In re the Estate of Martin

146 Misc. 2d 144
CourtNew York Surrogate's Court
DecidedDecember 20, 1989
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 146 Misc. 2d 144 (In re the Estate of Martin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Surrogate's Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re the Estate of Martin, 146 Misc. 2d 144 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1989).

Opinion

[145]*145OPINION OF THE COURT

Renee R. Roth, S.

The issue before the court in this construction proceeding is whether testator Henry Bradley Martin authorized his executors under article twenty-fourth of his will to sell his extensive library collection at a price "less than full market value” thereby imperiling the marital deduction for the QTIP trust established for his wife.

The major asset of Mr. Martin’s estate consists of an extraordinary library collection. Included among the collection are Sir Thomas Moore’s "Utopia” printed in 1516, Shakespeare’s "Rape of Lucrece” (1594), the first English translation of St. Augustine’s "Confessions”, the second edition of Chaucer’s complete works (1542), a first printing of the Declaration of Independence and George Washington’s own copy of the "The Federalist”. Valued by his executors at $40,000,000 in their Federal estate tax return (form 706), the collection constitutes approximately 80% of decedent’s estate.

Under article eleventh of his will, testator created a trust of his entire residuary for the life income benefit of his wife. The library collection is an asset of this residuary trust. As testator expressly provided, his executors have elected to qualify the entire residuary trust for the marital deduction as a QTIP trust (26 USC § 2056 [b] [7]).

The executors are concerned that the marital deduction may be threatened because of article twenty-fourth of the will. They seek construction of such article which grants special powers to Mr. Martin’s fiduciaries in dealing with the library collection. One of the provisions empowers his fiduciaries to determine whether the collection shall be sold intact to a single purchaser or sold in parts to separate purchasers and if sold in such parts, to determine which special parts shall be kept and sold to single purchasers. The provision within article twenty-fourth which the petitioners contemplate may cause a tax problem is the one which authorizes them to sell such entire collection or special part thereof at a price "less than full market value” if in their consideration such a sale could result in keeping the collection or special parts thereof intact.

The executors contend that adverse tax consequences may result because of the requirements for qualifying a QTIP trust under the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA). Under ERTA, a disposition of property, unlimited in amount, to a [146]*146surviving spouse may qualify for the marital deduction as qualified terminable interest property if (1) the property passes from a decedent to a surviving spouse, (2) the surviving spouse receives all the income from the property for life, (3) such income is paid to the surviving spouse not less than annually, (4) there is no power in anyone to appoint any part of the property subject to the qualifying income interest to any person other than the surviving spouse and (5) the decedent’s executor elects to qualify the property on the estate tax return (26 USC § 2056 [b] [5]). The purpose of these detailed requirements is to ensure that, while the interspousal transfer is tax free, ultimately the assets of the QTIP (the library collection in this case) will be taxed in the surviving spouse’s estate upon his or her death.

The petitioners are concerned that the provision in article twenty-fourth which authorizes them to sell the library collection below market value will be deemed to be a "power * * * to appoint any part of the property to any person other than the surviving spouse” (Prop Treas Reg § 20.2056[b]-7 [c] [1] [ii], 49 Fed Reg 21350-03 [1984]) and that consequently the collection will not be treated as qualified terminable interest property for the marital deduction.

Although they have filed renunciations of the questionable power, because of the uncertainty of the effectiveness of such renunciation (see, Matter of Witz, 95 Misc 2d 36; Cleaveland v United States, 88-1 US Tax Cas [CCH] ¶ 13,766), petitioners request that the court effectuate Mr. Martin’s actual intention, as expressed in his will, that the entire residuary trust pass free of estate tax by virtue of the marital deduction.

There does appear to be a conflict between the provisions of article twenty-fourth and the provisions of article eleventh of Mr. Martin’s will, but only if Mr. Martin intended in article twenty-fourth to authorize his fiduciaries to sell the library collection at less than market value.

A review of decedent’s will establishes that Mrs. Martin was the primary object of his bounty and that he provided that his estate would benefit from the maximum «generation-skipping tax (GST) exemption and marital deduction.

The will contains many illustrations of careful tax planning. For example, article eleventh (C) authorizes the executors to qualify the residuary trust for the marital deduction as a QTIP but adds that if Mrs. Martin dies before the election is made they should consider whether the combined estate taxes [147]*147would be lower without such an election. In order to qualify the non-income-producing assets for the marital deduction, article twentieth authorizes the widow to direct the fiduciaries to make the residuary trust productive of income (26 CFR 20.2056[b]-5 [¶] [4]). Article eighteenth provides for the allocation of the GST exemption and the severance of trusts to facilitate the creation of trusts with inclusion ratios of zero or one. Article nineteenth sets forth careful directions for tax apportionment.

It is clear that Mr. Martin intended that the entire residuary estate, including the library collection, pass to his wife’s trust free of estate taxes as a QTIP. The draftsman states by affidavit that he suggested the language at issue to provide additional flexibility for the fiduciaries and that testator was not advised that such language might imperil the marital deduction. It is observed that although where possible, the testator’s intent must be gleaned from the four corners of the will itself, if, as here, ambiguity exists, extrinsic evidence may be admitted and taken into account (e.g., Matter of Martin, 255 NY 248; Matter of Lust, 35 AD2d 997; Matter of Khadad, 135 Misc 2d 67; Estate of Liebowitz, NYLJ, Feb. 16, 1989, at 26, col 4) to ascertain testator’s true intention without regard to whether ambiguity is latent or patent (Matter of Liebowitz, supra; Estate of Heaslip, NYLJ, Oct. 24, 1988, at 26, col 5; Estate of Stieg, NYLJ, Apr. 12, 1982, at 17, col 1).

The court therefore construes article twenty-fourth to provide that none of the special powers contained therein, and particularly the power to sell the entire library collection, or parts thereof, at less than full market value, was ever intended by testator to be exercised if such exercise could imperil his primary intention that the library collection pass to the residuary trust free of estate taxes as qualified terminable interest property. Because of the tax considerations manifested in his will, it is unlikely that Mr. Martin intentionally gave his fiduciaries a power that could materially erode the marital deduction. Unless article twenty-fourth is construed as petitioners request, most of Mr. Martin’s sophisticated tax planning could have no effect because a power in an unrelated provision dissipates the marital deduction. Since the library collection represents the major portion of the estate Mr.

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Bluebook (online)
146 Misc. 2d 144, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-the-estate-of-martin-nysurct-1989.