sale of the real estate was by the terms of the will given to the trustees and not to the executors. In these circumstances the proceeds of sale of the real estate, as well as its rents accruing after testator’s death must, in contemplation of law, be regarded as having been received by the trustees. Under the provisions of the will the executors could neither sell the- real estate nor properly receive the proceeds of sale of the real estate or the rents accruing after testator’s decease in the absence of some necessity for that purpose arising from the exigencies of administration. The testimony which has been taken disclosing the circumstances surrounding the settlement renders it entirely obvious that the allowance of com[274]*274missions as made by the orphans court was predicated upon the assumption that the executors, as such, were entitled to compensation for administering the aggregate amount of assets disclosed by their accounts as filed. That was manifest error. The importance of confining the executors’ allowance to commissions on the amount that ■ properly came to their hands as executors will be observed by the circumstance that when commissions are hereafter appropriately sought by the same persons as trustees, it will be impossible to then inquire whether the allowance to the executors may not have been chiefly based upon peculiar or special difficulties attendant upon the administration.

I am also of the opinion that the allowance to the proctor was without authority of law. ' In Kingsland v. Scudder, 36 N. J. Eq. 284,

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Bluebook (online)
99 A. 612, 87 N.J. Eq. 270, 2 Stock. 270, 1917 N.J. Prerog. Ct. LEXIS 32, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-the-estate-of-steelman-njsuperctappdiv-1917.