In re the estate of Spencer

1 Connoly 208, 4 N.Y.S. 395, 21 N.Y. St. Rep. 145
CourtNew York Surrogate's Court
DecidedJanuary 15, 1889
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 1 Connoly 208 (In re the estate of Spencer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Surrogate's Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re the estate of Spencer, 1 Connoly 208, 4 N.Y.S. 395, 21 N.Y. St. Rep. 145 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1889).

Opinion

The Surrogate.

Elizabeth Spencer, the testatrix, died at the village of Cazenovia, in this county, on the 4th day of March, 1888, leaving a will, in and by which she gave to four grand-nephews and nieces, one thousand dollars each, and bequeathed the remainder of her property, amounting to $ 15,000, to the petitioner, Mary Y. Jackson, and also appointed her executrix, and John D. Ely of Rome, executor, of her estate.

The testatrix was a maiden lady, and Mrs. Jackson was her niece. It is claimed that the property devised to Mrs. Jackson is not subject to the tax mentioned in chapter 713 of the Laws of 1887 by reason of circumstances to which we shall hereafter refer because she is a “ person to whom the deceased for [210]*210not less than ten years prior to her death, stood in the mutually acknowledged relation of a parent.”

The evidence shows that Mrs. Jackson was a daughter of Archelaus Spencer, a brother of the deceased, who resided at Rome, N. Y., from 1840 until his death in 1884. The testatrix and her maiden sister were residents of Cazenovia, and Mrs. Jackson, at the age of fifteen years went to school at this place for three years, living with her two aunts, after which she returned to her father’s home, and there remained, a period of nearly four years, when, upon the death of her aunt Sarah, in 1860, and at the request of the testatrix she returned to Cazenovia to live with her aunt, and continued to live with her until her death in 1888, a period of nearly twenty-eight years. The petitioner was* not adopted by the testatrix by any legal formalities, but she has rendered those services, bestowed that care and attention which would be expected from a daughter. All her relations have been those of a child instead of a domestic, heeding and respecting her aunt’s desires, confiding in her judgment, shaping her life and character under her control and influence, doing all that a child could or would have done for the comfort and happiness of the testatrix, and upon the other hand the testatrix treated the petitioner and lived with her'upon the same terms and in the same manner as a mother would be expected to live with a daughter, caring and providing for her in every respect as if she were an actual parent. In 1879 the petitioner was married to Mr. Jackson, but, at the testatrix’s request, she and her husband continued to live with her until her death; she in the [211]*211meantime having almost wholly supported them all. The testatrix was fifty-eight years of age when Mrs. Jackson went to live with and make her home with her aunt, her father consenting and approving such a course on her part, and bequeathing to Mrs. Jackson his interest, about f1,000, in the house which she occupied in Cazenovia. During all the time the petitioner and the testatrix lived together, the words “mother” or “daughter” were not used in addressing each other but both at home and abroad, the testatrix was addressed as “Auntie,” and Mrs. Jackson as “Mary,” nor did either make statements or declarations to any person that parental relations existed between them.

By chapter 483 of the Laws of 1885, and amendments thereto, all property which shall pass by will or the intestate laws of this state to any other—with few exceptions “ than to the use of his or her father, mother, husband, wife, child, brother, sister, the wife or widow of a son, or the husband of a daughter, or any child or children adopted as such, in conformity with the laws of the state of New York; or any person to whom the deceased for not less than ten years prior to his or her death, stood in the mutually acknowledged relation of a parent,” is required to pay a tax of five per cent upon the amount so devised or distributed, and our conclusion from the facts above and hereinafter stated, is that the legacy to Mrs. Jackson comes within the exemption of the law, because of the fact that the testatrix stood in the mutually acknowledged relation of a parent for more than [212]*212ten years prior to her death, and our reasons for so holding are as follows:

The father of Mrs. Jackson was a resident of Rome from the year 1840, having three children, two sons and a daughter, a man of ample means with which to maintain and educate his children, and provide a suitable home for them. Under such circumstances, it would be very unreasonable to assume he would have consented that his daughter should go to Cazenovia to live with and make her future home with his sister, if it had been understood by him that she was to remain there as a domestic, and be recognized as such by her aunt and by the community in which she lived. But, knowing the circumstances of his sister, the loneliness of her life, her dependent condition, the necessity for social surroundings acceptable to her, the incompleteness of her home without the freedom and joyousness which the life of one who might stand in the relation of a child to her might bring, it would be very reasonable to believe that he might, under such circumstances, be willing to make the sacrifice of his daughter’s society, in order to make cheerful the home of his sister, might be content to let the daughter go from the sheltering judgment of a father, to the equally safe and watchful protection of a sister, knowing that in all the relations of life, she would surround her with a mother’s influence, and safely guard and guide her in all the paths of life.

If the daughter was to sustain towards her aunt simply the relation of niece, if her life and conduct were not to be subservient to the wishes of her aunt, if she was to maintain independent relations, be free [213]*213from the controlling motive which should exist in every home, be merely a nurse or companion instead of one discharging the duties of a child, it seems improbable that her father would have let his daughter leave him for such a purpose, would have consented to her exchanging her standing as a daughter for that of a watchful nurse of his sister, and so be known as a menial rather than an equal in the home of her aunt. The word “home” implies the existence of parental relations, and, we cannot doubt, he understood, that in this exchange of homes, parental relations were to exist between them, that parental anxiety, vigilance, solicitude would thereafter be the duty of the aged sister, while she lived. Less than this understanding on his part, would imply a lack of parental interest in his child, and we shall assume, he would not knowingly and willingly have permitted his daughter to occupy a less honorable position in the home of his sister than she did in his own household. True, Mrs. Jackson at that time had a legal right to choose a home for herself, but judging from all the circumstances attending her life, we think she did not leave her father’s home to live with her aunt without his approval, and therefore infer that her relations with her aunt would be those which would be most likely to bring into existence that social element and those friendly relations, surroundings and influences, which parental associations alone can develop, and which do not arise, save where the mutually acknowledged relations of a parent are to exist and be a part of the home life of the parties interested.

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Bluebook (online)
1 Connoly 208, 4 N.Y.S. 395, 21 N.Y. St. Rep. 145, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-the-estate-of-spencer-nysurct-1889.