In Re The Estate Of Irvin N. Strom

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Decided: November 20, 2023
• Docket: 84489-0
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In the Matter of the Estate of No. 84489-0-I

IRVIN N. STROM. DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

MARY M. PARCHER and ROBERT PARCHER,

Appellants,

v.

ESTATE OF IRVIN STROM,

Respondent.

DÍAZ, J. — A trial court awarded the estate of Irvin Strom, who died intestate,

an 89% ownership interest in his home in Sultan (“the Property”). He owned this

home with his daughter and her husband (the “Parchers”), who, following the

division, retained the remaining 11% interest. The Parchers appeal, arguing the

trial court improperly weighed the evidence and committed procedural errors.

Consistent with the discretion we afford trial courts in these proceedings, we affirm. No. 84489-0-I/2

I. BACKGROUND

In early 2020, Strom, his daughter, Mary Parcher, and her husband, Robert

Parcher, bought the Sultan property. The Property included one developed lot with

a house and an outbuilding. Strom and the Parchers purchased the property for

$499,950.

Closing documents show that Strom and the Parchers made a down

payment of approximately $50,000. $5,000 came from Strom Auto Sales, and

approximately $45,000 from the Parchers. However, the day before, Strom wired

approximately $45,000 to the Parchers from his Umpqua bank account. The intent

of that transfer will be discussed further below.

According to Strom, the Parchers and he each agreed to pay half of the

monthly mortgage payment. Strom claimed, that, in July 2020, he discovered that,

while they collected his monthly mortgage payment, the Parchers were not paying

the mortgage because they had received a COVID-19 related deferral. Strom

claimed the Parchers did not notify him that they had chosen to defer paying the

mortgage. Strom demanded they return the monthly mortgage payments he gave

them, and alleged they refused.

The Parchers disputed Strom’s telling. In short, the relationship between

Strom and the Parchers devolved to the point that Mary Parcher obtained a

protection order against Strom. During that time, Strom lived in the outbuilding.

He moved elsewhere in 2021, and passed away six months later intestate.

The court appointed a personal representative to resolve the ownership

interests of the estate. The representative filed the present action to determine the

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ownership interests in the Sultan property.

Following a hearing in August 2022, the superior court issued an order and

letter memorandum, which awarded the estate of Strom an 89.38% interest in the

property and the marital community of the Parchers an 10.62% interest (“order”). 1

The court also approved fees for the personal representative from Strom’s estate.

The Parchers appeal, pro se.

II. DISCUSSION

The Parchers assert approximately 10 assignments of error. To

summarize, they argue (A) the trial court did not support its findings of fact and

conclusions of law with substantial evidence; (B) the trial court erred by considering

certain evidence; (C) the trial court erred as a matter of law when it found the

Parchers were tenants in common; and (D) the trial court erred by granting attorney

fees and costs to the estate of Strom’s personal representative. For its part, the

estate seeks attorney fees on appeal. We address each in turn.

A. Substantial Evidence

The Parchers assign error to several portions of the trial court’s order and

generally posit that the trial court unfairly discounted the evidence before it, or

unfairly weighed the evidence against the Parchers. We conclude the trial court

supported its order with substantial evidence.

1 This hearing was the initial hearing, at which the parties appeared and at which

“[t]he Court received and considered the arguments and testimony.” The statute mandates that the initial hearing on a petition “must be a hearing on the merits to resolve all issues of fact and all issues of law” unless “requested otherwise by a party.” RCW 11.96A.100(8). 3 No. 84489-0-I/4

“[W]here competing documentary evidence must be weighed and issues of

credibility resolved, the substantial evidence standard is appropriate.” Dolan v.

King County, 172 Wn.2d 299, 310, 258 P.3d 20 (2011). Appellate courts defer to

trial courts on a sliding scale based on how much assessment of credibility is

required. Dolan, 172 Wn.2d at 311. The substantial evidence standard is “more

appropriate, even if the credibility of witnesses is not specifically at issue,” when

the trial court must review and weigh significant documentary evidence, “resolve[]

inevitable evidentiary conflicts and discrepancies, and issue[] statutorily mandated

written findings.” Id. “Substantial evidence is evidence that is sufficient to

persuade a rational, fair-minded person of the truth of the finding.” In re Estate of

Jones, 152 Wn.2d 1, 8, 93 P.3d 147 (2004).

In its August 26 order, the trial court noted that it reviewed and weighed

several documents when it determined the respective ownership interests in the

Sultan property, including declarations from the parties, financial records, a

memorandum from the personal representative, and the relevant instruments for

the Sultan property. The record was replete with “evidentiary conflicts and

discrepancies,” all of which the trial court had to resolve with at least some

“assessment of credibility.” Dolan, 172 Wn.2d at 311. Thus, the substantial

evidence standard is appropriate here.

With the above standard in mind, it is also important to preliminarily note

that we hold pro se litigants to the same rules of procedure and substantive law as

we do licensed attorneys. Holder v. City of Vancouver, 136 Wn. App. 104, 106,

147 P.3d 641 (2006). An appellant’s brief must contain “argument in support of

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the issues presented for review, together with citations to legal authority and

references to relevant parts of the record.” RAP 10.3(a)(6).

First, the Parchers argue the trial court “erroneously attributed” the

mortgage payment solely to Strom and “false[ly]” credited Strom for mortgage

payments thereafter, when it “came up with” its finding that the estate had an

approximate 89% interest in the property and the Parchers approximately 11%.

It is undisputed the down payment totaled approximately $50,000. The

estate claims Strom contributed the entire amount, $5,000 from his auto shop (as

earnest money), and approximately $45,000 through the Parchers “to satisfy a

request from” a lending agent. Either before the trial court or on appeal, the

Parchers claim the court misunderstood their contribution to the down payment,

claiming variously the $45,000 was a gift, or repayment for their “active[]

involve[ment] with the automobile sales business,” or represented “moneys [sic.]

owed to them by Strom.”

After reviewing the Parchers’ declarations, the trial court found that it was

not “credible” that Strom intended to transfer $50,000 to the Parchers “as

compensation” for their contributions to the business. Indeed, the trial court found

that the Parchers had “fabricated or embellished [their financial interest in the

property] in an effort to enhance their [claim to] the Sultan property.” The trial court

specifically noted that the Parchers claimed that only the $5,000 was a gift or

compensation, and provided no evidence in support of the claim that the remaining

90% ($45,000) of the deposit was a gift or compensation.

5 No. 84489-0-I/6

As to the mortgage payments thereafter, the trial court found that, after the

parties signed the loan note in January 2020, the Parchers paid half the mortgage

for four months, and Strom paid the other half for six months, by Strom transferring

his half to the Parchers, who, in turn, were supposed to pay the lender. Between

January and July 2020, the trial court found that Strom paid $9,600 and the

Parchers $6,400 as mortgage payments. 2 The trial court supported these findings

with specific reference to Strom’s declarations, which were filed both in this case

and in a separate action. 3

The total investment in the property was approximately $66,000, comprised

of the approximately $50,000 down payment, $12,800 in full mortgage payments,

and the $3,200 Strom contributed for half of two mortgage payments. Further,

Strom contributed approximately $60,000 of the $66,000 total investment in the

property, which is approximately 90% of the investment. In turn, per Cummings v.

Anderson, 94 Wn.2d 135, 144, 614 P.2d 1283 (1980), the trial court awarded

Strom a proportional interest in the property, namely 89.38%. The Parchers do

not contest the applicability of Cummings.

In short, the trial court reviewed declarations from the respective family

members, available documentation, the petition and memorandum from the

2 The monthly mortgage payment was approximately $3200. Strom’s contribution (of $9600) is calculated simply by multiplying half the mortgage payment ($1,600) by six months. The Parchers’ contribution (of $6,400) is calculated by multiplying half the mortgage by four months. 3 The Parchers also argue the trial court misstated the date of Strom’s death and

applied improper dates to the first mortgage statements. However, they do not explain what legal effect they believe these scrivener’s error have, nor do they support this argument with reference to the record or legal authority. Thus, we decline to consider it. State v. Elliott, 114 Wn.2d 6, 15, 785 P.2d 440 (1990). 6 No. 84489-0-I/7

personal representative. And, the trial court was best positioned to weigh the

various parties’ credibility, and it supported its calculation of ownership with

specific references to the record. Thus, it was not an abuse of discretion for the

court to divide the property in the way it did. Such facts are enough to persuade a

reasonable person that the trial court did not err in finding Strom had an 89%

ownership interest. Estate of Jones, 152 Wn.2d at 8.

Second, the Parchers argue that the trial court improperly discounted their

family members’ statements, which allegedly corroborated their testimony. The

trial court reviewed declarations from Strom’s two other adult daughters, which

offered contradictory testimony about whether Strom intended to leave the

property to the Parchers. For example, one of the daughters, Denise Hadelman,

stated that her other sisters were actually estranged from Strom, and he did not

intend to leave them the Sultan property. Again, given the procedural posture of

this matter, the trial court was in the best position to review the evidence and

determine credibility of the witnesses. “We will not substitute our judgment for the

trial court’s, weigh the evidence, or adjudge witness credibility.” In Re: Marriage

of Greene, 97 Wn. App. 708, 714, 986 P.2d 144 (1999). A reasonable factfinder

would find the same, thus, substantial evidence supports this finding.

Third, the Parchers argue that the trial court improperly inferred that they

willfully failed to disclose that they had applied for a COVID-19 mortgage

forbearance, and that it disregarded testimony to the contrary. Indeed, the trial

court found that, based on his own declaration, Strom discovered the Parchers

stopped paying their half of the mortgage by speaking with his mortgage lender.

7 No. 84489-0-I/8

In rebuttal, the Parchers offered only their own declarations and that of another

sibling, neither of which provided further factual support. In short, the trial court

was confronted with competing contradictory declarations.

As we previously discussed, in this procedural posture, the trial court is best

positioned to evaluate the truthfulness and credibility of a declarant’s statements.

See, e.g., Greene, 97 Wn. App. at 714; Dolan, 172 Wn.2d at 310. Sworn

statements in Strom’s declaration constitute substantial evidence to persuade a

reasonable finder of fact that the evidence is true. Sunnyside Valley Irr. Dist. v.

Dickie, 149 Wn.2d 873, 879, 73 P.3d 369 (2003). “If the standard is satisfied, a

reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court even though

it might have resolved a factual dispute differently.” Id. at 879-880. We conclude

substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding.

Fourth, the Parchers contend the trial court improperly discounted their

alleged material improvements to the property. The Parchers argue that the trial

court omitted that they spent $4,000 to remove “danger trees” that allegedly fell on

a neighbor’s car and home. However, the Parchers fail to explain how removing

a tree from a neighbor’s property improved the Sultan property’s value. They

merely provide a copy of a receipt for $4,000 from February 27, 2022. The trial

court reasonably supported its finding to the contrary with substantial evidence.

B. Procedural Errors

“[The Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act (“TEDRA”)] gives the trial

court ‘full and ample power and authority’ to administer and settle all estate and

trust matters, RCW 11.96A.020(1), ‘all to the end that the matters be expeditiously

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administered and settled by the court.’” In re Estate of Fitzgerald, 172 Wn. App.

437, 448, 294 P.3d 720 (2012) (citing RCW 11.96A.020(2)). We review discovery

decisions by a trial court in a TEDRA proceeding for an abuse of discretion. Id. at

447-448. “A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly

unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or untenable reasons.” In re

Marriage of Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d 39, 46-47, 940 P.2d 1362 (1997).

The Parchers assign error to two evidentiary decisions by the trial court.

They argue the trial court erred in considering the statement of Denise Halderman

because it was allegedly submitted late and contained hearsay and falsehoods.

They also argue that the superior court improperly considered Strom’s statement

from the DVPO hearing in its TEDRA proceedings.

Again, the superior court has broad discretion to decide evidentiary and

procedural matters. Estate of Fitzgerald, 172. Wn. App. at 447-448. Additionally,

the Parchers do not assign an error of law or procedure to these decisions, rather,

they say the trial court judge violated rules, without saying which rules were

violated. We reiterate that we hold pro se appellants to the same standard we do

licensed attorneys. Holder, 136 Wn. App. at 106. And when the parties do not cite

to caselaw or the record, we are not required to search the record for such.

Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549

(1992) (argument unsupported by reference to the record or citation to authority

will not be considered) (citing RAP 10.3(a)(6)). Thus, we conclude the trial court

did not err by admitting either statement.

C. Legal Errors

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“‘In a true joint tenancy, each of the tenants has an undivided interest in the

whole, and not the whole of an undivided interest.’” Walsh v. Reynolds, 183 Wn.

App. 830, 854, 335 P.3d 984 (2014) (quoting Merrick v. Peterson, 25 Wn. App.

248, 258, 606 P.2d 700 (1980)). “Joint tenancy shall be created only by written

instrument, which instrument shall expressly declare the interest created to be a

joint tenancy.” RCW 64.28.010 (emphasis added) (also Walsh, 183 Wn. App. at

854).

The Parchers argue that the trial court erred by finding the Parchers and

Strom were tenants in common for the Sultan property. They argue that Strom’s

estate had no interest in the property. 4

Washington law, indeed, requires written instruments to expressly declare

the creation of a joint tenancy. RCW 64.28.010. The written instrument here

contained no reference to a joint tenancy. Instead, the trial court based its findings

of fact and conclusions of law on the statutory warranty deed, the statute, and

correspondence between Robert Parcher and First American Title, which stated:

It appears you did not instruct us to create a joint tenancy with rights of survivorship. This means that if you or Mary were to die, title would pass to the surviving spouse due to it being your community property. However, if Irvin were to die, his heirs would inherit his interest and you would have new tenant(s) in common ownership.

4 As part of their argument, the Parchers contend that because “[a] man . . . in his

seventies who purchases a home together with his daughter . . . and her young family logically implies that upon the death of Irvin Strom, the ownership of the home would revert to the daughter and her family.” However, they offer no legal authority to support this argument and thus, we decline to consider it. Palmer v. Jensen, 81 Wn. App. 148, 153, 913 P.2d 413 (1996) (“Passing treatment of an issue or lack of reasoned argument is insufficient to merit judicial consideration.”). 10 No. 84489-0-I/11

The Parchers offer no legal or factual support for their assertion to the

contrary. Thus, we hold that the trial court did not err by concluding the Parchers

were tenants in common.

D. Attorney Fees and Costs

“TEDRA grants trial courts remarkably broad discretion to award any party

its reasonable attorney fees or costs.” Radliff v. Schmidt, 27 Wn. App. 2d. 206,

218, 532 P.3d 622 (2023) (citing RCW 11.96A.150(1)). “Fees may be awarded to

any party ‘in such amount and in such manner as the court determines to be

equitable.’” Id. “In exercising its discretion, the court ‘may consider any and all

factors that it deems to be relevant and appropriate, which factors may but need

not include whether the litigation benefits the estate or trust involved.’” Id. (citing

RCW 11.96A.150(1)) (alteration in original).

We review the trial court’s award of attorney fees under RCW 11.96A.150

is reviewed for abuse of discretion. In re Guardianship of Matthews, 156 Wn. App.

201, 212, 232 P.3d 1140 (2010).

Further, “[r]easonable attorney fees are recoverable on appeal if allowed by

statute, rule, or contract, and the request is made pursuant to RAP 18.1(a).” In re

Guardianship of Wells, 150 Wn. App. 491, 503, 208 P.3d 1126 (2009). “[A]ny court

on appeal may . . . order costs, including reasonable attorneys fees to be awarded

to any . . . party to the proceedings . . . involving . . . decedent’s estates and

properties . . .” RCW 11.96A.150(1)-(2).

The Parchers contend the trial court erred by granting the personal

representative fees and costs because the representative allegedly improperly

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subpoenaed certain documents from the mortgage company multiple times.

However, when awarding fees and costs, the trial court did not base its decision

on untenable grounds. Rather, it reviewed the personal representative’s

memorandum, declaration, and associated exhibits. Seeing no error, we decline

to reverse the trial court’s fee award to the personal representative below.

The estate requests fees for the cost on appeal. Although the estate

prevails on appeal, and pursued its TEDRA petition for the benefit of the estate,

we decline, in our discretion, to award attorney fees and costs to the personal

representative, as we believe the finality of this litigation is most beneficial to the

estate.

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court.

WE CONCUR: