IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2023-CA-00423-SCT
IN RE THE ESTATE OF EDWIN LEA BRENT, DECEASED: DR. SUSANNAH BRENT MAYS, SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF EDWIN LEA BRENT
v.
THE ESTATE OF ANN BRENT
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/31/2022 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. BENNIE LE NARD RICHARD TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: JOEL J. HENDERSON DAVID SCOTT MAYS NICK CRAWFORD R. BRITTAIN VIRDEN EDWARD D. LAMAR WALTER ALAN DAVIS COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: WASHINGTON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: JOHN S. GRANT, IV ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: R. BRITTAIN VIRDEN NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES DISPOSITION: REVERSED AND RENDERED - 06/05/2025 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
BEFORE RANDOLPH, C.J., ISHEE AND GRIFFIS, JJ.
ISHEE, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. This estate case involves a probate claim for unpaid alimony. In short, the estates of
Ann Brent and Lea Brent disagree over whether Ann’s Estate can recover from Lea’s Estate
permanent periodic alimony Lea failed to pay his ex-wife Ann prior to her death. The
Washington County Chancery Court sided with Ann’s Estate and awarded it $139,104—the
total amount of alimony Lea owed Ann between July 2014 and November 2015, plus 8 percent interest per annum for eight years and two months. The chancellor erred, however,
by denying Lea’s Estate credit (1) for partial alimony payments totaling $51,000 Lea made
to Ann between July 2014 and November 2015 and (2) for a $75,143.28 life-insurance
proceeds payment Lea made to Ann’s Estate in March 2019. Because the total amount of
credit exceeds the total amount owed for the relevant period, thereby leaving no unpaid
alimony to award Ann’s Estate, we reverse the chancellor’s decision and render judgment
in favor of Lea’s Estate.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2. Lea and Ann married on April 24, 1953, and divorced on September 21, 1983.
According to their property settlement agreement (PSA), incorporated into the divorce
decree, Lea agreed to pay Ann $5,600 on the tenth day of each month in permanent periodic
alimony. The guaranteed minimum monthly alimony amount was to be paid until Ann
remarried or until her death. Ann died on November 27, 2015, having never remarried.
According to Lea’s tax returns, he began paying Ann less than the required amount in 2002,
but no modification action was ever filed. Further, Ann never filed a contempt action against
Lea for nonpayment of alimony based on a violation of their PSA.
¶3. The PSA also required Lea to acquire a term life-insurance policy for himself before
the entry of the divorce decree. The PSA specified that the policy amount had to be at least
$500,000 and required that the funds from the policy be placed into a trust upon Lea’s death.
The PSA additionally stated that “the income from said trust shall be paid periodically but
in no event less than annually to [Ann] during her lifetime and regardless of her re-marriage
2 at the discretion of the trustee.” Lea accordingly obtained a policy from Manhattan Life
Insurance.
¶4. Lea and Ann had five children together: Collins, Margaret, Jesse, Belinda, and Ruth
Ann. Collins became the power of attorney for Ann on July 31, 2014. When Ann passed
away, she left her entire estate to her five children in her last will and testament. She also
named Collins as executor of her estate. After his divorce from Ann in 1983, Lea remarried
and had another child, Susannah, who, along with his five children from Ann, were the
beneficiaries of his estate in his last will and testament. Lea named Collins and David Mays,
Susannah’s husband, as coexecutors of his estate. Lea died on January 10, 2021.
¶5. On July 2, 2021, Collins, as executor of Ann’s Estate, filed a Notice of Probate Claim
against the Estate of Lea Brent for unpaid alimony that Lea failed to pay Ann prior to her
death, in the total amount of $358,700. The deficient alimony payments spanned from 2002
to 2015. After Collins filed the probate claim, he realized a conflict existed because he
served as an executor for both estates. Thus, Jesse Brent, Ann’s other son, was appointed
substitute executor of Ann’s Estate in place of Collins, and Collins remained coexecutor of
Lea’s Estate. On April 14, 2022, David Mays filed an objection to the probate claim as
coexecutor of Lea’s Estate. Mays also filed discovery requests, including various motions
to compel discovery, against Ann’s Estate.
¶6. The chancery court held an evidentiary hearing on August 9, 2022. Jesse testified that
the family was aware Lea was only making partial alimony payments to Ann for years prior
to her death. Jesse also testified that the divorce decree provided Ann $5,600 a month but
3 that Lea had started paying her $3,000 a month starting in 2004. When asked why his mother
never took legal action for the deficient payments, Jesse stated that he did not know, but he
thought she wanted to avoid the “contention” that the divorce wrought.
¶7. Lea’s tax returns from 2001 to 2015 were admitted into evidence during Jesse’s
testimony. The tax returns showed Lea applied for tax deductions in the amount of $67,200
in 2001, which was the annual total for the minimum monthly payments of $5,600. In 2002,
Lea’s tax returns show he reduced the alimony and continued lowering the total paid through
2005, 2006, and 2007. In 2006 and 2007, Lea reportedly paid $2,000 a month in
alimony—less than half the required amount. Beginning in 2008, Lea’s tax returns stated he
only paid $3,000 per month in alimony and consistently deducted an annual total of $36,000
per year on his tax returns from 2008 to 2015.
¶8. Ann’s tax returns from 2008 to 2015 were also admitted into evidence. Most of Ann’s
tax returns showed alimony income of $36,000 per year, rather than the court-ordered
$67,200.1 The amounts received in 2014 and 2015 were further corroborated with Ann’s
monthly bank statements from Trustmark Bank, which showed she only deposited $3,000 per
month into her personal bank account from Lea until her death in November 2015.
¶9. Jesse testified the total arrearage owed for unpaid alimony exceeded $600,000
spanning an eleven-year period, including interest. Jesse ultimately agreed, however, that
Ann’s Estate could only recover unpaid alimony from 2014 and 2015 due to the applicable
seven-year statute of limitations. See Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-43 (Rev. 2019) (stating that
1 Although Lea reported in his tax return that he paid Ann $36,000 in alimony in 2015, Ann reported in her tax return that she received $33,000 in alimony in 2015.
4 “[a]ll actions founded on any judgment or decree rendered by any court of record in this
state” can be “brought within seven (7) years next after the rendition of such judgment or
decree[.]”). Nonetheless, Jesse claimed that Lea’s Estate should not receive any credits for
payments made during the relevant time period between July 2014 and November 2015
because the arrearage was so large, and Lea never caught up on the payments. Jesse
therefore requested that court order Lea’s Estate to pay Ann’s Estate $159,128, which
accounted for the full amount of alimony required but not received between July 2014 and
November 2015 ($95,200), plus 8 percent interest compounded annually.2
¶10. On cross-examination, Jesse testified that Ann’s Estate received approximately
$75,000 directly from Manhattan Life Insurance in 2019. Jesse also testified he had no
knowledge of any agreement that Lea or Ann may have had regarding the reduced payments
since 2004.
¶11. Ann’s Estate called Collins as its second witness. When questioned by the court,
Collins agreed that the PSA required an insurance policy to cover nonpayment of alimony
in the event Lea died before Ann, which did not occur. Notably, the attorney for Ann’s
Estate argued that the PSA did not contain a provision stating that any proceeds from the
2 At the hearing, Jesse and the chancellor had several exchanges about how Jesse calculated the requested amount. Jesse explained as follows:
[B]eginning in 2016, we have a beginning balance of what [Lea] owed of $95,200. At eight percent interest, you add [$]7,616 and your ending balance of [$]102,816. Take that balance over to 2017 and then do the same thing for 2018, all the way to today present, the eighth month of 2022, there’s eight months in interest so far this year would be $8,057 and so the total amount would be $159,128.
5 policy were to be used to pay alimony or to serve as a credit toward alimony. Collins
testified that his father wanted to cease paying the premium that was on the policy, so he
“had the trustees cash that policy out.” Collins explained that his father gave him the check
from Manhattan Life Insurance in the amount of $75,143.28 (the cash value of the policy).
As executor of Ann’s Estate, Collins deposited the check into Ann’s Estate’s bank account
on March 14, 2019. Collins testified that he understood the money to be a gift and that his
father made no mention of the money being used as an alimony payment.
¶12. Following the hearing, the court entered an Order to Establish Probate Claim finding
the probate claim valid. The court based its ruling primarily on the tax returns of Lea and
Ann, which showed delinquent alimony payments. The court found, however, that a majority
of past-due payments in the 2021 probate claim were barred by the seven-year statute of
limitations. Therefore, the court held the only valid claims for past-due alimony were
between July 2014 and November 2015. The court denied Lea’s request for offset or credit
for payments made between July 2014 and November 2015 based on the “significant
arrearage” outside of the statute of limitations. Thus, the court determined that the most
equitable calculation for the probate claim was $139,104, which accounted for the alimony
payments owed between July 2014 and November 2015 ($95,200) and a simple-interest rate
of 8 percent per annum. The court further found that Lea’s Estate failed to submit sufficient
proof to justify an offset or credit based on Lea’s payment to Ann’s Estate with the money
he received after surrendering his life insurance policy.
¶13. Lea’s Estate appealed.
6 STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶14. When reviewing appeals from chancery court decisions, “we apply a limited standard
of review in that the factual findings of the chancery court, if supported by substantial
evidence, will not be disturbed unless the chancery court abused its discretion, applied an
erroneous legal standard, or its findings are manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous.” Flowers
v. Boolos (In re Est. of Smith), 204 So. 3d 291, 305 (Miss. 2016) (citing Arrington v. Ready
(In re Est. of Baumgardner), 82 So. 3d 592, 598 (Miss. 2012)). We review questions of
law, however, de novo. Id. (citing In re Est. of Baumgardner, 82 So. 3d at 598).
DISCUSSION
1. Ann’s Estate has standing to bring the subject probate claim.
¶15. Lea’s Estate first argues that Ann’s heirs lack standing to bring a claim for unpaid
alimony. Standing is to be determined at the outset of a lawsuit. In re Est. of Baumgardner,
82 So. 3d at 599. Lea’s Estate also made this argument in chancery court, but the chancery
court effectively found that Ann’s Estate did have standing to pursue a claim against Lea for
past due and unpaid alimony.
¶16. Our general law on standing is outlined below:
Our general standing requirement is important to our review of standing issues because it appropriately focuses judicial review on a plaintiff’s legal interest and a defendant’s legal duty. However, it must be recognized that different standing requirements are accorded to different areas of the law, and an individual’s legal interest or entitlement to assert a claim against a defendant must be grounded in some legal right recognized by law, whether by statute or by common law. Quite simply, the issue adjudicated in a standing case is whether the particular plaintiff had a right to judicial enforcement of a legal duty of the defendant or, as stated in American Book Co. v. Vandiver, 181 Miss. 518, 178 So. 598 (1938), whether a party plaintiff in an action for legal
7 relief can show in himself a present, existent actionable title or interest, and demonstrate that this right was complete at the time of the institution of the action. Id. at 599. “Such is the general rule.” Id.
Butler v. Watson (In re Initiative Measure No. 65), 338 So. 3d 599, 605 (Miss. 2021)
(quoting City of Picayune v. S. Reg’l Corp., 916 So. 2d 510, 526 (Miss. 2005)).
¶17. It is undisputed that Ann’s five children are heirs to her Estate. This Court generally
recognizes that a decedent’s heirs at law have “direct, pecuniary interests [that] will be either
detrimentally or advantageously affected by the probate of the will.” Garrett v. Bohannon,
621 So. 2d 935, 937 (Miss. 1993) (quoting Weems, Wills and Administration of Estates in
Mississippi § 8-4 (1988)).
¶18. In Maxcy v. Estate of Maxcy, 485 So. 2d 1077, 1078 (Miss. 1986), this Court held
that the alimony recipient’s estate could recover lump-sum alimony from the recipient’s ex-
husband. As part of the divorce, the ex-husband had agreed to pay $16,000 in alimony,
payable in four annual installments of $4,000 each. Id. The ex-wife died three and a half
months later. Id. On appeal, this Court analyzed whether the alimony was lump-sum
alimony or periodic alimony. Id. This Court ultimately found that alimony was lump-sum
alimony and recoverable by the alimony recipient’s estate. Id.
¶19. Lea’s Estate argues that Maxcy completely forecloses an alimony recipient’s estate
from recovering unpaid periodic alimony. But Maxcy is distinguishable. Maxcy dealt with
payments that had not yet become due, as opposed to payments that were past due. Although
permanent alimony “terminates upon the death or remarriage of the [spouse,]” money that
was owed and not paid during the spouse’s lifetime may still be recoverable if the probate
8 claim falls within the requisite statute of limitations. Id. (citing Bridges v. Bridges, 217 So.
2d 281, 283 (Miss. 1968); Jenkins v. Jenkins, 278 So. 2d 446, 449-50 (Miss. 1973)).
Regardless of whether Ann had received lump-sum or periodic alimony, she was entitled to
those payments during her lifetime and did not receive the contracted amount. Under the
PSA, Lea was required to pay Ann $5,600 a month until she remarried or died. It is
well-settled that periodic alimony becomes fixed and vested on the date in which the payment
is due and unpaid. Lewis v. Lewis, 586 So. 2d 740, 742 (Miss. 1991); see also Rubisoff v.
Rubisoff, 133 So. 2d 534 (Miss. 1961). As heirs to Ann’s Estate, Ann’s five children would
have inherited whatever income Ann received, including income from alimony payments.
Notably, there is no Mississippi case directly on point in which an alimony recipient’s estate
has filed a probate claim against either the indebted spouse or the indebted spouse’s estate
for unpaid periodic alimony.
¶20. Lea’s Estate further claims that Ann’s Estate lacks standing because Ann and Lea are
both deceased. Mississippi Code Section 91-7-149 provides the procedure for probating
claims against an estate. It provides, in relevant part:
Any person desiring to probate his claim shall present to the clerk the written evidence thereof, if any, or if the claim be a judgment or decree, a duly certified copy thereof, or if there be no written evidence thereof, an itemized account or a statement of the claim in writing, signed by the creditor, and make affidavit to be attached thereto, to the following effect, viz.: That the claim is just, correct, and owing from the deceased; that it is not usurious; that neither the affiant nor any other person has received payment in whole or in part thereof, except such as is credited thereon, if any; and that security has not been received therefore except as stated, if any.
9 Miss. Code Ann § 91-7-149 (Rev. 2021). Mays, as coexecutor of Lea’s Estate, objected to
the probate claim pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 91-7-165, which provides:
The executor or administrator, legatee, heir, or any creditor may contest a claim presented against the estate. The court or clerk may refer the same to auditors, who shall hear and reduce to writing the evidence on both sides, if any be offered, and report their findings with the evidence to the court. Thereupon the court may allow or disallow the claim, but such proceeding shall not be had without notice to the claimant.
Miss. Code Ann. § 91-7-165 (Rev. 2021). We find that Ann’s heirs followed the proper
procedure in probating their claim against Lea’s Estate on behalf of Ann’s Estate. And, as
previously stated, Ann’s heirs have standing to bring this claim because they have a direct
financial stake that will be positively or negatively impacted by the probate of the will. See
Garrett, 621 So. 2d at 937.
¶21. Lea’s Estate additionally argues that because Ann never filed a contempt action for
Lea’s alimony arrearage, Ann’s Estate lacks standing to enforce Lea’s alimony obligation.
Lea’s Estate admits, however, that there is no Mississippi law requiring an alimony recipient
to bring an contempt action during his or her lifetime in order for the estate to recover past-
due payments after his or her death. Lea’s Estate instead relies on Dodd v. Lovett, 211 So.
2d 799, 800-02 (Ala. 1968), in which the Alabama Supreme Court held that a deceased
former wife’s estate could not recover permanent alimony arrearage because the past-due
amounts were not reduced to a money judgment during her lifetime. The Alabama Supreme
Court, however, appears to have since rejected that proposition, stating, “There is no logical
reason for having the judgment of past due installments [such as alimony installments]
10 reduced to a monied judgment. It is already a monied judgment [on the date it becomes
due].” Moates v. Morgan (Ex parte Morgan), 440 So. 2d 1069, 1072 (Ala. 1983).
¶22. Although it may have been prudent for Ann to file a contempt action against Lea, Ann
was not required to file such an action to preserve her claim under Mississippi law. Thus,
we find that Ann’s Estate has standing to bring this probate claim on her behalf.
2. The chancery court erred by denying Lea’s Estate credit toward the total amount owed during the applicable statute of limitations.
¶23. Lea’s Estate asserts that the chancery court improperly disregarded the statute of
limitations in calculating the amount of arrearage owed. Specifically, Lea’s Estate claims
that the court erred by considering deficient payments for alimony due prior to July 2014 to
support its finding that Lea would not receive any credit for partial alimony payments made
to Ann between July 2014 and November 2015 because his total arrearage—including the
arrearage accrued prior to July 2014—was so “significant.”
¶24. The record reveals that Lea began making deficient payments as early as 2002.
Indeed, by 2015, Lea was in arrears of more than $350,000 (excluding interest). But Ann
had ample opportunity to pursue the unpaid alimony between 2002 and her death in 2015
and, for whatever reason, chose not to do so. The applicable seven-year statute of limitations
accordingly bars any claims to unpaid alimony due prior to 2014. Even so, the chancellor
found the arrearage from the years outside the statute of limitations negated any credit Lea
could have received for the seventeen alimony payments he made to Ann between July 2014
and November 2015.
11 ¶25. This finding was an abuse of discretion. Considering the statute of limitations, unpaid
alimony from 2002-2013 has no bearing on the time period that falls within the statute of
limitations and is the subject of the present claim—July 2014 to November 2015. During
that seventeen-month period, Lea consistently paid Ann $3,000 a month, totaling $51,000.
But the chancery court’s ruling ignores those payments entirely and, with no viable legal
justification, forces Lea’s Estate to make the payments again. Put simply, Lea made the
partial alimony payments. His estate is therefore entitled to credit for them. Further, Ann’s
Estate should not receive an unjust windfall by recovering from Lea’s Estate alimony Lea
already paid to Ann during her lifetime. We therefore reverse the chancellor’s decision to
deny the $51,000 in credit.
¶26. Lea’s Estate also claims that the chancery court erred by refusing to give Lea credit
toward his arrearage for his $75,143.28 insurance-proceeds payment to Ann’s Estate in 2019.
Specifically, Lea’s Estate claims that, per the PSA, the life-insurance policy served as an
alternate form of security for nonpayment of Ann’s alimony and that the insurance-proceeds
amount Lea paid to Ann’s Estate accordingly should have been deducted from the deficient
alimony owed for the period between July 2014 and November 2015.
¶27. Denying credit for the insurance-proceeds payment, the chancellor stated in his bench
ruling:
[T]he Court really does not know why [Lea gave Ann’s Estate $75,000]. But what the Court is clear about, as I said earlier, Mr. Lea Brent was a sophisticated man who used certified public accountants, who used lawyers, and the Court looks to Mr. Lea Brent’s 2019 income tax returns where he did not list his alimony payments at all, much less in the amount of the $75,000 amount given to the Ann Brent trust. So, the Court does not give Mr. Lea
12 Brent’s Estate credit for that $75,000 payment. That has not been established to the Court with any credible evidence that that should be an offset or attributable to alimony . . . . I’ll note that even if this $75,000 cash surrender given to the Ann Brent trust was arguably for alimony, and that was not established on the record, the Court does not believe or find that that amount would have brought Mr. Lea Brent current given the amount of his back due alimony.[3]
¶28. The chancery court memorialized this ruling in its written order, finding that Lea’s
Estate failed to present sufficient proof to justify an offset or credit. The court further
concluded that, regardless of whether the life-insurance proceeds were an alternate form of
alimony payment, the amount paid was “insufficient to satisfy the significant arrearage in
light of the final amount of the [p]robate [c]laim.”
¶29. We agree with Lea’s Estate and find that the chancellor abused his discretion by
denying Lea’s Estate alimony credit for his 2019 payment to Ann’s Estate from his life-
insurance proceeds. The PSA expressly establishes that Lea obtained the life-insurance
policy solely as an alternate source of alimony that would continue to provide Ann periodic
alimony if Lea predeceased Ann. Because Ann predeceased Lea, Lea was not required to
pay the life-insurance proceeds to Ann’s Estate, but he voluntarily chose to do so after
surrendering the policy. And regardless of his motivation for making the payment, he gave
the money to Ann’s Estate at a time when he was in debt to that estate. His payment
therefore cannot be viewed as anything other than a payment toward his debt, especially since
3 To support his finding that the life-insurance payment was not intended to cover unpaid alimony, the chancellor relied on the fact that Lea did not list any alimony payments on his 2019 tax return. But the earliest Lea could have listed the March 2019 payment was on his 2020 tax return.
13 he paid Ann’s Estate money that he received from an insurance policy obtained to secure
Ann’s alimony.
¶30. As for the chancellor’s citing the total arrearage owed as justification for denying
credit, we find that was also error. As previously mentioned, the arrearage was outside of
the statute of limitations, and Ann never sought to recover the unpaid amount during her
lifetime. For these reasons, we find that the chancellor erred by denying Lea credit for his
$75,143.28 payment to Ann’s Estate in 2019. We thus reverse the chancellor’s decision to
deny the $75,143.28 credit.
¶31. Deducting the credit for partial alimony payments Lea made to Ann between July
2014 and November 2015 ($51,000) from the total amount of alimony Lea owed during that
period ($95,200), the delinquent amount for the relevant period becomes $44,200. Eight
percent interest per annum on that amount through March 2019—the month Lea paid
$75,143.28 in life-insurance proceeds to Ann’s Estate—amounts to $11,856.4 Accordingly,
the correct unpaid alimony value for the period between July 2014 and November 2015 was
$56,056 at the time Lea paid $75,143.28 in life-insurance proceeds to Ann’s Estate in March
2019. Because the $75,143.28 payment is credit, as of his payment in March 2019, Lea owed
no more alimony for the period between July 2014 and November 2015. To the contrary, as
of March 2019, Lea still had $19,087.28 ($75,143.28 in credit minus $56,056 in unpaid
alimony) in credit remaining after his delinquent alimony balance for July 2014 to November
4 $44,200 divided by 17 months between July 2014 and November 2015 equals $2,600 in unpaid alimony per month; $2,600 per month x .08 equals $208 in interest per month; 57 months span the period between July 2014 and March 2019; 57 months times $208 in interest per month equals $11,856 in total interest.
14 2015 was satisfied. We therefore find that Lea’s Estate is not obligated to make any
additional payment to Ann’s Estate.
3. Ann’s Estate presented sufficient evidence to the chancery court to support its probate claim.
¶32. Lea’s Estate claims that Ann’s Estate offered insufficient evidence to prove an
alimony deficiency. The chancery court chiefly based its ruling on Lea’s and Ann’s tax
returns that evinced delinquent alimony payments from 2002 to 2015. After hearing
testimony from several witnesses and reviewing all other evidence presented, the chancery
court found that “Lea Brent was a sophisticated business man who routinely utilized
accountants and attorneys in his business affairs and the Court sees no reason why Lea Brent
would under report alimony payments on his tax returns.” We find nothing in the record to
contradict or undermine the chancellor’s findings of fact. Both Lea’s tax returns and Ann’s
tax returns reflect that Lea consistently underpaid his obligation of $5,600 per month in
alimony. Equally important, Lea’s Estate failed to provide any evidence challenging the
accuracy of either party’s tax returns. We therefore find that chancery court did not err by
relying on both parties’ tax returns to support its finding that Lea only paid Ann $3,000 in
alimony between July 2014 and November 2015.
4. The chancery court did not err by awarding interest on the unpaid alimony owed.
¶33. Lea’s Estate argues that the chancery court erred by awarding interest because the
PSA did not provide for any interest. Lea’s Estate further argues that chancery court erred
in calculating the amount of interest owed. Mississippi law clearly supports the chancery
15 court’s decision to award interest on all unpaid amounts owed by the deceased spouse from
his estate. See Rubisoff, 133 So. 2d at 537 (holding that alimony payments become vested
as they become due and that “each payment bears legal interest from and after its due date
. . . .”). Mississippi Code Section 75-17-1(1) states that the legal rate for contracts is 8
percent. Miss. Code Ann. § 75-17-1(1) (Rev. 2016). The chancery court emphasized that
it chose the simple interest calculation (as opposed to the requested compound interest)
because the court did not believe compound interest was appropriate. The court rightly
reasoned that “[t]he needs of the heirs are not greater than a spouse after a divorce.”
¶34. In support of its argument, Lea’s Estate relies on Mississippi Code Section 75-17-7,
which states that “[a]ll judgments or decrees founded on any sale or contract shall bear
interest at the same rate as the contract evidencing the debt on which the judgment or decree
was rendered.” Miss. Code Ann. § 75-17-7 (Rev. 2016). So here, because the PSA did not
provide for an interest rate, Lea’s Estate argues no interest should be awarded. We find,
however, that because the PSA did not provide an interest rate, the chancellor was within his
discretion to defer to Section 75-17-1 and use an 8 percent interest rate. As for chancellor’s
interest-rate calculation, we agree with Lea’s Estate that the chancellor erred by calculating
interest based on the total amount of alimony owed (absent the above-discussed credit)
between July 2014 and November 2015.
CONCLUSION
¶35. Ann’s five children almost certainly sought to take away a portion of Susannah’s
inheritance through the subject probate claim. Specifically, they brought a claim against
16 themselves and Susannah which would financially burden only Susannah. As heirs of both
estates, Ann’s children would have kicked back to themselves any amount they owed as heirs
to Lea’s Estate.
¶36. Nevertheless, we hold that Ann’s Estate had standing to bring the subject probate
claim. The chancery court, however, abused its discretion by denying Lea’s Estate credit (1)
for the $51,000 in the alimony Lea paid to Ann during 2014 and 2015 and (2) for the
$75,143.28 Lea paid to Ann’s Estate in 2019. These errors led to both an excessive interest
calculation and an inappropriate award of $139,104 to Ann’s Estate. Indeed, the $75,143.28
in credit Lea’s Estate is entitled to is greater than the $56,056 Lea owed Ann’s Estate at the
time of his $75,143.28 payment to Ann’s Estate in March 2019. Thus, because Lea’s Estate
does not owe Ann’s Estate any unpaid alimony, we reverse the chancery court’s order and
render judgment in favor of Lea’s Estate.
¶37. REVERSED AND RENDERED.
RANDOLPH, C.J., KING AND COLEMAN, P.JJ., MAXWELL, CHAMBERLIN, GRIFFIS, SULLIVAN AND BRANNING, JJ., CONCUR.