In re the Estate of Leo

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

In re the Estate of Leo

20 A.D.2d 807, 248 N.Y.S.2d 769, 1964 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4167

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMarch 23, 1964

StatusPublished

This text of 20 A.D.2d 807 (In re the Estate of Leo) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

In re the Estate of Leo, 20 A.D.2d 807, 248 N.Y.S.2d 769, 1964 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4167 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1964).

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Opinion

In a proceeding for a compulsory accounting and for construction of the fourth paragraph of the testatrix’ will, the objeetant Jewell O. Peterman, the widow of William Peterman, Sr., deceased, who was a son of testatrix’ deceased sister, Helen Peterman, appeals from so much of a decree of the Surrogate’s Court, Queens County, dated July 3, 1962, as construed said paragraph to mean: (a) that the failure of said William Peterman, Sr., to survive the two life tenants of certain real property or the sale of said property or the discontinuance of the life tenants’ occupancy, “ divested him of his remainder interest and made his attempted devise [to appellant] ineffectual; ” and (b) that upon “ the termination of the [808]*808life estates, title to the one-fourth share of Helen Peterman vested in her sole surviving issue, the petitioner, William Peterman,” her grandson (the son of the deceased William Peterman, Sr.). Decree, insofar as appealed from, affirmed, with costs to all parties filing separate briefs, payable out of the estate. The canon of construction, to the effect that public policy favors early indefeasible vesting of estates, is not applicable to the devise of a remainder following upon the termination of an intermediate estate (Matter of Larkin, 9 N Y 2d 88; Matter of Gulbenkian, 9 N Y 2d 363). Kleinfeld, Acting P. J., Christ, Brennan, Hill and Rabin, JJ., concur.

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In a proceeding for a compulsory accounting and for construction of the fourth paragraph of the testatrix’ will, the objeetant Jewell O. Peterman, the widow of William Peterman, Sr., deceased, who was a son of testatrix’ deceased sister, Helen Peterman, appeals from so much of a decree of the Surrogate’s Court, Queens County, dated July 3, 1962, as construed said paragraph to mean: (a) that the failure of said William Peterman, Sr., to survive the two life tenants of certain real property or the sale of said property or the discontinuance of the life tenants’ occupancy, “ divested him of his remainder interest and made his attempted devise [to appellant] ineffectual; ” and (b) that upon “ the termination of the [808]*808life estates, title to the one-fourth share of Helen Peterman vested in her sole surviving issue, the petitioner, William Peterman,” her grandson (the son of the deceased William Peterman, Sr.). Decree, insofar as appealed from, affirmed, with costs to all parties filing separate briefs, payable out of the estate. The canon of construction, to the effect that public policy favors early indefeasible vesting of estates, is not applicable to the devise of a remainder following upon the termination of an intermediate estate (Matter of Larkin, 9 N Y 2d 88; Matter of Gulbenkian, 9 N Y 2d 363). Kleinfeld, Acting P. J., Christ, Brennan, Hill and Rabin, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

20 A.D.2d 807, 248 N.Y.S.2d 769, 1964 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4167, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-the-estate-of-leo-nyappdiv-1964.