In Re: The Estate of Helen L. Opdycke (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: February 28, 2019
• Docket: 18A-ES-2236
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED this Memorandum Decision shall not be Feb 28 2019, 11:01 am regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK court except for the purpose of establishing Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court

estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE Douglas G. Opdycke Bonita Springs, Florida

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In Re: February 28, 2019

The Estate of Helen L. Opdycke Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-ES-2236 Appeal from the DeKalb Circuit Court The Honorable Kirk D. Carpenter, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 17C01-9002-ES-15

Brown, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-ES-2236 | February 28, 2019 Page 1 of 5 [1] Douglas G. Opdycke (“Opdycke”), pro se, appeals the trial court’s order

denying his petition to reopen the estate of Helen Opdycke. We dismiss.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In February 1990, the trial court appointed Jana L. Hughes as personal

representative for the estate of Helen Opdycke (the “Estate”) and authorized

unsupervised administration of the Estate. In January 1993, Opdycke filed an

Application and Petition for Information on the Estate. He filed multiple

objections and petitions including objections to the closing statement and final

accounting and a motion to vacate judgment based on newly discovered

evidence and fraud. A chronological case summary (“CCS”) entry dated

November 1994 indicates that the estate administration proceedings were

completed and closed on March 29, 1994. The CCS contains entries dated

January and February 1995 indicating that this Court dismissed an appeal in

this case. Opdycke continued to file motions and petitions in 1995 and 1996.

A CCS entry dated September 6, 1996, indicates that Opdycke filed a petition to

revoke probate and an independent action to vacate judgment by extrinsic

fraud, which the trial court denied.

[3] In September 2016, Opdycke filed a Petition to Reopen Estate, and the trial

court denied the petition. On August 9, 2018, he filed another Petition to

Reopen Estate. On August 14, 2018, the trial court entered an order denying

Opdycke’s petition. The court’s order states:

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-ES-2236 | February 28, 2019 Page 2 of 5 1. On August 9, 2018, Douglas Opdycke again filed a Petition to Reopen Estate based upon the same allegations he has made several times in the past.

2. The Court now denies this latest Petition on the same grounds the Court used to deny the last Petition on September 8, 2016[, a] copy of which is attached hereto and made a part hereof.

3. Douglas Opdycke’s actions are repetitive, as the Court has communicated with him several times on these very same points.

4. The Court now Orders Douglas Opdycke to not file anymore motions or petitions on these issues or the Court may consider holding him in contempt of court and issue appropriate enforcement orders.

Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 10.

Discussion

[4] Although Opdycke is proceeding pro se, such litigants are held to the same

standard as trained attorneys and are afforded no inherent leniency simply by

virtue of being self-represented. Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind.

2014) (citing Matter of G.P., 4 N.E.3d 1158 (Ind. 2014)). This Court will “not

become an advocate for a party, or address arguments that are inappropriate or

too poorly developed or expressed to be understood.” Basic v. Amouri, 58

N.E.3d 980, 984 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), reh’g denied.

[5] In the Statement of Issues, Opdycke alleges that two DeKalb County public

officials and at least two DeKalb County law firms conducted a fraud on the

court. In his argument section, Opdycke asserts that Hughes and the DeKalb

County Assessor’s Representative had no business to conduct in Helen’s safe

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-ES-2236 | February 28, 2019 Page 3 of 5 deposit box two days after she passed away and six days before her will was

delivered to the court. He appears to assert that different typewriters were used

to type Helen’s will. He contends that a reasonable observer could believe that

the attorney who submitted the will to the court knowingly submitted

fraudulent documents to the court. He also mentions judicial disqualification

and fraud on the court and requests that Dorothy Leins, the assessor, David

Kruse, an attorney, the Grimm Law Firm, Judge Paul Cherry, and the DeKalb

County Government each pay him $1,000,000.

[6] At the end of his argument section, Opdycke cites Ind. Trial Rule 60(B), which

provides:

Mistake--Excusable Neglect--Newly Discovered Evidence-- Fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a judgment, including a judgment by default, for the following reasons:

(1) mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect;

(2) any ground for a motion to correct error, including without limitation newly discovered evidence, which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a motion to correct errors under Rule 59;

(3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party;

*****

(6) the judgment is void;

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-ES-2236 | February 28, 2019 Page 4 of 5 (8) any reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment, other than those reasons set forth in sub- paragraphs (1), (2), (3), and (4).

The motion shall be filed within a reasonable time for reasons (5), (6), (7), and (8), and not more than one year after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken for reasons (1), (2), (3), and (4). A movant filing a motion for reasons (1), (2), (3), (4), and (8) must allege a meritorious claim or defense. A motion under this subdivision (B) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or for fraud upon the court.

[7] The record reveals that Opdycke alleged fraud in 1994, 1995, and 1996. We

also observe that, prior to filing his petition to reopen the Estate in August

2018, Opdycke filed a petition to reopen the Estate and the court dismissed that

petition in August 2016. Opdycke does not develop a cogent argument with

respect to Trial Rule 60(B) or his other assertions, and we conclude that he has

waived his arguments. See Loomis v. Ameritech Corp., 764 N.E.2d 658, 668 (Ind.

Ct. App. 2002) (holding argument waived for failure to cite authority or provide

cogent argument), reh’g denied, trans. denied.

Conclusion

[8] For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss Opdycke’s appeal.

[9] Dismissed.

Bailey, J., and Bradford, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-ES-2236 | February 28, 2019 Page 5 of 5