In re the Estate of Hubbard

Utah Supreme Court

In re the Estate of Hubbard

516 P.2d 741, 30 Utah 2d 260, 1973 Utah LEXIS 695

CourtUtah Supreme Court

DecidedDecember 4, 1973

DocketNo. 13251

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 516 P.2d 741 (In re the Estate of Hubbard) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Utah Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

In re the Estate of Hubbard, 516 P.2d 741, 30 Utah 2d 260, 1973 Utah LEXIS 695 (Utah 1973).

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Opinion

HENRIOD, Justice:

Appeal from a judgment after a jury verdict that a decedent was subjected to undue influence when suffering from a stroke, and who signed a codicil to her will, executed many years before, switching a memorial trust fund which would then go to a sister. Affirmed with no costs awarded.

The codicil was executed some time after 1:30 a. m., a week before decedent died, when another sister had awakened suddenly, thought about it and promoted it.

This case is strictly a factual one, and the only point on appeal is alleged insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict and judgment. The appeal principally urges facts unfavorable to the result. On review the rule always has been that there will be an affirmance of the verdict if believable, admissible facts are adduced supporting it.

Besides the facts already adverted to above, and in light of the established doctrine that the veniremen prerogatively may canvass the facts in an atmosphere of reasonable credibility assessment, we cannot say the panel erred here when the advocate for admission of the will to probate, awoke one night, at 1:30 a. m., a week before an apparently terminal patient died, went to a rest home where decedent obviously was dying, and stated she had reminisced “about the many good times the three sisters had had together,” and that during that period of reminiscing, the idea came to her to inquire as to whether interest on the fund “set up by her sister” to memorialize her deceased husband, should be diverted to her other sister. An hour and a half later, at 3:00 a. m., on a typewriter in her kitchen, the moving party here created and gave birth, in type, to the codicil, subject to this action, — -had her sister sign it and procured a couple of nurses standing in the rest home hallway to witness it.

Arrangements were made by the petitioner for an attorney and a trust officer of the bank to see the decedent about her affairs, which they attempted to do. However, she did not want to see them or talk to them the day they called, — and she died four days later. Other facts could be recited here to support the jury, which we think would serve no useful purpose.

Under established rules of appellate review, we think it inescapable to decide other than to affirm the jury and the judge,— which we do.

CALLISTER, C. J., and CROCKETT, ELLETT and TUCKETT, JJ., concur.

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HENRIOD, Justice:

Appeal from a judgment after a jury verdict that a decedent was subjected to undue influence when suffering from a stroke, and who signed a codicil to her will, executed many years before, switching a memorial trust fund which would then go to a sister. Affirmed with no costs awarded.

The codicil was executed some time after 1:30 a. m., a week before decedent died, when another sister had awakened suddenly, thought about it and promoted it.

This case is strictly a factual one, and the only point on appeal is alleged insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict and judgment. The appeal principally urges facts unfavorable to the result. On review the rule always has been that there will be an affirmance of the verdict if believable, admissible facts are adduced supporting it.

Besides the facts already adverted to above, and in light of the established doctrine that the veniremen prerogatively may canvass the facts in an atmosphere of reasonable credibility assessment, we cannot say the panel erred here when the advocate for admission of the will to probate, awoke one night, at 1:30 a. m., a week before an apparently terminal patient died, went to a rest home where decedent obviously was dying, and stated she had reminisced “about the many good times the three sisters had had together,” and that during that period of reminiscing, the idea came to her to inquire as to whether interest on the fund “set up by her sister” to memorialize her deceased husband, should be diverted to her other sister. An hour and a half later, at 3:00 a. m., on a typewriter in her kitchen, the moving party here created and gave birth, in type, to the codicil, subject to this action, — -had her sister sign it and procured a couple of nurses standing in the rest home hallway to witness it.

Arrangements were made by the petitioner for an attorney and a trust officer of the bank to see the decedent about her affairs, which they attempted to do. However, she did not want to see them or talk to them the day they called, — and she died four days later. Other facts could be recited here to support the jury, which we think would serve no useful purpose.

Under established rules of appellate review, we think it inescapable to decide other than to affirm the jury and the judge,— which we do.

CALLISTER, C. J., and CROCKETT, ELLETT and TUCKETT, JJ., concur.

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516 P.2d 741, 30 Utah 2d 260, 1973 Utah LEXIS 695, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-the-estate-of-hubbard-utah-1973.

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