In re the Estate of Satin

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

In re the Estate of Satin

265 A.D.2d 330, 696 N.Y.S.2d 223, 1999 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 9619

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedOctober 4, 1999

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 265 A.D.2d 330 (In re the Estate of Satin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

In re the Estate of Satin, 265 A.D.2d 330, 696 N.Y.S.2d 223, 1999 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 9619 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1999).

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Opinion

—In a proceeding for the judicial settlement of an estate, the executor appeals from so much of an order of the Surrogate’s Court, Westchester County (Emanuelli, S.), dated May 21, 1998, as denied his motion for partial summary judgment dismissing the second objection filed by his former counsel seeking a finder’s fee.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs payable by Marvin L. Tenzer personally, and the motion is granted.

It is well settled that “ ‘[a]n attorney who engages in misconduct by violating the Disciplinary Rules is not entitled to legal fees for any services rendered’ ” (Matter of Winston, 214 AD2d 677; Shelton v Shelton, 151 AD2d 659; see also, Pessoni v Rabkin, 220 AD2d 732; Brill v Friends World Coll., 133 AD2d 729). The record reveals that Marvin L. Tenzer, knowing that the executor was represented by counsel who had advised against executing a finder’s fee agreement, violated the Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-104 (A) (22 NYCRR 1200.35 [a]) by secretly meeting with and inducing the executor to execute the finder’s fee agreement. As a result, the Surrogate’s Court should have granted the executor’s motion for partial summary judgment dismissing the second objection filed by Tenzer’s professional corporation for a finder’s fee. Ritter, J. P., Friedmann, McGinity and Smith, JJ., concur.

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—In a proceeding for the judicial settlement of an estate, the executor appeals from so much of an order of the Surrogate’s Court, Westchester County (Emanuelli, S.), dated May 21, 1998, as denied his motion for partial summary judgment dismissing the second objection filed by his former counsel seeking a finder’s fee.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs payable by Marvin L. Tenzer personally, and the motion is granted.

It is well settled that “ ‘[a]n attorney who engages in misconduct by violating the Disciplinary Rules is not entitled to legal fees for any services rendered’ ” (Matter of Winston, 214 AD2d 677; Shelton v Shelton, 151 AD2d 659; see also, Pessoni v Rabkin, 220 AD2d 732; Brill v Friends World Coll., 133 AD2d 729). The record reveals that Marvin L. Tenzer, knowing that the executor was represented by counsel who had advised against executing a finder’s fee agreement, violated the Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-104 (A) (22 NYCRR 1200.35 [a]) by secretly meeting with and inducing the executor to execute the finder’s fee agreement. As a result, the Surrogate’s Court should have granted the executor’s motion for partial summary judgment dismissing the second objection filed by Tenzer’s professional corporation for a finder’s fee. Ritter, J. P., Friedmann, McGinity and Smith, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

265 A.D.2d 330, 696 N.Y.S.2d 223, 1999 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 9619, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-the-estate-of-satin-nyappdiv-1999.

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