In re the Estate of Lagemann

165 Misc. 747, 1 N.Y.S.2d 519, 1937 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1123
CourtNew York Surrogate's Court
DecidedDecember 20, 1937
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 165 Misc. 747 (In re the Estate of Lagemann) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Surrogate's Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re the Estate of Lagemann, 165 Misc. 747, 1 N.Y.S.2d 519, 1937 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1123 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1937).

Opinion

Delehanty, S.

An application is here made to modify the decree on accounting entered on July 19, 1937. An obvious clerical error requires modification of the decree so that the total of commissions allowed will be stated at $23,090.70 instead of at $15,393.80. The original .decree correctly fixed the amount of commissions for each trustee, but computed the total as if there were only two rather than three acting trustees. The application is granted to the extent stated.

The moving party seeks separately on this application to have the court adopt a proposed revised decree submitted in behalf of the trustees containing text dealing with their acts in liquidating certain shares of stock and in retaining other shares of the same stock. By the decree entered in July the court limited its determination to a holding that in the absence of objection the transactions actually reported in the account stood approved. The language of the decree then submitted in behalf of the trustees sought to deal prospectively with the operation of the trust, sought approval prospectively of the continued handling of the shares which remained in the trust and sought prospectively to establish an exemption from liability for such retention by the trustees. The court declined to make the decree in the language requested, and there is now presented by this motion for reargument the problem whether the decree actually entered should be corrected to conform to the wishes of the trustees.

Before dealing with the text of the decree as entered and of the decree proposed in behalf of the trustees, the court deems it appropriate to comment on a situation which is not directly involved in the question whether the decree should be revised but is of vital importance in assuring a complete development of the merits of the problem. The trustees heretofore retained counsel in connection with the administration of the affairs of the trust. Counsel so retained are attorneys for the estate. In the general character of their work they are engaged in the interest of the trust as a whole. An accounting proceeding is one in rem in a certain sense since it may furnish only an opportunity for settlement of controversies arising among claimants to estate assets. The impersonal relationship which a fiduciary holds in such a situation is wholly changed when the issue becomes one between the beneficiaries, on the one hand, and the fiduciary, acting in his personal interest, on the other. When such controversies arise it may develop that the attorney for the estate is asked to advance or to defend a legal [749]*749position of the fiduciary wMch is taken essentially in the fiduciary's own personal, private interest. That seems to the court to be the situation here. When such a situation arises the question is immediately presented whether or not the fiduciary may pursue his personal interests without assuming that the interests of his cestuis are adequately protected. Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm’s length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to this there has developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the 1 disintegrating erosion ’ of particular exceptions. (Wendt v. Fischer, 243 N. Y. 439, 444.) Only thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd.” (Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N. Y. 458, 464.) The sixth canon of the American Bar Association’s Canons of Professional Ethics has been accepted generally by the bar as an appropriate regulation of the conduct of attorneys in such a situation. Of course, a lay or corporate trustee is not bound by that canon. But a fiduciary is subject to direction of the court. (Surr. Ct. Act, § 40, subd. 2.) Having thus pointed out the applicable principles, the court assumes that in the appellate court there will be presented by independent and competent counsel such matters in support of the decree of the court as counsel interested in the cestuis only may determine to be appropriate, and that no need exists for express direction to the trustees to this effect. The intermediate appellate court is the court which has general jurisdiction over lawyers, and has full authority to see to it that no appeal is argued in that court without representation of the necessary parties. The limited field of action avai able to the special guardian is not sufficient here to assure full hearing. This court’s attention has been called to appeals taken by fiduciaries on decrees affecting only their own commissions wherein the attorney for the estate ” has applied to the appellate court for reversal or modification of the decree in favor of the personal interests of the fiduciary, leaving the beneficiaries of the estate wholly unrepresented. A typical instance is Matter of Jesup (161 Misc. 618; affd., 251 App. Div. 813).

At the time of his death in 1930 deceased held a controlling share interest in a holding corporation. The executors of deceased delivered this controlling interest to the trustees at a total valuation of about $600,000. Two of the trustees were also shareholders [750]*750in the same corporation. They constituted the majority of the directors of the corporation. By stockholder vote in December, 1936, the capital of the corporation was reduced by one-half. At that time the shares had a book value of $101.54 each. Equality of treatment of the shareholders in the capital distribution which followed the capital reduction would have permitted the redemption of one-half of the shares held by each shareholder. The trustees on such a plan would have had paid to them approximately $390,000. Actually the individual stockholders withdrew in cash or securities, the value of all of their shares. The trust received only $98,000.! The trust continued to be a shareholder in the corporation. Its original percentage of stock ownership was 52.54 per cent. When the redemption of shares was completed its share ownership had, increased to 91.61 per cent. If ratable distribution had been made to the trustees they would have had approximately $390,000 which, under the will, they would have been obliged to invest in legal securities. The ninth article of the will gives the trustees broad powers with respect to the retention of the testator’s investments. It provides in respect of such investments “ that no liability shall be incurred on behalf of my estate beyond the amount then invested.” Article eighth of the will provides: I direct thab all investments made by my said trustees shall be in such securities as are authorized by the laws of the State of New York regulating investment of trustees.” The trustees contend that it is an advantage to the trust to have a greater amount of the corporate stock since thereby they may, through the corporate form and by the employment of investment counsel to advise the corporation, make a greater profit than they could make if limited to investments in legáis. They assert that the percentage increase in share holding in the corporation works no change in the investment of the deceased. They say that the value behind the shares of stock on hand, though such shares now represent 91.61 per cent of the total, is the same value which was theretofore behind the shares when they represented only 52.54 per cent of the value.

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Related

In re the Estate of Lagemann
178 Misc. 352 (New York Surrogate's Court, 1942)

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165 Misc. 747, 1 N.Y.S.2d 519, 1937 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1123, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-the-estate-of-lagemann-nysurct-1937.